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DOE OSTI2022

HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) v.4.1.1

HyRAM+ is a software toolkit for conducting quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and consequence modeling for hydrogen and other alternative fuels infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM+ contains validated, simplified release behavior models, a standardized QRA approach, and engineering models and generic data relevant to hydrogen installations. HyRAM (hydrogen-only) versions 1.0 to 3.1 were developed by Sandia for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Office (HFTO). The U.S. DOE Vehicle Technologies Office (VTO) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) contributed to the development of HyRAM+ version 4.0 regarding the addition of methane (natural gas) and propane models. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-10862 O

Groth, Katrina↗

DOE OSTI2024

HyRAM+ (Hydrogen Plus Other Alternative Fuels Risk Assessment Models) v.5.1.1

Groth, Katrina↗

DOE OSTI2024

Carbon Management Projects (CONNECT) Database and Explorer

Overview The Carbon Management Projects (CONNECT) Toolkit is an online exploratory visualization tool developed by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM) with support from other federal agencies such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). It provides a single point of access to authoritative information on federal agency investment in a portfolio of research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects that have been publicly announced to advance technologies for point source carbon capture, carbon dioxide removal, transport, storage, and conversion, collectively referred to as carbon management. The RD&D programs covered in this tool are authorized by annual congressional appropriations ("Base Program") and the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). The tool also incorporates public information on other federal initiatives, such as the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs, and public information released by other government agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and Primacy States’ Underground Injection Control Class VI permits and EPA’s facility level greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Developed in a geographic information system, the tool organizes carbon management projects into five groups based on the primary technology that a project aims to advance, each visually represented as a digital layer ("carbon management project layer"). Only federally funded projects are included, which can be awarded projects that are completed or ongoing, or projects that have been selected but are currently under negotiation. Project information can be viewed in the map or in the attribute table below it when turned on. In the map view, each project is displayed at either its host site (for field work), where available, or its performer site (project lead's location, further explained in the table below). Host sites and performer sites are represented in distinct icons. Several reference layers offer additional public information on infrastructural and natural resource environment for carbon management. These reference layers, combined with multiple geographical basemaps, enable users to visualize the carbon management project layers in context. Carbon management project information will be updated monthly based on feedback and information availability. Carbon management project layers Point Source Carbon Capture (PSC) This layer contains DOE-funded projects focused on capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) from power plants or industrial facilities. Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) This layer contains DOE-funded projects focused on capturing CO2 from the atmosphere, including direct air capture (DAC) and DAC hubs, direct ocean capture, enhanced mineralization, and biomass carbon removal and storage. For projects with multiple host sites, each of the sites are displayed individually with the project cost and cost sharing information representing the total for the entire project. Carbon Transport This layer contains DOE- and DOT-funded projects focused on CO2 transport. The Transport Research and Development sublayer contains projects that do not involve physical infrastructure; the Proposed Transport Corridor sublayer contains projects for which either a route for the transport infrastructure has been proposed or a general area for the transport infrastructure has been identified. Carbon Storage This layer contains DOE-funded key projects focused on CO2 storage. For projects with multiple field-work sites, each of the sites are displayed individually on the map with the project cost and cost sharing information representing the overall total for the entire project. Carbon Conversion This layer contains DOE-funded projects focused on converting CO2 into economically valuable products. Reference layers The following layers provide additional information in the geographic proximity of carbon management projects. Users should reference the original sources for more details (weblinks provided below and in pop-up windows on the map). Regional Clean Hydrogen Hub and Facility These layers illustrate the approximate areas of the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs announced by DOE's Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED) and the approximate locations of individual facilities that constitute the hubs (see "Where are the H2Hubs located?" on the webpage linked above). EPA Facility Level GHG Emissions (direct emitter) This layer shows direct CO2 emissions from stationary sources in 2022, using data extracted from EPA's Facility Level Information on GreenHouse gases Tool (FLIGHT). Captured and injected CO2 are not deducted from direct emitters’ total emissions. Contact EPA for additional details. Underground Injection Control Class VI permit/permit application This layer shows the locations of CO2 injection wells that are granted or in the process of applying for an Underground Injection Control Class VI permit by EPA or a Primacy State (currently Louisiana, North Dakota, and Wyoming). The URLs for the permits or permit applications are provided in the pop-up windows associated with the well locations. Contact EPA for additional details. Carbon Storage Resource This layer contains information on prospective CO2 storage resources in saline formations and oil and gas reservoirs provided by the National Carbon Sequestration Database and Geographic Information System (NATCARB) spatial database. Contact NETL for additional details. Existing CO2 pipeline This layer shows active CO2 pipelines based on information digitized from the map issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Contact PHMSA for additional details.

Carbon Conversion↗

DOE OSTI2021

Modeling Study of Reduced Tubing Size Effects on Flow in Depleted Reservoir Natural Gas Storage Wells

This report explores the effects of tubing size reductions on natural gas flow from representative depleted reservoir underground storage wells and fields using basic models for coupled reservoir and pipe flow. This work was motivated by interest at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, in evaluating the effects of tubing and packer as a potential safety upgrade to implement double-barrier systems to existing underground natural gas storage wells. Reservoir and well flow models were developed from widely accepted industry equations, verified against a commercial process simulator model, and validated against field data. The study utilized U.S. operator survey data to provide context and assure that modeling parameters including aver age deliverability rates for wells and fields, operating pressures, well depths, and storage capacities were all carefully considered to keep the modeling relevant to the known range of U.S. operations. The models generally found that wells and fields with inherently low deliverability were relatively insensitive to reductions in tubing diameter, primarily because the hydraulics in those cases were controlled by reservoir properties. For the high-producing wells and fields, the models found that reducing tubing diameter could produce significant reductions in deliverability, both at the field- and well-level. When put into context with occurrence data regarding average deliverability of fields and wells, it appears that most wells and most fields across the U.S. would experience deliverability reductions on the low end of what was simulated here, generally below 20%. For fields with moderate to high deliverability, reductions were generally larger, and could reach as high as 60% for the highest-producing wells and fields.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Nine Canyon Long-Duration Energy Storage: A Feasibility Study

The Nine Canyon Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES) Feasibility Study explores the technical and economic viability of deploying advanced energy storage technologies at Energy Northwest's (EN) Nine Canyon (9C) Wind Project site in Benton County, Washington. Supported by the Washington State Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity under its LDES Voucher Program, the study represents a collaborative effort between EN, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and ARES North America. At the core of this effort is the development of a generalized techno-economic modeling framework and evaluation tool designed to assess the value proposition of LDES projects across a variety of contexts. The modeling tool is technology-agnostic and accommodates user-defined parameters such as rated power, energy duration, round-trip efficiency, capital and operational costs, and dispatch constraints. It also integrates economic inputs, including market prices, energy revenue structures, and financing parameters to evaluate performance through key metrics. The tool provides utilities with a transparent, adaptable platform to support decision-making, investment prioritization, and portfolio planning for various storage technologies. To guide scenario design and interpretation, the study first surveyed the LDES technology landscape, including lithium-ion batteries, flow batteries, non-hydro gravity storage, and thermo-mechanical systems, comparing cost trajectories, technical performance, safety and hazards, materials sourcing and recyclability, and spatial/siting considerations. This literature-grounded review highlights technology trade-offs and reinforces the need to align technology choice with site characteristics, use cases, and project objectives. A companion chapter examines ownership structures (EN ownership, third-party ownership, shared models) and offtake options (energy marketing, capacity/energy PPAs, time-of-use PPAs, block-delivery PPAs, and tolling), where PPAs (power purchase agreements) represent contractual arrangements for buying and selling electricity. The chapter also highlights implications for risk allocation, capital access, operational control, and revenue certainty. The study also evaluates supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and transmission interconnection pathways, options include upgrading the existing SCADA or deploying a dedicated LDES controller, with attention to protection schemes, data telemetry, cybersecurity, and regulatory coordination with BPA. In addition, an ARES-specific geotechnical and hydrology assessment presented in the appendix screens multiple corridors for slope stability, bearing capacity, cut-and-fill magnitude, and stormwater behavior.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

R.U.N. Motion VR Boots: Realistic Unimpeded Natural (RUN) Motion Boots for VR gaming in the comfort of your home

Virtual reality (VR) gaming has experienced increasingly widespread adoption in recent years largely due to the development of affordable, consumer-grade headsets equipped with high quality, miniature displays and compact sensors for motion tracking. These devices are now able to provide users with immersive experiences that far surpass what traditional video games can achieve. However, despite these technological strides, a fundamental limitation remains: VR users are unable to move freely in their physical environment without the risk of colliding with real-world obstacles and hazards. This safety concern significantly restricts the level of immersion and natural movement possible in VR gaming.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Department of Transportation PHMSA Aerosol Spray Project: Phase-0

This report discusses the work conducted at Sandia National Laboratories during the preliminary phase (Phase-0) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) project tasked to better understand what happens to a high-pressure liquid canister or vessel during a fire in which an accidental instantaneous release occurs. Phase 0 had two main objects: (1) to establish a methodology for the high temperature and pressure spray vessel release and (2) to characterize the spray droplet formation. For this test series, diagnostic equipment such as the Malvern Spraytec, high-speed photometric cameras, pencil gauges, and thermocouples were used. Additionally, the effect of surface tension on the particle size distribution was evaluated with 1-liter of distilled water and with the same including the addition of 0.5% soap/water mixture. Results from this effort indicated that the plume formed from the instantaneous release in all conditions primarily included two distinct particle size distributions including 217-312µm and 0.53µm on average. Soapy water formed a higher concentration of smaller mist (0.53µm) than distilled water, potentially due to decreased surface tension with the added surfactant. Though results showed good correlation to certain particle size distributions it is encouraged to conduct additional tests like this with a wider range of liquids with different properties, which could affect the overall particle size distribution when released.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2026

Statistical and Machine Learning Approaches to Analyzing Pipeline Incidents in the United States (2010–2024)

This study applies machine learning methods to analyze natural gas pipeline incidents in the United States using the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Gas Distribution Incident Dataset (2010–2024). The dataset includes over 600 variables describing incident characteristics, infrastructure attributes, and contributing factors associated with unintentional gas releases. The objective is to assess whether these features can reliably predict the underlying cause of pipeline failures. Multinomial logistic regression and Random Forest models were developed to classify incident causes, including excavation damage, corrosion, equipment failure, and natural forces. Results show that excavation damage is both the most frequent and most predictable cause, with models achieving strong performance for this category. However, when excavation damage is excluded, model accuracy declines significantly, with some models performing near random levels. Across all approaches, severe class imbalance and limited variability in key predictors constrain predictive performance. Pipeline age and diameter emerge as the most influential variables, but they provide insufficient discriminatory power to distinguish among less frequent failure types. These findings indicate that non-excavation-related incidents are rare, heterogeneous, and weakly represented in the dataset, limiting the effectiveness of machine learning classification. Overall, this study highlights the structural limitations of the PHMSA dataset for predictive modeling and underscores the need for improved data balance and feature enrichment. The results reinforce excavation damage prevention as the most impactful strategy for reducing pipeline incidents.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Prioritizing Uncertainties in Hydrogen Contribution to Risk in Post-Crash Outcomes for Rail

This report presents analysis from Sandia National Laboratories predicting contributions to risk associated with the use of hydrogen technology for rail. Event sequence diagrams are used to describe possible accident scenarios and progressions. Initiating event frequencies and branch event probabilities for each scenario are quantified with uncertainty using distributions fit to Federal Railroad Administration and U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration data on applicable accidents from 2000 to 2020. Uncertainty is propagated through the event sequence diagram to estimate the frequency and conditional probability of accident end states. The analysis identifies four scenarios with significant contributions to risk from hydrogen that are predicted to occur relatively frequently, which may inform priorities for reducing uncertainty. These scenarios are 1) overpressure events resulting from collisions with hydrogen release due to mechanical damage and delayed ignition, 2) jet fire events resulting from collisions with hydrogen release due to mechanical damage and immediate ignition, 3) jet fires resulting from fire or explosion initiating events involving the hydrogen tank and correct operation of the thermally-activated pressure relief device (TPRD) subsequent to the thermal insult, and 4) pressure burst resulting from fire or explosion initiating events involving the hydrogen tank and failure of the TPRD. Delayed and immediate hydrogen ignition probabilities are identified as being highly uncertain and potential candidates for reducing conservatism in the predicted frequencies for these two scenarios.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2026

Mechanical and durability properties of ultra-high-performance concrete of spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems: a review

Dry storage systems are used for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). However, with the growing need to extend the operational periods of these systems, there are concerns about the degradation of their concrete overpacks, which could compromise the system's structural integrity and safety during hazardous events. Traditional concrete mixtures used in SNF dry storage systems have remained largely unchanged since their inception and often use conventional ingredients. These materials are susceptible to degradation mechanisms such as chemical attacks, alkali-silica reactions (ASR), and freeze–thaw cycles, which can lead to a loss of strength and durability over time. To address these challenges, this paper reviews the application of ultra-high-performance concrete (UHPC) as a promising alternative for spent nuclear fuel dry storage system overpacks. UHPC offers superior mechanical properties, exceptional durability, and reduced susceptibility to degradation mechanisms compared to conventional concrete. This paper focuses on the role of supplementary cementitious materials (SCMs) such as silica fume, fly ash, and metakaolin in enhancing UHPC performance for SNF storage applications. These SCMs have been shown to significantly improve the material’s microstructure, strength, and resistance to environmental stressors typically encountered in SNF storage environments. Moreover, incorporating SCMs supports sustainable construction by reducing cement consumption and associated carbon emissions. The review brings together existing research and experimental data, providing insights for engineers and researchers on developing UHPC mixtures that meet the rigorous demands of spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems, extending their service life and minimizing inspection intervals.

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2021

Noise Level Hazards due to Agricultural Equipment in a Laboratory

Noise exposure is a common health hazard in the agricultural field due to the continuous use of large pieces of equipment. In lab settings it is not as common to noise exposure due to industrial scale equipment. However, the energy system laboratories at INL are exploring new and inventive ways to create energy from biomaterials. This process requires the use of large pieces of agricultural equipment such as hammer mills, shakers, conveyor belts, etc. As the researchers continuously refine this process, they not only test the limits of renewable resources for energy but also test the noise exposure threshold limits. The purpose of this project was to determine the noise level hazards which are present due to the use of large agricultural equipment in a laboratory setting.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating the Incident Energy of Arcs in Photovoltaic DC Systems: Comparison Between Calculated and Experimental Data

Solar Photovoltaic (PV) systems have permeated the energy generation world at a very high rate, some of the safety codes and standards are still lagging in accurately assessing the hazards and risks associated with PV array arcing energies. Safety professionals and maintenance workers using NFPA 70E have utilized the Doan, Stokes & Oppenlander or Enrique models, meant to determine arc energies in DC power systems using the maximum power method. These methods may lead to an overestimate of energy available in PV systems during a fault. Since PV modules/arrays are non-linear, current limited DC devices, some of these calculation methods may not accurately predict fault energy. This paper will validate current arc energy models for PV systems by comparing experimental and calculated data. Additionally, this data will help modify the current NFPA 70E models related to smaller solar arrays. Understanding where the real safety threshold for DC arc flash in PV systems exists will help maintenance and safety professionals better prepare for a variety of work related activities. This paper will analyze real arc data taken for PV systems <1000VDC and <60amps and compare this to the calculated incident energy models, to include 70E. Thus, using these comparisons, it may be possible to reduce the safety hazard severity and thus relax the PPE requirements for installation and maintenance crews.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2026

Hazard Analysis to Support Fusion Systems Safety Assessments

Reliability, safety, and performance are vital aspects of any nuclear operation. Fusion technology continues to grow in public, private, and research interest, and coupled with rapidly growing energy needs, fusion technology research is poised for fast progress. The development of a Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) is seen as stepping stone for demonstrating long-cycle fusion. Naturally, such operation requires systems that are available, reliable, and safe. This work provides a novel demonstration of systems theory coupled with traditional hazard analysis to provide insights into the risk priority of components and systems found within the FNSF. The results of this work are a set of identified hazards that should be considered for the risk-informed design and development of the FNSF.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Hazard analysis for identifying common cause failures of digital safety systems using a redundancy-guided systems-theoretic approach

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection, digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Here, this paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the causal factors of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, GUIDANCE, AND REVIEW OF EMBEDDED DIGITAL DEVICES IN SAFETY SYSTEMS

Interest in embedded digital devices (EDDs) for monitoring and providing control of components is increasing in the nuclear power market as more and more users both within and outside the nuclear sector are employing EDDs. EDDs in other industries or countries may be known by the related terms as smart devices, devices of limited functionality, or intelligent devices. EDDs can sometimes perform a safety role when embedded in components such as temperature transmitters, pressure transmitters, voltage regulators, gas analyzers, boiler controllers, relays, and radiation monitors. The introduction of EDDs can affect safety by creating new hazards, vulnerabilities, failure modes, triggering mechanisms, and other potential safety concerns at both the component and system levels. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) existing regulations and guidance cover the use of EDDs in safety-related and important to safety systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs). In addition to potential future challenges, the nature of EDDs being implemented in similar or identical manners between different plants and industries opens up the potential of leveraging the reviews of other regulators or utilization of industry certifications.Key words: embedded digital device, firmware

Halverson, D. S.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Grid-scale Energy Storage Hazard Analysis and Design Objectives for System Safety.

Abstract not provided.

Rosewater, David Martin↗

DOE OSTI2020

Physics and technology considerations for the deuterium–tritium fuel cycle and conditions for tritium fuel self sufficiency

The tritium aspects of the DT fuel cycle embody some of the most challenging feasibility and attractiveness issues in the development of fusion systems. The review and analyses in this paper provide important information to understand and quantify these challenges and to define the phase space of plasma physics and fusion technology parameters and features that must guide a serious R&D in the world fusion program. We focus in particular on components, issues and R&D necessary to satisfy three 'principal requirements': (1) achieving tritium self-sufficiency within the fusion system, (2) providing a tritium inventory for the initial start-up of a fusion facility, and (3) managing the safety and biological hazards of tritium. A primary conclusion is that the physics and technology state-of-the-art will not enable DEMO and future power plants to satisfy these principal requirements. We quantify goals and define specific areas and ideas for physics and technology R&D to meet these requirements. A powerful fuel cycle dynamics model was developed to calculate time-dependent tritium inventories and flow rates in all parts and components of the fuel cycle for different ranges of parameters and physics and technology conditions. Dynamics modeling analyses show that the key parameters affecting tritium inventories, tritium start-up inventory, and tritium self-sufficiency are the tritium burn fraction in the plasma (f b ), fueling efficiency (η f ), processing time of plasma exhaust in the inner fuel cycle (t p ), reactor availability factor (AF), reserve time (tr) which determines the reserve tritium inventory needed in the storage system in order to keep the plant operational for time t r in case of any malfunction of any part of the tritium processing system, and the doubling time (t d ). Results show that η f f b > 2% and processing time of 1–4 h are required to achieve tritium self-sufficiency with reasonable confidence. For η f f b = 2% and processing time of 4 h, the tritium start-up inventory required for a 3 GW fusion reactor is ~11 kg, while it is <5 kg if η f f b = 5% and the processing time is 1 h. To achieve these stringent requirements, a serious R&D program in physics and technology is necessary. The EU-DEMO direct internal recycling concept that carries fuel directly from the plasma exhaust gas to the fueling systems without going through the isotope separation system reduces the overall processing time and tritium inventories and has positive effects on the required tritium breeding ratio (TBR R ). A significant finding is the strong dependence of tritium self-sufficiency on the reactor availability factor. Simulations show that tritium self-sufficiency is: impossible if AF < 10% for any η f f b , possible if AF > 30% and 1% ≤ η f f b ≤ 2%, and achievable with reasonable confidence if AF > 50% and η f f b > 2%. These results are of particular concern in light of the low availability factor predicted for the near-term plasma-based experimental facilities (e.g. FNSF, VNS, CTF), and can have repercussions on tritium economy in DEMO reactors as well, unless significant advancements in RAMI are made. There is a linear dependency between the tritium start-up inventory and the fusion power. The required tritium start-up inventory for a fusion facility of 100 MW fusion power is as small as 1 kg. Since fusion power plants will have large powers for better economics, it is important to maintain a 'reserve' tritium inventory in the tritium storage system to continue to fuel the plasma and avoid plant shutdown in case of malfunctions of some parts of the tritium processing lines. But our results show that a reserve time as short as 24 h leads to unacceptable reserve and start-up inventory requirements. Therefore, high reliability and fast maintainability of all components in the fuel cycle are necessary in order to avoid the need for storing reserve tritium inventory sufficient for continued fusion facility operation for more than a few hours. The physics aspects of plasma fueling, tritium burn fraction, and particle and power exhaust are highly interrelated and complex, and predictions for DEMO and power reactors are highly uncertain because of lack of experiments with burning plasma. Fueling by pellet injection on the high field side of tokamak has evolved to be the preferred method to fuel a burning plasma. Extrapolation from the DIII-D penetration scaling shows fueling efficiency expected in DEMO to be <25%, but such extrapolations are highly uncertain. The fueling efficiency of gas in a reactor relevant regime is expected to be extremely poor and not very useful for getting tritium into the core plasma efficiently. Gas fueling will nonetheless be useful for feedback control of the divertor operating parameters. Extensive modeling has been carried out to predict burn fraction, fueling requirements, and fueling efficiency for ITER, DEMO, and beyond. The fueling rate required to operate Q = 10 ITER plasmas in order to provide the required core fueling, helium exhaust and radiative divertor plasma conditions for acceptable divertor power loads was calculated. If this fueling is performed with a 50–50 DT mix, the tritium burn fraction in ITER would be ~0.36%, which is too low to satisfy the self-sufficiency conditions derived from the dynamics modeling for fusion reactors. Extrapolation to DEMO using this approach would also yield similarly low burn fraction. Extensive analysis presented shows that specific features of edge neutral dynamics in ITER and fusion reactors, which are different from present experiments, open possibilities for optimization of tritium fueling and thus to improve the burn fraction. Using only tritium in pellet fueling of the plasma core, and only deuterium for edge density, divertor power load and ELM control results in significant increase of the burn fraction to 1.8–3.6%. These estimates are performed with physics models whose results cannot be fully validated for ITER and DEMO plasma conditions since these cannot be achieved in present tokamak experiments. Thus, several uncertainties remain regarding particle transport and scenario requirements in ITER and DEMO. The safety standard requirements for protection of the public and release guidelines for tritium have been reviewed. General safety approaches including minimizing tritium inventories, reducing tritium permeation through materials, and decontaminating material for waste disposal have been suggested.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗