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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5
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NASA NTRS1989

Human mononuclear cell function after 4 degrees C storage during 1-G and microgravity conditions of spaceflight

Future space missions of long duration may require that autologous leukocytes be stored in flight for infusion to restore normal immune competence in crewmembers. Peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMNCs), as leukocyte concentrates in autologous plasma and 2% dextrose, were stored in the microgravity conditions provided by the U.S. Space Shuttle Columbia (Mission 61-C). Activity of PBMNC after space flight was compared with that from a series of preflight ground control experiments, which demonstrated in culture a progressive daily loss in mitogen-stimulated protein synthesis at 24 h and thymidine uptake at 72 h after storage for 7 d at 4 degrees C. Post-storage viabilities were at least 90% as determined by trypan dye exclusion. A progressive reduction in the percentage of PBMNC expressing cell-surface phenotype markers, which was similar for monocytes, B cells, and T-cell subsets, also occurred after storage. The ability of PBMNC, stored for 8 d in Columbia's middeck, to become activated and proliferate in vitro was similar to that of cells that remained in identical flight lockers on the ground as 1-G controls, thus indicating that PBMNCs were not adversely affected by storage under microgravity conditions.

NASA Discipline Number 00-00↗
NASA NTRS2007

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Spatial learning and memory is preserved in rats after early development in a microgravity environment

This study evaluated the cognitive mapping abilities of rats that spent part of their early development in a microgravity environment. Litters of male and female Sprague-Dawley rat pups were launched into space aboard the National Aeronautics and Space Administration space shuttle Columbia on postnatal day 8 or 14 and remained in space for 16 days. These animals were designated as FLT groups. Two age-matched control groups remained on Earth: those in standard vivarium housing (VIV) and those in housing identical to that aboard the shuttle (AGC). On return to Earth, animals were tested in three different tasks that measure spatial learning ability, the Morris water maze (MWM), and a modified version of the radial arm maze (RAM). Animals were also tested in an open field apparatus to measure general activity and exploratory activity. Performance and search strategies were evaluated in each of these tasks using an automated tracking system. Despite the dramatic differences in early experience, there were remarkably few differences between the FLT groups and their Earth-bound controls in these tasks. FLT animals learned the MWM and RAM as quickly as did controls. Evaluation of search patterns suggested subtle differences in patterns of exploration and in the strategies used to solve the tasks during the first few days of testing, but these differences normalized rapidly. Together, these data suggest that development in an environment without gravity has minimal long-term impact on spatial learning and memory abilities. Any differences due to development in microgravity are quickly reversed after return to earth normal gravity.

NASA Discipline Neuroscience↗
NASA NTRS2006

Characterization of Deposits on Glass Substrate as a Tool in Failure Analysis: The Orbiter Vehicle Columbia Case Study

In connection with the accident investigation of the space shuttle Columbia, an analysis methodology utilizing well established microscopic and spectroscopic techniques was implemented for evaluating the environment to which the exterior fused silica glass was exposed. Through the implementation of optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, energy dispersive spectroscopy, transmission electron microscopy, and electron diffraction, details emerged regarding the manner in which a charred metallic deposited layer formed on top of the exposed glass. Due to nature of the substrate and the materials deposited, the methodology proved to allow for a more detailed analysis of the vehicle breakup. By contrast, similar analytical methodologies on metallic substrates have proven to be challenging due to strong potential for error resulting from substrate contamination. This information proved to be valuable to not only those involved in investigating the break up of Columbia, but also provides a potential guide for investigating future high altitude and high energy accidents.

Olivas, J. D.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Test-Analysis Correlation for Space Shuttle External Tank Foam Impacting RCC Wing Leading Edge Component Panels

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA develop, validate, and maintain a modeling tool capable of predicting the damage threshold for debris impacts on the Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) wing leading edge and nosecap assembly. The results presented in this paper are one part of a multi-level approach that supported the development of the predictive tool used to recertify the shuttle for flight following the Columbia Accident. The assessment of predictive capability was largely based on test analysis comparisons for simpler component structures. This paper provides comparisons of finite element simulations with test data for external tank foam debris impacts onto 6-in. square RCC flat panels. Both quantitative displacement and qualitative damage assessment correlations are provided. The comparisons show good agreement and provided the Space Shuttle Program with confidence in the predictive tool.

Lyle, Karen H.↗
NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery Mission Status Briefing

This STS-114 Discovery Mission Status Briefing begins with Eileen Collins, Commander of the STS-114 Discovery, and crewmembers in orbit talking with mission control after launch of the Space Shuttle Discovery. Collins gives tribute to the crewmembers of the Space Shuttle Columbia and their families. Phil Engelauf, STS-114 Mission Operations Representative presents his mission status briefing and John Shannon, Space Shuttle Flight Operations and Integration Manager talks about the processing of radar data taken of the Space Shuttle Discovery during ascent. A video presentation from the Solid Rocket Booster Camera is shown by John Shannon. The video includes: 1) Piece of orbiter tile and origins of debris; 2) Pictures of debris after SRB separation; 3) TYVEK covers; and 4) Bird impacts external tank nose cone. Questions from the news media about tile shearing, vehicle damage and debris from the external tank are answered.

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NASA NTRS2004

Materials Analysis: A Key to Unlocking the Mystery of the Columbia Tragedy

Materials analyses of key forensic evidence helped unlock the mystery of the loss of space shuttle Columbia that disintegrated February 1, 2003 while returning from a 16-day research mission. Following an intensive four-month recovery effort by federal, state, and local emergency management and law officials, Columbia debris was collected, catalogued, and reassembled at the Kennedy Space Center. Engineers and scientists from the Materials and Processes (M&P) team formed by NASA supported Columbia reconstruction efforts, provided factual data through analysis, and conducted experiments to validate the root cause of the accident. Fracture surfaces and thermal effects of selected airframe debris were assessed, and process flows for both nondestructive and destructive sampling and evaluation of debris were developed. The team also assessed left hand (LH) airframe components that were believed to be associated with a structural breach of Columbia. Analytical data collected by the M&P team showed that a significant thermal event occurred at the left wing leading edge in the proximity of LH reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) panels 8 and 9. The analysis also showed exposure to temperatures in excess of 1,649 C, which would severely degrade the support structure, tiles, and RCC panel materials. The integrated failure analysis of wing leading edge debris and deposits strongly supported the hypothesis that a breach occurred at LH RCC panel 8.

Mayeaux, Brian M.↗
NASA NTRS1981

First reusable spaceship prepared for second mission

The inspection, repair, and modification of the space shuttle Columbia prior vehicle assembly and roll out for the second space transportation system flight are described. The schedule for launch countdown and a preliminary sketch of plans for the second flight are presented.

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NASA NTRS2000

Return to Flight Crew Activities Resource Reel JSC 1988 2 of 2

The crew of the STS-114 Discovery continues to answer questions from the news media about the upcoming mission. Commander Collins thanks NASA for enabling the astronauts to express their thoughts and feelings about procedures during spaceflight and she is also very happy to work for NASA. Pilot James Kelly talks about the pictures that they are now able to take of the external tank. Mission Specialists Wendy Lawrence and Steve Robinson discuss the items that they will be bringing up to the International Space Station. Robinson also talks about mementos of the Space Shuttle Columbia crew that they will be taking to the International Space Station.

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NASA NTRS2006

Shuttle Propulsion Overview to NATO

In the early morning on Saturday, February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up during entry. After extensive investigation of the accident and recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, President Bush gave the vision for space exploration for NASA, which include return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical, complete assembly of the ISS by the end of the decade, initiate robotic missions to the moon no later than 2008, develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, conduct first robotic, then human missions to Mars and extend human exploration across the solar system.

Lightfoot, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2003

Unlocking the Mystery of Columbia's Tragic Accident Through Materials Characterization

The wing and underbelly reconstruction of Space Shuttle Columbia took place at the Shuttle Landing Facility Hangar after the accident which destroyed STS-107. Fragments were placed on a grid according to their original location on the orbiter. Some Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels of the left wing leading edge and other parts from both leading edges were recovered and incorporated into the reconstruction. The recovered parts were tracked on a database according to a number and also tracked on a map of the orbiter. This viewgraph presentation describes the process of failure analysis undertaken by the Materials and Processes (M&P) Problem Resolution Team. The team started with factual observations about the accident, and identified highest level questions for it to answer in order to understand where on the orbiter failure occured, what component(s) failed, and what was the sequence of events. The finding of Columbia's MADS/OEX data recorder shifted the focus of the team's analysis to the left wing leading edge damage. The team placed particular attention on slag deposits on some of the RCC panels. The presentation lists analysis techniques, and lower level questions for the team to answer.

Shah, Sandeep↗
NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

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NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the tragic February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months and involved 13 Board members, approximately 120 Board investigators, and thousands of NASA and support personnel. Because the events that initiated the accident were not apparent for some time, the investigation's depth and breadth were unprecedented in NASA history. Further, the Board determined early in the investigation that it intended to put this accident into context. We considered it unlikely that the accident was a random event; rather, it was likely related in some degree to NASA's budgets, history, and program culture, as well as to the politics, compromises, and changing priorities of the democratic process. We are convinced that the management practices overseeing the Space Shuttle Program were as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing. The Board was also influenced by discussions with members of Congress, who suggested that this nation needed a broad examination of NASA's Human Space Flight Program, rather than just an investigation into what physical fault caused Columbia to break up during re-entry. Findings and recommendations are in the relevant chapters and all recommendations are compiled in Chapter 11. Volume I is organized into four parts: The Accident; Why the Accident Occurred; A Look Ahead; and various appendices. To put this accident in context, Parts One and Two begin with histories, after which the accident is described and then analyzed, leading to findings and recommendations. Part Three contains the Board's views on what is needed to improve the safety of our voyage into space. Part Four is reference material. In addition to this first volume, there will be subsequent volumes that contain technical reports generated by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA, as well as volumes containing reference documentation and other related material.

Gehman, Harold W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Preliminary results from the flight of the Solar Array Module Plasma Interactions Experiment (SAMPIE)

SAMPIE, the Solar Array Module Plasma Interactions Experiment, flew in the Space Shuttle Columbia payload bay as part of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology-2 (OAST-2) mission on STS-62, March, 1994. SAMPIE biased samples of solar arrays and space power materials to varying potentials with respect to the surrounding space plasma, and recorded the plasma currents collected and the arcs which occurred, along with a set of plasma diagnostics data. A large set of high quality data was obtained on the behavior of solar arrays and space power materials in the space environment. This paper is the first report on the data SAMPIE telemetered to the ground during the mission. It will be seen that the flight data promise to help determine arcing thresholds, snapover potentials, and floating potentials for arrays and spacecraft in LEO.

Ferguson, Dale C.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Subcomponent Flat Plate Impact Testing for Space Shuttle Orbiter Return to Flight

Following the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003, a major effort commenced to develop a better understanding of debris impacts and their effect on the Space Shuttle subsystems. An initiative to develop and validate physics-based computer models to predict damage from such impacts was a fundamental component of this effort. To develop the models it was necessary to physically characterize Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) and various debris materials which could potentially shed on ascent and impact the Orbiter RCC leading edges. The validated models enabled the launch system community to use the impact analysis software LS DYNA to predict damage by potential and actual impact events on the Orbiter leading edge and nose cap thermal protection systems. Validation of the material models was done through a three-level approach: fundamental tests to obtain independent static and dynamic material model properties of materials of interest, sub-component impact tests to provide highly controlled impact test data for the correlation and validation of the models, and full-scale impact tests to establish the final level of confidence for the analysis methodology. This paper discusses the second level subcomponent test program in detail and its application to the LS DYNA model validation process. The level two testing consisted of over one hundred impact tests in the NASA Glenn Research Center Ballistic Impact Lab on 6 by 6 in. and 6 by 12 in. flat plates of RCC and evaluated three types of debris projectiles: BX 265 External Tank foam, ice, and PDL 1034 External Tank foam. These impact tests helped determine the level of damage generated in the RCC flat plates by each projectile. The information obtained from this testing validated the LS DYNA damage prediction models and provided a certain level of confidence to begin performing analysis for full-size RCC test articles for returning NASA to flight with STS 114 and beyond.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

High Resolution Millimeter Wave Detection of Vertical Cracks in the Space Shuttle External Tank Spray-On-Foam Insulation (SOFI)

Space Shuttle Columbia s catastrophic failure, the separation of a piece of spray-on-foam insulation (SOFI) from the external tank (ET) in the Space Shuttle Discovery s flight in 2005 and crack detected in its ET foam prior to its successful launch in 2006 emphasize the need for effective nondestructive methods for inspecting the shuttle ET SOFI. Millimeter wave nondestructive testing methods have been considered as potential and effective inspection tools for evaluating the integrity of the SOFI. This paper presents recent results of an investigation for the purpose of detecting vertical cracks in SOFI panels using a focused millimeter wave (150 GHz) reflectometer. The presented images of the SOFI panels show the capability of this reflectometer for detecting tight vertical cracks (also as a function of crack opening dimension) in exposed SOFI panels and while covered by a piece of SOFI ramp simulating a more realistic and challenging situation.

Kharkovsky, S.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Support activities to maintain SUMS flight readiness

The Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS), a component experiment of the NASA Orbital Experiments Program (OEX), was flown aboard the shuttle Columbia (OV102) mounted at the forward end of the nose landing gear well with an atmospheric gas inlet system fitted to the lower fuselage (chin panel) surface. The SUMS was designed to provide atmospheric data in flow regimes inaccessible prior to the development of the Space Transportation System (STS). The experiment mission operation began about one hour prior to shuttle de-orbit entry maneuver and continued until reaching 1.6 torr (about 86 km altitude). The SUMS mass spectrometer consists of the spare unit from the Viking mission to Mars. Bendix Aerospace under contract to NASA LaRC incorporated the Viking mass spectrometer, a microprocessor based logic card, a pressurized instrument case, and the University of Texas at Dallas provided a gas inlet system into a configuration suited to interface with the shuttle Columbia. The SUMS experiment underwent static and dynamic calibration as well as vacuum maintenance before and after STS 40 shuttle flight. The SUMS flew a total of 3 times on the space shuttle Columbia. Between flights the SUMS was maintained in flight ready status. The flight data has been analyzed by the NASA LaRC Aerothermodynamics Branch. Flight data spectrum plots and reports are presented in the Appendices to the Final Technical Report for NAS1-17399.

Wright, Willie↗
NASA NTRS2012

Software Programs Derive Measurements from Photographs

Even under the most unfortunate circumstances, NASA continues on a path of innovation. After the Space Shuttle Columbia reentered the atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it experienced a catastrophic failure, and the entire crew and vehicle were lost. For the two weeks prior to the accident, Columbia STS-107 was on a mission to perform physical, life, and space sciences research in the unique environment of microgravity. Following the accident, the remaining shuttles - Endeavor, Atlantis, and Discovery - were grounded, and an intense investigation ensued. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board spent nearly 7 months examining the cause of the accident and determining what would ensure a safe return to flight. To this end, investigators performed an extensive review down five analytic paths: aerodynamic, thermodynamic, sensor data timeline, debris reconstruction, and imaging. As part of the evaluation of all the available imagery from Columbia's ascent, orbit, and entry, investigators needed a new method for analyzing still video images to determine the size of the material that fell from Columbia, as well as the distance that the material traveled. John Lane, a scientist at Kennedy Space Center, devised a software program to calculate the unknown dimension of the material in the images, and soon after the investigation was complete, continued to enhance the technology. Eventually, the program that assisted in the Columbia investigation became available for licensing.

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