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NASA NTRS2011

MLAS and LAS: Project Comparison of Lessons Learned

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. This presentation will compare both projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives and highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program.

Dittemore, Gary↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Joint Communication Resource Allocation and Velocity Selection in Urban Air Mobility via Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning

With traffic congestion problems becoming more severe in urban areas, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration promotes the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concept, which envisages a safe and efficient air transportation system. However, the increased communication demands in UAM can exacerbate the spectrum scarcity. Therefore, a new communication resource allocation solution is necessary. In this paper, we focus on uplink UAM communications, where multiple aerial vehicles (AV) perform cargo/passenger delivery tasks. With predefined flight paths, AVs make decisions on communication resource allocation and velocity selection to complete their missions under safety constraints. Accordingly, we formulate a joint optimization problem to minimize the weighted sum of the total travel time and communication outage time. We first model the optimization problem as a Markov game and propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning based solution. Simulation results corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed solution.

Ruixuan Han↗

NASA NTRS2008

Automated Planning and Scheduling for Orbital Express (151)

The challenging timeline for DARPA's Orbital Express mission demanded a flexible, responsive, and (above all) safe approach to mission planning. Because the mission was a technology demonstration, pertinent planning information was learned during actual mission execution. This information led to amendments to procedures, which led to changes in the mission plan. In general, we used the ASPEN planner scheduler to generate and validate the mission plans. We enhanced ASPEN to enable it to reason about uncertainty. We also developed a model generator that would read the text of a procedure and translate it into an ASPEN model. These technologies had a significant impact on the success of the Orbital Express mission.

autonomy↗

NASA NTRS2014

Development of a Route Crossing Tool for Shared Airspace Environments

In current-day Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) operations, departure and arrival controllers maintain separate and dedicated airspace for their respective traffic flows. Although this practice has obvious safety features, it also leads to inefficiencies; for example, departure aircraft may be routinely capped beneath arrival airspace. With the right decision-support and coordination tools, departures could continue to climb through arrival airspace when sufficient gaps exist. Previous studies of ‘shared airspace’ have examined pre-arranged coordination procedures, as well as tools that gave feedback to the controllers on where gaps between arrivals were located and whether the departure aircraft could be scheduled to fly through those gaps [1, 2, 3, 4]. Since then, the Route Crossing Tool (RCT) has been developed to allow controllers to assess multiple pre-defined route options at points where the arrivals and departures cross, thereby increasing the possibility of climbing a departure through an arrival gap.The RCT aids in ensuring lateral separation between departure and arrival aircraft that pass through the same altitude. Since the RCT can be applied tactically, it can enable aircraft to fly through arrival flows even if these aircraft depart outside scheduled times. The RCT makes use of a set of predefined parallel departure routes crossing the arrival flow at equidistant intersecting points on the arrival route. The RCT uses the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) of the departure aircraft at each intersecting point to calculate the lateral separation with the neighboring arrivals when it crosses that point; this information is graphically displayed to the controller. Additionally, the RCT incorporates forecast winds in its ETA predictions.Multiple prototypes of the RCT have been iteratively developed with feedback from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). This paper presents the final design, the design process, and lessons learned. Initial results from a simulation suggest that the tool was successful in helping controllers to safely climb more aircraft. Controller feedback on the tool was also positive.

shared airspace↗

NASA NTRS1988

Two gimbal bearing case studies: Some lessons learned

Two troublesome, torque related problems associated with gimbal actuators are discussed. Large, thin section angular contact bearings can have a surprisingly high torque sensitivity to radial thermal gradients. A predictive thermal-mechanical bearing analysis, as described, was helpful in establishing a safe temperature operating envelope. In the second example, end-of-travel torque limits of an oscillatory gimbal bearing appoached motor stall during limit cycling life tests. Bearing modifications required to restore acceptable torque performance are described. The lessons learned from these case studies should benefit designers of precision gimbals where singular bearing torque related problems are not uncommon.

Loewenthal, Stuart H.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Hydrogen Flow Control Valve Poppet Breakage

The Main Propulsion System (MPS) uses three Flow Control Valves (FCV) to modulate the flow of pressurant hydrogen gas from the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) to the hydrogen External Tank (ET). This maintains pressure in the ullage volume as the liquid level drops, preserving ET structural integrity and assuring the engines receive a sufficient amount of head pressure. On Space Transportation System (STS)-126 (2009), with only a handful of International Space Station (ISS) assembly flights from the end of the Shuttle program, a portion of a single FCV?s poppet head broke off at about a minute and a half after liftoff. The risk of the poppet head failure is that the increased flow area through the FCV could result in excessive gaseous hydrogen flow back to the external tank, which could result in overboard venting of hydrogen ullage pressure. If the hydrogen venting were to occur in first stage (i.e., lower atmosphere), a flammability hazard exists that could lead to catastrophic loss of crew and vehicle. Other failure risks included particle impact damage to MPS downstream hardware. Although the FCV design had been plagued by contamination-related sluggish valve response problems prior to a redesign at STS-80 (1996), contamination was ruled out as the cause of the STS-126 failure. Employing a combination of enhanced hardware inspection and a better understanding of the consequences of a poppet failure, safe flight rationale for subsequent flights (STS-119 and later) was achieved. This paper deals with the technical lessons learned during the investigation and mitigation of this problem at a time when assembly flights were each in the critical path to Space Station success.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Constellation Operations: Lessons Learned For Future Exploration

The Earth science community has long advocated placing numerous instruments in space to study the Earth and its environment. Space agencies from many countries have responded to this call with a wide range of orbiting satellites. Scientists also envisioned placing some satellites in constellations, to enable diverse remote sensing instruments to observe the same part of the Earth (or its atmosphere) at about the same time, thereby increasing the opportunities for coincident science observations. The Earth Science Afternoon Constellation is answering this call, but there have been unique challenges on the way to its deployment. Currently, the Afternoon Constellation is to comprise six satellites. Three are currently on orbit: NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS)-Aqua (2002) and EOS-Aura (2004), and CNES's Polarization & Anisotropy of Reflectances for Atmospheric Sciences coupled with Observations from a Lidar (PARASOL) (2004). Two more satellites, the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observation (CALIPSO) and Cloudsat, are to be jointly launched in late 2005, followed by the Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) in 2008. The Afternoon Constellation is unlike most satellite constellations in that: 1) It is not a homogenous mix of identical satellites; rather it comprises several satellites with complementary observational capabilities; 2) The satellites are not spaced around the Earth to provide instantaneous, global coverage (as for a communications satellite constellation); rather they orbit in close proximity so observations occur at about the same time over approximately the same region; and 3) Lastly, the satellites are not managed and controlled by one organization; rather the list of organizations is diverse: CNES in France, NASA Centers at Goddard, Langley, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the US Air Force facility in New Mexico. The PARASOL launch and early orbit (L&EO) phase proved to be a learning experience for constellation members (including Constellation management). Prior to launch, all members signed an operations coordination document that spelled out basic requirements for keeping the constellation safe and resolving non-nominal events. Once PARASOL reached orbit and the mission teams gained experience using the newly-developed constellation monitoring tools, it became clear that some of the guidelines in the signed agreements had to be adjusted. This paper presents the L&EO lessons learned and how they were used to prepare for the next phase - the period following the CloudSat/CALIPSO launch.

Kelly, Angelita C.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Taxi-Out Time Prediction for Departures at Charlotte Airport Using Machine Learning Techniques

Predicting the taxi-out times of departures accurately is important for improving airport efficiency and takeoff time predictability. In this paper, we attempt to apply machine learning techniques to actual traffic data at Charlotte Douglas International Airport for taxi-out time prediction. To find the key factors affecting aircraft taxi times, surface surveillance data is first analyzed. From this data analysis, several variables, including terminal concourse, spot, runway, departure fix and weight class, are selected for taxi time prediction. Then, various machine learning methods such as linear regression, support vector machines, k-nearest neighbors, random forest, and neural networks model are applied to actual flight data. Different traffic flow and weather conditions at Charlotte airport are also taken into account for more accurate prediction. The taxi-out time prediction results show that linear regression and random forest techniques can provide the most accurate prediction in terms of root-mean-square errors. We also discuss the operational complexity and uncertainties that make it difficult to predict the taxi times accurately.

Safe and efficient surface operations↗

NASA NTRS2018

Verification and Validation Challenges for Adaptive Flight Control of Complex Autonomous Systems

Autonomy of aerospace systems requires the ability for flight control systems to be able to adapt to complex uncertain dynamic environment. In spite of the five decades of research in adaptive control, the fact still remains that currently no adaptive control system has ever been deployed on any safety-critical or human-rated production systems such as passenger transport aircraft. The problem lies in the difficulty with the certification of adaptive control systems since existing certification methods cannot readily be used for nonlinear adaptive control systems. Research to address the notion of metrics for adaptive control began to appear in the recent years. These metrics, if accepted, could pave a path towards certification that would potentially lead to the adoption of adaptive control as a future control technology for safety-critical and human-rated production systems. Development of certifiable adaptive control systems represents a major challenge to overcome. Adaptive control systems with learning algorithms will never become part of the future unless it can be proven that they are highly safe and reliable. Rigorous methods for adaptive control software verification and validation must therefore be developed to ensure that adaptive control system software failures will not occur, to verify that the adaptive control system functions as required, to eliminate unintended functionality, and to demonstrate that certification requirements imposed by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can be satisfied. This presentation will discuss some of the technical issues with adaptive flight control and related V&V challenges.

Nguyen, Nhan T.↗

NASA NTRS2021

NASA Framework for the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

The NASA Framework for the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides six key principles to guide NASA's use of AI. The principles are NASA's AI must be 1. Fair, 2., Explainable and transparent, 3. Accountable, 4. Secure and safe, 5. Human-centric and societally beneficial, and 6. Scientifically and technically robust. The framework describes each ethical AI principle, and then applies that principle to NASA work. The framework also includes a list of questions practitioners should use to guide their AI work. Finally, the framework focuses on concrete, practical considerations for the next five - ten years, while also beginning to lay the foundation for longer-term disruptive change as human-level (or beyond) AI is created.

Artificial Intelligence↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines: Successes and Failures

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

L-PBF↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

Additive Manufacturing↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with a new human-rated system suitable for missions to the Moon and Mars. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station and be capable of carrying crews back to lunar orbit and of supporting missions to Mars orbit. NASA is using its extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize the CLV system design approach, with the objective of reducing total lifecycle costs through operational efficiencies. To provide in-depth data for selecting this follow-on launch vehicle, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the confirmation of the new NASA Administrator. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, with a focus on human rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the reusable Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine to deliver 25 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, was the best choice to reduce the risks associated with fielding a new system in a timely manner. The CLV Project, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operation of this new human-rated system. The CLV Project works closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch system . leveraging a wealth of lessons learned from Shuttle operations. The CL V is being designed to reduce costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting trades studies against the concept design. Innovations such as automated processing will build on lessons learned from the Shuttle, other launch systems, Department of Defense operations experience, and subscale flight tests such as the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DCXA) vehicle operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated cryogen ic propellant loading , and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system. For the CLV, the results of hazard analyses are contributing to an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. Such advances will help streamline the mission operations process for pilots and ground controllers alike. In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.5 billion of its $16 bill ion budget on the Space Shuttle. The ultimate goal of the CLV Project is to deliver a safe, reliable system designed to minimize lifecycle costs so that NASA's budget can be invested in missions of scientific discovery. Lessons learned from developing the CLV will be applied to the growth path for future systems, including a heavy lift launch vehicle.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Can We Learn From Resilient Pilot Behaviors? The Case of Energy Management While Flying a Star

Recently, there has been increased interest in documenting flightcrew behaviors that contribute to safe operations. Instead of only capturing errors, new efforts are attempting to understand how pilots manage complexity and variability in the operational environment to ensure a safe mission. This approach highlights pilot responses to events and conditions that fall outside typical TEM threats; e.g., revised ATC clearances. This approach presents a two-sided coin: characterize flightcrew resilience /or/ generate insights regarding complexity in the operational environment that is not adequately managed by current flight deck interface designs, procedures, and training. To capture operational complexity, we have been analyzing flight path management tied to flying an RNAV STAR. Because ATC often requests revisions—e.g., descend late—and because RNAV STARs may not align with airplane performance limits, flightcrews need to monitor, anticipate threats to RNAV STAR compliance, and devise ways to accommodate unexpected challenges. In this paper, we identify general strategies that can support response adaptation and explore methods to facilitate training these strategies.

flight operations↗

NASA NTRS2007

Flight and Integrated Testing: Blazing the Trail for the Ares Launch Vehicles

It has been 30 years since the United States last designed and built a human-rated launch vehicle. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has marshaled unique resources from the government and private sectors that will carry the next generation of astronauts into space safer and more efficiently than ever and send them to the Moon to develop a permanent outpost. NASA's Flight and Integrated Test Office (FITO) located at Marshall Space Flight Center and the Ares I-X Mission Management Office have primary responsibility for developing and conducting critical ground and flight tests for the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles. These tests will draw upon Saturn and the Space Shuttle experiences, which taught the value of using sound systems engineering practices, while also applying aerospace best practices such as "test as you fly" and other lessons learned. FITO will use a variety of methods to reduce the technical, schedule, and cost risks of flying humans safely aboard a launch vehicle.

Taylor, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2007

An Exploration Perspective of Beamed Energy Propulsion

The Vision for Exploration is currently focused on flying the Space Shuttle safely to complete our Space Station obligations, retiring the Shuttle in 2010, then returning humans to the Moon and learning how to proceed to Mars and beyond. The NASA budget still includes funds for science and aeronautics but the primary focus is on human exploration. Fiscal constraints have led to pursuing exploration vehicles that use heritage hardware, particularly existing boosters and engines, with the minimum modifications necessary to satisfy mission requirements. So, pursuit of immature technologies is not currently affordable by NASA. Beamed energy is one example of an immature technology, from a human exploration perspective, that may eventually provide significant benefits for human exploration of space, but likely not in the near future. Looking to the more distant future, this paper will examine some of the criteria that must be achieved by beamed energy propulsion to eventually contribute to human exploration of the solar system. The analysis focuses on some of the implications of increasing the payload fraction of a launch vehicle, with a quick look at trans-lunar injection. As one would expect, there is potential for benefit, and there are concerns. The analysis concludes with an assessment of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) for some beamed energy propulsion components, indicating that TRL 2 is close to being completed.

Cole, John W.↗

NASA NTRS2024

International Space Station Satellite Deployment: Jettison Policy and Best Practices for Satellite Payload Developers

The International Space Station (ISS) deploys dozens of small satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) each year. This presentation and associated paper cover the ISS Jettison Policy requirements and review/approval process, as well as best practices for satellite Payload Developers who have satellites manifested for deployment from ISS. Specifically, topics will include ISS Jettison Policy requirements to limit generation of orbital debris, limit risk of collision with ISS, and limit risk of collision with ISS visiting vehicles. The paper will include details on the ISS Program jettison candidate analysis and approval process, timelines for data submittal to ISS Program, resources for small satellite developers, and design & analysis recommendations for small satellite developers to maximize their likelihood of successful deployment from ISS. New Station deploy capabilities and ways the ISS Program addresses and facilitates innovations in small satellite technology, including propulsion systems, deorbit devices, constellation development, and novel tech demos, will also be explored. The 2024 session topic that best fits this abstract is Orbital Debris, SSA & STM. The ISS Jettison Policy intends to quantify and control the risks of deploying and operating small satellites, not only to ensure the safety of the humans flying in space, but also to preserve the orbital environment for world space activities and enable the significant benefits brought by such utilization. The ISS Program is committed to working with smallsat providers to address their challenges and enable safe, accessible, innovative missions. The Policy has grown with the industry, with each deploy yielding hard-earned lessons learned that improve our process – not only for the next deploy campaign, but with applicability and adaptability for future applications in LEO and beyond.

Jettison Policy↗