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The development of a culture of safety and NASA since the Challenger accident is reviewed. The technical elements of the strengthened NASA safety program are described, including problem reporting, risk/assessment/risk management, operational safety, and safety assurance are addressed. Future directions in the development of safety are considered.
The paper describes the role of technical excellence and communication in the development and maintenance of safety and mission assurance programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and that contribute to healthy and effective organizational cultures. The events and conditions leading to the development of the MSFC S&MA organization are reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk assessment roles are discussed. The structure and functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions are presented. The current organization s mission and vision commitments serve as the starting points for the description of the current organization. The goals and objectives are presented that address the criticisms of the predecessor organizations. Additional improvements are presented that address the development of technical excellence and the steps taken to improve communication within the Center, with program customers, and with other Agency S&MA organizations.
NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.
The basic vision of AdvoCATE is to automate the creation, manipulation, and management of large-scale assurance cases based on a formal theory of argument structures. Its main purposes are for creating and manipulating argument structures for safety assurance cases using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), and as a test bed and proof-of-concept for the formal theory of argument structures. AdvoCATE is available for Windows 7, Macintosh OSX, and Linux. Eventually, AdvoCATE will serve as a dashboard for safety related information and provide an infrastructure for safety decisions and management.
This standard specifies the software assurance program for the provider of software. It also delineates the assurance activities for the provider and the assurance data that are to be furnished by the provider to the acquirer. In any software development effort, the provider is the entity or individual that actually designs, develops, and implements the software product, while the acquirer is the entity or individual who specifies the requirements and accepts the resulting products. This standard specifies at a high level an overall software assurance program for software developed for and by NASA. Assurance includes the disciplines of quality assurance, quality engineering, verification and validation, nonconformance reporting and corrective action, safety assurance, and security assurance. The application of these disciplines during a software development life cycle is called software assurance. Subsequent lower-level standards will specify the specific processes within these disciplines.
The Assurance Case approach is being adopted in a number of safety-mission-critical application domains in the U.S., e.g., medical devices, defense aviation, automotive systems, and, lately, civil aviation. This paradigm refocuses traditional, process-based approaches to assurance on demonstrating explicitly stated assurance goals, emphasizing the use of structured rationale, and concrete product-based evidence as the means for providing justified confidence that systems and software are fit for purpose in safely achieving mission objectives. NASA has also been embracing assurance cases through the concepts of Risk Informed Safety Cases (RISCs), as documented in the NASA System Safety Handbook, and Objective Hierarchies (OHs) as put forth by the Agency's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). This talk will give an overview of the work being performed by the SGT team located at NASA Ames Research Center, in developing technologies and tools to engineer and apply assurance cases in customer projects pertaining to aviation safety. We elaborate how our Assurance Case Automation Toolset (AdvoCATE) has not only extended the state-of-the-art in assurance case research, but also demonstrated its practical utility. We have successfully developed safety assurance cases for a number of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations, which underwent, and passed, scrutiny both by the aviation regulator, i.e., the FAA, as well as the applicable NASA boards for airworthiness and flight safety, flight readiness, and mission readiness. We discuss our efforts in expanding AdvoCATE capabilities to support RISCs and OHs under a project recently funded by OSMA under its Software Assurance Research Program. Finally, we speculate on the applicability of our innovations beyond aviation safety to such endeavors as robotic, and human spaceflight.
We describe a generic approach for automatically integrating the output generated from a formal method/tool into a software safety assurance case, as an evidence argument, by (a) encoding the underlying reasoning as a safety case pattern, and (b) instantiating it using the data produced from the method/tool. We believe this approach not only improves the trustworthiness of the evidence generated from a formal method/tool, by explicitly presenting the reasoning and mechanisms underlying its genesis, but also provides a way to gauge the suitability of the evidence in the context of the wider assurance case. We illustrate our work by application to a real example-an unmanned aircraft system- where we invoke a formal code analysis tool from its autopilot software safety case, automatically transform the verification output into an evidence argument, and then integrate it into the former.
This viewgraph presentation reviews NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's approach to safety and mission assurance. The contents include: 1) NASA GSFC Background; 2) Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate; 3) The Role of SMA-D and the Technical Authority; 4) GSFC Mission assurance Requirements; 5) GSFC Systems Review Office (SRO); 6) GSFC Supply Chain Management Program; and 7) GSFC ISO9001/AS9100 Status Brief.
NASA and the FAA sought industry research to identify and evaluate alternate concepts for assuring safety of airborne systems. This report documents a research effort focused on the evaluation of Run Time Assurance (RTA) as applied to a novel, airborne system architecture. The RTA pattern is applied to a case study focused on a notional integrated flight and propulsion control system for a DEP VTOL aircraft. During flight, while the high-automation algorithms are operating, the RTA system will monitor the aircraft state for any impending violation of safety requirements. When necessary, it will switch to the low-automation software to prevent such violations. Assurance practices for both baseline industry activities and the RTA approach were captured and compared to illustrate the required engineering design considerations, and possible advantages and disadvantages of each approach as part of this case study.
This slide presentation reviews the change in the work and impact of the Safety and Mission Assurance directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center. It reviews the background and the reasons given for a strong Safety & Mission Assurance presence in all planning for space flight. This was pointed out by the Rogers Commission Report after the Space Challenger accident, by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) and by a 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team. The overall objective of the work in this area was to improve and maintain S&MA expertise and skills. Training for this work was improved and the S&MA organization was reorganized. This has resulted in a paradigm shift for NASA's safety efforts, which is described. The presentation then reviews the impact of the new S&MA work in the Ares I design and development.
Distributed approaches for conflict resolution rely on analyzing the behavior of each aircraft to ensure that system-wide safety properties are maintained. This paper presents the criteria method, which increases the quality and efficiency of a safety assurance analysis for distributed air traffic concepts. The criteria standard is shown to provide two key safety properties: safe separation when only one aircraft maneuvers and safe separation when both aircraft maneuver at the same time. This approach is complemented with strong guarantees of correct operation through formal verification. To show that an algorithm is correct, i.e., that it always meets its specified safety property, one must only show that the algorithm satisfies the criteria. Once this is done, then the algorithm inherits the safety properties of the criteria. An important consequence of this approach is that there is no requirement that both aircraft execute the same conflict resolution algorithm. Therefore, the criteria approach allows different avionics manufacturers or even different airlines to use different algorithms, each optimized according to their own proprietary concerns.
These slides provide visual aids for a panel presentation on the question of "How can organization of Safety Assurance information be improved, so that various parties can identify the residual uncertainties and reason about their effects on the safety conclusion efficiently." The purpose of the panel is to generate discussion among the participants.
This NASA Technical Handbook compiles into a single volume safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance and risk management terms defined and used in NASA safety and mission assurance directives and standards. The purpose of this handbook is to support effective communication within NASA and with its contractors. The definitions in this handbook are updated when the definition of the acronym or term is updated in the originating document.
Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.
As NASA increasingly pursues collaborative public-private partnerships and international efforts to advance space exploration goals, ensuring robust safety and mission assurance protocols has become more complex. The evolving dynamics introduce multifaceted challenges spanning regulatory oversight, governance and acquisition models, and technical standardization. To address these issues, NASA plans to prioritize deeper integration of safety and mission assurance principles from the formulation and acquisition stages when structuring partnerships and contracts. This embeds appropriate oversight from the start. Additionally, it is vital to establish an enterprise-level capability focused on identifying and resolving cross-cutting risks that transcend individual missions. Together, all these initial thoughts will form the basis of a broad roadmap of decisions that aims to ensure strategic alignment from policy to implementation allowing NASA to harmonize the currently fragmented safety and mission assurance ecosystem as it navigates the complexities introduced by the new era of public-private space partnerships.
As NASA increasingly pursues collaborative public-private partnerships and international efforts to advance space exploration goals, ensuring robust safety and mission assurance protocols has become more complex. The evolving dynamics introduce multifaceted challenges spanning regulatory oversight, governance and acquisition models, and technical standardization. To address these issues, NASA plans to prioritize deeper integration of safety and mission assurance principles from the formulation and acquisition stages when structuring partnerships and contracts. This embeds appropriate oversight from the start. Additionally, it is vital to establish an enterprise-level capability focused on identifying and resolving cross-cutting risks that transcend individual missions. Together, all these initial thoughts will form the basis of a broad roadmap of decisions that aims to ensure strategic alignment from policy to implementation allowing NASA to harmonize the currently fragmented safety and mission assurance ecosystem as it navigates the complexities introduced by the new era of public-private space partnerships.
This document from the Stennis Space Center Office of Safety and Mission Assurance rates flight preparation elements for Space Shuttle mission STS-114. All elements are rated with the status "Standard Open Work or Completed", and marked in green on the document, which contains a Certificate of Flight Readiness for STS-114.
We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.