NASA NTRSDate not supplied
Many space life support assumptions are obviously mistaken but they are generally accepted because they mutually support each other and because they advance a mistaken futuristic vision of closed human ecosystems in space. Many projects have been mistakenly selected to increase life support system closure or reduce launch mass in order to implement this impractical vision. Project members rarely challenge their project’s assumptions and guiding vision. Systems engineering including cost, reliability, risk, and system trade-offs has been very strongly discouraged to prevent rational criticism of these dubious assumptions, the projects, and the ecosystem vision. A more realistic vision can define better near term life support goals and future aspirations that will improve mission support and increase public interest. Given more realistic goals, it will be possible to develop effective technical alternatives, use open rational project selection methods, conduct professional project management, and make swifter progress in the inevitable human advance into space. The current unworkable human space settlement scenario involves moon visits and permanent bases, zero gravity trips to Mars, Mars visits and bases, all leading to extensive human settlements on the moon and Mars. This is unrealistic because the moon and Mars have less than Earth normal gravity and high radiation that can seriously damage human health. A better alternative would use rotating space colonies that produce Earth gravity and are radiation shielded. The attractive fantasy of reproducing terrestrial ecology in space should be replaced by the idea of building a closed system based on advancing technology such as artificial photosynthesis. Past mistaken projects include growing plants for food to replicate terrestrial food sources, recovering small amounts of water from difficult to process waste to achieve high system closure, and using newly designed, lighter, but unreliable hardware to reduce launch mass. The political process supporting the false assumptions, projects, and vision has deliberately prevented the usual systems engineering and cost-benefit analysis. We are going to do much better.