Results for “Supportability” — Page 5

NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security↗

NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security↗

NASA NTRS2017

Material Analysis and System Design for Exploration Life Support Systems: Introduction to ECLSS Air Revitalization Support for Exploration Missions

No abstract available

Cmarik, Gregory E.↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Supportability Engineering Implementation Utilizing DoD Practices and Processes

The Ares I design and development program made the determination early in the System Design Review Phase to utilize DoD ILS and LSA approach for supportability engineering as an integral part of the system engineering process. This paper is to provide a review of the overall approach to design Ares-I with an emphasis on a more affordable, supportable, and sustainable launch vehicle. Discussions will include the requirements development, design influence, support concept alternatives, ILS and LSA planning, Logistics support analyses/trades performed, LSA tailoring for NASA Ares Program, support system infrastructure identification, ILS Design Review documentation, Working Group coordination, and overall ILS implementation. At the outset, the Ares I Project initiated the development of the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) and a Logistics Support Analysis process to provide a path forward for the management of the Ares-I ILS program and supportability analysis activities. The ILSP provide the initial planning and coordination between the Ares-I Project Elements and Ground Operation Project. The LSA process provided a system engineering approach in the development of the Ares-I supportability requirements; influence the design for supportability and development of alternative support concepts that satisfies the program operability requirements. The LSA planning and analysis results are documented in the Logistics Support Analysis Report. This document was required during the Ares-I System Design Review (SDR) and Preliminary Design Review (PDR) review cycles. To help coordinate the LSA process across the Ares-I project and between programs, the LSA Report is updated and released quarterly. A System Requirement Analysis was performed to determine the supportability requirements and technical performance measurements (TPMs). Two working groups were established to provide support in the management and implement the Ares-I ILS program, the Integrated Logistics Support Working Group (ILSWG) and the Logistics Support Analysis Record Working Group (LSARWG). The Ares I ILSWG is established to assess the requirements and conduct, evaluate analyses and trade studies associated with acquisition logistic and supportability processes and to resolve Ares I integrated logistics and supportability issues. It established a strategic collaborative alliance for coordination of Logistics Support Analysis activates in support of the integrated Ares I vehicle design and development of logistics support infrastructure. A Joint Ares I - Orion LSAR Working Group was established to: 1) Guide the development of Ares-I and Orion LSAR data and serve as a model for future Constellation programs, 2) Develop rules and assumptions that will apply across the Constellation program with regards to the program's LSAR development, and 3) Maintain the Constellation LSAR Style Guide.

Smith, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Uncrewed Lunar Surface Operations and Support Activities

Sustained human presence on the surface of the Moon and future missions to Mars require increased independence from surface crews and Earth-based mission control to operate efficiently, safely, and reliably. The time for surface crews to perform tasks will be limited. Extravehicular activities by surface personnel are burdensome and time-consuming, even when a continuous human presence on the surface occurs. Identifying and balancing human/automation roles and tasks and infusing automation and autonomy practices early in a system’s lifecycle will be essential to achieve mission objectives. Among these objectives are attaining a sustained human presence, improving performance and mission effectiveness, reducing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, and ensuring operations that are robust to communication delays. To achieve these objectives, an operational shift toward increased automation and autonomy with less reliance on humans is needed. Uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities occur when surface crews are not present or are independent of surface crew timeline activities requiring no surface crew oversight or intervention. These uncrewed surface opportunities can also be planned to minimize crew workload that avoids routine maintenance and support tasks, thus maximizing crew exploration time. Uncrewed preparations such as staging and prepositioning equipment and materials before the crew arrives could improve crew task efficiency. Additional opportunities exist to conduct uncrewed science, exploration, and utilization. Uncrewed surface architecture functions can include science and exploration; habitation; launch and landing support; surface communication and navigation; surface power generation and distribution; human surface mobility; lifting, handling, manipulating; excavation, construction, and site preparation; logistics management; maintenance and repair; surface resource utilization; integrated site operations and shared support services (e.g., site scheduling/prioritization, dust mitigation/contamination control, and surface safety). Early robotic lunar surface campaigns will provide information on the availability of resources, such as oxygen and water, and demonstrate surface-based technologies. After the Artemis III human lunar return mission, a series of landers will deliver surface systems, cargo, supplies, science packages, spare parts, and commodities. A balance of crewed and uncrewed surface operations will enable a sustained lunar surface presence at the South Pole of the Moon at a site that will be known as the Artemis Base Camp (ABC). It is envisioned that base camp operations on and around the Moon will then help prepare for the mission durations and activities needed to support the first human mission to Mars. Before long-duration crew missions to the base camp can occur, the necessary surface infrastructure will be pre-deployed and verified operational. Surface assets will be teleoperated and remotely managed from Earth. Additionally, robotic and short-duration crewed missions to the ABC will ensure the site’s merit to achieve long-term science objectives, availability of usable resources, and that terrain, seasonal variations, and illumination conditions are acceptable. ABC will consist of different areas where specific functions and services are rendered, including: • Launch and Landing Area • Habitation Area • Power Production Area • Resource Areas Launch and Landing Area—The launch and landing area will support associated functions for the arrival and departure of vehicles, such as crewed landing and ascent and uncrewed cargo deliveries and offloading. It will evolve from an unimproved site at the beginning of the exploration campaign to a more sustainable landing and launch area that can support repeated arrivals and departures. Initial uncrewed Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) surface operations may include emplacement of navigation beacons and communication equipment, real-time video and photography of landing/liftoff events, and element repositioning, such as portable utility power (PUP) (applicable for other landed assets at other areas). Site preparations, such as surface leveling, soil compaction, and berm/path construction, may be needed for a more sustainable launch and landing area capable of accommodating vehicles that are increasingly more reusable and reduce the effects of plume surface interactions and ejecta impacts on nearby surface assets. During the ABC missions, cargo and logistics will be delivered to the lunar surface via robotic cargo landers before the crew arrives. These shipments, which can arrive in pressurized logistics carriers, will deliver the logistics necessary to support a crewed mission and include items such as food, water, equipment spares, etc. Providing the capability to retrieve, offload, and transport the logistics closer to the ABC site before the arrival of the crew will increase the overall efficiency of crew operations once they arrive. In the sustained phase of exploration, other supporting services may be needed, such as lander propellant servicing, surface power services, commodity refreshes, and additional inspection, maintenance, and repair capabilities, to sustain a cadence of extended personnel stays and cargo arrivals and departures. Habitation Area—Uncrewed support to surface habitation could involve supporting activation and pre-entry operations of the habitat while the crew is in orbit at the Gateway outpost preparing for a surface landing. Surface Habitat (SH) uncrewed operations may include bringing the cabin environment to a habitable temperature and air mix and activating other critical crew support systems. Potential crop production uncrewed tasks in the SH could also include autonomous watering and tending. Additionally, when the crew departs, the SH enters dormancy for the long period of uncrewed operation. A logistical staging area could also be collocated near the SH. If so, staging operations for crew supplies, waste re-location, and recycling operations may be opportunities for uncrewed operations. Power Production Area—The Fission Surface Power (FSP) element and its supporting distribution equipment provide power to surface elements as needed across the ABC to supplement day-to-day operations and survive lunar nights. Uncrewed support of this power system includes any initial LTV-assisted deployments of cables and other distributed equipment, associated electrical connections, and system testing and activation operations. Robotically performing some inspections, maintenance, or repair tasks on the power distribution equipment could reduce the surface crew workload. Resource Area— Uncrewed resource prospecting, mapping, and characterizing possible resource sites is likely to be time-consuming and represents an opportunity for uncrewed operations between crewed missions. Uncrewed mobile equipment operations will be needed in the extreme environments of permanently shadowed locations where resource extractions occur. As In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) pilot plant operations begin, uncrewed surface support activities with available mobile and portable assets (LTV, PUP, etc.) will better support these operations. Any produced commodities can be stored at a centralized storage location for future use. Also associated with these operations is the use of mobile robotic excavators for resource acquisition and robotic/autonomous regolith processing. The waste tailings generated during excavation and regolith processing would also need to be transported and deposited at a dedicated location. Surface assets will continue operating between crew visits to maintain surface capabilities, conduct lunar surface science, technology demonstrations, and public outreach opportunities. Additionally, certain sustaining tasks that would consume valuable crew time could be performed before crew arrival, or after their departure. This capability may offer more affordable options to construct, activate, test, and maintain a broad set of surface assets. Telerobotically operated human surface mobility systems, such as the LTV and Pressurized Rover (PR), can be utilized for various tasks. Surface environmental conditions pose a distinct challenge for all these activities. Surface illumination and localized shadows are one such factor. Night-survival operations could consist of thermal management, battery pre-charging, and load shedding. Some surface systems may hibernate through the night and then awake and continue nominal operations. Uncrewed mobile assets may use a more adaptive approach to optimize their power and operations; one method is to follow the sunlight. Night-survival operations may be initiated remotely by teleoperation, automated, or accomplished by supervised autonomous operation. The ability to pre-deploy and control remote assets in orbit or on Mars before the arrival of the mission crew is a key capability that can be simulated on the moon. The base camp provides a venue where these advanced operational concepts, technologies, and autonomous methods and techniques, including the incorporation of time delays to simulate Earth-Mars latency can be replicated to help buy down future Mars mission risks. This paper will examine the evolution of uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities. It will also discuss the lunar surface environmental conditions (thermal, lighting, terrain, topography, communications) along with the challenges they pose on uncrewed surface operations, and the performance of these activities with limited to minimal human interaction and/or teleoperation. Since lunar missions include Mars mission analogs, such investigation provides the framework for future uncrewed Mars mission support.

Mark E Lewis↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Lunar Surface System Supportability Technology Development Roadmap

This paper discusses the establishment of a Supportability Technology Development Roadmap as a guide for developing capabilities intended to allow NASA's Constellation program to enable a supportable, sustainable and affordable exploration of the Moon and Mars. Presented is a discussion of "supportability", in terms of space facility maintenance, repair and related logistics and a comparison of how lunar outpost supportability differs from the International Space Station. Supportability lessons learned from NASA and Department of Defense experience and their impact on a future lunar outpost is discussed. A supportability concept for future missions to the Moon and Mars that involves a transition from a highly logistics dependent to a logistically independent operation is discussed. Lunar outpost supportability capability needs are summarized and a supportability technology development strategy is established. The resulting Lunar Surface Systems Supportability Strategy defines general criteria that will be used to select technologies that will enable future flight crews to act effectively to respond to problems and exploit opportunities in a environment of extreme resource scarcity and isolation. This strategy also introduces the concept of exploiting flight hardware as a supportability resource. The technology roadmap involves development of three mutually supporting technology categories, Diagnostics Test & Verification, Maintenance & Repair, and Scavenging & Recycling. The technology roadmap establishes two distinct technology types, "Embedded" and "Process" technologies, with different implementation and thus different criteria and development approaches. The supportability technology roadmap addresses the technology readiness level, and estimated development schedule for technology groups that includes down-selection decision gates that correlate with the lunar program milestones. The resulting supportability technology roadmap is intended to develop a set of technologies with widest possible capability and utility with a minimum impact on crew time and training and remain within the time and cost constraints of the Constellation program

Oeftering, Richard C.↗

NASA NTRS2011

A Lunar Surface System Supportability Technology Development Roadmap

This paper discusses the establishment of a Supportability Technology Development Roadmap as a guide for developing capabilities intended to allow NASA s Constellation program to enable a supportable, sustainable and affordable exploration of the Moon and Mars. Presented is a discussion of supportability, in terms of space facility maintenance, repair and related logistics and a comparison of how lunar outpost supportability differs from the International Space Station. Supportability lessons learned from NASA and Department of Defense experience and their impact on a future lunar outpost is discussed. A supportability concept for future missions to the Moon and Mars that involves a transition from a highly logistics dependent to a logistically independent operation is discussed. Lunar outpost supportability capability needs are summarized and a supportability technology development strategy is established. The resulting Lunar Surface Systems Supportability Strategy defines general criteria that will be used to select technologies that will enable future flight crews to act effectively to respond to problems and exploit opportunities in an environment of extreme resource scarcity and isolation. This strategy also introduces the concept of exploiting flight hardware as a supportability resource. The technology roadmap involves development of three mutually supporting technology categories, Diagnostics Test and Verification, Maintenance and Repair, and Scavenging and Recycling. The technology roadmap establishes two distinct technology types, "Embedded" and "Process" technologies, with different implementation and thus different criteria and development approaches. The supportability technology roadmap addresses the technology readiness level, and estimated development schedule for technology groups that includes down-selection decision gates that correlate with the lunar program milestones. The resulting supportability technology roadmap is intended to develop a set of technologies with widest possible capability and utility with a minimum impact on crew time and training and remain within the time and cost constraints of the Constellation program.

Oeftering, Richard C.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Articulating Support for Horizontal Resistive Exercise

A versatile mechanical device provides support for a user engaged in any of a variety of resistive exercises in a substantially horizontal orientation. The unique features and versatility of the device promise to be useful in bedrest studies, rehabilitation, and specialized strength training. The device affords a capability for selectively loading and unloading of portions of the user s body through its support mechanisms, so that specific parts of the body can be trained with little or no effect on other parts that may be disabled or in the process of recovery from injury. Thus, the device is ideal for rehabilitation exercise programs prescribed by physicians and physical therapists. The capability for selective loading and support also offers potential benefits to strength and conditioning trainers and athletes who wish to selectively strengthen selected parts. The principal innovative aspect of the device is that it supports the subject s weight while enabling the subject, lying substantially horizontally, to perform an exercise that closely approximates a full standing squat. The device includes mechanisms that support the subject in such a way that the hips are free to translate both horizontally and vertically and are free to rotate about the line connecting the hips. At the same time, the shoulders are free to translate horizontally while the upper back is free to rotate about the line connecting the shoulders. Among the mechanisms for hip motion and support is a counterbalance that offsets the weight of the subject as the subject s pelvis translates horizontally and vertically and rotates the pelvis about the line connecting the hips. The counterbalance is connected to a pelvic support system that allows these pelvic movements. The subject is also supported at the shoulder by a mechanism that can tilt to provide continuous support of the upper back while allowing the rotation required for arching the back as the pelvis is displaced. The shoulder support also affords a capability for horizontal motion, and acts as the point of attachment of a load that is provided for squat and heel-raise exercises. The device is compatible with any resistive-exercise machine that provides bilateral loading via a moving cable or other mechanical linkage. The hip-translation and shoulder-translation and -rotation degrees of freedom of the supports can be locked individually or in combination in order to support the subject as necessary for exercises other than the standing squat. If necessary, for such exercises, the load can be applied directly to the subject by use of various attachments. In addition to the aforementioned heel raise, such exercises include the upright row, leg press, curls, extension of the triceps, front raise, lateral raise, and rear raise.

Gundo, Daniel↗

NASA NTRS2019

Supporting Crew Autonomy in Deep Space Exploration: Preliminary Onboard Capability Requirements and Proposed Research Questions. Technical Report of the Autonomous Crew Operations Technical Interchange Meeting

Communication delays are a critical challenge posed by long duration deep space exploration. Space missions historically have relied on an ever-present Mission Control Center (MCC) to direct operations in near real-time. As unanticipated anomalies that defeat fault detection and resolution systems do arise, the lack of real-time communication will significantly weaken what the MCC support represents: a reliable safety net for the flight crew through its deep and diverse areas of expertise and investigative resources. As a consequence, future space vehicles and habitats need to be equipped with capabilities to support the flight crew to operate with little or no ground support. Considerations must be given to vehicle and mission designs that will fortify the traditionally ground-centered safety net and forge new support systems, when communication delays exist. In August 2018, NASA’s Human Research Program, through its Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element, convened a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) on Autonomous Crew Operations at NASA Ames Research Center. The goal of the meeting was to gather input from NASA centers, industry, academia, and branches of the Department of Defense (DoD) to address how intelligent technologies can be applied to augment onboard capabilities to support crew anomaly response. The TIM featured 24 presentations by 29 speakers and hosted a total of 59 attendees, including 43 from 5 NASA centers (Ames, Johnson, Langley, Marshall, and Jet Propulsion Lab) and 4 from the DoD (3 from Army Research Lab and 1 from Naval Postgraduate School), with remaining attendees from academia (e.g., UC Davis, CMU) and industry (e.g., IBM, Siemens). Discussions were centered around three themes: standards and guidelines, lessons learned in analog environments, and technologies. To help provide a framework for discussion, a concept matrix describing anomaly response processes was created prior to the TIM (Figure 1, page 6). The matrix captures the steps involved (monitoring and detection, diagnosis, solution development and evaluation, solution implementation and verification, resolution documentation) as well as the resources and capabilities required to support these steps (data, knowledge, analysis, synthesis, resource management). A wallpaper size printout of the matrix was utilized at the TIM to solicit attendee inputs along the three themes; the activity garnered 108 submissions of ideas. Overall, what emerged from TIM discussions was a picture of mismatch between crew anomaly response needs and support that can be provided by existing intelligent technologies. The needs are broad, spanning multiple steps and processes/resources, with many of which lacking support from existing technologies, such as knowledge management throughout the steps of problem solving (especially in resolution documentation) and manpower management. The solutions provided by existing intelligent technologies are specific to the steps/processes that they are designed to support and constrained to solving only problems similar to those that have occurred before. What is lacking from technologies is typically made up by humans, specifically their complex critical thinking, creative problem solving, and domain expertise. In the end, the TIM highlighted the pressing need to support responses to onboard anomalies during autonomous crew operations, particularly those that have eluded the system tests, inspection, and other assurance processes. Such anomalies can potentially threaten crew and vehicle safety, as well as significantly impact overall operations with additional workload. These fairly rare events are difficult to anticipate and prepare for, given the state-of-the-art in intelligent technologies. This is true even for anomalies that stem from “unknown knowns”—cases in which there is sufficient external information to characterize the problem but the overall pattern fails to be recognized by the problem solver, or in which the internal knowledge needed to solve a problem is held tacitly and potentially accessible by the problem solver but not articulated. It follows that the ability to tackle anomalies lies not only with the availability of relevant information and knowledge but also their accessibility in times of need. To that end, we propose research questions along the following three broad themes: • How intelligent technologies can help make relevant knowledge and information available? • How intelligent technologies can help make relevant knowledge and information accessible? • How intelligent technologies can help support the crew operating as a team in anomaly response processes?

autonomous crew operations↗

NASA NTRS1974

Flutter of panels on discrete flexible supports

The supersonic flutter of wide panels on discrete flexible supports is investigated for three different panel-support configurations. The first study examines the effect of support stiffness on the flutter behavior of a specific five-support configuration with leading-and trailing-edge overhangs; this configuration was recently under consideration for a heat shield on an entry body. The second study investigates the effect of support stiffness on flutter of panels with various numbers of equally spaced supports. The third study examines the effect of center-support location on the flutter of panels with three supports. Results are presented in nondimensional form. The analysis is based on wide-plate structural theory and Ackeret aerodynamics. Finite differences are employed to obtain solutions for flutter pressure. A computer program based on this analysis and including a direct solution technique is presented. The program can be used to find the flutter pressure of wide panels of variable thickness supported by any number of flexible supports.

Stein, M.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Environmental Control and Life Support Integration Strategy for 6-Crew Operations

The International Space Station (ISS) crew compliment will be increasing in size from 3 to 6 crew members in the summer of 2009. In order to support this increase in crew on ISS, the United States on-orbit Segment (USOS) has been outfitted with a suite of regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) hardware including an Oxygen Generation System(OGS), Waste and Hygiene Compartment (WHC), and a Water Recovery System (WRS). The WRS includes the Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) and the Water Processor Assembly (WPA). A critical step in advancing to a 6Crew support capability on ISS is a full checkedout and verification of the Regenerative ECLS hardware. With a successful checkout, the ISS will achieve full redundancy in its onorbit life support system between the USOS and Russian Segment (RS). The additional redundancy created by the Regenerative ECLS hardware creates the opportunity for independent support capabilities between segments, and for the first time since the start of ISS, the necessity to revise Life Support strategy agreements. Independent operating strategies coupled with the loss of the Space Shuttle supply and return capabilities in 2010 offers additional challenges. These challenges create the need for a higher level of onorbit consumables reserve to ensure crewmember life support during a system failure. This paper will discuss the evolution of the ISS Life Support hardware strategy in support of 6Crew on ISS, as well as the continued work which will be necessary to ensure the support of crew and ISS Program objectives through the life of station.

FROM↗

NASA NTRS2010

Developing a Logistics Data Process for Support Equipment for NASA Ground Operations

The United States NASA Space Shuttle has long been considered an extremely capable yet relatively expensive rocket. A great part of the roughly US $500 million per launch expense was the support footprint: refurbishment and maintenance of the space shuttle system, together with the long list of resources required to support it, including personnel, tools, facilities, transport and support equipment. NASA determined to make its next rocket system with a smaller logistics footprint, and thereby more cost-effective and quicker turnaround. The logical solution was to adopt a standard Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process based on GEIA-STD-0007 http://www.logisticsengineers.org/may09pres/GEIASTD0007DEXShortIntro.pdf which is the successor of MIL-STD-1388-2B widely used by U.S., NATO, and other world military services and industries. This approach is unprecedented at NASA: it is the first time a major program of programs, Project Constellation, is factoring logistics and supportability into design at many levels. This paper will focus on one of those levels NASA ground support equipment for the next generation of NASA rockets and on building a Logistics Support Analysis Record (LSAR) for developing and documenting a support solution and inventory of resources for. This LSAR is actually a standards-based database, containing analyses of the time and tools, personnel, facilities and support equipment required to assemble and integrate the stages and umbilicals of a rocket. This paper will cover building this database from scratch: including creating and importing a hierarchical bill of materials (BOM) from legacy data; identifying line-replaceable units (LRUs) of a given piece of equipment; analyzing reliability and maintainability of said LRUs; and therefore making an assessment back to design whether the support solution for a piece of equipment is too much work, i.e., too resource-intensive. If one must replace or inspect an LRU too much, perhaps a modification of the design of the equipment can make such operational effort unnecessary. Finally, this paper addresses processes of tying resources to a timeline of tasks performed in ground operations: this enables various overarching analyses, e.g., a summarization of all resources used for a given piece of equipment. Quality Control of data will also be discussed: importing and exporting data from product teams, including spreadsheets-todatabase or data exchange between databases.

Chakrabarti, Suman↗

NASA NTRS2012

Fischer-Tropsch Cobalt Catalyst Improvements with the Presence of TiO2, La2O3, and ZrO2 on an Alumina Support

The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of titanium oxide, lanthanum oxide, and zirconium oxide on alumina supported cobalt catalysts. The hypothesis was that the presence of lanthanum oxide, titanium oxide, and zirconium oxide would reduce the interaction between cobalt and the alumina support. This was of interest because an optimized weakened interaction could lead to the most advantageous cobalt dispersion, particle size, and reducibility. The presence of these oxides on the support were investigated using a wide range of characterization techniques such as SEM, nitrogen adsorption, x-ray diffraction (XRD), temperature programmed reduction (TPR), temperature programmed reduction after reduction (TPR-AR), and hydrogen chemisorptions/pulse reoxidation. Results indicated that both La2O3 and TiO2 doped supports facilitated the reduction of cobalt oxide species in reference to pure alumina supported cobalt catalysts, however further investigation is needed to determine the effect of ZrO2 on the reduction profile. Results showed an increased corrected cluster size for all three doped supported catalysts in comparison to their reference catalysts. The increase in reduction and an increase in the cluster size led to the conclusion that the support-metal interaction weakened by the addition of TiO2 and La2O3. It is also likely that the interaction decreased upon presence of ZrO2 on the alumina, but further research is necessary. Preliminary results have indicated that the alumina-supported catalysts with titanium oxide and lanthanum oxide present are of interest because of the weakened cobalt support interaction. These catalysts showed an increased extent of reduction, therefore more metallic cobalt is present on the support. However, whether or not there is more cobalt available to participate in the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis reaction (cobalt surface atoms) depends also on the cluster size. On one hand, increasing cluster size alone tends to decrease the active site density; on the other hand, by increasing the size of the cobalt clusters, there is less likelihood of forming oxidized cobalt complexes (cobalt aluminate) during Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. Thus, from the standpoint of stability, improving the extent of reduction while increasing the particle size slightly may be beneficial for maintaining the sites, even if there is a slight decrease in overall initial active site density.

Klettlinger, Jennifer Lindsey Suder↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supportability Concepts for Crewed Deep Space Exploration

Supportability—defined as the set of system characteristics that influence the logistics and support required to enable safe and effective operations—will be a much larger driver of mass, risk, and crew time for future human space exploration due to the more challenging mission context. For Mars, systems must operate in a logistically isolated environment for much longer durations than previous missions, which results in a higher probability of system failure and therefore an increased need for maintenance or contingency options. Mars missions also lack access to quick aborts, which increases the consequences of an unrecoverable system failure. Together, this higher likelihood and consequence of failure results in an increase in supportability-related risk. Supportability analysis is an important part of systems development that helps designers better understand the impacts of system and mission decisions on risk, mass, and crew time. The real-world processes that drive maintenance requirements and other supportability-related characteristics are probabilistic, and therefore they require different conceptual approaches and models than are used for more deterministic aspects of space systems. This paper provides an overview of supportability analysis, addresses key concepts, and provides examples of how supportability analysis can be incorporated into system development. Specifically, system supportability involves stochastic processes, and therefore must be evaluated using probabilistic models. These models can be used to perform sensitivity analysis even if system characteristics are not yet fully defined. Failure rates cannot be measured directly, but tests provide valuable data that can help refine those estimates. Human spaceflight architectures are complex, and exhibit coupled behavior that should be examined with integrated systems analysis that includes an assessment of supportability.

Supportability↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supportability Concepts for Crewed Deep Space Exploration

Supportability—defined as the set of system characteristics that influence the logistics and support required to enable safe and effective operations—will be a much larger driver of mass, risk, and crew time for future human space exploration due to the more challenging mission context. For Mars, systems must operate in a logistically isolated environment for much longer durations than previous missions, which results in a higher probability of system failure and therefore an increased need for maintenance or contingency options. Mars missions also lack access to quick aborts, which increases the consequences of an unrecoverable system failure. Together, this higher likelihood and consequence of failure results in an increase in supportability-related risk. Supportability analysis is an important part of systems development that helps designers better understand the impacts of system and mission decisions on risk, mass, and crew time. The real-world processes that drive maintenance requirements and other supportability-related characteristics are probabilistic, and therefore they require different conceptual approaches and models than are used for more deterministic aspects of space systems. This paper provides an overview of supportability analysis, addresses key concepts, and provides examples of how supportability analysis can be incorporated into system development. Specifically, system supportability involves stochastic processes, and therefore must be evaluated using probabilistic models. These models can be used to perform sensitivity analysis even if system characteristics are not yet fully defined. Failure rates cannot be measured directly, but tests provide valuable data that can help refine those estimates. Human spaceflight architectures are complex, and exhibit coupled behavior that should be examined with integrated systems analysis that includes an assessment of supportability.

Supportability↗

NASA NTRS1990

Space Station Freedom ECLSS: A step toward autonomous regenerative life support systems

The Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) is a Freedom Station distributed system with inherent applicability to extensive automation primarily due to its comparatively long control system latencies. These allow longer contemplation times in which to form a more intelligent control strategy and to prevent and diagnose faults. The regenerative nature of the Space Station Freedom ECLSS will contribute closed loop complexities never before encountered in life support systems. A study to determine ECLSS automation approaches has been completed. The ECLSS baseline software and system processes could be augmented with more advanced fault management and regenerative control systems for a more autonomous evolutionary system, as well as serving as a firm foundation for future regenerative life support systems. Emerging advanced software technology and tools can be successfully applied to fault management, but a fully automated life support system will require research and development of regenerative control systems and models. The baseline Environmental Control and Life Support System utilizes ground tests in development of batch chemical and microbial control processes. Long duration regenerative life support systems will require more active chemical and microbial feedback control systems which, in turn, will require advancements in regenerative life support models and tools. These models can be verified using ground and on orbit life support test and operational data, and used in the engineering analysis of proposed intelligent instrumentation feedback and flexible process control technologies for future autonomous regenerative life support systems, including the evolutionary Space Station Freedom ECLSS.

Dewberry, Brandon S.↗