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At least 91 records · Page 5

AI/Ml Assurance

Presentation of the AI/ML (Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning) design assurance work done under the System-Wide Safety project to INCAS (Romanian National Institute for Aerospace Research). The meeting was organized by the Airspace Operations & Safety program (AOSP) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. The presentation gave an overview of why assurance is needed for AI/ML applications, the industry and governmental drivers and a list of the assurance technology themes explored in SWS.

Safety↗

Ground Risk Informed Operational Planning for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Increasing quantities of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) operations present many challenges in terms of safe adoption and integration into existing airspace. The ability to study and quantify the risk to third parties on the ground prior to flight is an important step toward enabling Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations. The Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) software is a capability developed by NASA to assist with third-party risk quantification and risk-informed flight planning. In this paper, two nominal flight paths intended to represent an infrastructure inspection mission are evaluated using the software to demonstrate its utility. A method is also introduced for adding other NASA-developed capabilities into a single architecture to assess a broader set of operational risks associated with BVLOS operations. These capabilities include a navigation system performance prediction tool, a high fidelity vehicle dynamics model, high resolution wind field data, and other information pertinent to operators. Data produced by these capabilities are combined to enable use of the Performance Based Navigation (PBN) concept borrowed from conventional aviation, providing quantified flight path uncertainty for where the sUAS is likely to be relative to its nominal flight plan. Ground risk is assessed within this region of uncertainty, giving a higher level of confidence in the solution compared to an analysis of only the nominal flight path.

Ground Risk↗

Uncertainty Quantification of Expected Time-of-Arrival in UAV Flight Trajectory

One of the foremost requirements for accurate in-flight safety monitoring of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is tracking of their flight trajectory. Existing UAVs leverage autonomous flight functionalities based on trajectory generation algorithms developed in robotic applications such as polynomial or spline curves in order to facilitate kinematic smoothness, minimum vibrations and fuel efficiency. However in practice, the actual path may be subjected to unexpected local weather conditions, unexpected obstacles along the path or abrupt traffic changes in the low-altitude airspace resulting in large errors of the predicted time-of-arrival at way-points. In this study, an approach to quantify and propagate uncertainty in 4D trajectories is proposed. The paper presents a simple error interval propagation method based on the expected cruise speed of the UAV and its associated uncertainty. The uncertainty is then propagated in time to estimate reasonable confidence intervals on the times-of-arrival of the vehicle at each way-point as well as along the entire flight-path. The uncertainty propagation is demonstrated on a state-of-the-art trajectory generation algorithm based on non-uniform rational B-spline (NURBS) curves. Further, the effect of a stationary wind field is incorporated in the uncertainty propagation approach. The proposed method is implemented on synthetic and real data obtained from flight experiments with a small UAV.

Uncertainty Quantification↗

Humans as Automation Failsafe: HAT Assistant

Humans are frequently left to “backstop” automated systems, and Human Factors specialists have argued against this for decades with, at best, partial success. What if we took a different tack... and designed to support it? The participants were involved in a recent effort to review and document cases across multiple domains where operators acted as a “failsafe” for automation, intervening in unanticipated situations to maximize success and minimize damage. We defined a “Human As Failsafe” (HAF) incident and then investigated conditions and practices making HAF success more or less likely. Analyzing these historical incidents, we suggested remediation approaches. The project also examined the legal concept of culpability (i.e., when intervention should have happened but didn’t) and proposed a state-machine-based analytic simulation to identify when HAF interventions are plausible. The panel objective will be to briefly present these concepts, but more generally to discuss designing for inevitable HAF events. This presentation with review the concept of a HAT Assistant to support multi-vehicle control of drones in a wildland firefighting context.

humans as failsafe↗

Role of PHM in Autonomous Decision-Making: Aerospace applications

There is an increased need for onboard decision-making capabilities in cyber-physical systems be it in energy, automotive, aviation, space, or other industries as they aim for increased efficiency, resiliency, and mission assurance capabilities. Emerging next-gen technologies such as multi-rover planetary missions, distributed satellites, unmanned ground and aerial vehicle operations and smart grid systems rely on in-time risk assessment and autonomous decision-making. One critical piece of the autonomy puzzle is reliable prediction of system behavior under time-varying and potentially uncertain environmental conditions. Further, if agent states change during operation such as initiation of faults or degradation, reliable diagnostic tools need to be investigated. In this tutorial, we will revise approaches that integrates existing physics-based and data-driven models of agents interacting with probability models of the environment and component operation state. Role of existing PHM methodologies as they feed into decision-making under uncertainty will be studied. Balancing critical trade-offs between high-fidelity prognostic models, prediction time-horizons and the computational requirements for in-time cost-effective decision-making will be discussed through the implementation of surrogate models. Finally, the audience will be introduced to a real-time application of in-time trajectory planning of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) based on its PHM assessments under uncertain and varying wind conditions.

decision-making↗

Aviation Safety Concerns for the Future

The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) is a multidisciplinary international group of aviation professionals that was established to identify possible future aviation safety hazards. The principle was adopted that future hazards are undesirable consequences of changes, and a primary activity of FAST became identification and prioritization of possible future changes affecting aviation. Since 2004, FAST has been maintaining a catalogue of "Areas of Change" (AoC) that could potentially influence aviation safety. The horizon for such changes is between 5 to 20 years. In this context, changes must be understood as broadly as possible. An AoC is a description of the change, not an identification of the hazards that result from the change. An ex-post analysis of the AoCs identified in 2004 demonstrates that changes catalogued many years previous were directly implicated in the majority of fatal aviation accidents over the past ten years. This paper presents an overview of the current content of the AoC catalogue and a subsequent discussion of aviation safety concerns related to these possible changes. Interactions among these future changes may weaken critical functions that must be maintained to ensure safe operations. Safety assessments that do not appreciate or reflect the consequences of significant interaction complexity will not be fully informative and can lead to inappropriate trade-offs and increases in other risks. The FAST strongly encourages a system-wide approach to safety risk assessment across the global aviation system, not just within the domain for which future technologies or operational concepts are being considered. The FAST advocates the use of the "Areas of Change" concept, considering that several possible future phenomena may interact with a technology or operational concept under study producing unanticipated hazards.

emerging risks↗

Ring Buffered Network Bus

This report describes the research effort to demonstrate the integration of a data sharing technology, Ring Buffered Network Bus, in development by Dryden Flight Research Center, with an engine simulation application, the Java Gas Turbine Simulator, in development at the University of Toledo under a grant from the Glenn Research Center. The objective of this task was to examine the application of the RBNB technologies as a key component in the data sharing, health monitoring and system wide modeling elements of the NASA Aviation Safety Program (AVSP) [Golding, 1997]. System-wide monitoring and modeling of aircraft and air safety systems will require access to all data sources which are relative factors when monitoring or modeling the national airspace such as radar, weather, aircraft performance, engine performance, schedule and planning, airport configuration, flight operations, etc. The data sharing portion of the overall AVSP program is responsible for providing the hardware and software architecture to access and distribute data, including real-time flight operations data, among all of the AVSP elements. The integration of an engine code capable of numerically "flying" through recorded flight paths and weather data using a software tool that allows for distributed access of data to this engine code demonstrates initial steps toward building a system capable of monitoring and modeling the National Airspace.

Source record↗

National Campaign Partner Demonstration Team Annual Review April 2023

- NASA developed the Advanced Air Mobility Project (AAM) and the National Campaign (NC) series to identify and address challenges ahead for advanced air mobility concepts. - NC seeks to challenge industry as follows; - Execute progressively more difficult ecosystem-wide system-level safety and integration scenarios - Demonstrate practical and scalable system concepts - Build a knowledge base for development of requirements and standards - There are currently three focus areas within the NASA AAM NC Portfolio - Vehicle Development and Operations: test and inform capabilities that are critical enablers for AAM such as electric aircraft propulsion and increasing levels of automation - Airspace Design and Operations: develop and validate an operational concept to integrate and manage AAM traffic safely and efficiently - Community Integration: understand and address critical barriers to community integration, such as public acceptance (noise, security, privacy, etc.), supporting infrastructure, and local regulation

Eric N Becker↗

Architecture of the personnel protection systems for Spallation Neutron Source Second Target Station

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is implementing a major upgrade to the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) facility, encompassing the addition of the Second Target Station (STS). Preliminary design reviews have been conducted on several STS Personnel Protection Systems (PPS). The reviews focused primarily on the integration with the existing SNS PPS, the new proton transport tunnel, and the target areas. Development of the PPS is ongoing, to ensure a coherent safety system with the mission of protecting users and workers from prompt radiation hazards while providing high beam availability to operations. The STS PPS element in the Integrated Control System (ICS) is a facility-wide system composed of multiple safety subsystems, including the Ring to Second Target (RTST) beam transport tunnel, Target, Bunker and Instruments. Personnel working in all these geographic areas are protected by modular reliable PPS solutions. The safety system enforces access controls, radiation monitoring, beam destination control, and application of critical device inhibit upon detection of abnormal condition. It uses well-documented processes, Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) safety, pulsed test, and redundancy to achieve the desired Safety Integrity Level (SIL). This paper gives an architectural overview of the STS PPS and a detailed safety plan for the SNS facility, addressing safety solutions and human factors.

Michaelides, Tommy [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000190499869)↗

Prototype Input and Output Data Elements for the Occupational Health and Safety Information System

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration plans to implement a NASA-wide computerized information system for occupational health and safety. The system is necessary to administer the occupational health and safety programs and to meet the legal and regulatory reporting, recordkeeping, and surveillance requirements. Some of the potential data elements that NASA will require as input and output for the new occupational health and safety information system are illustrated. The data elements are shown on sample forms that have been compiled from various sources, including NASA Centers and industry.

Whyte, A. A.↗

System safety checklist Skylab program report

Design criteria statement applicable to a wide variety of flight systems, experiments and other payloads, associated ground support equipment and facility support systems are presented. The document reflects a composite of experience gained throughout the aerospace industry prior to Skylab and additional experience gained during the Skylab Program. It has been prepared to provide current and future program organizations with a broad source of safety-related design criteria and to suggest methods for systematic and progressive application of the criteria beginning with preliminary development of design requirements and specifications. Recognizing the users obligation to shape the checklist to his particular needs, a summary of the historical background, rationale, objectives, development and implementation approach, and benefits based on Skylab experience has been included.

Mcnail, E. M.↗

Collision avoidance sensor skin

The objective was to totally eliminate the possibility of a robot (or any mechanism for that matter) inducing a collision in space operations. We were particularly concerned that human beings were safe under all circumstances. This was apparently accomplished, and it is shown that GSFC has a system that is ready for space qualification and flight. However, it soon became apparent that much more could be accomplished with this technology. Payloads could be made invulnerable to collision avoidance and the blind spots behind them eliminated. This could be accomplished by a simple, non-imaging set of 'Capaciflector' sensors on each payload. It also is evident that this system could be used to align and dock the system with a wide margin of safety. Throughout, lighting problems could be ignored, and unexpected events and modeling errors taken in stride. At the same time, computational requirements would be reduced. This can be done in a simple, rugged, reliable manner that will not disturb the form factor of space systems. It will be practical for space applications. The lab experiments indicate we are well on the way to accomplishing this. Still, the research trail goes deeper. It now appears that the sensors can be extended to end effectors to provide precontact information and make robot docking (or any docking connection) very smooth, with minimal loads impacted back into the mating structures. This type of ability would be a major step forward in basic control techniques in space. There are, however, baseline and restructuring issues to be tackled. The payloads must get power and signals to them from the robot or from the astronaut servicing tool. This requires a standard electromechanical interface. Any of several could be used. The GSFC prototype shown in this presentation is a good one. Sensors with their attendant electronics must be added to the payloads, end effectors, and robot arms and integrated into the system.

Source record↗

Multiple Kernel Learning for Heterogeneous Anomaly Detection: Algorithm and Aviation Safety Case Study

The world-wide aviation system is one of the most complex dynamical systems ever developed and is generating data at an extremely rapid rate. Most modern commercial aircraft record several hundred flight parameters including information from the guidance, navigation, and control systems, the avionics and propulsion systems, and the pilot inputs into the aircraft. These parameters may be continuous measurements or binary or categorical measurements recorded in one second intervals for the duration of the flight. Currently, most approaches to aviation safety are reactive, meaning that they are designed to react to an aviation safety incident or accident. In this paper, we discuss a novel approach based on the theory of multiple kernel learning to detect potential safety anomalies in very large data bases of discrete and continuous data from world-wide operations of commercial fleets. We pose a general anomaly detection problem which includes both discrete and continuous data streams, where we assume that the discrete streams have a causal influence on the continuous streams. We also assume that atypical sequence of events in the discrete streams can lead to off-nominal system performance. We discuss the application domain, novel algorithms, and also discuss results on real-world data sets. Our algorithm uncovers operationally significant events in high dimensional data streams in the aviation industry which are not detectable using state of the art methods

Das, Santanu↗

Adapting safety requirements analysis to intrusion detection

Several requirements analysis techniques widely used in safety-critical systems are being adapted to support the analysis of secure systems. Perhaps the most relevant system safety techique for Intrusion Detection Systems is hazard analysis.

requirements analysis safety intrusion detection↗