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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2024

Handbook of Molecular Beam Epitaxy of Oxide Materials: Epitaxial Complex Oxide Growth on Semiconductors

This chapter covers the epitaxy of complex oxides on common inorganic semiconductors. The chapter opens with an introduction, motivating the subject and highlighting key general challenges (Section 6.1). We then proceed to describe the general steps of the growth procedure in Section 6.2, which concludes with an overall discussion about trade-offs and expectation management, with an emphasis on the oxide–semiconductor interface. From there, the text describes oxide growth on the common semiconductors, starting with silicon (Section 6.3), where surface reactions and oxidation are the most challenging aspects. Oxide epitaxy on germanium is described in Section 6.4, which is a less challenging oxide growth scheme on semiconductors. Section 6.5 describes oxide epitaxy on gallium arsenide, one of the more challenging schemes, where interface stability and surface preparation pose key challenges. Finally, in Section 6.6, oxide epitaxy on gallium nitride is described, where the lattice mismatch takes the stage as the key challenge. Altogether, this chapter aims to provide the reader with the practical knowledge, tactics and strategies for oxide epitaxy on semiconductors.

Demkov, Alexander A↗
DOE OSTI2024

Wildfire management decisions outweigh mechanical treatment as the keystone to forest landscape adaptation

Modern land management faces unprecedented uncertainty regarding future climates, novel disturbance regimes, and unanticipated ecological feedbacks. Mitigating this uncertainty requires a cohesive landscape management strategy that utilizes multiple methods to optimize benefits while hedging risks amidst uncertain futures. We used a process-based landscape simulation model (LANDIS-II) to forecast forest management, growth, climate effects, and future wildfire dynamics, and we distilled results using a decision support tool allowing us to examine tradeoffs between alternative management strategies. We developed plausible future management scenarios based on factorial combinations of restoration-oriented thinning prescriptions, prescribed fire, and wildland fire use. Results were assessed continuously for a 100-year simulation period, which provided a unique assessment of tradeoffs and benefits among seven primary topics representing social, ecological, and economic aspects of resilience. Projected climatic changes had a substantial impact on modeled wildfire activity. In the Wildfire Only scenario (no treatments, but including active wildfire and climate change), we observed an upwards inflection point in area burned around mid-century (2060) that had detrimental impacts on total landscape carbon storage. While simulated mechanical treatments (~ 3% area per year) reduced the incidence of high-severity fire, it did not eliminate this inflection completely. Scenarios involving wildland fire use resulted in greater reductions in high-severity fire and a more linear trend in cumulative area burned. Mechanical treatments were beneficial for subtopics under the economic topic given their positive financial return on investment, while wildland fire use scenarios were better for ecological subtopics, primarily due to a greater reduction in high-severity fire. Benefits among the social subtopics were mixed, reflecting the inevitability of tradeoffs in landscapes that we rely on for diverse and countervailing ecosystem services. This study provides evidence that optimal future scenarios will involve a mix of active and passive management strategies, allowing different management tactics to coexist within and among ownerships classes. Our results also emphasize the importance of wildfire management decisions as central to building more robust and resilient future landscapes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Partner with a Third-Party Delivery Service or Not? A Prediction-and-Decision Tool for Restaurants Facing Takeout Demand Surges During a Pandemic

Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, restaurants become more reliant on no-contact pick-up or delivery ways for serving customers. As a result, they need to make tactical planning decisions such as whether to partner with online platforms, to form their own delivery team, or both. In this paper, we develop an integrated prediction-decision model to analyze the profit of combining the two approaches and to decide the needed number of drivers under stochastic demand. We first use the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model to forecast future infected cases in a given region and then construct an autoregressive-moving-average (ARMA) regression model to predict food-ordering demand. Using predicted demand samples, we formulate a stochastic integer program to optimize food delivery plans. We conduct numerical studies using COVID-19 data and food-ordering demand data collected from local restaurants in Nuevo Leon, Mexico, from April to October 2020, to show results for helping restaurants build contingency plans under rapid market changes. Our method can be used under unexpected demand surges, various infection/vaccination status, and demand patterns. Here, our results show that a restaurant can benefit from partnering with third-party delivery platforms when (i) the subscription fee is low, (ii) customers can flexibly decide whether to order from platforms or from restaurants directly, (iii) customers require more efficient delivery, (iv) average delivery distance is long, or (v) demand variance is high.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Always/Never Safety Framework for Satellite Rendezvous and Proximity Operations and On-Orbit Servicing

Space rendezvous and proximity operations are increasing in numbers, enabling inspections, diagnostics, and maintenance of on-orbit systems. Because collision, loss of control, and unintended damage can impact the system under examination -- and at the extreme, cause system break-up and space debris -- the safety practices for rendezvous and proximity operations can have significant implications for national security. This study examines the applicability of the Always/Never surety framework, which was developed for United States nuclear weapons, as a model safety basis for unmanned space proximity operations. This unclassified framework has understandable safety approaches and principles and focuses on a system being always safenever unsafe. The authors consider that the adapting the framework might present a means for standardization across government and commerce, encouraging a consistent approach and a set of clarifying safety principles and applications for rendezvous and proximity operations. The framework also offers a consistent taxonomy, presents safety and reliability requirements organized by four environment categories, defines accident or abnormal conditions, contributes a strategy for identifying hostile and tactical environments, and enables decision-making for determining if conditions are safe for proximity space operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Approaching scalable VQE of interacting bosons with NISQ devices [Slides]

Scaling up variational quantum eigensolver (VQE) algorithms to practical applications utilizing quantum advantage with noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices is challenging. The expansive cost-function evaluation and demanding optimization quickly exhaust the precious quantum resource available on NISQ devices. In this work, we discuss the appropriate VQE strategy suitable for multi-site interacting boson systems, for example, the Holstein model and the Rabi lattice model. We investigate the cost-function setup and the optimization tactics to utilize the limited quantum resource efficiently. Our strategy illustrates that the scalable VQE algorithms of interacting bosons have a promising future.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Structures of Cyber Competition in an Era of Major Power Rivalry

Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Atomic Cannon: Upshot-Knothole Grable

The May 25, 1952, Upshot-Knothole Grable event, aka Atomic Annie, proof tested a tactical nuclear weapon fashioned into a 280 mm cannon shell and fired from the Army’s M65 artillery piece. Travelling nearly seven miles downrange, Grable detonated with a force of fifteen kilotons 500 feet over a dry lake bed on the Nevada Test Site known as Frenchman Flat.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Resilience as a Deterrence Strategy

This paper was written by the Cyber Deterrence and Resilience Strategic Initiative in partnership with the Resilience Energy Systems Strategic Initiative. Resilience and deterrence are both part of a comprehensive cyber strategy where tactics may overlap across defense, resilience, deterrence, and other strategic spaces. This paper explores how building resiliency in cyberspace can not only serve to strengthen the defender's posture and capabilities in a general sense but also deter adversaries from attacking.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Design Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Honeypots and Canaries

There are now over 2.5 million Distributed Energy Resource (DER) installations connected to the U.S. power system. These installations represent a major portion of American electricity critical infrastructure and a cyberattack on these assets in aggregate would significantly affect grid operations. Virtualized Operational Technology (OT) equipment has been shown to provide practitioners with situational awareness and better understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Deploying synthetic DER devices as honeypots and canaries would open new avenues of operational defense, threat intelligence gathering, and empower DER owners and operators with new cyber-defense mechanisms against the growing intensity and sophistication of cyberattacks on OT systems. Well-designed DER canary field deployments would deceive adversaries and provide early-warning notifications of adversary presence and malicious activities on OT networks. In this report, we present progress to design a high-fidelity DER honeypot/canary prototype in a late-start Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cineradiography System and Initial 3D-printed Brain Phantoms

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a significant cause of death in tactical, sport and civilian populations. According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) report in 2016, TBI accounted for 227,000 hospitalizations and 60,000 related deaths. In the military, the prevalence of traumatic brain injuries is related to the type of conflict U.S. forces are involved in and are typically classified as mild traumatic brain injuries (mTBIs). Troops returning from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom had a TBI rate estimated at 15.2% to 22.8%; nearly 320,000 troops. These mTBIs were primarily blast-induced and often lacked any accompanying symptoms. Left untreated, these mild injuries have been linked to chronic disorders and cognitive alterations. One such disorder that has been frequently recorded in literature is chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE). CTE is a progressive neurodegenerative tauopathy resulting from repetitive mTBIs. The repetitive head injuries involved in sport, classified as mTBIs, has resulted in CTE development in athletes involved in contact sports. While the association between mTBIs and CTE has been pathologically verified, the mechanisms have yet to be identified. In order to better understand these mechanisms, the use of flash x-ray radiography is being considered.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating China's Road to Cyber Super Power

This report examines open source, non-classified qualitative analysis to evaluate China’s current cyber maturity. Evidence for this document draws on materials from academia, private cybersecurity companies, and national security research institutions. Private sector threat intelligence firms produce high quality analysis on Chinese APTs tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and investigation from companies such as FireEye illuminate China’s ability to wield cyber means for its security ends. None of the materials cited in this assessment originate from classified United States or foreign government sources. Any references to United States government sources are sourced entirely to unclassified information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Buster-Jangle

Buster-Jangle changed the working relationship between the AEC and the DoD. Beginning with Trinity and continuing through Greenhouse, the military was the logistical hub of nuclear testing, supplying men and material to carry out the myriad of mostly non-technical tasks. With the inclusion of the two Jangle tests and the Desert Rock exercises, that relationship became more symbiotic driven by the growing requirements for tactical weapons and their possible battlefield use. At Buster-Jangle, as well, the first use of a jet bomber was evidence that the military technology was evolving, requiring closer cooperation between the two agencies to match weapons and delivery systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Events Virtual Workshop: Nuclear Security Planning and Operations (Day 3) [Slides]

This module will provide a basic overview of radiological/nuclear search operations, including the application of radiological detection instrumentation and best practices for operational tactics, techniques and procedures. This module will introduce basic radiological/nuclear search operations and include the following: (1) A review of the principles of optimizing detection, (2) An understanding of radiation hazards and alarms, and (3) An examination of nuclear security measures best practices for buildings and stadium complexes, large areas, roadways and parking areas, and pedestrian and vehicle entrance portals.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

The False Dilemma: Rethinking AF Science and Technology Officer Talent Management

In 2019, Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) Heather Wilson launched the 2030 Science and Technology (S&T) Strategy by stating, “The advantage will go to those who create the best technologies and who integrate and field them in creative operational ways that provide military advantages.” In 2021, 15% of Air Force general officers responsible for creating and integrating this technological edge had a science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) graduate degree, and less than 1% of generals had a STEM doctorate. As one point of comparison, at least 32% and 13% of founding CEOs of Fortune 500 technology companies had a master’s and doctoral STEM degree, respectively. The gulf is larger when you consider that these CEOs used their technical degrees throughout their careers whereas most general officers do not. In large organizations, if the leader does not possess technical knowledge, it is difficult to drive innovation systems and connect ideas to reality. The evidence for this disconnect is abundant in acquisition challenges for high-tech systems, significant pushback to the “revolution in military affairs”, and failure of the “Third Offset” to take hold and deliver capabilities to offset Chinese and Russian capabilities. Indeed, when the former Air Force and Space Force Chief Software Officer, Nicolas M. Chaillan, offered his resignation, one of the main reasons for leaving was “the failure of OSD and the Joint Staff to deliver on their own alleged top ‘priority’, JADC2 – they couldn’t ‘walk the walk.’” Senior leaders have recognized this disconnect, and several inquiries and studies regarding STEM competency have been conducted. Many have posed a false dilemma: a large, STEM-cognizant or small, STEM-expert force. However, current and future STEM human capital needs are managed at the unit and functional area level. This leads to “silos” and the tactical “needs of the present” dominating the strategic “needs of the future”, highlighted by only two functional areas systematically tracking future STEM needs. Therefore, the decision on force structure appears to have been historically made by default through these and other perceived structural realities, and a vast majority of recommendations have focused on the small STEM community – an exercise in diminishing returns. In essence, the solution often boils down to finding unicorns – officers that have chartered the unforgiving pathway through the traditional “gates” to general officer while obtaining sufficient STEM proficiency along the way. Fortunately for the Air Force, these officers exist, albeit at a rate below what the evidence would suggest is necessary. However, this approach fundamentally limits the ability to develop a deep pool of officers with the ability to create and integrate technologies and ensures the Dunning-Kruger effect is prevalent. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where those with limited knowledge in an area lack the expertise necessary to recognize their lack of expertise and consequently are prone to overestimate their knowledge and performance. In short, we need less leaders overestimating their STEM knowledge and more with hard-earned STEM competency required to “walk the walk” to create and integrate technologies for military advantage. This will not be accomplished by restricting the emphasis to the traditional scientists and engineering (S&E) career fields – the pool, only 10% of line officers, and general officer progression is just too small. Fortunately, the recent SECAF’s Management Initiatives and Chief of Staff’s (CSAF) Action Orders, both containing emphasis on organic expertise to “accrue advantage in military-technological competition,” present an opportunity to truly develop a framework for the force of the future.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Considerations for Department of Defense Implementation of Zero-Emission Vehicles and Charging Infrastructure

This guide provides a roadmap to comply with Executive Order (EO) 14057 requirements and transition to a zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) fleet efficiently and quickly. EO 14057 on Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs Through Federal Sustainability requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to transition its non-tactical vehicles to a 100% ZEV fleet, including 100% of light-duty acquisitions by 2027 and 100% of medium- and heavy-duty acquisitions by 2035. The report covers planning for ZEVs and electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in designing EVSE, and execution issues including acquisition, installation, and ongoing fleet management.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2022

HEMM Workshop EMRTC [Slides]

Los Alamos is responsible for the NATO deterrent, is critical to the UK at-sea deterrent, and has designed over 90% of the current US stockpile. Los Alamos MUST lead the stockpile into the next phase of nuclear deterrence. To succeed, we need to leverage across several funding sources and sites to both answer the tactical needs of the current stockpile and to develop capabilities and personnel to meet future challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Surface Tagging with Photoluminescent Particles (Summary Report for FY22)

This report describes the results of initial welding trials for the purpose of implanting photoluminescent taggants in the form of metal-based oxides on the surface of a base material for future detection. The goal of this work was to explore the feasibility of using photoluminescent particles as surface tags for nuclear fuels and related materials (e.g., cladding). These tags could be used to store information about material provenance while being difficult to observe with the naked eye. This work is one of many related projects focused on nuclear fuel tagging, at the surface and bulk level, and is part of a multi-site Venture project. This tactic should not be viewed as a sole solution to tagging fuel, but rather a potential manufacturing strategy that may be implemented alongside other tagging strategies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗