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79 records · Page 5

New Observing Strategies Testbed (NOS-T)

The New Observing Strategies (NOS) initiative within the NASA Earth Science Technology Office(ESTO)Advanced Information Systems Technology(AIST) program envisions future Earth science missions with distributed sensors(nodes) interconnected by a communications fabric that enables dynamic and intelligent operations [1].Some NOS concepts resemble systems-of-systems or collaborative systems where operational authority is distributed among multiple systems, necessitating new methods for systems engineering and design to cope with more decentralized control over constituent systems[2].The New Observing Strategies Testbed (NOS-T, verbalized as "enoh es tee") is a computational environment to develop, test, mature, and socialize new operating concepts and technology for NOS. NOS-T provides infrastructure to integrate and orchestrate user-contributed applications for system-of-systems test cases with true distributed control over constituent systems. The overall concept, illustrated in Figure 1, interconnects individual user applications and a NOS-T manager application via common information system infrastructure to coordinate the execution of virtual Earth science missions. NOS-T enables principal investigators to conduct test runs in the same environment, systematically changing variables to assess the overall efficacy of the proposed new observing strategies. Recorded data and outcomes provide evidence to advance technology readiness level and improve or innovate upon existing Earth science measurement techniques

Paul Grogan↗

Safety Risk Knowledge Elicitation in Support of Aeronautical R and D Portfolio Management: A Case Study

Aviation is a problem domain characterized by a high level of system complexity and uncertainty. Safety risk analysis in such a domain is especially challenging given the multitude of operations and diverse stakeholders. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) projects that by 2025 air traffic will increase by more than 50 percent with 1.1 billion passengers a year and more than 85,000 flights every 24 hours contributing to further delays and congestion in the sky (Circelli, 2011). This increased system complexity necessitates the application of structured safety risk analysis methods to understand and eliminate where possible, reduce, and/or mitigate risk factors. The use of expert judgments for probabilistic safety analysis in such a complex domain is necessary especially when evaluating the projected impact of future technologies, capabilities, and procedures for which current operational data may be scarce. Management of an R&D product portfolio in such a dynamic domain needs a systematic process to elicit these expert judgments, process modeling results, perform sensitivity analyses, and efficiently communicate the modeling results to decision makers. In this paper a case study focusing on the application of an R&D portfolio of aeronautical products intended to mitigate aircraft Loss of Control (LOC) accidents is presented. In particular, the knowledge elicitation process with three subject matter experts who contributed to the safety risk model is emphasized. The application and refinement of a verbal-numerical scale for conditional probability elicitation in a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is discussed. The preliminary findings from this initial step of a three-part elicitation are important to project management practitioners as they illustrate the vital contribution of systematic knowledge elicitation in complex domains.

Shih, Ann T.↗

Electronic map interpretation in a dual-task context

The present experiment was designed to assess the extent to which spatial and verbal-analytic (VA) information processing resources are used in performing a simulated aircraft navigation task. Subjects were required to decide whether a 'match' or a mismatch' existed between a schematic 3D perspective forward field of view and a 2D top-down map. On dual-task trials, this navigation task was concurrently performed with either a VA side-task or with one of two tracking tasks. The data suggest that a VA strategy was most likely to be used when stimuli were simple or were mismatches, whereas a spatial mental rotation strategy was apparently used to confirm complex match stimuli. These results indicate that it may be possible to specify conditions wherein navigation is likely to compete for resources critical to other cockpit activities, such as aircraft control and communication.

Williams, Henry P.↗

Personality factors in flight operations. Volume 1: Leader characteristics and crew performance in a full-mission air transport simulation

Crew effectiveness is a joint product of the piloting skills, attitudes, and personality characteristics of team members. As obvious as this point might seem, both traditional approaches to optimizing crew performance and more recent training development highlighting crew coordination have emphasized only the skill and attitudinal dimensions. This volume is the first in a series of papers on this simulation. A subsequent volume will focus on patterns of communication within crews. The results of a full-mission simulation research study assessing the impact of individual personality on crew performance is reported. Using a selection algorithm described in previous research, captains were classified as fitting one of three profiles along a battery of personality assessment scales. The performances of 23 crews led by captains fitting each profile were contrasted over a one-and-one-half-day simulated trip. Crews led by captains fitting a positive Instrumental-Expressive profile (high achievement motivation and interpersonal skill) were consistently effective and made fewer errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Expressive profile (below average achievement motivation, negative expressive style, such as complaining) were consistently less effective and made more errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Instrumental profile (high levels of competitiveness, verbal aggressiveness, and impatience and irritability) were less effective on the first day but equal to the best on the second day. These results underscore the importance of stable personality variables as predictors of team coordination and performance.

Chidester, Thomas R.↗

Weather data dissemination to aircraft

Documentation exists that shows weather to be responsible for approximately 40 percent of all general aviation accidents with fatalities. Weather data products available on the ground are becoming more sophisticated and greater in number. Although many of these data are critical to aircraft safety, they currently must be transmitted verbally to the aircraft. This process is labor intensive and provides a low rate of information transfer. Consequently, the pilot is often forced to make life-critical decisions based on incomplete and outdated information. Automated transmission of weather data from the ground to the aircraft can provide the aircrew with accurate data in near-real time. The current National Airspace System Plan calls for such an uplink capability to be provided by the Mode S Beacon System data link. Although this system has a very advanced data link capability, it will not be capable of providing adequate weather data to all airspace users in its planned configuration. This paper delineates some of the important weather data uplink system requirements, and describes a system which is capable of meeting these requirements. The proposed system utilizes a run-length coding technique for image data compression and a hybrid phase and amplitude modulation technique for the transmission of both voice and weather data on existing aeronautical Very High Frequency (VHF) voice communication channels.

Mcfarland, Richard H.↗

Operational Lessons Learned from the Ares I-X Flight Test

The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I. Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions. To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB, several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle s configuration had to be removed to accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing, transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B. Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than the Shuttle s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle. Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

Mode Transitions in Glass Cockpit Aircraft: Results of a Field Study

One consequence of increased levels of automation in complex control systems is the presence of modes. A mode is a particular configuration of a control system that defines how human command inputs are interpreted. In complex systems, modes also often determine a specific allocation of control authority between the human and automated systems. Even in simple static devices (e.g., electronic watches, word processors), the presence of modes has been found to cause problems in either-the acquisition or production of skilled performance. Many of these problems arise due to the fact that the selection of a mode causes device behavior to be mediated by hidden internal state information. For these simple systems, many of these interaction problems can be solved by the design of appropriate feedback to communicate internal state information to the human operator. In complex dynamic systems, however, the design issues associated with modes seem to trancend the problem of merely communicating internal state information via displayed feedback. In complex supervisory control systems (e.g., aircraft, spacecraft, military command and control), a key function of modes is the selection of a particular configuration of control authority between the human operator and automated control systems. One mode may result in full manual control, another may result in a mix of manual and automatic control, while a third may result in full automatic control over the entire system. The human operator selects an appropriate mode as a function of current goals, operating conditions, and operating procedures. Thus, the operator is put in a position of essentially trying to control two coupled dynamic systems: the target system itself, and also a highly complex suite of automation controlling the target system. From a historical perspective, it should probably not come as a surprise that very little information is available to guide the design of mode-oriented control systems. The topic of function allocation (i.e., the proper division of control authority among human and computer) has a long history in human-machine systems research. Although this research has produced some relevant guidelines, a design approach capable of defining appropriate allocations of control function between the human and automation is not yet available. As a result, the function allocation decision itself has been allocated to the operator, to be performed in real-time, in the operation of mode-oriented control systems. A variety of documented aircraft accidents and incidents suggest that the real-time selection and monitoring of control modes is a weak link in the effective operation of complex supervisory control systems. Research in human-machine systems and human-computer interaction has barely scraped the surface of the problem of understanding how operators manage this task.The purpose of this paper is to present the results of a field study which examined how operators manage mode selection in a complex supervisory control system. Data on mode engagements using the Boeing B757/767 auto-flight system were collected during approach and descent into four major airports in the East Coast of the United States. Protocols documenting mode selection, automatic mode changes, pilot actions, quantitative records of flight-path variables, and verbal reports during and after mode engagements were collected by an observer from the jumpseat. Observations were conducted on two typical trips between three airports. Each trip was be replicated 11 times, which yielded a total of 22 trips and 66 legs on which data were collected. All data collected concerned the same flight numbers, and therefore, the same time of day, same type of aircraft, and identical operational environments (e.g., ATC facilities, weather patterns, traffic flow etc.)

Degani, Asaf↗