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At least 91 records · Page 5

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

Overview of Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Analysis Process for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry System

Introduction: Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk analyses for the Mars Sample Return (MSR) Earth Entry System (EES) have been significantly more rigorous than previously flown missions because of its categorization as a Class V restricted return mission. This means the returned samples present significant concern for biogenic contamination. These analyses seek to determine if a micrometeoroid or orbital debris strike would result in loss of containment assurance and are summarized in the flowchart in Fig. 1. Methodology: The mission is considered in two MMOD phases: a pre-release phase where the EES is protected by a Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) and a post-release phase called “free-flight” where the EES is exposed directly to the MMOD environment. These phases correspond to interplanetary cruise and imminent re-entry, respectively. To inform the MMPS design, a 30-shot high velocity impact testing (HVIT) series on candidate configurations at NASA White Sands Test Facility was completed in the summer of 2022. Sample post-shot images are shown in Fig 2 [1]. These data are used to baseline the MMPS design and to tune the hydrocode simulations. ALE3D, CTH, and SPHC are the hydrocodes that simulate physics of high-speed impacts [2]. Results generated with these populate a penetration depth versus energy space beyond the testable velocity regime of HVIT (~7 km/s). The penetration depth versus energy space data are used to define a critical projectile diameter function called a Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE), where the projectile “criticality” is determined by zone dependent failure criteria defined a-priori [3]. For example, the nose of the heatshield has a failure criterion of 50% TPS penetration, assigned because the landing loads are concentrated on that region and no substructure damage is permitted. The BLEs for each vehicle material zone are input into the BUMPER 3 code, along with the vehicle surface mesh and the corresponding space environment model, to calculate a probability of penetration or number of penetrations. The environment models, MEM3 for MM and ORDEM 3.2 for OD, simulate the meteoroid environment from 0.2 to 2 au based on the Grün flux equation, and the debris environment up to 40,000 km altitude from Earth surface, respectively [4,5]. Presentation Focus: The presentation or poster will present the results to-date focusing on the full risk analysis process flow seen in Fig. 1. Details on the derivation of the failure criteria will be discussed, along with HVIT results and how these influenced the MMPS configuration baseline decision. Further, results of hydrocode simulations will be presented and the tuning to HVIT outputs will be described. Finally, the strategies that direct the BLE formulation will be reviewed, specifically, for the EES elements that are most exposed to the MMOD environment.

mmod↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.

Wilson, R. E.↗

Ares Launch Vehicles Development Awakens Historic Test Stands at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center

This paper chronicles the rebirth of two national rocket testing assets located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center: the Dynamic Test Stand (also known as the Ground Vibration Test Stand) and the Static Test Stand (also known as the Main Propulsion Test Stand). It will touch on the historical significance of these special facilities, while introducing the requirements driving modifications for testing a new generation space transportation system, which is set to come on line after the Space Shuttle is retired in 2010. In many ways, America's journey to explore the Moon begins at the Marshall Center, which is developing the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle, along with managing the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program and leading the Lunar Lander descent stage work, among other Constellation Program assignments. An important component of this work is housed in Marshall's Engineering Directorate, which manages more than 40 facilities capable of a full spectrum of rocket and space transportation technology testing - from small components to full-up engine systems. The engineers and technicians who operate these test facilities have more than a thousand years of combined experience in this highly specialized field. Marshall has one of the few government test groups in the United States with responsibility for the overall performance of a test program from conception to completion. The Test Laboratory has facilities dating back to the early 1960s, when the test stands needed for the Apollo Program and other scientific endeavors were commissioned and built along the Marshall Center's southern boundary, with logistics access by air, railroad, and barge or boat on the Tennessee River. NASA and its industry partners are designing and developing a new human-rated system based on the requirements for safe, reliable, and cost-effective transportation solutions. Given below are summaries of the Dynamic Test Stand and the Static Test Stand capabilities, along with an introduction to the new missions that these sleeping giants will be fulfilling as NASA readies the Ares I for service in the 2015 timeframe, and plans the development work for fielding the Ares V late next decade (fig. 1). Validating modern computer design models and techniques requires the sorts of data that can only be generated by these one-of-a-kind facilities.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

Building on 50 Years of Mission Operations Experience for a New Era of Space Exploration

The U.S. National Space Policy, I the 14-nation Global Exploration Strategy,2 and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) 2006 Strategic Plan3 provide foundational direction for far-ranging missions, from safely flying the Space Shuttle and completing construction of the International Space Station by 2010, to fielding a next generation space transportation system consisting of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle!Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle!Altair Lunar Lander (fig. 1). Transportation beyond low-Earth orbit will open the frontier for a lunar outpost, where astronauts will harness in-situ resources while exploring this 4 billion-year-old archaeological site, which may hold answers to how the Earth and its satellite were formed. Ultimately, this experience will pave the way for the first human footprint on Mars. In October 2007, NASA" announced assignments for this lunar exploration work.4 The Marshall Space Flight Center is responsible for designing, developing, testing, and evaluating the Ares I and Ares V, which are Space Shuttle derived launch vehicles, along with a number of lunar tasks. The Marshall Center's Engineering Directorate provides the skilled workforce and unique manufacturing, testing, and operational infrastructure needed to deliver space transportation solutions that meet the requirements stated in the Constellation Architecture Requirements Document (CARD). While defining design reference missions to the Station and the Moon, the CARD includes goals that include reducing recurring and nonrecurring costs, while increasing safety and reliability. For this reason, future systems are being designed with operability considerations and lifecycle expenses as independent variables in engineering trade studies.

Onken, Jay F.↗

Old Journey, New Heights

If you could see the road ahead, you might pass up a fantastic opportunity because you're blinded by the potential pitfalls. In my case, I was testing the project management waters at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center after ten years of being a research engineer. I was an eager (but ignorant) rookie project manager (PM) and I was willing to engage in just about any project without knowing what it would entail. The assignment I accepted was to help NASA's Environment Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology (ERAST) Project, a partnership with a fledgling Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry, to tackle stratospheric flight. I remember one of our industrial partners querying me about whether or not I understood what 1 was getting into. Like one of those bobble-head toys that have become quite popular, I nodded. But in reality, I didn't have a clue. His response was, "Hang on, it's going to be a wild ride." He was right. In retrospect, if I had clearly understood the ten years of pitfalls that were coming, I might not have "hung on." Now I can look back and say that I would not trade the experience for anything. The lows included the destruction of a number of UAVs on my watch. Later someone told me that we should not be surprised if we lost one UAV for every ten flights. We wrote many chapters in the book on what can go wrong with UAVs-and we are still writing. As you can imagine, each mishap was accompanied by an investigation. What an education!

DelFrate, John↗

Microrover Operates With Minimal Computation

Small, light, highly mobile robotic vehicles called "microrovers" use sensors and artificial intelligence to perform complicated tasks autonomously. Vehicle navigates, avoids obstacles, and picks up objects using reactive control scheme selected from among few preprogrammed behaviors to respond to environment while executing assigned task. Under development for exploration and mining of other planets. Also useful in firefighting, cleaning up chemical spills, and delivering materials in factories. Reactive control scheme and principle of behavior-description language useful in reducing computational loads in prosthetic limbs and automotive collision-avoidance systems.

Miller, David P.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bynum, M. C., III↗

Weight optimization of an aerobrake structural concept for a lunar transfer vehicle

An aerobrake structural concept for a lunar transfer vehicle was weight optimized through the use of the Taguchi design method, finite element analyses, and element sizing routines. Six design parameters were chosen to represent the aerobrake structural configuration. The design parameters included honeycomb core thickness, diameter-depth ratio, shape, material, number of concentric ring frames, and number of radial frames. Each parameter was assigned three levels. The aerobrake structural configuration with the minimum weight was 44 percent less than the average weight of all the remaining satisfactory experimental configurations. In addition, the results of this study have served to bolster the advocacy of the Taguchi method for aerospace vehicle design. Both reduced analysis time and an optimized design demonstrated the applicability of the Taguchi method to aerospace vehicle design.

Bush, Lance B.↗

Multi-input, multi-output system control for experimental aircraft

Two techniques, direct eigenspace assignment (DEA) and explicit model following (EMF), are used initially to synthesize control laws for the longitudinal dynamics model of a Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) vehicle in the landing configuration. The vehicle model and the flight control design are presented. The two synthesis techniques are briefly discussed and the handling qualities specifications mapped into the algorithm formulations. The control laws resulting from exercising the algorithms are evaluated in terms of achieved performance and robustness. Since the synthesized control laws involve full state feedback, methodologies were implemented for the control laws using output feedback without adversely affecting performance and robustness. Finally, the salient features of the two design techniques are summarized and the areas that require further investigation are suggested.

Schmidt, D. K.↗

A Three-fold Outlook of the Ultra-Efficient Engine Technology Program Office (UEET)

The Ultra-Efficient Engine Technology (UEET) Office at NASA Glenn Research Center is a part of the Aeronautics Directorate. Its vision is to develop and hand off revolutionary turbine engine propulsion technologies that will enable future generation vehicles over a wide range of flight speeds. There are seven different technology area projects of UEET. During my tenure at NASA Glenn Research Center, my assignment was to assist three different areas of UEET, simultaneously. I worked with Kathy Zona in Education Outreach, Lynn Boukalik in Knowledge Management, and Denise Busch with Financial Management. All of my tasks were related to the business side of UEET. As an intern with Education Outreach I created a word search to partner with an exhibit of a Turbine Engine developed out of the UEET office. This exhibit is a portable model that is presented to students of varying ages. The word search complies with National Standards for Education which are part of every science, engineering, and technology teachers curriculum. I also updated a Conference Planning/Workshop Excel Spreadsheet for the UEET Office. I collected and inputted facility overviews from various venues, both on and off site to determine where to hold upcoming conferences. I then documented which facilities were compliant with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990. The second area in which I worked was Knowledge Management. a large knowledge management system online which has extensive documentation that continually needs reviewing, updating, and archiving. Knowledge management is the ability to bring individual or team knowledge to an organizational level so that the information can be stored, shared, reviewed, archived. Livelink and a secure server are the Knowledge Management systems that UEET utilizes, Through these systems, I was able to obtain the documents needed for archiving. My assignment was to obtain intellectual property including reports, presentations, or any other documents related to the project. My next task was to document the author, date of creation, and all other properties of each document. To archive these documents I worked extensively with Microsoft Excel. different financial systems of accounting such as the SAP business accounting system. I also learned the best ways to present financial data and shadowed my mentor as she presented financial data to both UEET's project management and the Resources Analysis and Management Office (RAMO). I analyzed the June 2004 financial data of UEET and used Microsoft Excel to input the results of the data. This process made it easier to present the full cost of the project in the month of June. In addition I assisted in the End of the Year 2003 Reconciliation of Purchases of UEET.

Graham, La Quilia E.↗

Spaceport Performance Measures

Spaceports have traditionally been characterized by performance measures associated with their site characteristics. Measures such as "Latitude" (proximity to the equator), "Azimuth" (range of available launch azimuths) and "Weather" (days of favorable weather) are commonly used to characterize a particular spaceport. However, other spaceport performance measures may now be of greater value. These measures can provide insight into areas of operational differences between competing spaceports and identify areas for improving the performance of spaceports. This paper suggests Figures of Merit (FOMs) for spaceport "Capacity" (number of potential launch opportunities per year and / or potential mass' to low earth orbit (LEO) per year); "Throughput" (actual mass to orbit per year compared to capacity); "Productivity" (labor effort hours per unit mass to orbit); "Energy Efficiency" (joules expended at spaceport per unit mass to orbit); "Carbon Footprint" tons CO2 per unit mass to orbit). Additional FOMS are investigated with regards to those areas of special interest to commercial launch operators, such as "Assignment Schedule" (days required for a binding assignment of a launch site from the spaceport); "Approval Schedule" (days to complete a range safety assessment leading to an approval or disapproval of a launch vehicle); "Affordability" (cost for a spaceport to assess a new launch vehicle); "Launch Affordability" (fixed range costs per launch); "Reconfigure Time" (hours to reconfigure the range from one vehicle's launch ready configuration to another vehicle's configuration); "Turn,Around Time" (minimum range hours required between launches of an identical type launch vehicle). Available or notional data is analyzed for the KSC/CCAFS area and other spaceports. Observations regarding progress over the past few decades are made. Areas where improvement are needed or indicated are suggested.

Finger, G. Wayne↗

Determination of pilot and vehicle describing functions from the Gemini 10 mission

Three types of manual control maneuvers conducted during the Gemini-10 mission have been analyzed in order to measure and document the describing function of the pilot, the vehicle and the pilot-vehicle combination during an actual space mission. Measurements made from the data records of the reentry maneuver (a single axis control task) indicate that the pilot's control behavior changes during critical portions of the reentry. Measurements made of the deorbit maneuver and of a terminal phase initiation maneuver (three axis tasks) show that the pilot assigns priorities to the separate axes and controls them differently. His control technique is also influenced by the magnitude of the thrust disturbance present during the maneuvers. The results for all three types of maneuvers show that the pilot adapts to the nonlinear spacecraft control system in such a way that the combined pilot-vehicle dynamics take the form of the linear crossover model.

Edwards, F. G.↗

OAST Space Theme Workshop. Volume 3: Working Group Summary. 5: Propulsion (P-1). A. Summary Statement. B. Technology Needs (Form 1). C. Priority Assessments (Form 2)

All themes require some form of advanced propulsion capabilities to achieve their stated objectives. Requirements cover a broad spectrum ranging from a new generation of heavy lift launch vehicles to low thrust, long lift system for on-orbit operations. The commonality extant between propulsive technologies was established and group technologies were grouped into vehicle classes by functional capability. The five classes of launch vehicles identified by the space transportation theme were augmented with a sixth class, encompassing planetary and on-orbit operations. Propulsion technologies in each class were then ranked, and assigned priority numbers. Prioritized technologies were matched to theme requirements.

Source record↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the backup flight system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware. The BFS hardware consists of one General Purpose Computer (GPC) loaded with backup flight software and the components used to engage/disengage that unique GPC. Specifically, the BFS hardware includes the following: DDU (Display Driver Unit), BFC (Backup Flight Controller), GPC (General Purpose Computer), switches (engage, disengage, GPC, CRT), and circuit protectors (fuses, circuit breakers). The IOA analysis process utilized available BFS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the failure modes analyzed, 19 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.

Prust, E. E.↗

Building on 50 Years of Systems Engineering Experience for a New Era of Space Exploration

Over the past 50 years, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has delivered space transportation solutions for America's complex missions, ranging from scientific payloads that expand knowledge, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, to astronauts and lunar rovers destined for voyages to the Moon. Currently, the venerable Space Shuttle, which has been in service since 1981, provides the United States (US) capability for both crew and heavy cargo to low-Earth orbit to construct the International Space Station, before the Shuttle is retired in 2010. In the next decade, NASA will replace this system with a duo of launch vehicles: the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. The goals for this new system include increased safety and reliability coupled with lower operations costs that promote sustainable space exploration for decades to come. The Ares I will loft the Orion crew exploration vehicle, while the heavy-lift Ares V will carry the Altair lunar lander, as well as the equipment and supplies needed to construct a lunar outpost for a new generation of human and robotic space pioneers. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center manages the Shuttle's propulsion elements and is managing the design and development of the Ares rockets, along with a host of other engineering assignments in the field of scientific space exploration. Specifically, the Marshall Center's Engineering Directorate houses the skilled workforce and unique facilities needed to build capable systems upon the foundation laid by the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle programs. This paper will provide details of the in-house systems engineering and vehicle integration work now being performed for the Ares I and planned for the Ares V. It will give an overview of the Ares I system-level testing activities, such as the ground vibration testing that will be conducted in the Marshall Center's Dynamic Test Stand to verify the integrated vehicle stack's structural integrity and to validate computer modeling and simulation, as well as the main propulsion test article analysis to be conducted in the Static Test Stand. Ultimately, fielding a robust space transportation solution that will carry international explorers and essential payloads will pave the way for a new era of scientific discovery now dawning beyond planet Earth.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

Mars Planetary Network for Human Exploration Era – Potential Challenges and Solutions

During 2016-2017, a study was conducted under the sponsorship of the NASA’s Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Program to investigate the deep space communications capacity taking into account the needs of all the present and envisioned future missions toward 2030s. It was soon recognized that planning for human exploration to Mars would impose certain unprecedent challenges, both fiscal and technical, to the current space communications paradigm. Targeting the assumed missions concepts, i.e., Crewed Mission to Phobos (CMTP) and Mars Short Stay Mission (MSSM), a Mars Planetary Network for the human exploration era has been formulated. The activity modeling and network traffic simulation/modeling we performed gave some insight into the technical challenges in space communications for the envisioned human Mars exploration era. Chief among the potential challenges are: (1) the high demand on the deep space network (DSN) assets for achieving the high-rate links, both return and forward, from Mars farthest/farther distance (up to 2.67 AU); (2) the need for resilient, persistent communication coverage for crewed vehicles, on surface and in orbits; (3) the significant period of outage for the Mars-Earth link due to superior solar conjunction; (4) the need for on-demand, simultaneous access to the proximity link by multiple vehicles and astronauts in the exploration zone; (5) the capability of determining precise, real-time, positions of surface vehicles and astronauts by the deep space habitat and/or other tele-operations entities. Solution space to each of the above challenges has been explored and analyzed in the context of the individual problem domain and, more importantly, in conjunction with that for the other challenges. This has led to an end-to-end definition of a Mars Planetary Network that would feature: (1) the fusion of deep space Ka-band and optical communications for achieving Mars-Earth high-rate links taking advantage of the optical/RF hybrid 8m/34m antennas in DSN; (2) the integrated application of the Multiple Spacecraft Per Antenna (MSPA) technique, for return link data acquisition, and the Multiple Uplink Per Antenna (MUPA) technique, for forward link data trasnmission, to reduce the number of 34m beam-wave guide (BWG) antennas needed for the era; (3) the integration of three, arrayed, 34m beam-wave guide (BWG) antennas, to provide a high G/T aperture, with the MSPA/MUPA techniques, and a dual “trunk link”approach to cut down the needed G/T -- hence, reducing the number of 34m antennas, relative to that in the single trunk approach by 50%; (4) the deployment of two areostationary/areosynchronous Mars relay orbiters; one of them could also function as (or be served by) a notional Deep Space Habitat (DSH); (5) the opportunistic deployment of a science orbiter in a Pioneer-6 type orbit, equidistant Mars/Earth, that could also serve as an intermediary relay during the Mars superior solar conjunction perod; (6) the existence of the multi-function Mars proximity link that provides the demand-assigned, multiple access (DAMA) capability; and (7) the provision of tracking observables, by leveraging on the planned Mars orbiting and surface infrastructure, to enable the in-situ navigation for surface and orbiting vehicles. This paper provides the description of the proposed Mars Planetary Network in the human exploration era, the trade-off analysis for the various alternative architectures, and the optimal solutions to the key challenges in defining this end-to-end network.

Cheung, Kar-Ming↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 1671 failure modes analyzed, 9 single failures were determined to result in loss of crew or vehicle. Three single failures unique to intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of 136 single failures occurred. Six of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster separation. The other 6 criticality 1/1 failures are fuses, one each per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5, and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) 1, 2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System (MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) circuits.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗