The Nuclear System-of-Systems Capabilities Analytic Process (Doctoral Dissertation Defense) [Slides]
Abstract not provided.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
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Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm
Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
A subcellular biochemical model for T6SS dynamics reveals winning competitive strategies
Abstract The type VI secretion system (T6SS) is a broadly distributed interbacterial weapon that can be used to eliminate competing bacterial populations. Although unarmed target populations are typically used to study T6SS function in vitro, bacteria most likely encounter other T6SS-armed competitors in nature. However, the connection between subcellular details of the T6SS and the outcomes of such mutually lethal battles is not well understood. Here, we incorporate biological data derived from natural competitors of Vibrio fischeri light organ symbionts to build a biochemical model for T6SS at the single-cell level, which we then integrate into an agent-based model (ABM). Using the ABM, we isolate and experiment with strain-specific physiological differences between competitors in ways not possible with biological samples to identify winning strategies for T6SS-armed populations. Through in vitro experiments, we discover that strain-specific differences exist in T6SS activation speed. ABM simulations corroborate that faster activation is dominant in determining survival during competition. Once competitors are fully activated, the energy required for T6SS creates a tipping point where increased weapon building and firing becomes too costly to be advantageous. Through ABM simulations, we identify the threshold where this transition occurs in the T6SS parameter space. We also find that competitive outcomes depend on the geometry of the battlefield: unarmed target cells survive at the edges of a range expansion where unlimited territory can be claimed. Alternatively, competitions within a confined space, much like the light organ crypts where natural V. fischeri compete, result in the rapid elimination of the unarmed population.
59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
Coincidence measurements of radioxenon using passive implemented planar silicon (PIPS) detector
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.
38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
Nuclear Targeting Terms for Engineers and Scientists Revised Edition
This is a revised version of LA-UR-17-20752, Nuclear Targeting Terms for Engineers and Scientists, March 1, 2017. The discussion of compounding for damage and compounding for reliability was reworded for clarity. The Department of Defense has a methodology for targeting nuclear weapons, and a jargon that is used to communicate between the analysts, planners, aircrews, and missile crews. The typical engineer or scientist in the Department of Energy may not have been exposed to the nuclear weapons targeting terms and methods. This report provides an introduction to the terms and methodologies used for nuclear targeting. Its purpose is to prepare engineers and scientists to participate in wargames, exercises, and discussions with the Department of Defense. Terms such as Circular Error Probable, probability of hit and damage, damage expectancy, and the physical vulnerability system are discussed. Methods for compounding damage from multiple weapons applied to one target are presented.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
A Hardware Platform for Studying Naval Power Electronic Power Distribution Systems
Abstract – Future intelligent ship system designs will likely include electric propulsion, numerous highpower sensors, and directed energy weapons. Supply and control of these large nonlinear loads will require a networked, multi-converter power electronic power distribution system. This work presents a hardware platform to emulate a microgrid power system with multiple power converters and a power data communication network. The platform is reconfigurable and can include both AC and DC power distribution zones, representative of shipboard power systems. It also allows for the study of both power control actuation and power data communication delays. Since the platform is based on electric power hardware, spatial and temporal uncertainties are inherently embedded in the system. Specifically, this work examines the control actuation of multiple pulsed power loads in a single microgrid. Several pulse load levels and operating scenarios have been implemented and measured. A framework for control parameter quantification is presented, and various metrics are explored to capture pulse signal characteristics. The sensitivity of pulse load metric parameters is analyzed. Dynamic shipboard, mission-specific load profiles coupled with pulse loads can also be emulated in the hardware platform.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
304L Can Crush Validation Studies
Accurate prediction of ductile behavior of structural alloys up to and including failure is essential in component or system failure assessment, which is necessary for nuclear weapons alteration and life extensions programs of Sandia National Laboratories. Modeling such behavior requires computational capabilities to robustly capture strong nonlinearities (geometric and material), rate- dependent and temperature-dependent properties, and ductile failure mechanisms. This study's objective is to validate numerical simulations of a high-deformation crush of a stainless steel can. The process consists of identifying a suitable can geometry and loading conditions, conducting the laboratory testing, developing a high-quality Sierra/SM simulation, and then drawing comparisons between model and measurement to assess the fitness of the simulation in regards to material model (plasticity), finite element model construction, and failure model. Following previous material model calibration, a J 2 plasticity model with a microstructural BCJ failure model is employed to model the test specimen made of 304L stainless steel. Simulated results are verified and validated through mesh and mass-scaling convergence studies, parameter sensitivity studies, and a comparison to experimental data. The converged mesh and degree of mass-scaling are the mesh discretization with 140,372 elements, and a mass scaling with a target time increment of 1.0e-6 seconds and time step scale factor of 0.5, respectively. Results from the coupled thermal-mechanical explicit dynamic analysis are comparable to the experimental data. Simulated global force vs displacement (F/D) response predicts key points such as yield, ultimate, and kinks of the experimental F/D response. Furthermore, the final deformed shape of the can and field data predicted from the analysis are similar to that of the deformed can, as measured by 3D optical CMM scans and DIC data from the experiment.
36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
A PIPS + SrI 2 (Eu) detector for atmospheric radioxenon monitoring
The PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is a prototype atmospheric radioxenon detection system designed at Oregon State University in support of international efforts towards monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon testing activities. This detector aims to address some shortcomings found in currently deployed beta–gamma atmospheric radioxenon detection systems, such as lackluster energy resolution and memory effect, by employing modern detection materials and readout. The system uses a PIPSBox, a silicon-based gas cell, for electron detection, and a pair of ultrabright, D-shaped SrI 2 (Eu) scintillators coupled to silicon photomultipliers for photon detection. A custom eight-channel digital pulse processor equipped with a field programmable gate-array (FPGA) identifies electron–photon coincidences between the volumes in near real-time. Gas samples of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest were independently measured with the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) detection system to determine energy resolution and efficiency. Application of FPGA-based coincidence discrimination in near real-time reduced the ambient background count rate by 95.85 ± 0.04%. Using parameters from the Xenon International gas processing unit and assuming a blank sample and zero memory effect the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for the isotopes were calculated to be 0.12 ± 0.03, 0.27 ± 0.05, 0.15 ± 0.02, and 1.00 ± 0.08 mBq/m 3 air for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe, respectively. These MDC estimates compare well with other radioxenon detection systems employed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and indicate that the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) sensitivity requirement of ≤ 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
WRS Capabilities Booklet [Slides]
WRS is the digital backbone of the Weapons Program—delivering trusted data assets, cyber-assured software and systems, and AI-enabling software—that transform insights into decisive action. We empower physicists, engineers, researchers, and scientists to think faster, act strategically, and stay ahead in an ever-evolving threat landscape. Our efforts ensure critical nuclear weapons data remains secure, accessible, and usable—supporting mission-critical work, informed decision making, and scientific advancement at LANL and across the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE).
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information
High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information
High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Decision Support Tools for Stockpile Analysis (Unclassified summary) [Slides]
The annual stockpile and weapons complex planning process is a highly interdependent, complex system of analyses and decisions that involve multiple sites and stakeholders.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network
The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
A stilbene–strontium iodide based radioxenon detection system for monitoring nuclear explosions
Atmospheric measurement of noble gases has been extensively used for monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon explosions for many years. The ratios of four xenon isotopes of interest ( 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) help in discriminating regular reactor operations from nuclear tests. A new coincidence-based detection system using stilbene and strontium iodide [SrI 2 (Eu)] for electron and photon detection respectively was developed at Oregon State University to address some of the challenges of the radioxenon systems deployed in the field such as memory effect, and poor energy resolution. Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) were used for sensing optical photons from all scintillation media. Real-time coincidence identification was achieved using the eight-channel digital pulse processor. The detection system was evaluated using lab check sources and Oregon State TRIGA reactor irradiated radioxenon samples. A 48-hour background coincidence spectrum was collected yielding a coincidence count rate and background rejection rate of 0.0174 ± 0.0003 counts per second (cps) and 98.9% respectively. The minimum detectable concentration (MDC) of the system was evaluated to be 0.11 ± 0.01, 0.13 ± 0.02, 0.20 ± 0.02, and 0.73 ± 0.08 for 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe respectively. The memory effect of the detection system was found to be 0.069 ± 0.015%, which is almost a 70-fold reduction compared to traditional plastic scintillators. Here, the detection elements, custom-designed electronics, and the detector response to radioxenon are detailed in this work.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Remote Target Engagement System (RTES) Generation 4 ("Gen 4")
RTES is designed to provide teleoperation of remote weapon platform capability at defensive physical protection locations requiring active lethal capabilities for final access denial. Multiple operator consoles allow for coordinated engagement of many weapon platforms by one or more operator consoles. This results in faster response times, increased effectiveness, and increased survivability from removing response force from harm's way increasing survivability. This software is developed against DoD requirements and has been safety and functionally reviewed and approved for operational use. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-1935 O
Klingler, KristopherR.↗
ARIES team achieves major milestone in support of nonproliferation
The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program is a great example of LANL’s Weapons and Global Security programs working together to achieve important nuclear security mission goals. Executed at PF-4, a facility better known for its pit production mission, the ARIES Program is helping the nation meet its nonproliferation commitments by preparing surplus weapons-grade plutonium for final disposition. ARIES recently met a major milestone of producing 1 metric ton of plutonium oxide from material removed from surplus pits. The milestone was celebrated in an awards ceremony at LANL on January 28.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Weapon Material Program: FY24 Annual Report
The Weapon Material Program (WMP) framework was started in July of Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, along with other Mission Support organizations. The first year was about building the organization with the right people, identifying needs, and developing a vision for expectations. It was also a year to move forward with new equipment and technology for weapon material processes. With numerous improvements, WMP is building world-class systems for production, warehousing, and analytical testing. FY 2023 was a year of development. The WMP was a new organization defining its identity, its focus, and its mission. At the end of FY 2023, WMP evaluated its current position and its immediate needs along with its future goals. The entire organization set out on this FY 2024 journey to success. The lack of funding, staffing, and visibility dramatically impacted weapon material operations, testing, and qualifications. This neglect required numerous areas to be addressed and improvement plans to be developed and implemented. WMP processes, procedures, and overall business operations were dramatically in need of updating, revision, and formal documentation. This included all areas: technology, equipment, facility modifications/upgrades, and testing improvements. To ensure organizational improvement and forward momentum in FY 2024, WMP executed a multi-faceted strategic vision. Action items included the following: • Filling open positions with capable personnel who would contribute to a more robust organization • Establishing more formal operations and problem-solving techniques • Improving departmental procedures to align with expanding scope • Improving training • Establishing collaboration meetings with other departments/organizations • Focusing on the importance of identifying and mitigating concerns with At-Risk Materials (@RM) • Leading modernization eff orts for Blending and Packaging (B&P) We are on the verge of a transformational improvement in all of our processes in support of the mission. The following area achievements outlined in this report reflect the hard work toward achieving the goal of “being the material Subject Matter Experts in the nuclear enterprise”.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Genetic algorithm optimization of tin–copper graded shielding for improved plutonium safeguards measurements
Plutonium nuclear material safeguards is essential to ensure that states do not divert plutonium to clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Traditional safeguards methods rely on correlated neutron measurements. Detection systems based on organic scintillators, which are sensitive to fast neutrons and photons, are gaining support for use in safeguards applications due to increased capabilities and shorter measurement times compared to the current state-of-the-art. A drawback of organic scintillators in plutonium measurements is data throughput limitations; 241 Am builds up in plutonium samples and emits 60-keV gamma rays with a high specific activity. In this work, a genetic algorithm is used to design graded shielding made of tin and copper to attenuate the 60-keV gamma rays. The shield is designed to limit the attenuation of the higher-energy, fission photons, because fission photons can be used as a signature. The genetic algorithm optimization takes days to run, while a complete search space exploration would take years. The genetic algorithm was run for different levels of 60-keV gamma-ray attenuation, and the thickness of the required shielding layers was determined at each level. Tin–copper shielding was placed in front of an array of organic scintillation detectors for a measurement of approximately 4.5 kg of alpha-phase, weapons-grade plutonium, an AmLi source, and a 252 Cf source. We show that the shield successfully attenuated low-energy, non-fission gamma rays, which significantly improved the organic scintillator performance.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗