Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “adversarial attack”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

76 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Enabling Secure and Resilient XFC: A Software/Hardware-Security Co-Design Approach

Extremely fast charging (XFC) has the potential to reduce the charging time of battery electric vehicles (BEV) to be equivalent to the filling time of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), thus eliminating one of the few advantages ICEV still poses for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Enabling XFC will, however, require coordination and cooperation between the grid, charging stations, and the vehicles themselves, which leads to an inevitable increase in the attack surface for all systems combined. In securing the overall system, we must not only embrace traditional cybersecurity, which is chiefly concerned with communications and the operation of digital systems, but also cyber-physical systems security as the proper operation of XFC is critically dependent on systems’ abilities to know about (sense) and interact with (actuate) the physical world. The project team consists of academic and industry researchers with backgrounds in cybersecurity, cyber-physical systems security, learning in adversarial environments, transportation security, grid security and resilience, wireless power transfer, converter design, and battery management systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Engineering in Cyber Resilience with Cyber-Informed Engineering

Engineers have super powers to provide cybersecurity resilience with deterministic engineering solutions and to protect systems from the most catastrophic consequences that a cyber saboteur could cause. Come to this session to learn how to use engineering risk management skills to harden your engineered systems from cyberattacks. Objective 1 Identify what system functions could be digitally induced to cause undesired high-impact consequences. Objective 2 Analyze how loss or instability of digital controls in a subsystem could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 3 Analyze how loss or instability in the digital connectivity between systems could lead to high-impact consequences. Objective 4 Identify engineering controls which could build resilience by eliminating digital loss or instability pathways or reduce the impact of digital loss or instability. This presentation will introduce Cyber-Informed Engineering, described below, and walk participants through specific engineering use cases to show how engineers can consider the potential for cyber sabotage in their existing system designs and enact deterministic engineering-based controls which eliminate pathways for attack or mitigate specific consequences. A wide variety of application use cases will be considered so that audience members can align the material with familiar engineering applications. CIE is an engineering approach that integrates cyber resilience into the conception, design, build, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, sensors, monitoring, or control. CIE offers the opportunity to use engineering to eliminate or mitigate avenues for cyber attack—starting from the earliest stage of design and continuing throughout the system’s lifecycle. Today, engineers and industrial control system (ICS) technicians build engineered systems with specific goals for safety, reliability, and functionality. While systems engineering includes considerable safety and failure mode analysis, cybersecurity risks are often not specifically addressed—particularly the risks of intentional cyber compromise, exploitation, and misuse. Cyber-Informed Engineering pairs well with traditional cyber defenses and offers an extra designed-in protection to eliminate the most catastrophic consequences which can be realized by an adversary should traditional cyber defenses fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy for Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the 1984 martial arts drama film, The Karate Kid, a young Daniel LaRusso is unexpectedly placed in an adversarial environment unable to eYectively adapt to a series of new threats and limitations. Fortunately for the main character, once placed under the tutelage of a Mr. Miyagi, he finds resiliency not through the adoption of new tools, but a re-focused set of fundamentals. Much in the same way that Daniel learns waxing on and buYing oY car wax by hand has rewards for Karate, LANL is choosing the harder path of self-hosting Large Language Models (LLMs) for enterprise use instead of only relying on buying access to a hosted AI service like Azure’s OpenAI Application Programming Interface (API). We also are not willing to wait for software-as-a-service (SAAS) AI services to meet us where we need to be from a FedRAMP accreditation standpoint. Our operations regularly depend on access at CUI, UCNI, ITAR and other FIPS-199 moderate-impact data levels and hosting our own services gives us the right security and compliance posture to be useful across the broad range of our work at LANL. With the rise in threats to critical infrastructure, cloud service providers (CSPs), and supply chain attacks from both state and non-state actors, we are not placing the bet that SAAS hosted AI services will be available when we need them. Should a major event occur, we do not want our staY and operations left without a pathway for us to fix the problem and resume the use of AI tools.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Resilience Measurement Framework For Post-deployment Artificial Intelligence (ai) Integrated Systems

Resilience is largely defined as the ability to adapt or recover from adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by digital resources. In Artificial Intelligence Management and Research for Advanced Networked Testbed Hub (AMARANTH), resilience is measured in the amount of time it took from the beginning of a testing period for the model to reach predictions outside of the original 95% confidence interval or using the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence theorem, the Population Stability Index (PSI), and traditional methods such as root mean squared error (RMSE) threshold. Artificial Intelligence (AI) model drift is of significant concern when deploying AI-integrated systems into critical and/or secure environments. Drift can impact resilience of the AI-integrated system post-deployment and requires consistent maintenance and upkeep to ensure the model is accurate and precise. To quantify model drift and predict the point when a model's drift becomes unacceptable, we describe using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, Population Stability Index (PSI) and/or confidence interval width estimations to determine the point of failure and time to failure of a model post-deployment. Through simple code functions, the KL-divergence, PSI, confidence interval, and root mean squared (RMSE) point of failures can be used to derive when a model needs to be maintained as well as the impact of adversarial action through statistical means.

Yockey, Patience [Idaho National Laboratory (INL),↗