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NASA NTRS1993

Management of government quality assurance functions for NASA contracts

This handbook sets forth requirements for NASA direction and management of government quality assurance functions performed for NASA contracts and is applicable to all NASA installations. These requirements will standardize management to provide the minimum oversight and effective use of resources. This handbook implements Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 46, NASA FAR Supplement 18-46, Quality Assurance, and NMI 7410.1. Achievement of established quality and reliability goals at all levels is essential to the success of NASA programs. Active participation by NASA and other agency quality assurance personnel in all phases of contract operations, including precontract activity, will assist in the economic and timely achievement of program results. This involves broad participation in design, development, procurement, inspection, testing, and preventive and corrective actions. Consequently, government, as well as industry, must place strong emphasis on the accomplishment of all functions having a significant bearing on quality and reliability from program initiation through end-use of supplies and services produced. For purposes of implementing NASA and other agency agreements, and to provide for uniformity and consistency, the terminology and definitions prescribed herein and in a future handbook shall be utilized for all NASA quality assurance delegations and subsequent redelegations.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1995

Metrology: Measurement Assurance Program Guidelines

The 5300.4 series of NASA Handbooks for Reliability and Quality Assurance Programs have provisions for the establishment and utilization of a documented metrology system to control measurement processes and to provide objective evidence of quality conformance. The intent of these provisions is to assure consistency and conformance to specifications and tolerances of equipment, systems, materials, and processes procured and/or used by NASA, its international partners, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. This Measurement Assurance Program (MAP) guideline has the specific objectives to: (1) ensure the quality of measurements made within NASA programs; (2) establish realistic measurement process uncertainties; (3) maintain continuous control over the measurement processes; and (4) ensure measurement compatibility among NASA facilities. The publication addresses MAP methods as applied within and among NASA installations and serves as a guide to: control measurement processes at the local level (one facility); conduct measurement assurance programs in which a number of field installations are joint participants; and conduct measurement integrity (round robin) experiments in which a number of field installations participate to assess the overall quality of particular measurement processes at a point in time.

Eicke, W. G.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Product Assurance for Spaceflight Hardware

This report contains information about the tasks I have completed and the valuable experience I have gained at NASA. The report is divided into two different sections followed by a program summary sheet. The first section describes the two reports I have completed for the Office of Mission Assurance (OMA). I describe the approach and the resources and facilities used to complete each report. The second section describes my experience working in the Receipt Inspection/Quality Assurance Lab (RI/QA). The first report described is a Product Assurance Plan for the Gas Permeable Polymer Materials (GPPM) mission. The purpose of the Product Assurance Plan is to define the various requirements which are to be met through completion of the GPPM mission. The GPPM experiment is a space payload which will be flown in the shuttle's SPACEHAB module. The experiment will use microgravity to enable production of complex polymeric gas permeable materials. The second report described in the first section is a Fracture Analysis for the Mir Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP). The Fracture Analysis report is a summary of the fracture control classifications for all structural elements of the MEEP. The MEEP hardware consists of four experiment carriers, each of which contains an experiment container holding a passive experiment. The MEEP hardware will be attached to the cargo bay of the space shuttle. It will be transferred by Extravehicular Activity and mounted on the Mir space station. The second section of this report describes my experiences in the RVQA lab. I listed the different equipment I used at the lab and their functions. I described the extensive inspection process that must be completed for spaceflight hardware. Included, at the end of this section, are pictures of most of the equipment used in the lab. There is a summary sheet located at the end of this report. It briefly describes the valuable experience I have gained at NASA this summer and what I will be able to take with me as I return to college. I briefly discuss the experiences I mentioned in the previous three paragraphs along with training classes I attended and courses I completed at the Learning Lab.

Monroe, Mike↗

NASA NTRS2002

Radiation Hardness Assurance for Space Systems

The space radiation environment can lead to extremely harsh operating conditions for on-board electronic box and systems. The characteristics of the radiation environment are highly dependent on the type of mission (date, duration and orbit). Radiation accelerates the aging of the electronic parts and material and can lead to a degradation of electrical performance; it can also create transient phenomena on parts. Such damage at the part level can induce damage or functional failure at electronic box, subsystem, and system levels. A rigorous methodology is needed to ensure that the radiation environment does not compromise the functionality and performance of the electronics during the system life. This methodology is called hardness assurance. It consists of those activities undertaken to ensure that the electronic piece parts placed in the space system perform to their design specifications after exposure to the space environment. It deals with system requirements, environmental definitions, part selection, part testing, shielding and radiation tolerant design. All these elements should play together in order to produce a system tolerant to.the radiation environment. An overview of the different steps of a space system hardness assurance program is given in section 2. In order to define the mission radiation specifications and compare these requirements to radiation test data, a detailed knowledge of the space environment and the corresponding electronic device failure mechanisms is required. The presentation by J. Mazur deals with the Earth space radiation environment as well as the internal environment of a spacecraft. The presentation by J. Schwank deals with ionization effects, and the presentation by T. Weatherford deals with Single particle Event Phenomena (SEP) in semiconductor devices and microcircuits. These three presentations provide more detailed background to complement the sections 3 and 4. Part selection and categorization are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the organization of the hardness assurance within a project. Section 7 discusses emerging radiation hardness assurance issues.

Poivey, Christian↗

NASA NTRS2010

Technical Excellence and Communication: The Cornerstones for Successful Safety and Mission Assurance Programs

The paper describes the role of technical excellence and communication in the development and maintenance of safety and mission assurance programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and that contribute to healthy and effective organizational cultures. The events and conditions leading to the development of the MSFC S&MA organization are reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk assessment roles are discussed. The structure and functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions are presented. The current organization s mission and vision commitments serve as the starting points for the description of the current organization. The goals and objectives are presented that address the criticisms of the predecessor organizations. Additional improvements are presented that address the development of technical excellence and the steps taken to improve communication within the Center, with program customers, and with other Agency S&MA organizations.

Malone, Roy W.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Concept of Operation for Tactical Separation Assurance in Super-Density Operations

The Airspace Systems Program is committed to supporting the Next Generation Air Transportation System through research and development in select areas. One such area, referred to as Super Density Operations, is conducting research to develop technologies that will safely increase the throughput in busy terminal area environments. The purpose of this document is to develop a Concept of Operations for the Tactical Separation Assurance function, one of the functions included in Super Density Operations. A functional description of the technologies required for Super Density Operations is presented followed by a more detail description of the Tactical Separation Assurance function. Two story boards are presented to illustrate the operational use of the Tactical Separation Assurance function under different situations. The last section proposes a pathway to implementing the Tactical Separation Assurance function.

Denery, Dallas G.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Software for Optimizing Quality Assurance of Other Software

Software assurance is the planned and systematic set of activities that ensures that software processes and products conform to requirements, standards, and procedures. Examples of such activities are the following: code inspections, unit tests, design reviews, performance analyses, construction of traceability matrices, etc. In practice, software development projects have only limited resources (e.g., schedule, budget, and availability of personnel) to cover the entire development effort, of which assurance is but a part. Projects must therefore select judiciously from among the possible assurance activities. At its heart, this can be viewed as an optimization problem; namely, to determine the allocation of limited resources (time, money, and personnel) to minimize risk or, alternatively, to minimize the resources needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The end result of the work reported here is a means to optimize quality-assurance processes used in developing software.

Feather, Martin↗

NASA NTRS2012

Mission Assurance Modeling and Simulation: A Cyber Security Roadmap

This paper proposes a cyber security modeling and simulation roadmap to enhance mission assurance governance and establish risk reduction processes within constrained budgets. The term mission assurance stems from risk management work by Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute in the late 19905. By 2010, the Defense Information Systems Agency revised its cyber strategy and established the Program Executive Officer-Mission Assurance. This highlights a shift from simply protecting data to balancing risk and begins a necessary dialogue to establish a cyber security roadmap. The Military Operations Research Society has recommended a cyber community of practice, recognizing there are too few professionals having both cyber and analytic experience. The authors characterize the limited body of knowledge in this symbiotic relationship. This paper identifies operational and research requirements for mission assurance M&S supporting defense and homeland security. M&S techniques are needed for enterprise oversight of cyber investments, test and evaluation, policy, training, and analysis.

Gendron, Gerald↗

NASA NTRS2015

Current Practices in Constructing and Evaluating Assurance Cases With Applications to Aviation

This report introduces and provides an overview of assurance cases including theory, practice, and evaluation. This report includes a section that introduces the principles, terminology, and history of assurance cases. The core of the report presents twelve example uses of assurance cases from a range of domains, using a novel classification scheme. The report also reviews the state of the art in assurance case evaluation methods.

David J Rinehart↗

NASA NTRS2016

A Review of Function Allocation and En Route Separation Assurance

Today's air traffic control system has reached a limit to the number of aircraft that can be safely managed at the same time. This air traffic capacity bottleneck is a critical problem along the path to modernization for air transportation. The design of the next separation assurance system to address this problem is a cornerstone of air traffic management research today. This report reviews recent work by NASA and others in the areas of function allocation and en route separation assurance. This includes: separation assurance algorithms and technology prototypes; concepts of operations and designs for advanced separation assurance systems; and specific investigations into air-ground and human-automation function allocation.

Lewis, Timothy A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Understanding What It Means for Assurance Cases to "Work"

This report is the result of our year-long investigation into assurance case practices and effectiveness. Assurance cases are a method for working toward acceptable critical system performance. They represent a significant thread of applied assurance methods extending back many decades and being employed in a range of industries and applications. Our research presented in this report includes a literature survey of over 50 sources and interviews with nearly a dozen practitioners in the field. We have organized our results into seven major claimed assurance case benefits and their supporting mechanisms, evidence, counter-evidence, and caveats.

David J Rinehart↗

NASA NTRS2017

Assessment of the State-of-the-Art of System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies

Since its initiation, the System-wide Safety Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project has been focused on developing multidisciplinary tools and techniques that are verified and validated to ensure prevention of loss of property and life in NextGen and enable proactive risk management through predictive methods. To this end, four technical challenges have been listed to help realize the goals of SSAT, namely (i) assurance of flight critical systems, (ii) discovery of precursors to safety incidents, (iii) assuring safe human-systems integration, and (iv) prognostic algorithm design for safety assurance. The objective of this report is to provide an extensive survey of SSAT-related research accomplishments by researchers within and outside NASA to get an understanding of what the state-of-the-art is for technologies enabling each of the four technical challenges. We hope that this report will serve as a good resource for anyone interested in gaining an understanding of the SSAT technical challenges, and also be useful in the future for project planning and resource allocation for related research.

Roychoudhury, Indranil↗

NASA NTRS2018

UAS Autonomous Hazard Mitigation through Assured Compliance with Conformance Criteria

The behavior of a drone depends on the integrity of the data it uses and the reliability of the avionics systems that process that data to affect the operation of the aircraft. Commercial unmanned aircraft systems frequently rely on commercial-off-the-shelf and open source avionics components and data sources whose reliability and integrity are not easily assured. To mitigate failure events for aircraft that do not comply with conventional aviation safety standards, operational limitations are typically prescribed by regulators. Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations serves as a good example of operational limitations that mitigate risk for small unmanned aircraft systems. These limitations, however, restrict growth possibilities for the industry. Any reasonable path toward achieving routine operation of all types of drones will have to address the need for assurance of avionics systems, especially their software. This paper discusses the possibility of strategically using assured systems as a stepping stone to routine operation of drones. A specimen system for assured geofencing, called Safeguard, is described as an example of such a stepping stone.

Dill, Evan, T.↗

NASA NTRS2018

ASTERIA Operations Demonstrates the Value of Combining the Mission Assurance and Fault Protection Roles on CubeSats

On November 20, 2017, ASTERIA (Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research in Astrophysics), a 6U CubeSat performing a technology demonstration of astrophysical measurements, deployed from the ISS. The technology demonstration goals to achieve precision photometry via arcsecond-level line-of-sight pointing error and highly stable focal plane temperature control were met by February 2018. Extended mission operations are ongoing, with the primary focus on observing nearby stars for transiting exoplanets. Throughout development and operations, the roles of mission assurance and fault protection have proven critical to achieving the primary technical goals and to maintaining a healthy spacecraft through multiple extended missions. Given the budget and schedule constraints typical of a CubeSat, innovative tailoring of processes has been critical to success throughout both development and operations of ASTERIA. Mission assurance plays an important role in identifying and evaluating risk and developing cost-effective mitigations. Flexibility in the fault protection design offers a variety of options for implementing risk mitigations as risks have been uncovered both in pre-delivery testing and in mission operations. This paper will discuss the approach taken on ASTERIA to implement mission assurance and fault protection and the resulting benefits to operational efficiency and success. It will briefly address the advantages of this approach during development, in which the combination of the roles provided mission assurance significant insight to system risks, which feeds back into testing methodologies and directly into fault protection design. Operations will be discussed in detail. During this phase, the roles merge to identify in-flight fault protection updates to efficiently respond to anomalies and improve the likelihood of successful technology demonstrations. The paper will also detail the tools that are used to analyse data, identify anomalies, and develop the updates to uplink to the spacecraft. Finally, the general operational approach will be discussed to highlight the usefulness of the ASTERIA processes and their applicability to future CubeSat missions.

Knapp, Mary↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Toward Design Assurance of Machine-Learning Airborne Systems

In recent years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, enabled by Machine Learning (ML)technology, have demonstrated impressive progress and provides historic opportunities for the aviation industry. However, several key aspects of ML technology are not compatible with existing design assurance standards and make certification problematic. In this paper, we present a case study of a visual system with a Deep Neural Network (DNN) intended to detect and identify airport runway signs. Different use cases and variants of this system exhibit different levels of criticality ranging from design assurance level (DAL) D to B. We use the case study to illustrate the challenges of certification according to the current standards, such asDO-178C. We present the system design, data generation, training, and verification in detail and describe how the design assurance objectives can be met for a DAL D variant of the system. We also discuss gaps and potential approaches for the higher design assurance levels.

Avionics↗

NASA NTRS2020

Demonstrating Assurance of Model-Based Fault Diagnosis Systems on an Operational Mission

Developers of robotic scientific and commercial spacecraft are trending towards use of onboard autonomous capabilities for responding quickly to dynamic environments and rapidly changing situations. These capabilities need to know the state of the spacecraft’s health. Model-based fault diagnosis (MBFD) is an approach to estimating health by continuously verifying accurate behavior and diagnosing off-nominal behavior. Proper functioning of MBFD depends on 1) the quality of the diagnostic system model that is analyzed and compared to commands and onboard measurements to estimate a system’s health state, and 2) the correct functionality of the diagnosis engine interrogating the model and comparing its analyses to observed system behavior. Our goal is to develop Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques for MBFD to provide future missions sufficient confidence in its functionality and performance to deploy it on the systems they develop. Our work has been focused on infusing the techniques we developed earlier to an operational mission. First, we are constructing diagnostic models of a spacecraft attitude control system and updating our diagnostic engine so they can be demonstrated aboard the Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research in Astrophysics (ASTERIA) mission, an operational spacecraft for which experiments in autonomy are being planned and executed, using the V&V techniques we have previously developed to assure they are both correct and complete. Since it is nearing the end of its life, ASTERIA provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate MBFD since the monitored components are expected to fail. Our demonstration will give system developers additional confidence to make timely, informed MBFD deployment decisions. Second, we will be completing performance assessments of the diagnostic engine/diagnostic model ensemble both on the flight system and ground-based testbeds to gain confidence in MBFD’s ability to run successfully in a spacecraft’s resource-constrained environment without adversely affecting other on-board activities. Finally, we are capturing our experience in preparing this demonstration in a set of checklists and guidance documents. Current practice includes high-level institutional guidance documents and standards, but at a high level of abstraction that does not necessarily address specific MBFD concerns. The purpose of the new checklists is to provide future mission developers clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on assuring MBFD. This paper describes our work in these areas. For the first area, we describe the diagnostic models and updated diagnostic engine that will be used for the on-board demonstration. We describe how the V&V techniques we developed earlier are used to assure model and engine correctness and completeness. For the second area, we identify the performance measurement and assessment techniques used to characterize the diagnostic engine and diagnostic models, and discuss the effect of measured performance on overall mission operation. Finally, we present the checklist and guidance documents and describe how they meet the goals of providing system developers with clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on MBFD assurance. We show how the techniques we have developed map into those artifacts.

Nikora, Allen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Containment Assurance Risk Framework of the Mars Sample Return Program

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims at bringing rock and atmospheric samples from Mars to Earth through a series of robotic missions. These missions would collect the samples being cached and deposited on Martian soil by the Perseverance rover, place them in a container, and launch them into Martian orbit for subsequent capture by an orbiter that would bring them back. Given there exists a non-zero probability that the samples contain biological material, precautions are being taken to design systems that would break the chain of contact between Mars and Earth. These include techniques such as sterilization of Martian particles, redundant containment vessels, and a robust reentry capsule capable of accurate landings without a parachute. Requirements exist that the probability of containment not assured of Martian-contaminated material into Earth’s biosphere be less than one in a million. To demonstrate compliance with this strict requirement, a statistical framework was developed to assess the likelihood of containment loss during each sample return phase and make a statement about the total combined mission probability of containment not assured. The work presented here describes this framework, which considers failure modes or fault conditions that can initiate failure sequences ultimately leading to containment not assured. Reliability estimates are generated from databases, design heritage, component specifications, or expert opinion in the form of probability density functions or point estimates and provided as inputs to the mathematical models that simulate the different failure sequences. The probabilistic outputs are then combined following the logic of several fault trees to compute the ultimate probability of containment not assured. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the problem and the different types of mathematical models used, the statistical tools needed for analysis are required to be computationally efficient. While standard Monte Carlo approaches are used for fast models, a multi-fidelity approach to rare event probabilities is proposed for expensive models. In this paradigm, inexpensive low-fidelity models are developed for computational acceleration purposes while the expensive high-fidelity model is kept in the loop to retain accuracy in the results. This work presents an example of end-to-end application of this framework highlighting the computational benefits of a multi-fidelity approach.

Giuseppe Cataldo↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Safety, Reliability, and Mission Assurance Digital Future

The evolution from “document-centric” to “data-centric” and “model-centric” information leveraging structured data and model-based approaches is at the heart of digital engineering transformational efforts underway across industry and government. It is these approaches that pave the way for data lakes, Authoritative Sources of Truth (ASOTs), and systems- of-systems interoperability and the corresponding transformational benefits thereof. Such benefits include increased data availability, data access equity, data traceability, real-time analytics, batch analytics, and (most importantly) acceleration of the time-to-value and time-to-insights associated with engineering products and analyses. The longer-term benefits of reusability, customization and traceability are even more promising. For Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA), and Mission Success (SMS) activities; realization of such benefits is essential to provide engineers and analysts alike vital information when needed to support critical decision making throughout the entire life cycle. The SMA community often operate in parallel with engineering activities, for which information exchange with relevant context is paramount. Far too often, such information lags key decision points and/or is absent of the robust, integrated, knowledge needed, given inherent barriers associated with traditional document-centric means to data sharing, analysis, and reporting. This paper provides an overview of how NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evolving its policies, standards, guidance, and training to transform to eliminate such barriers, thus realizing the benefits emerging in this new digital era. A roadmap for achieving this digital future is presented along with key building blocks involving use and implementation of concepts such as: Objectives-Hierarchies, Objective-Driven Requirements, Accepted Standards, Safety and Assurance Cases, data digitization (i.e., ontologies, structured data, and model-centric data), FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, & Reusable) and/or FAIRUST (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable, Understandable, Secure, and Trusted) principles [1]. This paper also describes how OSMA, leveraging the Agency’s overall commitment to Digital Transformation (DT), is using the power of Policy, “Digital” Domain representation, Product Evolution, and Community Outreach and Engagement as part of a strategic vision and roadmap to evolve and transform its SMA organizations to become better able to serve its stakeholders and customers. Future publications will elaborate on these building blocks and deeper concepts.

Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT),↗