Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “attack graphs”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 91 records · Page 5

Optimizing power system restoration with damaged communications

Utility procedures for power system blackstart and restoration typically assume that energization decisions can be reliably communicated across the grid. In reality, the communications and control network would likely also be affected in power outages, such as those caused by extreme weather events or cyber-attacks. This paper studies the effect of damage to the power system communications and control infrastructure on restoration operations following a blackout. We model the communications infrastructure as a graph, overlaying the power grid, and imposing the requirement that every energized element in the power grid be observable from a control center. We expand on a specialized branch-and-bound algorithm from the literature to optimize the restoration process and devise an initialization heuristic and a rounding heuristic to improve solution speed. We perform numerical experiments on synthetic systems for Illinois and Texas with outages based on a solar flare or hurricane. We compare the results of our specialized branch-and-bound algorithm to the results from (i) the initialization heuristic alone, (ii) a variation of this heuristic that we use as a baseline, and (iii) the restoration optimization for the power system without communications constraints. Here, we find that damage to the communications infrastructure significantly increases the time required to re-energize the grid. Moreover, by simultaneously optimizing communications repairs and grid energization decisions, we are able to re-energize the grid significantly faster than if communications repairs and energization decisions were made independently or with partial coordination, motivating improvements to current industry practice.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

External Threat Risk Assessment Algorithm (ExTRAA)

Two risk assessment algorithms and philosophies have been augmented and combined to form a new algorit hm, the External Threat Risk Assessment Algorithm (ExTRAA), that allows for effective and statistically sound analysis of external threat sources in relation to individual attack methods . In addition to the attack method use probability and the attack method employment consequence, t he concept of defining threat sources is added to the risk assessment process. Sample data is tabulated and depicted in radar plots and bar graphs for algorithm demonstration purposes. The largest success of ExTRAA is its ability to visualize the kind of r isk posed in a given situation using the radar plot method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Action Recommendation for Cyber Resilience

This paper presents an unifying graph-based model for representing the infrastructure, behavior and missions of an enterprise. We describe how the model can be used to achieve resiliency against a wide class of failures and attacks. We introduce an algorithm for recommending resilience establishing actions based on dynamic updates to the models. Without loss of generality, we show the effectiveness of the algorithm for preserving latency based quality of service (QoS). Our models and the recommendation algorithms are implemented in a software framework that we seek to release as an open source framework for simulating resilient cyber systems.

resilience, cyber security↗

A distributed voltage inference framework for cyber-physical attacks detection and localization in active distribution grids

The transition to active distribution grids with real-time monitoring and control depends on the proliferation of advanced communication networks and devices. This paradigm shift towards a cyber-physical architecture also introduces new vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit and launch sophisticated cyber-physical attacks targeting grid observability. Current research highlights the challenges in distinguishing attacks on voltage phasor or nodal injection measurements and isolating multi-source attack locations in a multiphase distribution grid. The attack detection and localization methods in literature face accuracy issues, applications across diverse attack scenarios, or scalability limits. Here, to bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a distributed Voltage Inference framework for real-time detection and localization of cyber-physical attacks, addressing scalability, adaptability, and accuracy challenges in state-of-the-art methods. The proposed methodology leverages the distributed nature of the Voltage Inference framework through a two-step process of prediction and correction, together with a tractable graph partitioning approach, providing a reliable solution to identify compromised measurement sources and facilitate isolation. Extensive testing on IEEE 13 and 123-node distribution feeders underscores the algorithm’s efficacy, enhancing the security and resilience of active distribution grids against evolving cyber threats. Additionally, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) implementation validates the proposed strategy’s practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

active distribution grids↗

Faster-than-real-time Simulation with Demonstration for Resilient DER Integration

The US electric grid is facing operational, stability, and security challenges. Transmission system operators need some measure of visibility into distribution system renewable generation. Distribution system generation needs to support transmission system voltage. The grid is experiencing an expansion in measurement systems. How to take full advantage of this expansion and defend against attacks, both cyber and physical, poses additional challenges. The Faster-than-real-time Simulation with demonstration for Resilient DER Integration project set out to do the following: a. Flatten the voltage profile through the feeders and system for cost saving and voltage stabilization needs. b. Increase the amount of intermittent distributed energy resources (IDERs) that could be deployed on a utility feeder and provide 100% or more energy needed for the demands on that feeder, and c. based on an accurate model (Digital Twin) of the utilities system, be able to detect any abnormalities on the utilities distribution system. To manage the voltage and increase IDER penetration (a,b), Graph Trace Analysis is employed in a time-series, optimal power flow to coordinate the time-varying feedback control setpoints of a distribution feeder’s utility control devices. Under the coordinated control are a Load Tap Changing Transformer, a voltage regulator, and five switched capacitor banks. The feeder serves over 2000 customers, the feeder secondaries are modeled, and the feeder has 2.3 MW of PV generation, corresponding to a 17.4% penetration of PV generation. The feeder model has over 12,000 components, where every customer load bus and PV generator are modeled. The accuracy of the power flow solution is compared against historical meter voltage measurements, the improvement in conservation voltage reduction energy savings as a function of the coordinated control desired voltage profile is investigated, and the increase in PV penetration of the coordinated control over the existing control is presented. To achieve improved control performance while observing system operation constraints, bellwether Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) voltage measurements are used to adjust the desired voltage profile used by the optimal power flow analysis. To detect and alleviate or negate attacks or failures on the distribution and transmission utility grids (c) the grid needs to be resilient and self-healing. In this project software was designed to do just that. At the center of the software is an Integrated System Model (ISM) that spans from transmission to secondary distribution. The ISM is employed in real-time abnormality detection, voltage stability forecasting, and multi-mode control. Testing results are presented for: 1—attacks on utility infrastructure; 2—energy savings from optimal control; 3—distribution system control response during a low voltage transmission system event; 4—cyber-attacks on PV inverters, where physical inverters are used in hard-ware-in-the-simulation-loop studies. Contributions of this work include real-time analysis that spans from three-phase transmission through secondary distribution; an approach for detecting abnormalities that employs measurements from three independent measurement systems; and a multi-mode distribution system control that responds to cyber-attacks, physical attacks, equipment failures, and transmission system needs.

Integrated System Model, Graph Trace Analysis, Adv↗

CONGO²: Scalable Online Anomaly Detection and Localization in Power Electronics Networks

Rapid and accurate detection and localization of electronic disturbances simultaneously are important for preventing its potential damages and determining potential remedies. Existing anomaly detection methods are severely limited by the low accuracy, the expensive computational cost and the need for highly trained personnel. There is an urgent need for a scalable online algorithm for in-field analysis of large-scale power electronics networks. Here in this paper, we propose a fast and accurate algorithm for anomaly detection and localization of power electronics networks: stratified colored-node graph (CONGO2). This algorithm hierarchically models the change of correlated waveforms and then correlated sensors using the colored-node graph. By aggregating the change of each sensor with its neighbors’ inputs, we can spontaneously identify and localize the anomaly that cannot be detected by data collected from a single sensor. As our proposed method only focuses on the changes within a short time frame, it is highly computational efficient and only needs small data storage. Thus, our method is ideal for online and reliable anomaly detection and localization of large-scale power electronic networks. Compared to existing anomaly detection methods, our method is entirely data-driven without training data, highly accurate and reliable for wide-spectrum anomalies detection, and more importantly, capable of both detection and localization. Thus, it is ideal for infield deployment for large-scale power electronic networks. As illustrated by a distributed energy resources (DERs) power grid with 37-node, our method can effectively detect and localize various cyber and physical attacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Tools for Understanding Identity

Identity attribution and enrichment is critical to many aspects of law-enforcement and intelligence gathering; this identity typically spans a number of domains in the natural-world such as biographic information (factual information – e.g. names, addresses), biometric information (e.g. fingerprints) and psychological information. In addition to these natural-world projections of identity, identity elements are projected in the cyber-world. Conversely, undesirable elements may use similar techniques to target individuals for spear-phishing attacks (or worse), and potential targets or their organizations may want to determine how to minimize the attack surface exposed. Our research has been exploring the construction of a mathematical model for identity that supports such holistic identities. The model captures the ways in which an identity is constructed through a combination of data elements (e.g. a username on a forum, an address, a telephone number). Some of these elements may allow new characteristics to be inferred, hence enriching the holistic view of the identity. An example use-case would be the inference of real names from usernames, the ‘path’ created by inferring new elements of identity is highlighted in the ‘critical information’ panel. Individual attribution exercises can be understood as paths through a number of elements. Intuitively the entire realizable ‘capability’ can be modeled as a directed graph, where the elements are nodes and the inferences are represented by links connecting one or more antecedents with a conclusion. The model can be operationalized with two levels of tool support described in this paper, the first is a working prototype, the second is expected to reach prototype by July 2013: Understanding the Model The tool allows a user to easily determine, given a particular set of inferences and attributes, which elements or inferences are of most value to an investigator (or an attacker). The tool is also able to take into account the difficulty of the inferences, allowing the user to consider different scenarios depending on the perceived resources of the attacker, or to prioritize lines of investigation. It also has a number of interesting visualizations that are designed to aid the user in understanding the model. The tool works by considering the inferences as a graph and runs various graph-theoretic algorithms, with some novel adaptations, in order to deduce various properties. Using the Model To help investigators exploit the model to perform identity attribution, we have developed the Identity Map visualization. For a user-provided set of known starting elements and a set of desired target elements for a given identity, the Identity Map generates investigative workflows as paths through the model. Each path consists of a series of elements and inferences between them that connect the input and output elements. Each path also has an associated confidence level that estimates the reliability of the resulting attribution. Identity Map can help investigators understand the possible ways to make an identification decision and guide them toward the data-collection or analysis steps required to reach that decision.

Creese, Sadie↗

CyPhyR: a cyber‐physical analysis tool for measuring and enabling resiliency in microgrids

This study presents a tool to study the cyber‐physical resiliency (CyPhyR) of critical energy infrastructure system, in particular the effect of cyber attacks on the microgrid's resiliency. The developed tool enables measuring resiliency using data from cyber and physical systems and suggests control decisions for resilient planning and operation of the microgrid. The microgrid resiliency is formulated based on graph theory based indices and cyber‐power system characteristics. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System based metric called the Cyber Asset Impact Potential is developed and used in the planning phase, and another metric, Cyber Impact Severity is introduced to study the system performance in the operational phase. The information from these two phases is provided to the operator to make informed and proactive decisions to ensure the resilient operation of the microgrid. The performance of the developed tool has been tested using comprehensive real‐time cyber‐power testbed for a Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions microgrid test system.

Venkataramanan, Venkatesh↗

Systematic planning of moving target defence for maximising detection effectiveness against false data injection attacks in smart grid

Abstract Moving target defence (MTD) has been gaining traction to thwart false data injection attacks against state estimation (SE) in the power grid. MTD actively perturbs the reactance of transmission lines equipped with distributed flexible AC transmission system (D‐FACTS) devices to falsify the attacker's knowledge about the system configuration. However, the existing literature has not systematically studied what influences the detection effectiveness of MTD and how it can be improved based on the topology analysis. These problems are tackled here from the perspective of an MTD plan in which the D‐FACTS placement is determined. We first exploit the relation between the rank of the composite matrix and the detecting effectiveness. Then, we rigorously derive upper and lower bounds on the attack detecting probability of MTDs with a given rank of the composite matrix. Furthermore, we analyse existing planning methods and highlight the importance of bus coverage by D‐FACTS devices. To improve the detection effectiveness, we propose a novel graph theory–based planning algorithm to retain the maximum rank of the composite matrix while covering all necessary buses. Comparative results on multiple systems show the high detecting effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in both DC‐ and AC‐SE.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

An Exploration of Moving Target Efficacy and Application

Moving target defense (MTD) is an emerging paradigm in which system defenses dynamically mutate in order to decrease the overall system attack surface. Though the initial concept is promising, implementations have not been widely adopted. The field has been actively researched for over ten years, and has only produced a small amount of extensively adopted defenses, most notably, address space layout randomization (ASLR). This is despite the fact that there currently exist a variety of moving target implementations and proofs-of-concept. We suspect that this results from the moving target controls breaking critical system dependencies from the perspectives of users and administrators, as well as making things more difficult for attackers. As a result, the impact of the controls on overall system security is not sufficient to overcome the inconvenience imposed on legitimate system users. In this paper, we analyze a successful MTD approach. We study the control's dependency graphs, showing how we use graph theoretic and network properties to predict the effectiveness of the selected control. Then, with this framework in place, the dynamic nature of some Moving Target Defenses opens the possibility of modeling them with dynamic systems approaches, such as state space representations familiar from control and systems theory. We then use this approach to develop state space models for Moving Target Defenses, provide an analysis of their properties, and suggest approaches for using them.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Network protection system using linkographs

A method and apparatus for managing an attack on a computer system. A computer identifies actions taken by an adversary in the computer system and links connecting the actions over time using an ontology defining linking rules for linking the actions over time. The computer creates a graph of the actions with the links connecting the actions over time. The graph shows a number of patterns of behavior for the adversary. The computer then identifies a protective action to take with respect to the computer system using the graph of the actions taken by the adversary.

Zage, David John↗

Collection And Analysis Of Telemetry For The Cyote Heuristic

CATCH CLI focuses on gathering telemetry data, storing it in the Neo4j database, querying for Mitre ATT&CK patterns, and creating STIX 2.1 reports. Key Components: Analysis Modules: Analyze data to detect attack patterns. GoSTOTS Collection Engines: Collect telemetry data. These tools can be used together or individually. Analysis modules rely on data from specific engines to identify attack patterns. Source Code Organization: Engines: CATCH/catch/cmd/collection Modules: CATCH/catch/cmd/analysis CGUI Overview CATCH Graphical User Interface (CGUI) offers a graphical shell to execute CATCH CLI, allowing easy editing of: Analysis Modules Database configurations Profiles (collection and device settings) Neo4j Overview Neo4j is a graph database using the Cypher query language, storing data in JSON. It seamlessly integrates with STIX 2.1 data for: Data Submission: CATCH Collection Engines Data Querying: Analysis Modules CATCH modifies STIX 2.1 data for Neo4j submission and reverts it back during querying. STIG Overview Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG) is a tool for creating, editing, querying, analyzing, and visualizing threat intelligence using STIX 2.1 and storing data in Neo4j. Usage Tools can be run: Manually (CLI): Refer to CATCH documentation User Interface: Run ./cgui/CGUI or go run ./cgui/ Additional Information Logging System: Detailed in the config documentation Further Documentation: Available for CATCH and CGUI

Madsen, MichaelJ. [Idaho National Laboratory (INL)↗

Phasor Measurement Units Optimal Placement and Performance Limits for Fault Localization

Here, the performance limits of faults localization are investigated using synchrophasor data. The focus is on a non-trivial operating regime where the number of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) sensors available is insufficient to have full observability of the grid state. Proposed analysis uses the Kullback Leibler (KL) divergence between the distributions corresponding to different fault location hypotheses associated with the observation model. This analysis shows that the most likely locations are concentrated in clusters of buses more tightly connected to the actual fault site akin to graph communities. Consequently, a PMU placement strategy is derived that achieves a near-optimal resolution for localizing faults for a given number of sensors. The problem is also analyzed from the perspective of sampling a graph signal, and how the placement of the PMUs i.e. the spatial sampling pattern and the topological characteristic of the grid affect the ability to successfully localize faults. To highlight the superior performance of presented fault localization and placement algorithms, the proposed strategy is applied to a modified IEEE 34, IEEE-123 bus test cases and to data from a real distribution grid. Additionally, the detection of cyber-physical attacks is also examined where PMU data and relevant Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network traffic information are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system information and/or operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Lifeline-based Global Load Balancing

On shared-memory systems, Cilk-style work-stealing has been used to effectively parallelize irregular task-graph based applications such as Unbalanced Tree Search (UTS). There are two main difficulties in extending this approach to distributed memory. In the shared memory approach, thieves (nodes without work) constantly attempt to asynchronously steal work from randomly chosen victims until they find work. In distributed memory, thieves cannot autonomously steal work from a victim without disrupting its execution. When work is sparse, this results in performance degradation. In essence, a direct extension of traditional work-stealing to distributed memory violates the work-first principle underlying work-stealing. Further, thieves spend useless CPU cycles attacking victims that have no work, resulting in system inefficiencies in multi-programmed contexts. Second, it is non-trivial to detect active distributed termination (detect that programs at all nodes are looking for work, hence there is no work). This problem is well-studied and requires careful design for good performance. Unfortunately, in most existing languages/frameworks, application developers are forced to implement their own distributed termination detection. In this paper, we develop a simple set of ideas that allow work-stealing to be efficiently extended to distributed memory. First, we introduce lifeline graphs: low-degree, low diameter, fully connected directed graphs. Such graphs can be constructed from k-dimensional hypercubes. When a node is unable to find work after w unsuccessful steals, it quiesces after informing the outgoing edges in its lifeline graph. Quiescent nodes do not disturb other nodes. A quiesced node is reactivated when work arrives from a lifeline and itself shares this work with those of its incoming lifelines that are activated. Termination occurs precisely when computation at all nodes has quiesced. In a language such as X10, such passive distributed termination can be detected automatically using the finish construct -- no application code is necessary.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Optimal D-FACTS Placement in Moving Target Defense Against False Data Injection Attacks

Moving target defense (MTD) is a defense strategy to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against the power system state estimation using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. However, existing studies neglect to address a fundamental yet critical issue, i.e., the D-FACTS placement, by assuming that all lines are equipped with D-FACTS devices. Here, to tackle this problem, we first derive analytical necessary conditions and requirements on the D-FACTS placement for a complete MTD. Further, we propose sufficient conditions using a graph theory-based topology analysis to ensure that the MTD under the proposed D-FACTS placement has the maximum rank of its composite matrix, which is indicative of the MTD effectiveness. Based on the analytical conditions, we design D-FACTS placement algorithms by using the minimum number of D-FACTS devices to achieve the maximum MTD effectiveness. A novel MTD-based ACOPF model, in which the reactance of D-FACTS lines is introduced as decision variables, is proposed to find a trade-off between the system loss and the MTD effectiveness. Numerical results on 6-bus, IEEE 14-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems show the efficacy of MTDs using the proposed D-FACTS placement algorithms in maximizing the composite matrix rank and detecting FDI attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗