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At least 91 records · Page 5

Los Alamos National Laboratory Internal Audit Strategic Plan

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) is managed under a management and operations (M&O) contract by Triad National Security, LLC (Triad), a nonprofit, public-focused consortium that includes Battelle Memorial Institute, the Texas A&M University System, and the University of California. The Internal Audit Group (IA) at LANL creates a formal strategic plan every five years in order to establish longer-range goals and initiatives to ensure the group fulfills its purpose as established in the Audit Charter, conforms with relevant standards, and is focused on continuous improvement. This document establishes the five-year strategic plan for fiscal year’s (FY) 2024 - 2028.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Performance Audit Report: Automated Meteorological Monitoring Stations, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

The Waste and Air Quality Offices Group at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory operates two main meteorological monitoring sites near Livermore, California. The primary met tower (Site 200) is located in the northwest corner of the lab and consists of a fifty-two (52) meter tower with vertical wind speed sensors, horizontal wind speed and direction sensors and air temperature sensors at fifty-two (52) meters, twenty-three (23) meters and ten (10) meters. In addition, there is a temperature and humidity probe at ten (10) meters. At two (2) meters there are upward and downward facing solar and infrared radiation sensors, an air temperature sensor, barometric pressure sensor and a temperature and relative humidity probe. At ground level there is a tipping bucket rain gauge located to the southwest of the tower. The datalogger, communication peripherals and the barometric pressure sensor are housed in a small building near the tower. The Site 300 met site is located approximately 10 miles east of Livermore within the boundary of the LLNL blast test site. This site also consists of a 52-meter tower which is configured the same as the 52-meter tower at Site 200. There is also a building at this site that houses the datalogger, communication peripherals and the barometric pressure sensor. At both Site 200 and Site 300, data are collected by Ethernet with telephone modem collection as a backup. The data collection interval for both sites is fifteen (15) minutes via workstations running Loggernet software located at the main lab facility. The audits of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s two automated meteorological stations located near Livermore, California were performed on October 24 & 25, 2023. These audits were performed under the guidelines of the Quality Assurance Handbook for Air Pollution Measurement Systems, Volume IV, Version 2 and the On-Site Meteorological Program Guidance for Regulatory Modeling Applications, U.S. EPA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Quality Audit in the Fastener Industry

Both the financial and quality communities rely on audits to verify customers records. The financial community is highly structured around three categories of risk, INHERENT RISK, CONTROL RISK, and DETECTION RISK. Combined, the product of these three categories constitute the AUDIT RISK. The financial community establishes CONTROL RISK based in large part on a systems level understanding of the process flow. This system level understanding is best expressed in a flowchart. The quality community may be able to adopt this structure and thereby reduce cost while maintaining and enhancing quality. The quality community should attempt to flowchart the systems level quality process before beginning substantive testing. This theory needs to be applied in several trial cases to prove or disprove this hypothesis

Reagan, John R.↗

Software Quality Assurance Audits Guidebooks

The growth in cost and importance of software to NASA has caused NASA to address the improvement of software development across the agency. One of the products of this program is a series of guidebooks that define a NASA concept of the assurance processes that are used in software development. The Software Assurance Guidebook, NASA-GB-A201, issued in September, 1989, provides an overall picture of the NASA concepts and practices in software assurance. Second level guidebooks focus on specific activities that fall within the software assurance discipline, and provide more detailed information for the manager and/or practitioner. This is the second level Software Quality Assurance Audits Guidebook that describes software quality assurance audits in a way that is compatible with practices at NASA Centers.

Source record↗

Blockchain cybersecurity audit platform

A cybersecurity distributed ledger is provided herein for managing, tracking, auditing, and securing assets in a power infrastructure. The cybersecurity distributed ledger may include a blockchain, and may combine with smart contract or smart negotiation technology, such as in a permissioned proof of authority blockchain. The cybersecurity distributed ledger may manage the complete life cycle of a grid asset, from asset requirement and specification, through production, testing, deployment, maintenance, and retirement. The cybersecurity distributed ledger may create an immutable record of the grid asset, which may be audited for regulatory compliance or build or development compliance. Further, the cybersecurity distributed ledger may store unique identifying information for a grid asset, which may be used to detect a security breach or other tampering with a grid asset. The cybersecurity distributed ledger may also track control or ownership of the grid asset, as well as changes or updates to the grid asset.

Mylrea, Michael E.↗

Toward the Neutrino Discovery Platform: An Auditable, Uncertainty-Bearing Toolchain for MINERvA Open-Data Cross-Section Analysis

The Neutrino Discovery Platform (NDP) aims to accelerate DUNE-era science by making the neutrino program's existing datasets analyzable through fast, reproducible, and auditable workflows. We report a working version of two of its layers, data curation and agentic orchestration, built and tested end to end on MINERvA open data. The guiding lesson throughout is that a cross section is a measurement, and not just a plotted shape, only if it carries a defensible systematic-uncertainty budget, a trustworthy unfolding, and a reproducible record. Using a single medium-energy playlist pair from the MINERvA open-data release (about $2.05\times10^{17}$ protons on target of data), we first reproduced the shapes of two published charged-current inclusive $\nu_\mu$ measurements through a complete extraction ladder: selection, background subtraction, D'Agostini unfolding, efficiency correction, and flux normalization. These shape-level reproductions ran and tracked the published results, but they lacked the systematic-uncertainty machinery that defines a MINERvA cross section. To supply it, we vendored and built the MINERvA Analysis Toolkit and developed a many-universe systematic-uncertainty tool that produces a portable covariance artifact, a parallel event-loop runner, and a per-run auditability harness. Validated against a published covariance release, the toolchain reproduces the released statistical, flux, and muon-energy-scale terms and shows that they account for roughly 63\% of the total variance, with the remainder unreleased. Using this same infrastructure, we then performed a measurement of our own design, the hadronic recoil-energy distribution of low-energy ($E_\nu<2.5$~GeV) charged-current inclusive events, and found data/simulation shape agreement of $\chi^2/\mathrm{ndf}=1.26$. Together these results show that the platform supports original physics and not only reproductions.

Breaux, Auto [Tulane U. (main)]↗

Human health and wellbeing in environmental impact assessment in New South Wales, Australia: Auditing health impacts within environmental assessments of major projects

Internationally the inclusion of health within environmental impact assessment (EIA) has been shown to be limited. While Australian EIA documentation has not been studied empirically to date, deficiencies in practice have been documented. This research developed an audit tool to undertake a qualitative descriptive analysis of 22 Major Project EAs in New South Wales, Australia. Results showed that health and wellbeing impacts were not considered explicitly. They were, however, included indirectly in the identification of traditional public health exposures associated with the physical environment and to a lesser extent the inclusion of social and economic impacts. However, no health data was used to inform any of the assessments, there was no reference to causal pathways between exposures or determinants and physical or mental health effects, and there was no inclusion of the differential distribution of exposures or health impacts on different populations. The results add conceptually and practically to the long standing integration debate, showing that health is in a position to add value to the EIA process as an explicit part of standard environmental, social and economic considerations. However, to overcome the consistently documented barriers to integrating health in EIA, capacity must be developed amongst EIA professionals, led by the health sector, to progress health related knowledge and tools.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Programmatic Comparison and Dissemination of an Audit of Single-fraction Radiation Therapy Prescribing Practices for Bone Metastases is Associated with a Meaningful and Lasting Change in Practice on a Population Level

There is ample evidence that single-fraction radiation therapy (SFRT) is as efficacious as more costly and morbid multifraction regimens. We previously demonstrated that an audit-based intervention increased the use of SFRT in all regional cancer centers the following year. However, other investigators have demonstrated that interventions were only associated with a transient 1-year change in prescribing practices. We sought to determine whether our intervention resulted in a more lasting impact.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Building Energy Audit Report for Pearl Harbor, HI

A building energy audit was performed by a team of engineers from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) under contract to the Department of Energy/Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). The effort used the Facility Energy Decision System (FEDS) model to determine how energy is consumed at selected Pearl Harbor buildings, identify cost-effective energy retrofit measures, and calculate the potential energy and cost savings. This report documents the findings of that assessment.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Impact of E4 Training and Field Auditing of GSA Heartland Region Facilities

To assess the impact of energy efficiency expert evaluation (E4) training and field audits performed since 2007, the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) undertook a follow-up study on the implementation of E4 recommendations and an analysis of energy savings. The building property manager and O and M contractor of each facility were interviewed to obtain feedback and implementation status of the E4 recommendations. Overall, there were more than 160 recommendations documented in the E4 reports; about 50% of these recommendations were fully implemented and the remaining 50% either partially implemented or not implemented. In four buildings, the E4 recommendations were aligned with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) projects replacing HVAC equipment or upgrading the building control system. The E4 recommendations were not followed-up in two buildings because of uncertainty of the long-term use of the facility or personnel changes. Results of this followon study are reported in this document.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

EISA 432 Energy Audits Best Practices: Software Tools

Five whole building analysis software tools that can aid an energy manager with fulfilling energy audit and commissioning/retro-commissioning requirements were selected for review in this best practices study. A description of each software tool is provided as well as a discussion of the user interface and level of expertise required for each tool, a review of how to use the tool for analyzing energy conservation opportunities, the format and content of reports generated by the tool, and a discussion on the applicability of the tool for commissioning.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Methodology to Assess No Touch Audit Software Using Field Data

The research presented in this report builds upon these previous efforts and proposes a set of tests to assess no touch audit tools using real utility bill and on-site data. The proposed assessment methodology explicitly investigates the behaviors of the monthly energy end uses with respect to outdoor temperature, i.e., the building energy signature, to help understand the Tool's disaggregation accuracy. The project team collaborated with Field Diagnosis Services, Inc. (FDSI) to identify appropriate test sites for the evaluation.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

GHG Emissions Reduction Audit: A Checklist for Owners

This guidance and accompanying checklist detail recommended services and deliverables for a building-level greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction audit focused on Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Analyses to Verify and Improve the Accuracy of the Manufactured Home Energy Audit (MHEA)

A series of analyses were performed to determine the reasons that the Manufactured Home Energy Audit (MHEA) over predicted space-heating energy savings as measured in a recent field test and to develop appropriate corrections to improve its performance. The study used the Home Energy Rating System (HERS) Building Energy Simulation Test (BESTEST) to verify that MHEA accurately calculates the UA-values of mobile home envelope components and space-heating energy loads as compared with other, well-accepted hourly energy simulation programs. The study also used the Procedures for Verification of RESNET Accredited HERS Software Tools to determine that MHEA accurately calculates space-heating energy consumptions for gas furnaces, heat pumps, and electric-resistance furnaces. Even though MHEA's calculations were shown to be correct from an engineering point of view, three modifications to MHEA's algorithms and use of a 0.6 correction factor were incorporated into MHEA to true-up its predicted savings to values measured in a recent field test. A simulated use of the revised version of MHEA in a weatherization program revealed that MHEA would likely still recommend a significant number of cost-effective weatherization measures in mobile homes (including ceiling, floor, and even wall insulation and far fewer storm windows). Based on the findings from this study, it was recommended that a revised version of MHEA with all the changes and modifications outlined in this report should be finalized and made available to the weatherization community as soon as possible, preferably in time for use within the 2009 Program Year.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Audit Report The Procurement of Safety Class/Safety-Significant Items at the Savannah River Site

The Department of Energy operates several nuclear facilities at its Savannah River Site, and several additional facilities are under construction. This includes the National Nuclear Security Administration's Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) which is designated to help maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX Facility) is being constructed to manufacture commercial nuclear reactor fuel assemblies from weapon-grade plutonium oxide and depleted uranium. The Interim Salt Processing (ISP) project, managed by the Office of Environmental Management, will treat radioactive waste. The Department has committed to procuring products and services for nuclear-related activities that meet or exceed recognized quality assurance standards. Such standards help to ensure the safety and performance of these facilities. To that end, it issued Departmental Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance (QA Order). The QA Order requires the application of Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (NQA-1) for nuclear-related activities. The NQA-1 standard provides requirements and guidelines for the establishment and execution of quality assurance programs during the siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. These requirements, promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, must be applied to 'safety-class' and 'safety-significant' structures, systems and components (SSCs). Safety-class SSCs are defined as those necessary to prevent exposure off site and to protect the public. Safety-significant SSCs are those whose failure could irreversibly impact worker safety such as a fatality, serious injury, or significant radiological or chemical exposure. Due to the importance of protecting the public, workers, and environment, we initiated an audit to determine whether the Department of Energy procured safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that met NQA-1 standards at the Savannah River Site. Our review disclosed that the Department had procured and installed safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that did not meet NQA-1 quality standards. Specifically, we identified multiple instances in which critical components did not meet required quality and safety standards. For example: (1) Three structural components were procured and installed by the prime contractor at Savannah River during construction of the MOX Facility that did not meet the technical specifications for items relied on for safety. These substandard items necessitated costly and time consuming remedial action to, among other things, ensure that nonconforming materials and equipment would function within safety margins; (2) In six instances, items used in the construction of TEF failed to satisfy quality standards. In one of these situations, operating procedures had to be modified to ensure that the problem item did not compromise safety; and (3) Finally, at the ISP, one component that did not meet quality standards was procured. The failure of the item could have resulted in a spill of up to 15,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste. Based on an extensive examination of relevant internal controls and procurement practices, we concluded that these failures were attributable to inadequate attention to quality assurance at Savannah River. Simply put, Departmental controls were not adequate to prevent and/or detect quality assurance problems. For example, Federal and prime contractor officials did not expressly require that subcontractors or lower-tiered vendors comply with quality assurance requirements. Additionally, management did not effectively communicate quality assurance concerns between the several Departmental program elements operating at Savannah River. The procurement and installation of these nonconforming components resulted in cost increases. For example, as of October 2008, the MOX Facility had incurred costs of more than $680,000 due to problems associated with the procurement of $11 million of nonconforming safety-class reinforcing steel. In general, the internal control weaknesses we discovered could have permitted, without detection, the procurement and installation of safety critical components that did not meet quality assurance standards. In a worst case scenario, undetected, nonconforming components could fail and injure workers or the public. In certain instances, the Department took steps to ensure that the prime contractors at Savannah River began action to remediate nonconforming components and to strengthen policies and procedures. Additionally, the Department took actions to ensure that critical components necessary for projects worked as designed by requiring that the prime contractor place personnel at manufacturers' locations. Further, the Department had suspended work with certain other manufacturers due to quality assurance problems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Audit Report on "Management Controls over the Department's Excess Weapons Inventories and Selected Sensitive Equipment used by Protective Forces"

Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Energy has, on several occasions, revised its security posture based on identified threats and adversaries. These revisions in security posture have driven Departmental sites to upgrade their defensive and tactical equipment. Subsequent changes in the perceived threats have, in some cases, led to a reduction in the need for certain types of weapons, thus creating a pool of surplus equipment. These surplus weapons could potentially be used by other Department sites and Federal law enforcement agencies. Recent Office of Inspector General reports have raised concerns with the adequacy of controls related to defensive and tactical equipment. For example, our report on Management Controls Over Defense Related High Risk Property (OAS-M-08-06, April 2008) found that administrative controls over certain defense related high risk property were not sufficient for providing accountability over these items. Because of prior reported weaknesses in controls over defensive and tactical equipment, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors were properly managing excess weapons inventories and selected sensitive equipment used by protective forces. Our review disclosed that the Department was not always properly managing its inventories of excess weapons and selected sensitive equipment. We identified issues with the retention of unneeded weapons at many locations and with the identification and tracking of sensitive items. More specifically: Sites maintained large inventories of weapons that were no longer needed but had not been made available for use by either other Departmental sites or other Federal law enforcement agencies. For instance, at six of the locations included in our review we identified a total of 2,635 unneeded weapons with a total acquisition value of over $2.8 million that had not been officially declared as excess - an action that would have made them available for others to use. In addition; Sites were not always identifying, tracking and properly disposing of potentially high risk and sensitive equipment. In particular, we identified control weaknesses in this area related to weapons sights and scopes. These issues occurred because the Department did not have processes in place to properly manage excess inventories of weapons. In particular, the Department does not have requirements for ensuring timely declaration of excess weapons. Additionally, certain sites indicated that they were unwilling to give up excess weapons because of the possibility that they may be needed in the future. However, other sites had a need for some of these weapons and could have avoided purchasing them had they been made available through the excess screening process. Also, we found that the Department lacks clear guidance on the identification of high risk/sensitive equipment. Except for immaterial differences, we were able to locate and verify accountability over the items of defensive and tactical equipment we selected for review. Specifically, we took statistical samples of weapons, ammunition, and other related equipment and were able to verify their existence. While these accountability measures were noteworthy, additional action is necessary to strengthen controls over weapon and sensitive equipment management. Untimely declaration of excess weapons may result in an inefficient use of scarce Government resources. Similarly, if selected high risk/sensitive equipment is not properly categorized and tracked, accountability issues may occur. To address these issues, we made recommendations aimed at improving the management of these categories of defensive and tactical equipment.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Audit Report on "Work for Others Performed by the Department of Energy for the Department of Defense"

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Economy Act of 1932, the Department of Energy and its semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provide research and technical assistance to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable, full cost recovery basis through the Work for Others (WFO) program. For the vast majority of WFO technical projects, Department Federal officials furnish administrative project oversight while the actual detailed scientific or technical work is completed by the Department's 'management and operating' contractors. These contractors are awarded a special contract type specifically created under the Federal Acquisition Regulation to manage and operate Department sites and facilities, including sophisticated laboratories and technical centers, on a government-owned, contractor-operated basis. With annual expenditures exceeding $1 billion, the Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the Department's largest WFO customers. Work performed for DoD at the Department's national laboratories and other facilities includes highly technical research in areas such as nuclear weapons systems, counter-terrorism, and in-theater troop support. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, required the Inspectors General of the DoD and the Department to review procurement methods to determine whether the Department complied with DoD procurement requirements and/or whether alternative procurement policies were in place. In response, we focused our review on projects performed by NNSA because it completes the vast majority (approximately $900 million in FY 2008) of the Department's work for DoD. As part of this effort, and, at the specific request of the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), we identified the universe of WFO technical projects that received new funding in the fourth quarter of FY 2008 at NNSA sites. We independently reviewed a judgmental sample of 11 projects selected by the DoD OIG to meet the objectives of this audit. Our review revealed that NNSA managed DoD WFO technical projects in a manner consistent with requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Department's implementing guidance, the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation. Because of the very nature of the Department's management and operating contracting model, WFO projects may not be technically compliant with DoD procurement regulations in certain instances. We found that NNSA did not let new contracts or task orders for the DoD WFO technical projects we reviewed and instead managed them under its existing internal control process as part of its management and operating contract structure. In one instance, we noted that the Department had, at DoD's request, supplemented its control structure to incorporate specific DoD procurement requirements. Senior Department of Energy procurement officials acknowledged that neither the Department nor NNSA modified their existing prime contracts to incorporate specific defense procurement requirements because such modifications would be inappropriate, costly, and inefficient. In short, they informed us that the Department had developed and implemented a series of controls designed to monitor overall contractor performance, including WFO technical projects. Department and NNSA officials noted, however, that they were willing to incorporate DoD specific requirements into work orders should DoD request and fund such efforts. Additional details regarding management of WFO technical projects are discussed in the body of this report.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗