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Validating Phasing and Geometry of Large Focal Plane Arrays

The Kepler Mission is designed to survey our region of the Milky Way galaxy to discover hundreds of Earth-sized and smaller planets in or near the habitable zone. The Kepler photometer is an array of 42 CCDs (charge-coupled devices) in the focal plane of a 95-cm Schmidt camera onboard the Kepler spacecraft. Each 50x25-mm CCD has 2,200 x 1,024 pixels. The CCDs accumulate photons and are read out every six seconds to prevent saturation. The data is integrated for 30 minutes, and then the pixel data is transferred to onboard storage. The data is subsequently encoded and transmitted to the ground. During End-to-End Information System (EEIS) testing of the Kepler Mission System (KMS), there was a need to verify that the pixels requested by the science team operationally were correctly collected, encoded, compressed, stored, and transmitted by the FS, and subsequently received, decoded, uncompressed, and displayed by the Ground Segment (GS) without the outputs of any CCD modules being flipped, mirrored, or otherwise corrupted during the extensive FS and GS processing. This would normally be done by projecting an image on the focal plane array (FPA), collecting the data in a flight-like way, and making a comparison between the original data and the data reconstructed by the science data system. Projecting a focused image onto the FPA through the telescope would normally involve using a collimator suspended over the telescope opening. There were several problems with this approach: the collimation equipment is elaborate and expensive; as conceived, it could only illuminate a limited section of the FPA (.25 percent) during a given test; the telescope cover would have to be deployed during testing to allow the image to be projected into the telescope; the equipment was bulky and difficult to situate in temperature-controlled environments; and given all the above, test setup, execution, and repeatability were significant concerns. Instead of using this complicated approach of projecting an optical image on the FPA, the Kepler project developed a method using known defect features in the CCDs to verify proper collection and reassembly of the pixels, thereby avoiding the costs and risks of the optical projection approach. The CCDs composing the Kepler FPA, as all CCDs, had minor defects. At ambient temperature, some pixels look far brighter than they should. These ghot h pixels have a higher rate of charge leakage than the others due to manufacturing variations. They are usually stable over time, and appear at temperatures above 5 oC. The hot pixels on the Kepler FPA were mapped before photometer assembly during module testing. Selected hot pixels were used as target gstars h for the purposes of EEIS testing. gDead h pixels are permanently off, producing a permanently black pixel. These can also be used if there is some illumination of the FPA. During EEIS testing, Dark Current Full Frame Images (FFIs) taken at room temperature were used to create the hot pixel maps for all 84 Kepler photometer CCD channels. Data from two separate nights were used to create two hot pixel maps per channel, which were cross-correlated to remove cosmic ray events which appear to be hot pixels. These hot pixel maps obtained during EEIS testing were compared to the maps made during module testing to verify that the end-to-end data flow was correct.

Standley, Shaun P.↗

Monocular Ranging for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems in the Far-Field

Recent proliferation of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) applications requires onboard collision avoidance systems to mitigate the risk of collision with non-cooperative aircraft and manned aircraft, which may not see sUAS in time to perform an avoidance maneuver. An attractive avenue for onboard collision avoidance is the utilization of machine vision cameras due to their low size, weight and power (SWaP) requirements. In this paper, we characterize the range performance of a machine vision system developed in-house and mounted onto an sUAS. The technique was designed to estimate the performance of a sense-and-avoid system to ensure that the sensing components meet the well-clear requirements for the chosen platform and avoidance strategy. Experimental flight-test data was acquired from test-flights flown along multiple collision geometries for two intruders: a general Aviation (GA) aircraft and a fixed-wing sUAS. The ownship and both intruders were instrumented with inertial navigation systems (INS) recording position and attitude information. The range at first detection, 𝑹𝟎, was extracted from in-flight imagery of head-on collision course geometry synchronized with INS data from both aircraft and ground-truth values extracted from the raw imagery. This initial detection distance, 𝑹𝟎, scales with atmospheric attenuation. Therefore, under clear sky conditions, the derived 𝑹𝟎 value represents the upper bound on the detection range achievable by the test configuration of the detector. Results indicate that the maximum initial detection distance for a 4k resolution action camera fitted with a 41º Field of View (FOV) lens is 2.763 ± 0.037 km for a GA aircraft and 0.881 ± 0.061 km for a fixed-wing sUAS, respectively. The in results this study suggest that a vision-based detect and track system may be analyzed using the sensor characterization and contextualized within aircraft well-clear volumes.

Chester V. Dolph↗

Concepts and Challenges for Environmentally Friendly En Route Operations

A flight trajectory optimization algorithm with fuel and contrails models, which develops alternative flight paths, provides policy makers the necessary data to make tradeoffs between persistent contrails mitigation and aircraft fuel consumption. This study develops an algorithm that calculates wind-optimal trajectories for cruising aircraft while avoiding the regions of airspace prone to persistent contrails formation. The optimal trajectory is derived using Singular Perturbation Method. The regions of airspace favorable to persistent contrails formation are modeled as high-risk areas that aircraft should avoid and are adjustable. The tradeoffs between persistent contrails formation and additional travel time are investigated for wind-optimal trajectories and various contrails-avoidance trajectories at 10 different cruising altitudes for flights departing from Chicago and San Diego to New York. The additional travel times required for avoiding 100% persistent contrails formation at various flight altitudes ranged from approximately 0% to 4.3% for flights from Chicago to New York. For flights between San Diego and New York, additional traveling times vary between 1.3% and 5% depending on the cruise altitude and the percentage of contrail avoidance. Talk will present the results of aircraft fuel consumptions that are proportional to the travel time for cruising aircraft.

Sridhar, Banavar↗

Appendix A: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES)

Regulations that establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions. Those requirements will apply to detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the overall level of safety required to operate in the airspace. Several key gaps must be addressed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace level of safety. Foremost among these is the calculation of the relative effectiveness of a particular system to mitigate violations of a separation standard with other aircraft, which is known as the systems risk ratio. The risk ratio is calculated as the probability of mid-air collision with a DAA system divided by the probability of mid-air collision without a DAA system. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with the risk ratios of other collision avoidance mitigations, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of mid-air collisions per flight hour. Defining the required risk ratio that the DAA system needs to ensure the safety of the airspace requires an evaluation of the current airspace and a simulated evaluation that incorporates UAS aerodynamic performance and the mission characteristics of future UAS operations that are projected to be conducted in areas that interact with current operations. These evaluations will produce the frequency of encounters that currently exist in the airspace and those that could be generated with the introduction of UAS. Together, the frequency of encounters, an evaluation of unmitigated risk of collision, and a desired level of safety of the airspace will yield a required risk ratio of the DAA system. This study will focus on evaluating the encounter rates between aircraft based on historical radar data and encounter rates that could occur based on simulated UAS missions.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems↗

Assessment, Planning, and Execution Considerations for Conjunction Risk Assessment and Mitigation Operations

An operational Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) concept is the real-time process of assessing risk posed by close approaches and reacting to those risks if necessary. The most effective way to completely mitigate conjunction risk is to perform an avoidance maneuver. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has implemented a routine CARA process since 2005. Over this period, considerable experience has been gained and many lessons have been learned. This paper identifies and presents these experiences as general concepts in the description of the Conjunction Assessment, Flight Dynamics, and Flight Operations methodologies and processes. These general concepts will be tied together and will be exemplified through a case study of an actual high risk conjunction event for the Aura mission.

Frigm, Ryan C.↗

HabSim: A Modular Coupled Virtual Testbed for Simulating ExtraTerrestrial Habitat Systems

Extraterrestrial habitats involve a tightly coupled combination of hardware, software, and humans while operating in an unforgiving environment that poses many risks, both anticipated and unanticipated. Traditional approaches with such systems of systems focus on reliability, robustness, and redundancy. These approaches seek to avoid failure rather than reduce overall risk. However, faults are inevitable, and understanding and managing the complex and emergent behavior and cascading events of such a complex system is critical. This study describes the development of HabSim, a computational simulation environment intended to support research to establish the know-how to design and operate resilient and autonomous SmartHabs. HabSim is a modular virtual testbed composed of many of the coupled dynamic systems expected in a typical SmartHab. A heterogeneous set of interconnected physics-based and phenomenological models is used to represent the essential functions of a SmartHab. HabSim further considers disruptions and models damage and repair of certain components. This paper discusses a) system and subsystem requirements of the deep space habitat included in the HabSim platform; b) architectural choices made in response to the requirements; c) technical considerations for developing, verifying, configuring, and executing HabSim; and d) illustrative sample results from a simulation of a representative disruption scenario.

Mohsen Azimi↗

Middle Man Concept for In-Orbit Collision Risks Mitigation, CAESAR and CARA Examples

This paper describes the conjunction analysis which has to be performed using data provided by JSpOC. This description not only demonstrates that Collision Avoidance is a 2- step process (close approach detection followed by risk evaluation for collision avoidance decision) but also leads to the conclusion that there is a need for a Middle Man role. After describing the Middle Man concept, this paper introduces two examples with their similarities and particularities: the American civil space effort delivered by the NASA CARA team (Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis) and the French response CAESAR (Conjunction Assessment and Evaluation Service: Alerts and Recommendations). For both, statistics are presented and feedbacks discussed. All together, around 80 satellites are served by CARA and/or CAESAR. Both processes regularly evolve in order either to follow JSpOC upgrades or to improve analysis according to experience acquired during the past years.

conjunction↗

Using Risk Assessment Methodologies to Meet Management Objectives

Corporate and program objectives focus on desired performance and results. Management decisions that affect how to meet these objectives now involve a complex mix of: technology, safety issues, operations, process considerations, employee considerations, regulatory requirements, financial concerns and legal issues. Risk Assessments are a tool for decision makers to understand potential consequences and be in a position to reduce, mitigate or eliminate costly mistakes or catastrophic failures. Using a risk assessment methodology is only a starting point. A risk assessment program provides management with important input in the decision making process. A pro-active organization looks to the future to avoid problems, a reactive organization can be blindsided by risks that could have been avoided. You get out what you put in, how useful your program is will be up to the individual organization.

DeMott, D. L.↗

Airborne Radar for sUAS Sense and Avoid

A primary challenge for the safe integration of small UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) is traffic deconfliction, both from manned and unmanned aircraft. The UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project being conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) considers a layered approach to separation provision, ranging from segregation of operations through airspace volumes (geofences) to autonomous sense and avoid (SAA) technologies for higher risk, densely occupied airspace. Cooperative SAA systems, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems provide significant additional risk mitigation but they fail to adequately mitigate collision risks for non-cooperative (non-transponder equipped) airborne aircraft. The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify ICAROUS Navigation) flight test being conducted by NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP) was designed to investigate the applicability and performance of a prototype, commercially available sUAS radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both manned and unmanned. The radar selected for this research was a Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120 degree azimuth and 80 degree elevation field of view operating at 24.55GHz center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth. The radar transmits 2 watts of power thru a Metamaterial Electronically Scanning Array antenna in horizontal polarization. When the radar is transmitting, personnel must be at least 1 meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing radiation exposure. The radar physical dimensions are 18.7cm by 12.1cm by 4.1cm and it weighs less than 820 grams making it well suited for installation on small UASs. The onboard, SAA capability, known as ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, will provide autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks from the onboard radar. The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in three phases. The first phase included outdoor, ground-based radar evaluations performed at the Virginia Tech’s Kentland Farm testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The test was designed to measure how well the radar could detect and track a small UAS flying in the radar’s field of view. The radar was used to monitor 5 test flights consisting of outbound, inbound and crossing routes at different ranges and altitudes. The UAS flown during the ground test was the Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 4250 grams (10 pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set up to scan and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view from 0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was configured to eliminate tracks generated from any targets located beyond 2000 meters from the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 meters per second. For subsequent phases of the study the radar will be integrated with a sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned GA aircraft detections and tracking. Preliminary data analysis from the first outdoor ground tests showed the radar performed well at tracking the vehicle as it flew outbound and repeatedly maintained a track out to 1000 meters (maximum 1387 meters) until the vehicle slowed to a stop to reverse direction to fly inbound. As the Inspire flew inbound tracks from beyond 800 meters, a reacquisition time delay was consistently observed between when the Inspire exceeds a speed of 1.45 meters per second and when the radar indicated an inbound target was present and maintained its track. The time delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds for the inbound flights examined, and typically resulted in about a 200 meter closure distance before the Inspire track was maintained. The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking the vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters across the azimuthal field of view. The radar and ICAROUS software will be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-SE8-E UAS during the next phase of the RAAVIN project. The main goal at the conclusion of this effort is to determine if this radar technology can reliably support minimum requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In particular, the study will measure the range of vehicle detections, lateral and vertical angular errors, false and missed/late detections, and estimated distance at closest point of approach after an avoidance maneuver is executed. This last metric is directly impacted by sensor performance and indicates its suitability for the task.

Szatkowski, George N.↗

Implementation and Operation of Power Flow Control Solutions for Transmission Systems

Power-flow controls (PFCs) technologies provide a suite of alternatives to more-efficiently direct the flow of power on the grid, improving flexibility and enabling the grid to be more responsive and resilient. PFCs can be used in many cases to mitigate overloads and consequently defer the installation of grid-expansion projects. They can also be suitable options in situations where new transmission lines cannot be built because of environmental constraints, land use, or other types of restrictions. Other uses include mitigation of loop or unintended flows, forcing of contractual or scheduled flows, reduction of congestion, and mitigation solutions during large maintenance or construction projects. While many studies have demonstrated the potential economic benefits of PFC for different types of applications, the implementation implications of using multiple PFCs for system operation and reliability have not been analyzed in detail. The lack of information and practical experience on these aspects hinders adoption of this technology. One use case would be that multiple PFCs are required to coordinate congestion management. In such cases, multiple PFCs are deployed in a meshed power system to control power flows across a wide area. The challenges are associated with PFC interaction—namely, the self and mutual power-flow sensitivity of each PFC, which must be accounted for in the calculation of the respective operating setpoints. This report analyzes implementation and operation that must be considered in evaluating transmission solutions using PFCs. The report first analyzes attributes with which PFC-based solutions should comply, based on the objective and characteristics of each particular use case. It then describes different approaches for coordinated control of multiple PFC devices for different applications, including options to avoid adverse interactions and reduce risks due to inappropriate coordination. Control and operation are illustrated through case studies performed on both generic and actual power system models. This report provides insights for transmission planners and operation engineers about the implementation of PFC-based transmission solutions; consequently, it will help them make informed decisions about the adoption of the technology.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Achieving Operability via the Mission System Paradigm

In the past, flight and ground systems have been developed largely-independently, with the flight system taking the lead, and dominating the development process. Operability issues have been addressed poorly in planning, requirements, design, I&T, and system-contracting activities. In many cases, as documented in lessons-learned, this has resulted in significant avoidable increases in cost and risk. With complex missions and systems, operability is being recognized as an important end-to-end design issue. Never-the-less, lessons-learned and operability concepts remain, in many cases, poorly understood and sporadically applied. A key to effective application of operability concepts is adopting a 'mission system' paradigm. In this paradigm, flight and ground systems are treated, from an engineering and management perspective, as inter-related elements of a larger mission system. The mission system consists of flight hardware, flight software, telecom services, ground data system, testbeds, flight teams, science teams, flight operations processes, procedures, and facilities. The system is designed in functional layers, which span flight and ground. It is designed in response to project-level requirements, mission design and an operations concept, and is developed incrementally, with early and frequent integration of flight and ground components.

ground systems↗

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗

An Investigation Into Transecting Satellites in Future Space Traffic Management Scenarios

The number of satellites expected to populate the near-Earth space environment is set to dramatically increase in the coming decade as new large constellations are approved and deployed. Current strategies for deploying new batches of these satellites often involve launching into an initial orbit, and then performing apogee raising maneuvers to reach a target altitude. Similarly, end-of-life planning for these constellation satellites can consist of de-orbit burns that lower perigee to permit disposal via re-entry. Both the raising and de-orbiting maneuvers can result in the individual satellites traveling in transecting orbits that have the potential to cross other spacecraft trajectories. While individual large constellations may be able to coexist in separate altitude and inclination bands, having thousands of satellites moving between these bands as new satellites are added and old satellites are removed could pose additional collision risks. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the impact that large numbers of university-class CubeSats might have in terms of their overall collision risk, especially as these satellites typically do not have propulsion systems for active maneuvering. To assess the impact that transecting satellites might have on future space traffic management strategies, this study explored a variety of realistic future scenarios using a high-fidelity simulation tool. The model can simulate the orbit of tens of thousands of resident space objects (RSOs) simultaneously, to include active satellites, debris, rocket bodies, or even future hypothetical satellite constellations, using a realistic force model that incorporates non-spherical gravity, atmospheric drag, and solar radiation pressure, as well as station-keeping. The simulation can be customized to accommodate different methods of calculating the probability of collision, as well as the process for determining probability ellipsoids and screening volumes. This makes it possible to replicate, and compare, different processes used by different spacecraft operators and space situational awareness (SSA) providers. As the model is run forward in time, each conjunction event is recorded, allowing for the analysis of statistics and meta-data related to these events, providing insight into the nature and frequency of potential collisions, such as whether are they active or passive objects, what size are the two objects, and who owns the objects (if known). This information makes it possible to characterize how changes to the status quo affect the number and type of conjunctions that occur, as well as the distributional effects on various types of satellite operators. To assess the general risks that transecting satellites might pose for hypothetical future space object environments, approximately 60,000 new large constellation satellites were considered, in addition to the existing catalog of approximately 7800 known resident space objects (RSOs), over a simulation period of one year. The results indicate that the future space environment will introduce a non-linear increase in conjunction events as the number of RSOs also increase. This will require adjustments to spacecraft fuel budgets in order to conduct the avoidance maneuvers necessary to minimize collision risk, both for existing and new satellites. This increase is due in large part to the higher density of RSOs and the overlap between some constellation orbits. Current catalog objects were shown to require three times more ∆V for collision avoidance (CA) maneuvers in the simulated future environment, and some constellation spacecraft were estimated to devote the majority of their annual ∆V to CA. The impact of small satellites was found to be proportional for the current space environment, and actually decreased in terms of percentage for the future scenario, suggesting that small satellites do not pose an outsized collision risk. Lastly, transecting satellites were found to contribute thousands of additional conjunctions outside of their operational orbit, and may require up to an additional 5% in CA maneuver fuel allocation.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Ground Systems, Software and Operations Infrastructure Cloud Implementation

The growing number of large-scale constellations and the improvements made in the tracking and detection of resident space objects have contributed to the increase of satellite conjunction events. As a result of the increase of objects in Earth orbit, the timeline for risk analysis computations for satellite collision avoidance is more urgent when conjunctions occur. It is imperative NASA maintains a space environment safety functionality for the agency that allows CARA remote access to the ground system while maintaining redundancy. CARA’s On-premises (On-prem) ground system would no longer be able to meet these access and redundancy requirements, hence the investigation and eventual implementation of a Cloud-based ground station infrastructure as a viable solution. This paper will provide an overview of the principal parts of the Conjunction Assessment (CA) risk analysis process used at CARA, summarize the key drivers towards the Cloud solution, and share key lessons learned that are significant for any operational entity considering a cloud solution for real-time satellite operations to ensure a sustainable space traffic environment for all.

Sustainability↗

Cyber100 Compass: Quantification of Cybersecurity Risks for Systems Transitioning to High Levels of Renewables (Final Report)

The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Nutrient Replenishment by Turbulent Mixing in Suspended Macroalgal Farms

Abstract This study uses large eddy simulations to investigate nutrient transport and uptake in suspended macroalgal farms. Various farm configurations and oceanic forcing conditions are examined, with the farm base located near the nutricline depth. We introduce the Damkohler number Da to quantify the balance between nutrient consumption by macroalgae uptake and supply by farm‐enhanced nutrient transport. Most cases exhibit low Da , indicating that farm‐generated turbulence drives sufficient upward nutrient fluxes, supporting macroalgae growth. High Da and starvation may occur in fully grown farm blocks, a configuration that generates the weakest turbulence, particularly when combined with densely planted macroalgae or weak flow conditions. Flow stagnation within the farm due to macroalgae drag may constrain the uptake efficiency and further increase the starvation risk. Mitigation strategies involve timely harvesting, avoiding dense macroalgae canopies, and selecting farm locations with robust ocean currents and waves. This study provides insights for sustainable macroalgal farm planning.

Geology↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗