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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Middle Man Concept for In-Orbit Collision Risks Mitigation, CAESAR and CARA Examples

This paper describes the conjunction analysis which has to be performed using data provided by JSpOC. This description not only demonstrates that Collision Avoidance is a 2- step process (close approach detection followed by risk evaluation for collision avoidance decision) but also leads to the conclusion that there is a need for a Middle Man role. After describing the Middle Man concept, this paper introduces two examples with their similarities and particularities: the American civil space effort delivered by the NASA CARA team (Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis) and the French response CAESAR (Conjunction Assessment and Evaluation Service: Alerts and Recommendations). For both, statistics are presented and feedbacks discussed. All together, around 80 satellites are served by CARA and/or CAESAR. Both processes regularly evolve in order either to follow JSpOC upgrades or to improve analysis according to experience acquired during the past years.

conjunction↗
NASA NTRS2015

Using Risk Assessment Methodologies to Meet Management Objectives

Corporate and program objectives focus on desired performance and results. Management decisions that affect how to meet these objectives now involve a complex mix of: technology, safety issues, operations, process considerations, employee considerations, regulatory requirements, financial concerns and legal issues. Risk Assessments are a tool for decision makers to understand potential consequences and be in a position to reduce, mitigate or eliminate costly mistakes or catastrophic failures. Using a risk assessment methodology is only a starting point. A risk assessment program provides management with important input in the decision making process. A pro-active organization looks to the future to avoid problems, a reactive organization can be blindsided by risks that could have been avoided. You get out what you put in, how useful your program is will be up to the individual organization.

DeMott, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Airborne Radar for sUAS Sense and Avoid

A primary challenge for the safe integration of small UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) is traffic deconfliction, both from manned and unmanned aircraft. The UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project being conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) considers a layered approach to separation provision, ranging from segregation of operations through airspace volumes (geofences) to autonomous sense and avoid (SAA) technologies for higher risk, densely occupied airspace. Cooperative SAA systems, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems provide significant additional risk mitigation but they fail to adequately mitigate collision risks for non-cooperative (non-transponder equipped) airborne aircraft. The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify ICAROUS Navigation) flight test being conducted by NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP) was designed to investigate the applicability and performance of a prototype, commercially available sUAS radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both manned and unmanned. The radar selected for this research was a Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120 degree azimuth and 80 degree elevation field of view operating at 24.55GHz center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth. The radar transmits 2 watts of power thru a Metamaterial Electronically Scanning Array antenna in horizontal polarization. When the radar is transmitting, personnel must be at least 1 meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing radiation exposure. The radar physical dimensions are 18.7cm by 12.1cm by 4.1cm and it weighs less than 820 grams making it well suited for installation on small UASs. The onboard, SAA capability, known as ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, will provide autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks from the onboard radar. The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in three phases. The first phase included outdoor, ground-based radar evaluations performed at the Virginia Tech’s Kentland Farm testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The test was designed to measure how well the radar could detect and track a small UAS flying in the radar’s field of view. The radar was used to monitor 5 test flights consisting of outbound, inbound and crossing routes at different ranges and altitudes. The UAS flown during the ground test was the Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 4250 grams (10 pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set up to scan and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view from 0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was configured to eliminate tracks generated from any targets located beyond 2000 meters from the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 meters per second. For subsequent phases of the study the radar will be integrated with a sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned GA aircraft detections and tracking. Preliminary data analysis from the first outdoor ground tests showed the radar performed well at tracking the vehicle as it flew outbound and repeatedly maintained a track out to 1000 meters (maximum 1387 meters) until the vehicle slowed to a stop to reverse direction to fly inbound. As the Inspire flew inbound tracks from beyond 800 meters, a reacquisition time delay was consistently observed between when the Inspire exceeds a speed of 1.45 meters per second and when the radar indicated an inbound target was present and maintained its track. The time delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds for the inbound flights examined, and typically resulted in about a 200 meter closure distance before the Inspire track was maintained. The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking the vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters across the azimuthal field of view. The radar and ICAROUS software will be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-SE8-E UAS during the next phase of the RAAVIN project. The main goal at the conclusion of this effort is to determine if this radar technology can reliably support minimum requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In particular, the study will measure the range of vehicle detections, lateral and vertical angular errors, false and missed/late detections, and estimated distance at closest point of approach after an avoidance maneuver is executed. This last metric is directly impacted by sensor performance and indicates its suitability for the task.

Szatkowski, George N.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Achieving Operability via the Mission System Paradigm

In the past, flight and ground systems have been developed largely-independently, with the flight system taking the lead, and dominating the development process. Operability issues have been addressed poorly in planning, requirements, design, I&T, and system-contracting activities. In many cases, as documented in lessons-learned, this has resulted in significant avoidable increases in cost and risk. With complex missions and systems, operability is being recognized as an important end-to-end design issue. Never-the-less, lessons-learned and operability concepts remain, in many cases, poorly understood and sporadically applied. A key to effective application of operability concepts is adopting a 'mission system' paradigm. In this paradigm, flight and ground systems are treated, from an engineering and management perspective, as inter-related elements of a larger mission system. The mission system consists of flight hardware, flight software, telecom services, ground data system, testbeds, flight teams, science teams, flight operations processes, procedures, and facilities. The system is designed in functional layers, which span flight and ground. It is designed in response to project-level requirements, mission design and an operations concept, and is developed incrementally, with early and frequent integration of flight and ground components.

ground systems↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Investigation Into Transecting Satellites in Future Space Traffic Management Scenarios

The number of satellites expected to populate the near-Earth space environment is set to dramatically increase in the coming decade as new large constellations are approved and deployed. Current strategies for deploying new batches of these satellites often involve launching into an initial orbit, and then performing apogee raising maneuvers to reach a target altitude. Similarly, end-of-life planning for these constellation satellites can consist of de-orbit burns that lower perigee to permit disposal via re-entry. Both the raising and de-orbiting maneuvers can result in the individual satellites traveling in transecting orbits that have the potential to cross other spacecraft trajectories. While individual large constellations may be able to coexist in separate altitude and inclination bands, having thousands of satellites moving between these bands as new satellites are added and old satellites are removed could pose additional collision risks. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the impact that large numbers of university-class CubeSats might have in terms of their overall collision risk, especially as these satellites typically do not have propulsion systems for active maneuvering. To assess the impact that transecting satellites might have on future space traffic management strategies, this study explored a variety of realistic future scenarios using a high-fidelity simulation tool. The model can simulate the orbit of tens of thousands of resident space objects (RSOs) simultaneously, to include active satellites, debris, rocket bodies, or even future hypothetical satellite constellations, using a realistic force model that incorporates non-spherical gravity, atmospheric drag, and solar radiation pressure, as well as station-keeping. The simulation can be customized to accommodate different methods of calculating the probability of collision, as well as the process for determining probability ellipsoids and screening volumes. This makes it possible to replicate, and compare, different processes used by different spacecraft operators and space situational awareness (SSA) providers. As the model is run forward in time, each conjunction event is recorded, allowing for the analysis of statistics and meta-data related to these events, providing insight into the nature and frequency of potential collisions, such as whether are they active or passive objects, what size are the two objects, and who owns the objects (if known). This information makes it possible to characterize how changes to the status quo affect the number and type of conjunctions that occur, as well as the distributional effects on various types of satellite operators. To assess the general risks that transecting satellites might pose for hypothetical future space object environments, approximately 60,000 new large constellation satellites were considered, in addition to the existing catalog of approximately 7800 known resident space objects (RSOs), over a simulation period of one year. The results indicate that the future space environment will introduce a non-linear increase in conjunction events as the number of RSOs also increase. This will require adjustments to spacecraft fuel budgets in order to conduct the avoidance maneuvers necessary to minimize collision risk, both for existing and new satellites. This increase is due in large part to the higher density of RSOs and the overlap between some constellation orbits. Current catalog objects were shown to require three times more ∆V for collision avoidance (CA) maneuvers in the simulated future environment, and some constellation spacecraft were estimated to devote the majority of their annual ∆V to CA. The impact of small satellites was found to be proportional for the current space environment, and actually decreased in terms of percentage for the future scenario, suggesting that small satellites do not pose an outsized collision risk. Lastly, transecting satellites were found to contribute thousands of additional conjunctions outside of their operational orbit, and may require up to an additional 5% in CA maneuver fuel allocation.

conjunction assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Ground Systems, Software and Operations Infrastructure Cloud Implementation

The growing number of large-scale constellations and the improvements made in the tracking and detection of resident space objects have contributed to the increase of satellite conjunction events. As a result of the increase of objects in Earth orbit, the timeline for risk analysis computations for satellite collision avoidance is more urgent when conjunctions occur. It is imperative NASA maintains a space environment safety functionality for the agency that allows CARA remote access to the ground system while maintaining redundancy. CARA’s On-premises (On-prem) ground system would no longer be able to meet these access and redundancy requirements, hence the investigation and eventual implementation of a Cloud-based ground station infrastructure as a viable solution. This paper will provide an overview of the principal parts of the Conjunction Assessment (CA) risk analysis process used at CARA, summarize the key drivers towards the Cloud solution, and share key lessons learned that are significant for any operational entity considering a cloud solution for real-time satellite operations to ensure a sustainable space traffic environment for all.

Sustainability↗
NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRS2004

GEO Sounding Using Microwave Instruments

There are several microwave instruments in low Earth orbit (LEO) that are used for atmospheric temperature and humidity sounding in conjunction with companion IR sounders as well as by themselves. These instruments have achieved a certain degree of maturity and undergoing a redesign to minimize their size, mass, and power from the previous generation instruments. An example of these instruments is the AMSU-A series, now flying on POES and AQUA spacecraft with the IR sounders HIRS and AIRS. These older microwave instruments are going to be replaced by the ATMS instruments that will fly on NPP and NPOESS satellites with the CrIS sounder. A number of techniques learned from the ATMS project in instrument hardware design and data processing are directly applicable to a similar microwave sounder on a geosynchronous platform. These techniques can significantly simplify the design of a Geostationary orbit (GEO) microwave instrument, avoiding costly development and minimizing the risk of not being able to meet the scientific requirements. In fact, some of the 'enabling' technology, such as the use of MMIC microwave components (which is the basis for the ATMS' much reduced volume) can be directly applied to a GEO sounder. The benefits of microwave sounders are well known; for example, they penetrate non-precipitating cloud cover and allow for use of colocated IR observations in up to 80% cloud cover. The key advantages of a microwave instrument in GEO will be the ability to provide high temporal resolution as well as uniform spatial resolution and extend the utility of a colocated advanced IR sounder to cases in which partial cloud cover exists. A footprint of the order of 100 km by 100 km resolution with hemispherical coverage within one hour can be easily achieved for sounding channels in the 50 to 59 GHz range. A GEO microwave sounder will also allow mesoscale sampling of select regions.

Shiue, James↗
NASA NTRS2014

Spacecraft Charging Issues for Launch Vehicles

Spacecraft charging is well known threat to successful long term spacecraft operations and instrument reliability in orbits that spend significant time in hot electron environments. In recent years, spacecraft charging has increasingly been recognized as a potentially significant engineering issue for launch vehicles used to deploy spacecraft using (a) low Earth orbit (LEO), high inclination flight trajectories that pass through the auroral zone, (b) geostationary transfer orbits that require exposures to the hot electron environments in the Earths outer radiation belts, and (c) LEO escape trajectories using multiple phasing orbits through the Earths radiation belts while raising apogee towards a final Earth escape geometry. Charging becomes an issue when significant areas of exposed insulating materials or ungrounded conductors are used in the launch vehicle design or the payload is designed for use in a benign charging region beyond the Earths magnetosphere but must survive passage through the strong charging regimes of the Earths radiation belts. This presentation will first outline the charging risks encountered on typical launch trajectories used to deploy spacecraft into Earth orbit and Earth escape trajectories. We then describe the process used by NASAs Launch Services Program to evaluate when surface and internal charging is a potential risk to a NASA mission. Finally, we describe the options for mitigating charging risks including modification of the launch vehicle andor payload design and controlling the risk through operational launch constraints to avoid significant charging environments.

Electrostatics↗
NASA NTRS2014

Spacecraft Charging Issues for Launch Vehicles

Spacecraft charging is well known threat to successful long term spacecraft operations and instrument reliability in orbits that spend significant time in hot electron environments. In recent years, spacecraft charging has increasingly been recognized as a potentially significant engineering issue for launch vehicles used to deploy spacecraft using (a) low Earth orbit (LEO), high inclination flight trajectories that pass through the auroral zone, (b) geostationary transfer orbits that require exposures to the hot electron environments in the Earths outer radiation belts, and (c) LEO escape trajectories using multiple phasing orbits through the Earths radiation belts while raising apogee towards a final Earth escape geometry. Charging becomes an issue when significant areas of exposed insulating materials or ungrounded conductors are used in the launch vehicle design or the payload is designed for use in a benign charging region beyond the Earths magnetosphere but must survive passage through the strong charging regimes of the Earths radiation belts. This presentation will first outline the charging risks encountered on typical launch trajectories used to deploy spacecraft into Earth orbit and Earth escape trajectories. We then describe the process used by NASAs Launch Services Program to evaluate when surface and internal charging is a potential risk to a NASA mission. Finally, we describe the options for mitigating charging risks including modification of the launch vehicle and/or payload design and controlling the risk through operational launch constraints to avoid significant charging environments

electrostatics↗
NASA NTRS2018

Realistic Covariance Generation for the GPM Spacecraft

A covariance realism process for NASA's Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) spacecraft is detailed. The GPM spacecraft is in a low earth orbit, and performs collision avoidance maneuvers few times a year. Currently GPM is below the International Space Station (ISS). So, in addition to cataloged debris objects, GPM must contend with smallsat/cubesat objects that are deployed from the ISS. Both operational scenarios require complete knowledge of the expected GPM prediction errors as a function of time. In this study, we present a method for generating realistic predicted covariance that uses linear propagation of the covariance with the addition of process noise. Further analyses are presented for the process noise ''tuning'' that generates an inflation factor based on the observed error statistics of the predictive satellite trajectories when compared to the definitive ones. Different tuning strategies are considered and compared via a Goodness-of-Fit testing for the Gaussian properties of the scaled covariance. SpaceNav's realistic covariance generation approach takes into account the contribution of predicted maneuver errors in the increased propagation uncertainty. Corresponding maneuver uncertainty is injected into the state uncertainty, and is used within the collision avoidance process to determine the collision risk for close approach events that follow a maneuver. This is a critical step in the maneuver planning process that provides the satellite operator with an accurate quantification of the collision probability for planned maneuvers. Using this information, an informed decision can be made to proceed with a maneuver if the collision risk is acceptable. This approach is validated by Monte-Carlo simulations and results are presented.

spacecraft uncertainty propagation↗
NASA NTRS2017

A Fuzzy Logic Approach for Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance for Unmanned Aerial Systems

In the coming years, operations in low altitude airspace will vastly increase as the capabilities and applications of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) continue to multiply. Therefore, solutions to managing sUAS in highly congested airspace must be explored. In this study, a Fuzzy Logic based approach was used to help mitigate the risk of collisions between aircraft using separation assurance and collision avoidance techniques. The system was evaluated for its effectiveness to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions between aircraft. This system utilizes only current state information and can resolve potential conflicts without knowledge of intruder intent. The avoidance logic was verified using formal methods and shown to select the correct action in all instances. Additionally, the Fuzzy Logic Controllers were shown to always turn the vehicles in the correct direction. Numerical testing demonstrated that the avoidance system was able to prevent a mid-air collision between two sUAS in all tested cases. Simulations were also performed in a three-dimensional environment with a heterogenous fleet of sUAS performing a variety of realistic missions. Simulations showed that the system was 99.98 effective at preventing mid-air collisions when separation assurance was disabled (unmitigated case) and 100 effective when enabled (mitigated case).

Verification & Validation of a Fuzzy Logic Control↗
NASA NTRS2019

Dormancy Should Be Avoided for Mars and Deep Space Recycling Life Support

Mars is the crucial goal of human exploration beyond the Earth-moon system. The Mars round trip transit vehicle has been expected to use a regenerative Life Support System (LSS) similar to the one on the International Space Station (ISS). It often assumed that the Mars transit LSS will be operated on the outward trip to Mars, placed in dormancy while the full crew explores the surface, and then restored to operation for the return trip to Earth. The major difference between Mars missions and operations in the Earth-moon system is the need for much higher reliability for Mars missions, since rapid resupply of parts and materials or a quick crew return to Earth are not possible. Mars systems must achieve intrinsic high reliability by design, test, failure analysis, and redesign and then increase operational robustness by providing spare parts and redundant systems. Further requiring the LSS to be capable of dormancy and restoration to operation greatly increases the difficulty of design, test, and verification. The process of implementing dormancy and then restoring operation would add significant risk to the mission. Dormancy should be avoided for Mars and can be avoided several ways. First and most obvious, some crew can remain continually on board. If no crew can remain onboard, dormancy can still be avoided if an unused spare LSS is activated for the return trip, rather than restarting the used out bound system. Systems similar to the ISS LSS would have a significant probability of failure on a Mars trip and therefore would require two or three spares. Another full spare LSS could be provided as the return trip system, rather than refurbishing a used LSS.

dormancy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Aerial Vehicle Routing and Scheduling for UAS Traffic Management: A Monte Carlo Tree Search Approach

Numerous unmanned aircraft systems operating at low altitudes to deliver goods and services may one day become ubiquitous in our cities. In the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) framework, such a concept is envisioned, where aerial vehicles operate beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) within specifically reserved and time stamped “corridors” in the airspace. For example, these corridors or operational intent volumes can connect an aerial vehicle’s origin site to its destination site for package delivery operations. There may also be more than one corridor available for an aerial vehicle to choose from and often different corridors may intersect with one another. Thus, it is imperative to ensure flight trajectories belonging to different aerial vehicles are not in conflict. Per the UTM CONOPs, we assume that a vehicle almost always stays inside its corridor or operational volume. This work provides a framework for strategic deconfliction of UTM or package delivery drones, where we schedule the departure time of all vehicles subject to various temporal constraints (including the corridor deconfliction at the intersections). We present the “multi-route weighted package delivery problem” which serves as an exemplifying model for strategic deconfliction in UTM. In the multi-route weighted package delivery problem, a graph network is given which consists of a set of depots (source) and drop-off (destination) nodes, with multiple routes (defined as a sequence of waypoints) connecting the depots to drop-off nodes. In addition, routes are weighted by the associated ground risk and total travel distance for package delivery. The goal is for a known set of aerial vehicles to depart from the depots, choose a route and take off time, while avoiding conflicts with other aerial vehicles, and minimizing both risk and distance traveled. We provide a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulation of the problem, as well as a heuristic solution based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) – a method used in game theory and artificial intelligence – to overcome limitations inherent to optimal solvers. Computational results show the advantages of using MCTS over the MILP formulation; the former can provide a sub-optimal solution quickly, and may sometimes even reach an optimal solution, whereas the latter may not even produce a solution in reasonable time. Furthermore, results from both the MILP formulation and MCTS methods were validated using a preliminary agent-based simulator implementing the UTM concept of operations. Thus, the MCTS method can be seen as a scalable solution to the complex multi-route weighted package delivery problem and may possibly be extended to similar complex optimization problems.

Kenny Chour↗
NASA NTRS1992

Environmental effects consideration: A case study - Lessons learned

This paper discusses the importance for serious consideration of environmental effects and associated risks by management early in the development cycle of a facility. A case study on the Space Shuttle provides information with regard to some of the environmental effects issues encountered and the lesson learned. The importance of early management action to enable the acceptance of known environmental risks, or to make program adjustments to avoid their potential consequences, is emphasized.

Vaughan, William W.↗