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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Scaling Impacts in Life Support Architecture and Technology Selection

For long-duration space missions outside of Earth orbit, reliability considerations will drive higher levels of redundancy and/or on-board spares for life support equipment. Component scaling will be a critical element in minimizing overall launch mass while maintaining an acceptable level of system reliability. Building on an earlier reliability study (AIAA 2012-3491), this paper considers the impact of alternative scaling approaches, including the design of technology assemblies and their individual components to maximum, nominal, survival, or other fractional requirements. The optimal level of life support system closure is evaluated for deep-space missions of varying duration using equivalent system mass (ESM) as the comparative basis. Reliability impacts are included in ESM by estimating the number of component spares required to meet a target system reliability. Common cause failures are included in the analysis. ISS and ISS-derived life support technologies are considered along with selected alternatives. This study focusses on minimizing launch mass, which may be enabling for deep-space missions.

Lange, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2015

Out-of-Autoclave Cure Composites

As the size of aerospace composite parts exceeds that of even the largest autoclaves, the development of new out-of-autoclave processes and materials is necessary to ensure quality and performance. Many out-of-autoclave prepreg systems can produce high-quality composites initially; however, due to long layup times, the resin advancement commonly causes high void content and variations in fiber volume. Applied Poleramic, Inc. (API), developed an aerospace-grade benzoxazine matrix composite prepreg material that offers more than a year out-time at ambient conditions and provides exceptionally low void content when out-of-autoclave cured. When compared with aerospace epoxy prepreg systems, API's innovation offers significant improvements in terms of out-time at ambient temperature and the corresponding tack retention. The carbon fiber composites developed with the optimized matrix technology have significantly better mechanical performance in terms of hot-wet retention and compression when compared with aerospace epoxy matrices. These composites also offer an excellent overall balance of properties. This matrix system imparts very low cure shrinkage, low coefficient of thermal expansion, and low density when compared with most aerospace epoxy prepreg materials.

Hayes, Brian S.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Methods and Costs to Achieve Ultra Reliable Life Support

A published Mars mission is used to explore the methods and costs to achieve ultra reliable life support. The Mars mission and its recycling life support design are described. The life support systems were made triply redundant, implying that each individual system will have fairly good reliability. Ultra reliable life support is needed for Mars and other long, distant missions. Current systems apparently have insufficient reliability. The life cycle cost of the Mars life support system is estimated. Reliability can be increased by improving the intrinsic system reliability, adding spare parts, or by providing technically diverse redundant systems. The costs of these approaches are estimated. Adding spares is least costly but may be defeated by common cause failures. Using two technically diverse systems is effective but doubles the life cycle cost. Achieving ultra reliability is worth its high cost because the penalty for failure is very high.

deep space life support↗
NASA NTRS2017

The Influence of Robotic Assistance on Reducing Neuromuscular Effort and Fatigue during Extravehicular Activity Glove Use

The three-layered, pressurized space suit glove worn by Extravehicular Activity (EVA) crew members during missions commonly causes hand and forearm fatigue. The Spacesuit RoboGlove (SSRG), a Phase VI EVA space suit glove modified with robotic grasp-assist capabilities, has been developed to augment grip strength in order to improve endurance and reduce the risk of injury in astronauts. The overall goals of this study were to i) quantify the neuromuscular modulations that occur in response to wearing a conventional Phase VI space suit glove (SSG) during a fatiguing task, and ii) determine the efficacy of Spacesuit RoboGlove (SSRG) in reversing the adverse neuromuscular modulations and restoring altered muscular activity to barehanded levels. Six subjects performed a fatigue sequence consisting of repetitive dynamic-gripping interspersed with isometric grip-holds under three conditions: barehanded, wearing pressurized SSG, and wearing pressurized SSRG. Surface electromyography (sEMG) from six forearm muscles (flexor digitorum superficialis (FDS), flexor carpi radialis (FCR), flexor carpi ulnaris (FCU), extensor digitorum (ED), extensor carpi radialis longus (ECRL), and extensor carpi ulnaris (ECU)) and subjective fatigue ratings were collected during each condition. Trends in amplitude and spectral distributions of the sEMG signals were used to derive metrics quantifying neuromuscular effort and fatigue that were compared across the glove conditions. Results showed that by augmenting finger flexion, the SSRG successfully reduced the neuromuscular effort needed to close the fingers of the space suit glove in more than half of subjects during two types of tasks. However, the SSRG required more neuromuscular effort to extend the fingers compared to a conventional SSG in many subjects. Psychologically, the SSRG aided subjects in feeling less fatigued during short periods of intense work compared to the SSG. The results of this study reveal the promise of the SSRG as a grasp-assist device that can improve astronaut performance and reduce the risk of injury by offsetting neuromuscular effort. Modifications to the experimental protocol are needed, however, to improve the outcome of the neuromuscular fatigue metrics and determine the effectiveness of SSRG in increasing astronaut endurance. Nevertheless, these findings will improve the understanding of astronaut-spacesuit interaction and provide direction toward designing improved spacesuit gloves and robotic-assist devices, like the SSRG.

Madden, Kaci E.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Implementing Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) with State of the Art PT&I Technologies

Building on the work that was started two decades ago, Jacobs Space Operations Group has utilized state of the art PTI technologies to assess the current condition of the assets they manage under the Test and Operations Support Contract (TOSC). Specifically, the Asset Management department leveraged the benefits of ultrasound technology to quantify a motor issue in the Liquid Oxygen Storage Area, and troubleshoot the sources prior to loading the tank to perform Verification and Validation (VV) activities. This technology was efficient, easy to implement, and provided system engineers with data on a possible source of the problem. In situations where legacy motors are exhibiting unexpected noises, it may seem easier to remove and refurbish the motor and replace the bearings because that solution resolves most of the common causes of the noise. However, that solution would have involved additional spending and may not have solved issues stemming from the foundation, if those existed. By utilizing the ultrasound equipment provided by UE Systems, the sound profiles allowed Jacobs TOSC team to determine that the issue resembled a faulty bearing. After replacing the bearing, the unexpected noise ceased.

Reliability Centered Maintenance↗
NASA NTRS2018

Results of a Manned Over Pressurization Event in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit Space Suit Assembly

The Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) is a 102 x 202 x 40-foot-deep tank holding over 6 million gallons of water used to simulate weightlessness for Astronaut training. The maxim "Train Like You Fly" refers to the desire to have the suit perform, during training, as close as possible to how it performs during an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), particularly with respect to mobility. Therefore, the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) used in the NBL is a downgraded hardware version of the flight SSA; it is not designed for the NBL environment or operations. A classification system defines the flight Space Suit Assembly hardware as Class I, and the NBL training hardware SSA as Class IIIW. On July 20, 2017, during a manned training event in the NBL, the SSA was inadvertently over-pressurized to 22 psid; normal operating pressure being 4.3 psid. The suit subject was removed from the suit with no injury. The event was investigated by a NASA Mishap Team. The Team investigated common causes and differences between the Class I and Class IIIW Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The investigation determined that the event was limited to Class IIIW hardware and its external flow-controlled open loop ventilation systems. The flight EMU is a pressure regulated closed loop ventilation system. This paper will examine the differences between the Class I and Class IIIW SSA hardware and provide details of the Mishap Investigation. Corrective actions taken to mitigate risk with hardware, operations, and hazard documentation will be discussed.

Spacesuit↗
NASA NTRS2018

Electrical Engineering Medium Voltage Protection and Coordination

This presentation covers the basics of the medium voltage electrical system on the Kennedy Space Center. The material will include the process of selective coordination between protective devices and the analysis of a fault that occurred in the electrical system. I will discuss the most common causes of faults found and how the system reacts to the faults at different locations in the subsystem. Explain the importance of the sensitivity and coordination between the devices to protect the equipment it is supplying.

Wessner, Jason R.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Comparative Analysis of Static and Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

This study examines three different methodologies for producing loss-of-mission (LOM) and loss-of-crew (LOC) risks estimates for probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of crewed spacecraft. The three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches examined are a traditional static fault tree, a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation, and a fault tree hybrid that incorporates some dynamic elements. These approaches were used to model the reaction control system thruster pod of a generic crewed spacecraft and mission, and a comparative analysis of the methods is presented. The methodologies are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The system modeling process is compared in terms of the effort required to generate the initial model, update the model in response to design changes, and support mass-versus-risk trade studies. The results are compared by examining the top-level LOM/LOC estimates and the relative risk driver rankings at the failure mode level. The fidelity of each modeling methodology is discussed in terms of its capability to handle real-world system dynamics such as cold-sparing, changes in mission operations due to loss of redundancy, and common cause failure modes. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to different phases of system development and shows that a single methodology may not be suitable for all of the many purposes of a spacecraft PRA. The fault tree hybrid approach is shown to be best suited to the needs of early assessments during conceptual design phases. As the design begins to mature, the level of detail represented in the risk model must go beyond redundancy and nominal mission operations to include dynamic, time- and state-dependent system responses as well as diverse system capabilities. This is best accomplished using the dynamic simulation approach, since these phenomena are not easily captured by static methods. Ultimately, once the design has been finalized and the goal of the PRA is to provide design validation and requirement verification, more traditional, static fault tree approaches may become as appropriate as the simulation method.

Mattenberger, Christopher J.↗
NASA NTRS2021

A Century of Tidal Variability in the North Pacific Extracted from Hourly Geomagnetic Observatory Measurements at Honolulu

Previous analyses of hourly tide-gauge data taken at Honolulu since 1905 have shown that both sea level and the amplitude of the tides have increased synchronously over time, and a process has been proposed whereby the common cause is an increase in ocean temperature. Validation with independent data of this change in tides, as well as the proposed cause, has been lacking Ocean tides also generate magnetic fields that reach far outside the ocean, and tidal signals are clearly seen in the hourly data since 1905 from the Honolulu geomagnetic observatory. Here, it is found that the tidal amplitudes have increased synchronously in the tide-gauge and magnetic records, providing independent support for the previous results. Further information about the changing ocean is likely contained in the historical data from geomagnetic observatories as well as the global coverage of modern satellite magnetic surveys.

Robert H Tyler↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

It Depends - An Overview of Probabilistic Risk Analysis Concepts

How do you understand the data and assumptions in your probabilistic analysis? The PRA analyst needs to understand the data and input assumptions to effectively communicate the system/mission's risks. The decision maker also needs to understand conservatisms and how to interpret uncertainty in the PRA results. Properties such as assumptions on the distributions, uncertainty, use of test data, and common cause modeling can be the subject of much discussion, but often are the leading drivers of a risk profile.

risk assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Historical Aerospace Software Errors Categorized to Influence Fault Tolerance

- Motivation - Very little literature exists characterizing software errors in real-time avionic systems - How, where, and why is software most likely to fail? - Purpose - Raise awareness of how software fails through historical study - Recommend improvements to software fault tolerant design based on historical study - Outline - Discuss Software Failures - Common Cause, Failure Classes, Mitigation strategies - Review NASA requirements for Software Fault Tolerance - Review Historical Software Failures - Analyze failures and provide statistics - Erroneous vs. fail-Silent - Reboot recoverability likelihood - Code Location - Missing or unknown code?

Flilght↗
NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Holistic Approach for Risk Management During Design

In this paper, an approach for the identification, assessment, mitigation and continuous management of risks during the process of designing a space mission is presented. This approach has been developed by observing the risk patterns that occur at the Project Design Center of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (TeamX) which develops conceptual, concurrent design of Space Missions. TeamX develops an end-to-end conceptual design of a Space Mission in a matter of one or two weeks. As the risk chair in TeamX, the author has had the opportunity to observe the risk patterns that occur during design over the course of many design sessions. This paper introduces an abstraction and generalization of those patterns. Risk is defined as anything that can go wrong, along with its approximate likelihood and consequence. The indicators, and causes, and effects of these risks are cross cutting across the multiple levels of people and processes involved in the design, and the actual design product itself.

reliability analysis↗