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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1992

Cost, capability, and risk for planetary operations

The three key factors for flight projects - cost, capability, and risk - are examined with respect to their interplay, the uplink process, cost drivers, and risk factors. Scientific objectives are translated into a computer program during the uplink process, and examples are given relating to the Voyager Interstellar Mission, Galileo, and the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby. The development of a multimission sequence system based on these uplinks is described with reference to specific subsystems such as the pointer and the sequence generator. Operational cost drivers include mission, flight-system, and ground-system complexity, uplink traffic, and work force. Operational risks are listed in terms of the mission operations, the environment, and the mission facilities. The uplink process can be analyzed in terms of software development, and spacecraft operability is shown to be an important factor from the initial stages of spacecraft development.

Mclaughlin, William I.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mass and power modeling of communication satellites

Analytic estimating relationships for the mass and power requirements for major satellite subsystems are described. The model for each subsystem is keyed to the performance drivers and system requirements that influence their selection and use. Guidelines are also given for choosing among alternative technologies which accounts for other significant variables such as cost, risk, schedule, operations, heritage, and life requirements. These models are intended for application to first order systems analyses, where resources do not warrant detailed development of a communications system scenario. Given this ground rule, the models are simplified to 'smoothed' representation of reality. Therefore, the user is cautioned that cost, schedule, and risk may be significantly impacted where interpolations are sufficiently different from existing hardware as to warrant development of new devices.

Price, Kent M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Cost Modeling for low-cost planetary missions

This presentation will provide an overview of the JPL parametric cost models used to estimate flight science spacecrafts and instruments. This material will emphasize the cost model approaches to estimate low-cost flight hardware, sensors, and instrumentation, and to perform cost-risk assessments. This presentation will also discuss JPL approaches to perform cost modeling and the methodologies and analyses used to capture low-cost vs. key cost drivers.

cost model↗
NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g. manufacturing and systems operations). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographically distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across the Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g., manufacturing and systems operation). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost, risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographical distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA'S concept for a human mission to a near-earth asteroid : preference tradeoffs for the surveyor decision problem

NASA's recent attention and interest in sending a human mission to land on a Near-Earth asteroid raised the question of whether to first send a robotic surveyor. This paper describes a Bayesian approach for comparing the value and cost-risk tradeoffs of sending (versus not sending) surveyor missions prior to a human mission. A multiattribute decision analysis approach was used to account for both mission value and cost in each of 27 hypothetical risk-attitude cases corresponding to an emphasis on mission value; equal priority between mission value and cost; and an emphasis on cost. The decisions implied by the different strategic viewpoints are described.

Smith, Jeffrey H.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Team X Report #1401: Exoplanet Coronagraph STDT Study 2013-06

This document is intended to stimulate discussion of the topic described. All technical and cost analyses are preliminary. This document is not a commitment to work, but is a precursor to a formal proposal if it generates sufficient mutual interest. The data contained in this document may not be modified in any way. Cost estimates described or summarized in this document were generated as part of a preliminary, first-order cost class identification as part of an early trade space study, are based on JPL-internal parametric cost modeling, assume a JPL in-house build, and do not constitute a commitment on the part of JPL or Caltech. JPL and Team X add cost reserves for development and operations. Unadjusted estimate totals and cost reserve allocations would be revised as needed in future more-detailed studies as appropriate for the specific cost-risks for a given mission concept.

cost estimating↗
NASA NTRS1992

Nuclear thermal propulsion transportation systems for lunar/Mars exploration

Nuclear thermal propulsion technology development is underway at NASA and DoE for Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) missions to Mars, with initial near-earth flights to validate flight readiness. Several reactor concepts are being considered for these missions, and important selection criteria will be evaluated before final selection of a system. These criteria include: safety and reliability, technical risk, cost, and performance, in that order. Of the concepts evaluated to date, the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) derivative (NDR) is the only concept that has demonstrated full power, life, and performance in actual reactor tests. Other concepts will require significant design work and must demonstrate proof-of-concept. Technical risk, and hence, development cost should therefore be lowest for the concept, and the NDR concept is currently being considered for the initial SEI missions. As lighter weight, higher performance systems are developed and validated, including appropriate safety and astronaut-rating requirements, they will be considered to support future SEI application. A space transportation system using a modular nuclear thermal rocket (NTR) system for lunar and Mars missions is expected to result in significant life cycle cost savings. Finally, several key issues remain for NTR's, including public acceptance and operational issues. Nonetheless, NTR's are believed to be the 'next generation' of space propulsion systems - the key to space exploration.

Clark, John S.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Quick Fix for Managing Risks

Under a Phase II SBIR contract, Kennedy and Lumina Decision Systems, Inc., jointly developed the Schedule and Cost Risk Analysis Modeling (SCRAM) system, based on a version of Lumina's flagship software product, Analytica(R). Acclaimed as "the best single decision-analysis program yet produced" by MacWorld magazine, Analytica is a "visual" tool used in decision-making environments worldwide to build, revise, and present business models, minus the time-consuming difficulty commonly associated with spreadsheets. With Analytica as their platform, Kennedy and Lumina created the SCRAM system in response to NASA's need to identify the importance of major delays in Shuttle ground processing, a critical function in project management and process improvement. As part of the SCRAM development project, Lumina designed a version of Analytica called the Analytica Design Engine (ADE) that can be easily incorporated into larger software systems. ADE was commercialized and utilized in many other developments, including web-based decision support.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Development and Validation of High Precision Thermal, Mechanical, and Optical Models for the Space Interferometry Mission

SIM Planetquest (SIM) is a large optical interferometer for making microarcsecond measurements of the positions of stars, and to detect Earth-sized planets around nearby stars. To achieve this precision, SIM requires stability of optical components to tens of picometers per hour. The combination of SIM s large size (9 meter baseline) and the high stability requirement makes it difficult and costly to measure all aspects of system performance on the ground. To reduce risks, costs and to allow for a design with fewer intermediate testing stages, the SIM project is developing an integrated thermal, mechanical and optical modeling process that will allow predictions of the system performance to be made at the required high precision. This modeling process uses commercial, off-the-shelf tools and has been validated against experimental results at the precision of the SIM performance requirements. This paper presents the description of the model development, some of the models, and their validation in the Thermo-Opto-Mechanical (TOM3) testbed which includes full scale brassboard optical components and the metrology to test them at the SIM performance requirement levels.

astronomy↗
NASA NTRS2006

A New Heavy-Lift Capability for Space Exploration: NASA's Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is developing new launch systems in preparation for the retirement of the Space Shuttle by 2010, as directed in the United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration. The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and the Ares V heavy-lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) systems will build upon proven, reliable hardware derived from the Apollo Saturn (1961 to 1975) and Space Shuttle (1972 to 2010) programs to deliver safe, reliable, affordable space transportation solutions. This approach leverages existing aerospace talent and a unique infrastructure, as well as the vast amount of legacy knowledge gained from almost a half-century of hard-won experience in the space enterprise. Beginning early next decade, the Ares I will launch the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to the International Space Station (ISS) or to low-Earth orbit for trips to the Moon and, ultimately, Mars. Late next decade, the Ares V's Earth Departure Stage will carry larger payloads such as the lunar lander into orbit, and the Crew Exploration Vehicle will dock with it for missions to the Moon, where astronauts will explore new territories and conduct science and technology experiments. Both the Ares I and Ares V systems are being designed to support longer future trips to Mars. The Exploration Launch Projects Office, located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is designing, developing, testing, and evaluating both launch vehicle systems in partnership with other NASA Centers, Government agencies, and industry contractors. This paper provides top-level information regarding the genesis and evolution of the baseline configuration for the Ares V heavy-lift system. It also touches on risk-based management strategies, such as building on powerful hardware and promoting common features between the Ares I and Ares V systems to reduce technical, schedule, and cost risks, as well as development and operations costs. Finally, it gives a summary of several notable accomplishments over the past year, since the Exploration Launch Projects effort officially kicked off in October 2005, and looks ahead at work planned for 2007 and beyond.

Sumrall, John P.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Assessment of economic factors affecting the satellite power system. Volume 1: System cost factors

The factors relevant to SPS costing and selection of preferred SPS satellite configurations were studied. The issues discussed are: (1) consideration of economic factors in the SPS system that relate to selection of SPS satellite configuration; (2) analysis of the proper rate of interest for use in SPS system definition studies; and (3) the impacts of differential inflation on SPS system definition costing procedures. A cost-risk comparison of the SPS satellite configurations showed a significant difference in the levelized cost of power from them. It is concluded, that this difference is the result more of differences in the procedures for assessing costs rather than in the satellite technologies required or of any advantages of one satellite configuration over the other. Analysis of the proper rate of interest for use in SPS system is 4 percent. The major item of differential inflation to be expected over this period of time is the real cost of labor. This cost is likely to double between today and the period of SPS construction.

Hazelrigg, G. A., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is intended to be a how-to guide to prepare for, conduct, and close-out an Integrated Baseline Review (IBR). It discusses the steps that should be considered, describes roles and responsibilities, tips for tailoring the IBR based on risk, cost, and need for management insight, and provides lessons learned from past IBRs. Appendices contain example documentation typically used in connection with an IBR. Note that these appendices are examples only, and should be tailored to meet the needs of individual projects and contracts.

Project↗
NASA NTRS2002

Options and Risk for Qualification of Electric Propulsion System

Electric propulsion vehicle systems envelop a wide range of propulsion alternatives including solar and nuclear, which present unique circumstances for qualification. This paper will address the alternatives for qualification of electric propulsion spacecraft systems. The approach taken will be to address the considerations for qualification at the various levels of systems definition. Additionally, for each level of qualification the system level risk implications will be developed. Also, the paper will explore the implications of analysis verses test for various levels of systems definition, while retaining the objectives of a verification program. The limitations of terrestrial testing will be explored along with the risk and implications of orbital demonstration testing. The paper will seek to develop a template for structuring of a verification program based on cost, risk and value return. A successful verification program should establish controls and define objectives of the verification compliance program. Finally the paper will seek to address the political and programmatic factors, which may impact options for system verification.

Bailey, Michelle↗
NASA NTRS2011

Reducing the Risk and Improving Mission Success for NASA's Human Mission to a Near-Earth Asteroid: How Many Robotic Surveyors?

NASA's recent attention and interest in sending a human mission to land on a Near-Earth asteroid raises the question of need for a robotic surveyor. This paper describes a Bayesian approach for comparing the productivity and cost-risk tradeoffs of sending (versus not sending) one or more robotic surveyor missions prior to a human mission to land on an asteroid. The probability of finding an asteroid suitable for landing was derived from an analysis of more than 1200 asteroids in order to define a quantitative estimate of suitability. The low cost of the surveyors relative to the human mission underlined the multi-surveyor strategy as relatively inexpensive insurance against the risks of encountering an unsuitable asteroid for landing on arrival by a human mission.

decision analysis↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Altair Overview: Designing a Lunar Lander for 21st Century Human Space Exploration

Altair, the lunar lander element of NASA's Constellation program, was conducted in a different design environment than many other NASA projects of similar scope. Because of this relatively unique approach, there are a number of significant success stories that should be considered during the development of any future lunar landers or human spacecraft. This paper is divided into two separate themes; the first is the approach used during the conceptual design studies, including the systematic analysis cycles and the decision making process associated with each: and the second is a summary of the resulting lessons learned that were compiled after looking back at the lifetime of the Project. Altair was terminated before entering Phase B of its design, and was often criticized for being a very heavy and very large vehicle. While there was specific rationale for all of the decisions that led up to that configuration, future design cycles were specifically planned to re-address the mass challenge. Had the project continued, the deliberate, stepwise design process would have converged on an optimized lander design that balanced mass, risk, cost and capabilities. Some of the specific items that will be addressed in this paper include project development strategy, organizational approach and team dynamics, risk-informed design process, mission architecture constraints, mission key driving requirements, model-based systems engineering process, configuration studies, contingency considerations, subsystem overviews and key trade studies. The paper will conclude with a summary of the lessons identified during the Altair project and make suggestions for application to future studies.

Brown, Kendall K.↗