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Autonomous operations are critical for the success, safety and crew survival of NASA deep space missions beyond low Earth orbit, including Gateway. For the past 10 years, Stennis Space Center (SSC) has been developing, and has demonstrated an innovative software platform, along with expertise and processes for implementation of autonomous operations.
As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.
Significant work has been completed recently at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in the Space Suit and Crew Survival Systems Branch to design and mature an advanced exploration EVA (Extra-Vehicular Activity) architecture. This effort culminated in the xEMU (eXploration Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit) space suit, which was completed in 2022 and tested extensively through 2023, including human performance, cycle life performance and thermal vacuum testing. An overview of the xEMU design and test campaign is provided, as well as its value as the government reference design supporting the transition to EVA commercial services for the Artemis program. Lastly, a development roadmap is discussed which outlines NASA’s identified strategy to enable the next generation of exploration EVA hardware for sustaining-class Lunar and Mars missions.
Testing the life support hardware of a vehicle that is going to take humans beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) in conditions similar to space is crucial. The Orion Life-Support Integration Facility (OLIF) at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) was designed and built to test the Orion vehicle’s hardware and software as integrated systems to provide a complete Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) system-level qualification. The existing 11 Foot human rated vacuum chamber has been adapted to accommodate and integrate various qualification and flight like components of the Orion vehicle’s Air Revitalization System (ARS), Pressure Control System (PCS), Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) and the Orion Crew Survival System Suits (OCSS). The ultimate goal was to create an analog testbed that could safely support up to four test subjects in open “shirt-sleeve” or closed suit loop configurations and simulate Orion Cabin conditions. This integrated hardware/software ARS and PCS will help identify any technical issues that should be addressed prior to the Artemis-2 mission. This paper will discuss the history of Orion ECLSS hardware development testing in the 11 Foot Chamber, the challenge of integrating flight hardware and software control systems, and the capabilities that make it a unique, world class facility for NASA. It will provide an overview of past and future testing, and the lessons learned along the way.
Spacecraft are designed to prevent fires through careful material selection and configuration control combined with electrical design controls and isolation of ignition sources. Despite these best efforts, fire risk still exists due to the potential for configuration changes with the introduction of crew and the potential for a ‘failure of imagination’ by designers in anticipating all fuel and ignition sources. Therefore, fire suppression is a critical capability for any crewed spacecraft as a last resort for crew survival. Many spacecraft suppression methods have relied on fire suppressants such as compressed carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and water. A proposed alternative is depressurization of the cabin as a method to extinguish a fire. Limited testing was conducted during Skylab and showed that depress could result in stirring the air flow and aggravating a fire before extinguishing. However, limited information was available on how the test was conducted. To better characterize the approach, testing was conducted at NASA’s White Sands Test Facility to evaluate the effect of depressurization on material extinguishment. The results showed that depressurization does not provide a safe and effective fire suppression capability. The testing approach, results, and conclusions are described and discussed.
Some of the safety and survival aspects of the manned lunar-landing mission are examined. The conditions requiring abort to the earth, lunar orbit, and lunar surface are determined. Some of the possible design requirements to permit abort to lunar orbit or surface are indicated. Lunar orbital and surface survival kits are described, and the stationing of such kits in lunar orbit and at the intended landing site is proposed.
Extravehicular activity (EVA) on the lunar surface presents unique risks to crew with possibility for injury. Without appropriate assistance or rescue capability, inability to nominally ambulate and return to a lander, especially during early Artemis missions, could have catastrophic consequences. Mapping likelihood and consequence safety risk associated with identified injury scenarios establishes a baseline from which to assess potential mitigation solutions to ensure crew health and safety. Causes leading to the need for incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) during EVA on the lunar surface were previously identified and classified using an ICR/Acute Injury scenario spectrum. Severe scenarios are those when the affected astronaut requires either partial or full continuous assistance from the rescuer. Evaluation of these continual reliance conditions included calculating event probabilities (likelihoods) associated with an early Artemis mission and mapping them to established Exploration System Directorate (ESD) probability thresholds; safety consequences were analyzed and correlated to defined ESD personnel safety categories. These resulting likelihood and consequence values served as a baseline for assessing risk reduction of three mitigation capabilities: crew assistance (rescuer crew) only, walking assist devices, and a wheeled transport device. Of the twenty-five continual reliance conditions, ten were evaluated as “catastrophic” (Level 5, loss of life) during EVA on the lunar surface with probabilities ranging from moderate to very low during an early Artemis mission. Crew assistance only and walking assist devices showed similar potential for risk reduction, with four of the ten causes decreasing to Level 4. A wheeled transport device further increased risk reduction with six of the ten conditions decreasing to Level 4. Given the catastrophic consequence of several identified conditions, assessments should be performed to determine the feasibility of mitigation capabilities. It is currently unknown whether a rescuer astronaut could effectively provide continuous assistance to enable both crew to return safely to the lander from the standpoint of both suit geometry and human performance. Although resulting in an increase in resources, providing a wheeled transport provides the highest risk reduction potential, and walking assist devices may have prevention as well as mitigation benefits.
Extravehicular activity (EVA) on the lunar surface presents unique risks to crew with possibility for injury. Without appropriate assistance or rescue capability, inability to nominally ambulate and return to a lander, especially during early Artemis missions, could have catastrophic consequences. Mapping likelihood and consequence safety risk associated with identified injury scenarios establishes a baseline from which to assess potential mitigation solutions to ensure crew health and safety.
BIO-Plex is a ground-based test bed currently under development by NASA for testing technologies and practices that may be utilized in future long-term life support missions. All aspects of such an Advanced Life Support (ALS) System must be considered to confidently construct a reliable system, which will not only allow the crew to survive in harsh environments, but allow the crew time to perform meaningful research. Effective handling of solid wastes is a critical aspect of the system, especially when recovery of resources contained in the waste is required. This is particularly important for ALS Systems configurations that include a Biomass Production Chamber. In these cases, significant amounts of inedible biomass waste may be produced, which can ultimately serve as a repository of necessary resources for sustaining life, notably carbon, water, and plant nutrients. Numerous biological and physicochemical solid waste processing options have been considered. Biological options include composting, aerobic digestion, and anaerobic digestion. Physicochemical options include pyrolysis, SCWO (supercritical water oxidation), various incineration configurations, microwave incineration, magnetically assisted gasification, and low temperature plasma reaction. Modeling of these options is a necessary step to assist in the design process. A previously developed top-level model of BIO-Plex implemented in MATLAB Simulink (r) for the use of systems analysis and design has been adopted for this analysis. Presently, this model only considered incineration for solid waste processing. Present work, reported here, includes the expansion of this model to include a wider array of solid waste processing options selected from the above options, bearing in mind potential, near term solid waste treatment systems. Furthermore, a trade study has also been performed among these solid waste processing technologies in an effort to determine the ideal technology for long-term life support missions.
The design and development of crew emergency response systems, particularly to provide an unplanned emergency return to Earth, requires an understanding of crew performance challenges in space. The combined effects of psychological and physiological adaptation during long-duration missions will have a significant effect on crew performance in the unpredictable and potentially life-threatening conditions of an emergency return to Earth. It is therefore important that the systems to be developed for emergency egress address these challenges through an integrated program to produce optimum productivity and safety in times of utmost stress. Fundamental to the success of the CRV is the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS), which provides the necessary conditions for the crew to survive their return mission in a shirtsleeve environment. This article will discuss the many issues in the design of an ECLSS system for CRV and place it in the context of the human performance challenges of the mission.
Problems involving mesh motion-which should not be mistakenly associated with moving mesh methods, a class of adaptive mesh redistribution techniques-are of critical importance in numerical simulations of the thermal response of melting and ablative materials. Ablation is the process by which material vaporizes or otherwise erodes due to strong heating. Accurate modeling of such materials is of the utmost importance in design of passive thermal protection systems ("heatshields") for spacecraft, the layer of the vehicle that ensures survival of crew and craft during re-entry. In an explicit mesh motion approach, a complete thermal solve is first performed. Afterwards, the thermal response is used to determine surface recession rates. These values are then used to generate boundary conditions for an a posteriori correction designed to update the location of the mesh nodes. Most often, linear elastic or biharmonic equations are used to model this material response, traditionally in a finite element framework so that complex geometries can be simulated. A simple scheme for moving the boundary nodes involves receding along the surface normals. However, for all but the simplest problem geometries, evolution in time following such a scheme will eventually bring the mesh to intersect and "tangle" with itself, inducing failure. This presentation demonstrates a comprehensive and sophisticated scheme that analyzes the local geometry of each node with help from user-provided clues to eliminate the tangle and enable simulations on a wide-class of difficult problem geometries. The method developed is demonstrated for linear elastic equations but is general enough that it may be adapted to other modeling equations. The presentation will explicate the inner workings of the tangle-free mesh motion algorithm for both two and three-dimensional meshes. It will show abstract examples of the method's success, including a verification problem that demonstrates its accuracy and correctness. The focus of the presentation will be on the algorithm; specifics on how the techniques may be used in spacecraft design will be not discussed.
Water systems for human bases on the moon and Mars will recycle multiple sources of wastewater. Systems for both the moon and Mars will also store water to support and backup the recycling system. Most water system requirements, such as number of crew, quantity and quality of water supply, presence of gravity, and surface mission duration of 6 or 18 months, will be similar for the moon and Mars. If the water system fails, a crew on the moon can quickly receive spare parts and supplies or return to Earth, but a crew on Mars cannot. A recycling system on the moon can have a reasonable reliability goal, such as only one unrecoverable failure every five years, if there is enough stored water to allow time for attempted repairs and for the crew to return if repair fails. The water system that has been developed and successfully operated on the International Space Station (ISS) could be used on a moon base. To achieve the same high level of crew safety on Mars without an escape option, either the recycling system must have much higher reliability or enough water must be stored to allow the crew to survive the full duration of the Mars surface mission. A three loop water system architecture that separately recycles condensate, wash water, and urine and flush can improve reliability and reduce cost for a Mars base.
On December 11, 1972, Apollo 17 marked the last controlled U.S. lunar landing and was followed by an absence of methodical in-situ investigation of the lunar surface. The Moon Age and Regolith Explorer (MARE) proposal provides scientific measurement of the age and composition of a relatively young portion of the lunar surface near Aristarchus Plateau and the first post-Apollo U.S. soft lunar landing. It includes the first demonstration of a crew survivability-enhancing autonomous hazard detection and avoidance system. This report focuses on the mission design and performance associated with the MARE robotic lunar landing subject to mission and trajectory constraints.
The overarching purpose of this semester-long internship at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) was to study the impacts of corrosion regarding the development of ground support equipment (GSE), launch support structures, and flight hardware in aid of the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion program. Environmental corrosion is known as one of the largest material degradation issues for any structure comprised of metal on the Space Coast and requires the initiation of special protective measures for proper corrosion mitigation. The four (4) projects to be described were conducted with NASA Civil Servants and NASA Contractors who provided necessary resources to ensure the highest quality of data acquisition and knowledge transfer. The main objective shared between all four (4) of the following projects was to assess the modes by which corrosion takes place in multiple environments as well as the methods by which these modes of corrosion can be reduced for the enhancement of the mechanical, structural, and chemical compatibility of those respective environments with different candidate metals. A multitude of test methods were performed over the duration of this internship to assess the corrosive properties of these different candidate metals.
Orbital debris growth threatens the survival of spacecraft systems from impact-induced failures. Whereas the probability of debris impact and spacecraft penetration may currently be calculated, another parameter of great interest to safety engineers is the probability that debris penetration will cause actual spacecraft or crew loss. Quantifying the likelihood of crew loss following a penetration allows spacecraft designers to identify those design features and crew operational protocols that offer the highest improvement in crew safety for available resources. Within this study, a manned spacecraft crew survivability (MSCSurv) computer model is developed that quantifies the conditional probability of losing one or more crew members, P(sub loss/pen), following the remote likelihood of an orbital debris penetration into an eight module space station. Contributions to P(sub loss/pen) are quantified from three significant penetration-induced hazards: pressure wall rupture (explosive decompression), fragment-induced injury, and 'slow' depressurization. Sensitivity analyses are performed using alternate assumptions for hazard-generating functions, crew vulnerability thresholds, and selected spacecraft design and crew operations parameters. These results are then used to recommend modifications to the spacecraft design and expected crew operations that quantitatively increase crew safety from orbital debris impacts.
Baseline rescue and survival concepts for future space station crews are described. Preliminary studies are being carried out to identify potential threats to crew safety and means to counteract the dangers. Significant factors being considered include the type of threat, the warning time, the number of crewmembers, strategies for protection of the crew (including life-support measures redundancy), and the dependence of space station crews on ground personnel. Attention is being given to the impact of safety devices on the space station geometry and cost, as well as the equipment necessary to maintain the crew in a psychological status positive enough to cope with emergencies. Typical threats would be fire, crewmember illness or injury, and abandonment of the station. A Shuttle launch could take up to 12 days, while equipping the space station with an emergency return capsule would permit return on the same day as the capsule was occupied.
Section 3.0 of NASA's Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems, NPR 8705.2, represents technical engineering requirements that the Agenc y requires of Human Space Systems. In many cases the requirements are not unlike requirements for any space system, crewed or uncrewed, th ey deal with successfully accomplishing the mission objectives. Howev er, they go one step further and have requirements that go beyond suc cessful completion of the mission and dictate functions or actions ne cessary to assure the survival of the crew. In that regard they are u nique from other space system requirements. Even with their uniquenes s the technical requirements of the NPR 8705.2 have been relatively u nchanged in overall intent over the revisions. They all have provided for system redundancy, crew habitable environment, crew situational awareness, crew operation, system control, emergency egress and abort systems. In a few cases the intent of the requirement was changed in tentionally, either to restrict certain types of systems or their fun ctions, or to encompass lessons learned from previous programs. For t he most part the requirements are non controversial and represent the current best practices for human space systems, however, a few requi rements are always debated and have evolved over revisions of the NPR due to studies conducted with various programs like the Orbital Spac e Plane and the Constellation Programs. Those requirements will be di scussed using results of trade studies conducted during past programs highlighting how these particular requirements have evolved through the revisions of the NPR. Comments will also be provided for requirem ents that although not debated, have provided challenges in interpret ation.
For human spaceflight missions, a launch vehicle failure poses the challenge of returning the crew safely to earth through environments that are often much more stressful than the nominal mission. Manned spaceflight vehicles require continuous abort capability throughout the ascent trajectory to protect the crew in the event of a failure of the launch vehicle. To provide continuous abort coverage during the ascent trajectory, different types of Orion abort modes have been developed. If a launch vehicle failure occurs, the crew must be able to quickly and accurately determine the appropriate abort mode to execute. Early in the ascent, while the Launch Abort System (LAS) is attached, abort mode selection is trivial, and any failures will result in a LAS abort. For failures after LAS jettison, the Service Module (SM) effectors are employed to perform abort maneuvers. Several different SM abort mode options are available depending on the current vehicle location and energy state. During this region of flight the selection of the abort mode that maximizes the survivability of the crew becomes non-trivial. To provide the most accurate and timely information to the crew and the onboard abort decision logic, on-board algorithms have been developed to propagate the abort trajectories based on the current launch vehicle performance and to predict the current abort capability of the Orion vehicle. This paper will provide an overview of the algorithm architecture for determining abort achievability as well as the scalar integration scheme that makes the onboard computation possible. Extension of the algorithm to assessing abort coverage impacts from Orion design modifications and launch vehicle trajectory modifications is also presented.