Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “current attack”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Smart Microgrids

The Nation’s electrical power depends on one bulk power grid to support security and economic prosperity. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Threat Assessment of 2020, the largest cyber threat to homeland security is potential disruption to critical infrastructure, including power grids. Critical infrastructure includes the physical and cyber systems which generate, transmit, and distribute electricity with an impact on economic security, public health, or safety. The surety of the Nation’s power grid is vital for providing essential services and would put the population at risk if disrupted. Power outages can have catastrophic consequences for critical organizations such as hospitals and military installations. Additionally, the current fossil-fuel dependent power grid is extremely fragile and vulnerable to overloads, storms that destroy power lines, and cyber-attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Adoption in University Engineering Programs: An Overview of CIE Integration Successes at Nine U.S. Educational Institutions

This report examines the adoption of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in university engineering programs, driven by the need to protect critical energy infrastructure from adversarial threats. CIE equips current and future engineers and technicians with the necessary mindset, skills, and competencies to enhance the resilience of engineered systems against cyber attacks. This report highlights nine academic partners who are incorporating CIE into their curricula through various approaches, including lectures, courses, and certificates.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Detection and Diagnosis of Data Integrity Attacks in Solar Farms Based on Multilayer Long Short-Term Memory Network

Photovoltaic (PV) systems are becoming more vulnerable to cyber threats. In response to this emerging concern, developing cyber-secure power electronics converters has received increased attention from the IEEE Power Electronics Society that recently launched a cyber-physical-security initiative. Here this letter proposes a deep sequence learning based diagnosis solution for data integrity attacks on PV systems in smart grids, including dc–dc and dc–ac converters. The multilayer long short-term memory networks are used to leverage time-series electric waveform data from current and voltage sensors in PV systems. The proposed method has been evaluated in a PV smart grid benchmark model with extensive quantitative analysis. As a comparison, we have evaluated classic data-driven methods, including K-nearest neighbor, decision tree, support vector machine, artificial neural network, and convolutional neural network. Comparison results verify performances of the proposed method for detection and diagnosis of various data integrity attacks on PV systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity of Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control Systems for HVDC Applications

The flexibility provided by High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) systems can be further extended by Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control (WAMAPC) systems. WAMPAC systems enable many HVDC applications and, on the other hand, inevitably introduce cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. In this work, a security domain layer and decision framework is reported to detect and mitigate the impact of false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting HVDC stations. Specifically, a rule-based cyber-attack detection method is introduced and implemented on Raspberry Pi and tested on the real-time HVDC simulation facility on the real-time digital simulator (RTDS) platform at ABB U.S. Corporate Research Center.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber–physical vulnerability and resiliency analysis for DER integration: A review, challenges and research needs

High penetration of renewable and sustainable Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the traditional distribution system requires a well-coordinated control strategy for the improvement of system-wide reliability and resiliency. Implementation of such a holistic control architecture requires a flexible, near real-time, and bi-directional communication framework for facilitating the participation of various agents in a multi-vendor heterogeneous smart grid. While the sustainability of energy generation is ensured, this exposes the smart grid to extrinsic cyber threats, and appropriate defense mechanism(s) must be deployed to guarantee continued reliability and resiliency of the power grid. Further, the comprehensive literature review presented in this paper discusses the latest trends in the DER control schemes with fast communication requirements and their accompanying cyber–physical vulnerabilities. These control schemes are compared and contrasted for various traits. A three-level DER system architecture has been depicted, facilitating the deployment of these control schemes. The current developments of standard communication protocols, key security mechanisms, and best practices along major standards and guidelines are explored. The impacts of different attack types with miscellaneous DER functions based on various control schemes and associated mitigation solutions are also provided. Finally, challenges and future research directions for limiting cyber-power susceptibility to enhance resiliency are summarized. The work presented here will help us enabling a cyber-resilient and sustainable smart electric grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

PLC Vulnerabilities and Mitigations

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are used extensively in many high-importance industrial and nonindustrial settings including controlling elevators, manufacturing machines, and utility facilities such as power and natural gas, however cybersecurity protection for them has been neglected. Within recent years, PLCs have been put under more security scrutiny and experts have advocated for changes from the addition of protocol encryption and network segmentation to intrusion detection systems on the PLCs themselves. While PLC security is critical, a large portion of the PLCs available today will never receive these changes due to being legacy or the difficulty of overhauling the security on existing systems. Due to the infeasibility of applying many recommended security measures towards currently available machines, we aim to provide realistic and affordable best practices for hardening PLCs. We will first conduct security analysis and consider attack vectors within our target PLC. Once we’ve analyzed the device’s security, we will evaluate a variety of mitigation methods and create guidelines to effectively reduce the threat posed by PLC attacks with minimal disruption to operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Verification and Validation of Performance with Dissemination of Best Practices in District Energy and CHP for Enhanced Resiliency, Energy Efficiency, and Cybersecurity

This report contains the results of the International District Energy Association’s work to analyze, validate, and verify performance data of existing district energy systems and identify industy best practices for the purpose of improving system reliability, resiliency, and efficiency, and to accellerate decarbonization. In addition to a technical evaluation of the surveyed systems and identification of a series of technical performance metrics, the report illustrates the accompanying operations and financial best practices employed by surveyed systems to fully serve their customer base. Additionally, the third chapter of the report describes the current landscape of cybersecurity threats and counteracting measures, and recommends a series of steps for effectively guarding highly networked district energy systems against cybersecurity attacks.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Emerging Threats in Transportation Security Related to Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

Transport of high-consequence shipments requires a resilient and robust systems of systems to guarantee cargo arrival. Furthermore, rising adoption of technologies such as connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), intelligent infrastructure, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication presents unique challenges for securing transportation systems. Within these Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), several additional vulnerabilities exist that create pathways for adversarial attacks and cargo interception. For example, connectivity provides cyber pathways directly into vehicle systems and infrastructure for malicious actors. Furthermore, advanced vehicle automation exposes additional vehicle control necessary for shipment interception otherwise unavailable to adversaries. Within this paper, we will discuss the specific threats introduced by ITS-enabled technologies currently deployed and in development. These include those mentioned related to connectivity and automation, but will be expanded into grid, infrastructure, and vehicle specific threats. In addition, we will discuss how to potentially mitigate these emerging challenges as well as how to safeguard transportation systems from next generation attacks.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
DOE OSTI2021

Encoder–decoder neural network for solving the nonlinear Fokker–Planck–Landau collision operator in XGC

An encoder–decoder neural network has been used to examine the possibility for acceleration of a partial integro-differential equation, the Fokker–Planck–Landau collision operator. This is part of the governing equation in the massively parallel particle-in-cell code XGC, which is used to study turbulence in fusion energy devices. The neural network emphasizes physics-inspired learning, where it is taught to respect physical conservation constraints of the collision operator by including them in the training loss, along with the ℓ 2 loss. In particular, network architectures used for the computer vision task of semantic segmentation have been used for training. A penalization method is used to enforce the ‘soft’ constraints of the system and integrate error in the conservation properties into the loss function. During training, quantities representing the particle density, momentum and energy for all species of the system are calculated at each configuration vertex, mirroring the procedure in XGC. This simple training has produced a median relative loss, across configuration space, of the order of 10 –4 , which is low enough if the error is of random nature, but not if it is of drift nature in time steps. The run time for the current Picard iterative solver of the operator is O(n 2 ), where n is the number of plasma species. As the XGC1 code begins to attack problems including a larger number of species, the collision operator will become expensive computationally, making the neural network solver even more important, especially since its training only scales as O(n). Here, a wide enough range of collisionality has been considered in the training data to ensure the full domain of collision physics is captured. An advanced technique to decrease the losses further will be subject of a subsequent report. Eventual work will include expansion of the network to include multiple plasma species.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Data-driven model generation for deception defence of cyber-physical environments

Cyber-physical systems have the potential to greatly improve both the economic and the environmental efficiency of our current infrastructure. However, the necessary fusing of the cyber world with the physical world that results from these technologies also creates a host of new attack opportunities. In this work, we discuss how deception can be employed to effectively defend these systems.

Nowak, Kathleen E.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Side-channel Leakage Assessment Metrics: A Case Study of GIFT Block Ciphers

Determination of an adequate level of security and providing subsequent mechanisms to achieve it, is one of the most pressing problems regarding embedded computing devices. While there are some solutions available for resource-rich computer systems, direct application of these solutions to resource-constrained environments are often unfeasible. The fundamental problem for such resource-constrained systems is the fact that current cryptographic algorithms utilize significant energy consumption and storage overhead. Both the cryptographic algorithm and its physical implementation affect the resilience of a cryptosystem against side-channel attacks. A side-channel attack represents a process that exploits leakages in order to extract sensitive information such as the key. This paper focuses on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) which is side-channel attack based on the power consumption leakage. In 2016 the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the call for proposals of new cryptographic algorithms to strengthen the cryptographic defense of networked devices against cyberattacks and to protect the data created by those innumerable device. This work evaluates S-boxes used by NIST candidates PICCOLO, GIFT, and PRESENT, as well as several S-box variants that demonstrated sufficient weaknesses against classical cryptanalysis, for a quantitative comparison in terms of resiliency to CPA attack. Three well-known theoretical metrics are evaluated: transparency order (TO and RTO), nonlinearity, and signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio, aiming to characterize the resistance of these S-boxes against adversaries exploiting physical leakages. Experimental results from attacks on an 8- bit XMEGA were obtained via the ChipWhisperer platform and of all the S-boxes evaluated, GIFT64 with a PICCOLO S-box was found to be the most susceptible to CPA. Results showed that variations in TO and RTO were not sufficient to ensure practical CPA resistance and that among S-boxes with equal non-linearity there were no significant differences in the TO and SNR variants.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Side-channel Leakage Assessment Metrics: A Case Study of GIFT Block Ciphers

Determination of an adequate level of security and providing subsequent mechanisms to achieve it, is one of the most pressing problems regarding embedded computing devices. While there are some solutions available for resource-rich computer systems, direct application of these solutions to resource-constrained environments are often unfeasible. The fundamental problem for such resource-constrained systems is the fact that current cryptographic algorithms utilize significant energy consumption and storage overhead. Both the cryptographic algorithm and its physical implementation affect the resilience of a cryptosystem against side-channel attacks. A side-channel attack represents a process that exploits leakages in order to extract sensitive information such as the key. This paper focuses on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) which is side-channel attack based on the power consumption leakage. In 2016 the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the call for proposals of new cryptographic algorithms to strengthen the cryptographic defense of networked devices against cyberattacks and to protect the data created by those innumerable device. This work evaluates S-boxes used by NIST candidates PICCOLO, GIFT, and PRESENT, as well as several S-box variants that demonstrated sufficient weaknesses against classical cryptanalysis, for a quantitative comparison in terms of resiliency to CPA attack. Three well-known theoretical metrics are evaluated: transparency order (TO and RTO), nonlinearity, and signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio, aiming to characterize the resistance of these S-boxes against adversaries exploiting physical leakages. Experimental results from attacks on an 8- bit XMEGA were obtained via the ChipWhisperer platform and of all the S-boxes evaluated, GIFT64 with a PICCOLO S-box was found to be the most susceptible to CPA. Results showed that variations in TO and RTO were not sufficient to ensure practical CPA resistance and that among S-boxes with equal non-linearity there were no significant differences in the TO and SNR variants.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Logistics of defense: The contribution of endomembranes to plant innate immunity

Phytopathogens cause plant diseases that threaten food security. Unlike mammals, plants lack an adaptive immune system and rely on their innate immune system to recognize and respond to pathogens. Plant response to a pathogen attack requires precise coordination of intracellular traffic and signaling. Spatial and/or temporal defects in coordinating signals and cargo can lead to detrimental effects on cell development. The role of intracellular traffic comes into a critical focus when the cell sustains biotic stress. In this review, we discuss the current understanding of the post-immune activation logistics of plant defense. Specifically, we focus on packaging and shipping of defense-related cargo, rerouting of intracellular traffic, the players enabling defense-related traffic, and pathogen-mediated subversion of these pathways. We highlight the roles of the cytoskeleton, cytoskeleton–organelle bridging proteins, and secretory vesicles in maintaining pathways of exocytic defense, acting as sentinels during pathogen attack, and the necessary elements for building the cell wall as a barrier to pathogens. We also identify points of convergence between mammalian and plant trafficking pathways during defense and highlight plant unique responses to illustrate evolutionary adaptations that plants have undergone to resist biotic stress.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗