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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5

An Advanced Cyber-Physical System Security Testbed for Substation Automation

A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) testbed serves as a powerful platform for testing and validating cyber intrusion detection and mitigation strategies in substations. This study presents the design and development of a CPS testbed that can effectively assess the real-time dynamics of a substation. Cyber attacks exploiting IEC 61850-based SV and GOOSE protocols are demonstrated using the testbed, along with an analysis on attack detection. Realistic timing measurements are obtained, and the time frames for deploying detection and mitigation strategies are evaluated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Implementation experiences of NASTRAN on CDC CYBER 74 SCOPE 3.4 operating system

The implementation of the NASTRAN system on the CDC CYBER 74 SCOPE 3.4 Operating System is described. The flexibility of the NASTRAN system made it possible to accomplish the change with no major problems. Various sizes of benchmark and test problems, ranging from two hours to less than one minute CP time were run on the CDC CYBER SCOPE 3.3, Univac EXEC-8, and CDC CYBER SCOPE 3.4. The NASTRAN installation deck is provided.

Go, J. C.↗

Developement of an Optimum Interpolation Analysis Method for the CYBER 205

A state-of-the-art technique to assimilate the diverse observational database obtained during FGGE, and thus create initial conditions for numerical forecasts is described. The GLA optimum interpolation (OI) analysis method analyzes pressure, winds, and temperature at sea level, mixing ratio at six mandatory pressure levels up to 300 mb, and heights and winds at twelve levels up to 50 mb. Conversion to the CYBER 205 required a major re-write of the Amdahl OI code to take advantage of the CYBER vector processing capabilities. Structured programming methods were used to write the programs and this has resulted in a modular, understandable code. Among the contributors to the increased speed of the CYBER code are a vectorized covariance-calculation routine, an extremely fast matrix equation solver, and an innovative data search and sort technique.

Nestler, M. S.↗

CYBER-205 Devectorizer

DEVECT (CYBER-205 Devectorizer) is CYBER-205 FORTRAN source-language-preprocessor computer program reducing vector statements to standard FORTRAN. In addition, DEVECT has many other standard and optional features simplifying conversion of vector-processor programs for CYBER 200 to other computers. Written in FORTRAN IV.

Lakeotes, Christopher D.↗

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗

Cyber Threats and Security Controls Analysis for Urban Air Mobility Environments

Since the cyber threat landscape changes daily, cybersecurity needs to be an ongoing activity for every organization within the UAM environments. This paper will provide information on identified cyber threats and controls associated with an instance of the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment. The MITRE ATT&CK model and framework and the selection of cyber threats and the National Institute of Standards and Technology publications for security control identification and cybersecurity risk identification will be leveraged for analysis.

Urban Air Mobility↗

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems Cyber Range

As digital technologies expand to meet the needs of a more autonomous, interconnected, and advanced power system, new cybersecurity complexities and vulnerabilities arise. The ARIES Cyber Range enables the energy sector to evaluate these evolutions and validate cybersecurity solutions without impacting live systems. Combining power grid-scale hardware with emulation and simulation approaches, the ARIES Cyber Range can faithfully replicate modern energy systems - from grid physics to communication networks, and everything in between - with real-world fidelity. At NLR, researchers and partners are answering complex power system cybersecurity questions, examining emerging threats to the electric sector, and de risking new security technologies, all at a mission-relevant speed that keeps pace with rapidly evolving systems and hazards.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Nuclear Cyber Technical Exchange (March 2025 Charts)

Each month we host a Nuclear-Cyber Technical Exchange with a subset of our Bilat partners to support our risk reduction efforts. This month the topics are cyber test and evaluation and resiliency. This chart deck (12) charts will be used for the three TE's.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A real-time distributed solid oxide electrolysis cell (SOEC) model for cyber-physical simulation

System integration and dynamic operability between SOEC and balance-of-plant (BoP) components are major technical challenges before realizing rapid load following of SOEC systems. Cyber-physical simulation (CPS) is a leading-edge digital engineering approach and is regarded as the next step beyond Digital Twins. CPS approach can be used to research SOEC system integration and develop dynamic controls prior to actual pilot testing without using a real SOEC. To seamlessly couple with BoP hardware and access non-observable operational parameters (e.g., local temperature gradient) during transients, a distributed one-dimensional (1D) real-time SOEC model was developed. Its real-time execution was demonstrated for 20 to 640 nodes at the fixed time step of 5 ms. A higher excess air ratio enabled smaller local temperature gradients on SOEC solid materials and faster transients upon current density step change from 0.15 to 0.55 A cm -2 . During the transients, the magnitude of the peak temperature gradient nearly doubled in 10 s from -3.5 to -5.9 °C cm -1 . This represents a significant operating risk that can impact the dynamic operability of SOEC systems. In addition, the local temperature gradient was found to change directions on all nodes in SOEC solid materials, with the greatest impact on the upstream nodes. The SOEC model was also tested at the thermal neutral voltage using actual process air flow parameters as variable model inputs. Variable process air temperatures were found to induce alternating local temperature gradients on SOEC solid materials. These are new operational mechanisms for SOEC degradation relevant for load following operational modes yet distinct from previous reports. To mitigate these unfavorable features, the SOEC can be operated at voltages that are slightly (±20 mV) deviated from the thermal neutral voltage. Here, the corresponding net thermal energy change was less than 1.6% of the electric power consumption. This 1D real-time SOEC model established the basis of cyber-physical simulation of SOEC hybrid systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Reactor System Demonstration with Cyber-Attack Scenarios Using CrowPis and Arduino Microcontrollers

This study covers developing and simulating nuclear reactor system using CrowPis and Arduino microcontrollers for demonstrating cyber-attack scenarios. The team was tasked with implementing more sensors and cybersecurity aspects to the reactor program that was created by last year’s high school interns. The team received the opportunity to collaborate and obtain advice from multiple university interns that helped us gain a better perspective of our project. Our mentor’s background in nuclear science was pivotal to our understanding what we could add to the reactor program to make it as realistic as possible. The first week of our internship was spent reading as much material as possible to gain an understanding of and the background for cyber-attacks and nuclear science. Nuclear science was a new horizon for each of the high school interns on the team, so spending this time in the beginning of our internship was crucial to our success. For the remaining portion of our internship, the team collectively did our best to implement as many sensors and use as much hardware as we could to make an accurate representation of a nuclear reactor in the program that was created. This internship was a big learning experience for everyone on the team. We all gained so many insights into the nuclear world and how it can benefit our lives, as well as how so many moving pieces are needed for it to work properly.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Adoption in University Engineering Programs: An Overview of CIE Integration Successes at Nine U.S. Educational Institutions

This report examines the adoption of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in university engineering programs, driven by the need to protect critical energy infrastructure from adversarial threats. CIE equips current and future engineers and technicians with the necessary mindset, skills, and competencies to enhance the resilience of engineered systems against cyber attacks. This report highlights nine academic partners who are incorporating CIE into their curricula through various approaches, including lectures, courses, and certificates.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Validation Methods and Guidance

Validation is an important step in any systems engineering process to ensure the correct system was made to fulfill stakeholders’ needs, goals, and expectations. In the context of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), validation ensures cyber impact is reduced through implemented design choices and CIE requirements. This document details a process in validating CIE-based design choices relative to their effectiveness at mitigating high consequence events. The document includes a case study to illustrate the CIE validation process. The case study explores the implementation of CIE validation within the engineering lifecycle of a chemical mixing plant.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Power Generation Guide [Slides]

The CIE for Power Generation: Insights and Case Studies guide is being developed to assist engineers at utilities, asset owner-operators developers, and cybersecurity teams to build in robustness and cyber resiliency into their designs using cyber-informed engineering practices. This guide will break out these topics including use cases by chapters for areas such as Nuclear, IBRs, Geothermal, natural gas, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

End-to-End Encryption for Cyber-Physical Systems Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Cyber-physical systems require reliable, safe, and secure control of critical infrastructure, combining computational and networking capabilities, which heighten the risk of cyber attacks. These attacks can disrupt the physical process, causing unforeseen consequences. One solution is the use of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to protect the control loop, allowing for secure computations and communications without compromising signal and control system privacy. The challenge with FHE, however, is its requirement for inputs to be integers. This presentation introduces a modified Learning With Errors (LWE) FHE approach that encodes control system dynamics and signals into integers. Our proposed scheme leverages a generalized LWE encoding function and modifies the Gentry-Sahai-Waters gadget decomposition tool to encrypt the control system. Using the modified LWE scheme, we formalize a fully encrypted control system, supported by simulated results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber Threat Assessment of Solar PV Energy

This presentation discusses cyber threats to solar energy systems. Through a discussion of the cyber risk elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, we present examples of these risks in the solar industry. Then, we present 8 real-world events from the last 5 years that have affected the solar industry or solar companies.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Modeling Cyber Supply Chain Incidents with Multilayered Graph Motifs

As noted within the literature, supply chain includes people and organizations---manufacturers, integrators, and third-party vendors---that are involved in one or more stages of a product lifecycle. Since supply chains, by definition, include organizations and people, supply chain risk management activities must consider dependencies between an organization's business processes and third-party resources. Just as adversarial tactics can be implemented via techniques implemented via networked computer systems, so can such tactics be expressed via legal business relationships. A cyber incident may have an exponential impact downstream, for example, by leveraging a product's distribution channel (e.g. malicious updates in SolarWinds, buggy updates in CrowdStrike). Similarly, legitimate and legal business relationships also affect the attack surface exposure of systems, enabling long-term persistence and/or unknown impacts to product quality that are hard to detect. This paper catalogs several recent digital supply chain incidents and applies a multilayered network formalism to develop structural indicators (graph motifs) that reflect potentially-adversarial behavior. Finally, we compare and contrast the characteristics of adversarial tactics (e.g. Loss of Availability, Data Collection) that leverage cyber-physical dependencies to those that leverage legal organizational relationships.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Engineering Against Digital Risk in CIP Applications: Cyber-Informed Engineering Use Cases

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This presentation discusses engineered controls of 7 categories and the CIE database of controls that provides clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering: Incorporating CIE into Engineering Curricula

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an engineering approach that mitigates the consequences of cyber risk to critical infrastructure by integrating engineered controls into system design and operation. CIE-focused education is necessary to prepare future engineers and technicians to understand and mitigate digital risk in modern engineered systems. This session explores how universities can incorporate CIE into their curricula, provides examples of how existing universities are already leveraging CIE in their programs, and highlights resources to support adoption.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗