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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2022

The Cooling Loop A Anomaly of 2013: A Case Study in Human-Systems Resilience

Throughout the history of human spaceflight, NASA has employed an operational paradigm of 24/7 dependence on experts in Mission Control Center (MCC). In addition to nominal flight control and mission operations, these 85+ experts per shift manage anomaly detection, diagnosis, and response, and support the crew in real-time in performing maintenance and repair, procedure execution, and other complex mission operations. Future long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) will not operate successfully using this same Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) where crew rely on ground controllers, have ready access to resupply, and have a fallback plan of evacuation. As distance from Earth increases and the communication delay grows, crews will need to respond independently and adequately to time-critical vehicle malfunctions. It will not always be sufficient or even possible to ‘safe the system’ and then wait upon ground intervention. A new and radically different HSIA is needed to accommodate the paradigm shift of deep-space travel. Historical International Space Station (ISS) data show that for a 30-day mission, the likelihood of a high-consequence vehicle anomaly of uncertain origin that requires rapid response is greater than 10%. The likelihood of such an event is 50% by the fourth month of the mission, and it grows exponentially with time. Our team has conducted in-depth investigations into these events and their corresponding anomaly resolution activities. Using MCC and Mission Evaluation Room (MER) anomaly resolution artifacts (including meeting summaries, caution and warning data, and ISS daily summaries), we created timelines detailing ground actions and in-orbit events for two significant anomalies. We then mapped these timelines onto Mars transit conditions, introducing a ground-crew communications time delay and shifting immediate response, time-critical task execution, and vehicle commanding to the crew. In detailing successful anomaly resolution in transit to Mars, the timelines highlight where effective resolution requires drastically evolved onboard capabilities. Though this research has yielded a rich data set based on ground response in past missions, there is still insufficient knowledge to assess the potential impact of inflight anomalies on a small autonomous crew on future LDEMs beyond LEO. To begin building an evidence base that will inform future HSIA standards and requirements, we are developing an approach to systematically capture crew anomaly response and procedure execution during early Artemis missions. Being the first human spaceflight beyond LEO since Apollo, early Artemis missions provide a rare and unique opportunity to serve as a testbed for Mars missions. Our work aims to capitalize on planned data collection to derive crew operational responses to anomalous events in real-time. Our team is also researching the level of simulation fidelity required for empirically validating proposed HSIA standards and evaluating HSIA implementations for LDEMs beyond LEO. This work will produce a trade space study of HSIA simulation objectives and fidelity requirements. Ultimately, these research efforts will assist in developing the standards and technologies needed to build a next-generation HSIA for LDEMs beyond LEO.

human-systems integration architecture↗
NASA NTRS2016

Terrestrial Sources of X-Ray Radiation and Their Effects on NASA Flight Hardware

X-rays are an energetic and penetrating form of ionizing electromagnetic radiation, which can degrade NASA flight hardware. The main concern posed by such radiation is degradation of active electronic devices and, in some cases, diodes. Non-electronic components are only damaged at doses that far exceed the point where any electronic device would be destroyed. For the purposes of this document, flight hardware can be taken to mean an entire instrument, the flight electronics within the instrument or the individual microelectronic devices in the flight electronics. This document will discuss and describe the ways in which NASA flight hardware might be exposed to x-rays, what is and isn't a concern, and how to tell the difference. First, we must understand what components in flight hardware may be vulnerable to degradation or failure as a result of being exposed to ionizing radiation, such as x-rays. As stated above, bulk materials (structural metals, plastics, etc.) are generally only affected by ionizing radiation at very high dose levels. Likewise, passive electronic components (e.g. resistors, capacitors, most diodes) are strongly resistant to exposure to x-rays, except at very high doses. The main concerns arise when active components, that is, components like discrete transistors and microelectronic devices, are exposed to ionizing radiation. Active components are designed to respond to minute changes in currents and voltages in the circuit. As such, it is not surprising that exposure to ionizing radiation, which creates ionized and therefore electrically active particles, may degrade the way the hardware performs. For the most part, the mechanism for this degradation is trapping of the charges generated by ionizing radiation by defects in dielectric materials in the hardware. As such, the degree of damage is a function of both the quantity of ionizing radiation exposure and the physical characteristics of the hardware itself. The metric that describes the level of exposure to ionizing radiation is total ionizing dose (TID). The unit of TID is the rad, which is defined as 100 ergs absorbed per gram of material. Dose can be expressed in other units, for example grays (gy), where 1 gy = 100 rads. The actual fluence of radiation needed to deliver a rad depends on the absorbing material, so units of dose are usually stated in reference to the material of interest. That is, for microelectronic devices, the unit of dose is generally rad (Si) or rad (SiO2). However, the definition of absorbed dose in this fashion has the advantage that the type of radiation causing the ionization can be normalized so that a realistic and adequate comparison can be made. The sensitivity of microelectronic parts to TID varies over many orders of magnitude. (Note: Doses to humans are typically expressed in rems-or roentgen-equivalent-man-which measures tissue damage, and depends on the type of radiation, as well as the dose in rads.) Thus far, the "softest" parts tested at NASA showed damage at 500 rads (Si), while parts that are radiation-hardened by design can remain functional to doses on the order of 107 rads (Si). This broad range of sensitivity highlights one of the most important considerations when considering the effects of radiation on electronic parts: In order to determine whether a radiation exposure is a concern for a particular part, one must understand the technologies used in the part and their vulnerabilities to TID damage. A NASA radiation expert should be consulted to obtain such information.

X-ray↗
NASA NTRS2023

Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) Mission

NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) mission was humanity’s first attempt to move a celestial body, demonstrating the capability to perform a kinetic impact on a planetary defense–relevant sized asteroid. DART was part of the international collaboration known as the Asteroid Impact & Deflection Assessment (AIDA), involving NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI), and scientists around the world. DART was a key step to demonstrating preparedness to respond to planetary defense scenarios, and it provides a crucial data point for likely outcomes. Near-Earth objects (NEOs) greater than 140 m in size are of particular interest to planetary defense because they have the potential to cause significant damage if they were to impact Earth, and also because they are difficult to detect, with less than 50% of the predicted population discovered as of 2022 (National Academies Press, 2022). With an appropriately sized spacecraft and enough warning (typically many years to decades), a kinetic impact can slightly alter the orbit of an asteroid in a way that, over time, prevents the asteroid from colliding with Earth in the future. DART’s target was Dimorphos, the smaller (~150-m-diameter) member of the binary asteroid system (65803) Didymos, which is a near-Earth, potentially hazardous, and well-characterized asteroid system. By simply observing changes to the system after impact and comparing them with a pre-impact reference, it was possible to use ground-based telescopes to observe the deflection in the orbit of Dimorphos after impact. Developed and operated by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), the mission entered formulation in 2015 after multiple years of concept development. The project was administered according to NPR 7120.5, with technical oversight and funding through the Planetary Missions Program Office (PMPO) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and overall support as a directed mission from NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO). The DART spacecraft hosted a singular payload, the Didymos Reconnaissance and Asteroid Camera for Optical navigation (DRACO), and a deployable CubeSat contributed by ASI named the Light Italian CubeSat for Imaging of Asteroids (LICIACube). On 11 September 2022, DART deployed LICIACube, which subsequently followed the DART spacecraft at a safe distance and observed the immediate aftermath of the DART impact. DART was designed to autonomously detect, navigate to, and impact Dimorphos. This autonomous design was chosen to maximize the probability of impact, since commanding from the ground could result in course corrections arriving too late. On the day of impact, 26 September 2022, the spacecraft’s autonomous systems successfully detected and locked on to Dimorphos, impacting its surface within 2 m of the center of the illuminated figure (Jensenius et al., 2023). No human intervention was required for a successful impact, demonstrating that humanity possesses the technology to perform a kinetic impact. Within 2 weeks of impact, it was clear that the orbit of Dimorphos had been significantly altered. On 11 October 2022, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson announced that the new orbital period of Dimorphos was shortened by approximately 32 ± 2 min, from 11 h and 55 min before impact to 11 h and 23 min after impact. With additional observations over the following months, the accuracy of this measurement improved to a –33.24 min ± 1.4 s orbital period change (Naidu et al., 2023; Scheirich et al., 2023), and Beta (β), the momentum transfer enhancement parameter, was reported to be 3.6 (Cheng et al., 2023). Subsequent studies examined the details of DART’s impact site, modeled the impact event, investigated the ejecta produced, and analyzed the dynamics of the Didymos system. These combined results clearly demonstrate that the project met all Level 1 mission requirements.

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