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At least 91 records · Page 5

Application of multi-criteria decision analysis techniques and decision support framework for informing plant select agent designation and decision making

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Division of Agricultural Select Agents and Toxins (DASAT) established a list of biological agents (Select Agents List) that threaten crops of economic importance to the United States and regulates the procedures governing containment, incident response, and the security of entities working with them. Every 2 years the USDA DASAT reviews their select agent list, utilizing assessments by subject matter experts (SMEs) to rank the agents. We explored the applicability of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) techniques and a decision support framework (DSF) to support the USDA DASAT biennial review process. The evaluation includes both current and non-select agents to provide a robust assessment. We initially conducted a literature review of 16 pathogens against 9 criteria for assessing plant health and bioterrorism risk and documented the findings to support this analysis. Technical review of published data and associated scoring recommendations by pathogen-specific SMEs was found to be critical for ensuring accuracy. Scoring criteria were adopted to ensure consistency. The MCDA supported the expectation that select agents would rank high on the relative risk scale when considering the agricultural consequences of a bioterrorism attack; however, application of analytical thresholds as a basis for designating select agents led to some exceptions to current designations. A second analytical approach used agent-specific data to designate key criteria in a DSF logic tree format to identify pathogens of low concern that can be ruled out for further consideration as select agents. Both the MCDA and DSF approaches arrived at similar conclusions, suggesting the value of employing the two analytical approaches to add robustness for decision making.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

A technical review of non-destructive assay research for the characterization of spent nuclear fuel assemblies being conducted under the US DOE NGSI

There is a growing belief that expansion of nuclear energy generation will be needed in the coming decades as part of a mixed supply chain to meet global energy demand. At stake is the health of the economic engine that delivers human prosperity. As a consequence renewed interest is being paid to the safe management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the plutonium it contains. In addition to being an economically valuable resource because it can be used to construct explosive devices, Pu must be placed on an inventory and handled securely. A multiinstitutional team of diverse specialists has been assembled under a project funded by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to address ways to nondestructively quantify the plutonium content of spent nuclear fuel assemblies, and to also detect the potential diversion of pins from those assemblies. Studies are underway using mostly Monte Carlo tools to assess the feasibility, individual and collective performance capability of some fourteen nondestructive assay methods. Some of the methods are familiar but are being applied in a new way against a challenging target which is being represented with a higher degree of realism in simulation space than has been done before, while other methods are novel. In this work we provide a brief review of the techniques being studied and highlight the main achievements to date. We also draw attention to the deficiencies identified in for example modeling capability and available basic nuclear data. We conclude that this is an exciting time to be working in the NDA field and that much work, both fundamental and applied, remains ahead if we are to advance the state of the practice to meet the challenges posed to domestic and international safeguards by the expansion of nuclear energy together with the emergence of alternative fuel cycles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Real-World Driving Features for Identifying Intelligent Driver Model Parameters

Driver behavior models play a significant role in representing different driving styles and the associated relationships with traffic patterns and vehicle energy consumption in simulation studies. The models often serve as a proxy for baseline human driving when assessing energy-saving strategies that alter vehicle velocity. Such models are especially important in connectivity-enabled energy-saving strategy research because they can easily adapt to changing driving conditions like posted speed limits or change in traffic light state. While numerous driver models exist, parametric driver models provide the flexibility required to represent variability in real-world driving through different combinations of model parameters. These model parameters must be informed by a representative set of parameter values for the driver model to adequately represent a real-world driver. It stands to reason that determining the parameter values from real-world driving data would serve the purpose of representing a real-world driver. Although the published literature is replete with techniques and consequences of using real-world driving data to determine parameter values for parametric driver models, none have explored them in the context of using shorter driving features where the parameter values may change over the course of a single trip for the same driver. In this study we consider the “intelligent driver model” (IDM) as our driver behavior model and use real-world driving data from the Transportation Secure Data Center (TSDC) maintained at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The TSDC includes real-world travel data from across the United States, from which NREL has created a wide range of driving routes consisting of road features such as speed limits, stop locations, and turn locations. The real-world driving data are categorized into different driving regimes and extracted into driving features. The driving features are then used to calibrate the parameter values for the IDM. The distribution of the parameters and the relationships among them are reported. The insights obtained from this study enable judicious usage of IDM or similar parametric driver models to represent baseline human driver behavior in simulations.

27 ARPA - Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy↗

Real-World Driving Features for Identifying Intelligent Driver Model Parameters: Preprint

Driver behavior models play a significant role in representing different driving styles and the associated relationships with traffic patterns and vehicle energy consumption in simulation studies. The models often serve as a proxy for baseline human driving when assessing energy-saving strategies that alter vehicle velocity. Such models are especially important in connectivity-enabled energy-saving strategy research because they can easily adapt to changing driving conditions like posted speed limits or change in traffic light state. While numerous driver models exist, parametric driver models provide the flexibility required to represent variability in real-world driving through different combinations of model parameters. These model parameters must be informed by a representative set of parameter values for the driver model to adequately represent a real-world driver. It stands to reason that determining the parameter values from real-world driving data would serve the purpose of representing a real-world driver. While the published literature is replete with techniques and consequences of using real-world driving data to determine parameter values for parametric driver models, none have explored them in the context of using shorter driving features where the parameter values may change over the course of a single trip for the same driver. In this study we consider the “Intelligent Driver Model” (IDM) as the driver behavior model to explore and real-world driving data from the Transportation Secure Data Center (TSDC) maintained at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The TSDC includes real-world travel data from across the United States, from which NREL has created a wide range of driving routes consisting of road features such as speed limits, stop locations and turn locations. The real-world driving data are categorized into different driving regimes and extracted into driving features. The driving features are then used to calibrate the parameter values for the IDM. The distribution of the parameters and the relationships among them are reported. The insights obtained from this study enable judicious usage of IDM or similar parametric driver models to represent baseline human driver behavior in simulations.

27 ARPA - Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy↗

Impact of post-event avoidance behavior on commercial facilities sector venues-literature review.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), focused a great deal of interest and concern on how individual and social perceptions of risk change behavior and subsequently affect commercial sector venues. Argonne conducted a review of the literature to identify studies that quantify the direct and indirect economic consequences of avoidance behaviors that result from terrorist attacks. Despite a growing amount of literature addressing terrorism impacts, relatively little is known about the causal relationships between risk perception, human avoidance behaviors, and the economic effects on commercial venues. Nevertheless, the technical and academic literature does provide some evidence, both directly and by inference, of the level and duration of post-event avoidance behaviors on commercial venues. Key findings are summarized in this Executive Summary. Also included as an appendix is a more detailed summary table of literature findings reproduced from the full report.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

RAMSeS: Rapid Analysis of Mission Software Systems

Over the past few decades, software has become ubiquitous as it has been integrated into nearly every aspect of society, including household appliances, consumer electronics, industrial control systems, public utilities, government operations, and military systems. Consequently, many critical national security questions can no longer be answered convincingly without understanding software, including its purpose, its capabilities, its flaws, its communication, or how it processes and stores data. As software continues to become larger, more complex, and more widespread, our ability to answer important mission questions and reason about software in a timely way is falling behind. Today, to achieve such understanding of third-party software, we rely predominantly on the ability of reverse engineering experts to manually answer each particular mission question for every software system of interest. This approach often requires heroic human effort that nevertheless fails to meet current mission needs and will never scale to meet future needs. The result is an emerging crisis: a massive and expanding gap between the national security need to answer mission questions about software and our ability to do so. Sandia National Laboratories has established the Rapid Analysis of Mission Software Systems (RAMSeS) effort, a collaborative long-term effort aimed at dramatically improving our nation’s ability to answer mission questions about third-party software by growing an ecosystem of tools that augment the human reverse engineer through automation, interoperability, and reuse. Focusing on static analysis of binary programs, we are attempting to identify reusable software analysis components that advance our ability to reason about software, to automate useful aspects of the software analysis process, and to integrate new methodologies and capabilities into a working ecosystem of tools and experts. We aim to integrate existing tools where possible, adapt tools when modest modifications will enable them to interoperate, and implement missing capability when necessary. Although we do hope to automate a growing set of analysis tasks, we will approach this goal incrementally by assisting the human in an ever-widening range of tasks.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

INFORMATION: Management Alert on Environmental Management's Select Strategy for Disposition of Savannah River Site Depleted Uranium Oxides

The Administration and the Congress, through policy statements and passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), have signaled that they hope that proactive actions by agency Inspectors General will help ensure that Federal Recovery Act activities are transparent, effective and efficient. In that context, the purpose of this management alert is to share with you concerns that have been raised to the Office of Inspector General regarding the planned disposition of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) inventory of Depleted Uranium (DU) oxides. This inventory, generated as a by-product of the nuclear weapons production process and amounting to approximately 15,600 drums of DU oxides, has been stored at SRS for decades. A Department source we deem reliable and credible recently came to the Office of Inspector General expressing concern that imminent actions are planned that may not provide for the most cost effective disposition of these materials. During April 2009, the Department chose to use funds provided under the Recovery Act to accelerate final disposition of the SRS inventory of DU oxides. After coordination with State of Utah regulators, elected officials and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department initiated a campaign to ship the material to a facility operated by EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah. Although one shipment of a portion of the material has already been sent to the EnergySolutions facility, the majority of the product remains at SRS. As had been planned, both for the shipment already made and those planned in the near term, the EnergySolutions facility was to have been the final disposal location for the material. Recently, a member of Congress and various Utah State officials raised questions regarding the radioactive and other constituents present in the DU oxides to be disposed of at the Clive, Utah, facility. These concerns revolved around the characterization of the material and its acceptability under existing licensing criteria. As a consequence, the Governor of Utah met with Department officials to voice concerns regarding further shipments of the material and to seek return of the initial shipment of DU oxides to SRS. Utah's objections and the Department's agreement to accede to the State's demands effectively prohibit the transfer of the remaining material from South Carolina to Utah. In response, the Department evaluated its options and issued a draft decision paper on March 1, 2010, which outlined an alternative for temporary storage until the final disposition issue could be resolved. Under the terms of the proposed option, the remaining shipments from SRS are to be sent on an interim basis to a facility owned by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas. Clearly, this choice carries with it a number of significant logistical burdens, including substantial additional costs for, among several items, repackaging at SRS, transportation to Texas, storage at the interim site, and, repackaging and transportation to the yet-to-be-determined final disposition point. The Department source expressed the concern that the proposal to store the material on an interim basis in Texas was inefficient and unnecessary, asserting: (1) that the materials could remain at SRS until a final disposition path is identified, and that this could be done safely, securely and cost effectively; and, (2) that the nature of the material was not subject to existing compliance agreements with the State of South Carolina, suggesting the viability of keeping the material in storage at SRS until a permanent disposal site is definitively established. We noted that, while the Department's decision paper referred to 'numerous project and programmatic factors that make it impractical to retain the remaining inventory at Savannah River,' it did not outline the specific issues involved nor did it provide any substantive economic or environmental analysis supporting the need for the planned interim storage action. The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal established by the Department to accelerate the general disposition of the SRS material. We recognize that decisions such as the one proposed for the SRS inventory of DU oxides are often more complex and nuanced than might appear on the surface. Consideration of factors such as cost, state interest, posture of local regulators, etc., are important elements in this process. Although, we have not completed sufficient work to reach an independent judgment on the merits of this matter, we wanted to ensure that the Department was aware of the concerns that have been raised before imminent decisions and resource commitments were made regarding the path forward.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Investigating the Impact of Irrigation on Malaria Vector Larval Habitats and Transmission Using a Hydrology‐Based Model

Abstract A combination of accelerated population growth and severe droughts has created pressure on food security and driven the development of irrigation schemes across sub‐Saharan Africa. Irrigation has been associated with increased malaria risk, but risk prediction remains difficult due to the heterogeneity of irrigation and the environment. While investigating transmission dynamics is helpful, malaria models cannot be applied directly in irrigated regions as they typically rely only on rainfall as a source of water to quantify larval habitats. By coupling a hydrologic model with an agent‐based malaria model for a sugarcane plantation site in Arjo, Ethiopia, we demonstrated how incorporating hydrologic processes to estimate larval habitats can affect malaria transmission. Using the coupled model, we then examined the impact of an existing irrigation scheme on malaria transmission dynamics. The inclusion of hydrologic processes increased the variability of larval habitat area by around two‐fold and resulted in reduction in malaria transmission by 60%. In addition, irrigation increased all habitat types in the dry season by up to 7.4 times. It converted temporary and semi‐permanent habitats to permanent habitats during the rainy season, which grew by about 24%. Consequently, malaria transmission was sustained all‐year round and intensified during the main transmission season, with the peak shifted forward by around 1 month. Lastly, we evaluated the spatiotemporal distribution of adult vectors under the effect of irrigation by resolving habitat heterogeneity. These findings could help larval source management by identifying transmission hotspots and prioritizing resources for malaria elimination planning.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Repository-Scale Performance Assessment Incorporating Postclosure Criticality

A key objective of the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign is to better understand the technical basis, risks, and uncertainty associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. Commercial nuclear power generation in the United States has resulted in thousands of metric tons of SNF, the disposal of which is the responsibility of the DOE (Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended). Any repository licensed to dispose of SNF must meet requirements regarding the long-term performance of that repository. For an evaluation of the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration during the postclosure period. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently licensed and being used to store and transport SNF but were not designed for permanent geologic disposal. A study has been initiated to examine the potential consequences, with respect to long-term repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. The first phase (a scoping phase) consisted of developing an approach to creating the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be needed to either include or exclude criticality from a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate; this scoping phase is documented in Price et al. (2019a). In the second phase, that modeling approach was implemented and future work was identified, as documented in Price et al. (2019b). This report gives the results of a repository-scale PA examining the potential consequences of postclosure criticality, as well as the information, modeling tools, and techniques needed to incorporate the effects of postclosure criticality in the PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

An Approach to Assessing the Added Mass for a Plate in a Channel

The Global Threat Reduction initiative (GTRI) was established by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 2004. One of the highlights of the program is to convert research and test reactors at home and abroad from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuels. By switching directly from HEU to LEU, an LEU reactor produces fewer neutrons than an HEU reactor, and in some cases, a direct switch from HEU to LEU results in the reactor being unable to achieve criticality. Under certain circumstances, criticality is achieved and the original neutron fluxes are restored with LEU fuel by adding more fuel elements to the core. Not all reactors, exemplified by the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Lab (INL), have the luxury of simply adding more fuel to the core. In such cases, entirely new designs must be created and tested. The ATR utilizes plate type fuel. During the design and testing of the ATR fuel, flow induced vibrations were identified as potential source for experiment and fuel failure. Flow induced vibrations are problematic to solve because both the frequency of excitation and the modal frequencies of the object need to be determined. For the frequency of the object the frequency is often determined, either theoretically or experimentally without any influence of fluid. When a fluid is introduced, the fundamental frequency of an object can be greatly reduced allowing for resonance between the excitation frequency and the fundamental frequency of the plate. The consequence of such resonance is often failure of the component. Current methods for determining the frequency of a body immersed in a fluid requires the use of multi-physics software in order to determine (if at all possible) the frequency of the object. The work herein provides an alternative means of calculating the frequency of a plate by combining plate frequency theory to determine the added mass on the plate when in the presence of narrow channels. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Secure Route: Roadway Risk Mapping for Transportation Planners

The secure transport of sensitive materials across U.S. road networks pose unique challenges for local, state, and federal agencies. Threats range from random events (e.g., accidents, medical emergencies, mechanical failures) to opportunistic or organized tactical assaults. Although the probability of such attacks is very low, the consequences of material loss to foreign states or terrorists can be catastrophic, qualifying these scenarios as “grey swan” events—low-probability, high-impact occurrences that are predictable but difficult to quantify. Traditional risk assessments struggle in these contexts, necessitating a shift toward subjective risk perception to inform planning. Risk perception in transport planning is shaped by various factors, including knowledge of adversarial capabilities, vehicle defenses, manifest details, and geographic features along the route. Geographic features such as bridges, tunnels, roadside elevation, and gaps in cellular coverage introduce vulnerabilities, while mitigative features include safe havens, police stations, and medical services. Temporal variables such as congestion, accidents, and weather further complicate route planning. Despite their importance, existing routing tools like Google Maps and commercial software do not explicitly account for geographic risk features, requiring planners to rely on personal familiarity with routes—a time-intensive, non-scalable approach. This work addresses these gaps by: (1) developing datasets that catalog geographic risk features along U.S. roadways, (2) eliciting risk perceptions from experienced transportation security experts, and (3) linking these perceptions to roadway conditions and geographic data. We implement these capabilities within Secure Route a novel mapping tool for classifying route segment risks associated with roadway conditions. This system provides transportation planners with an intuitive interface to assess and contextualize risk along potential routes, improving decision-making for secure transport. We present current progress in this effort and identify next steps.

Stewart, Robert [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000281867559)↗

ARCADE Analysis Methods & Validation Pathway

The Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) provides an automated analysis system which supports risk-informed performance based (RIPB) evaluations of nuclear control systems. Every possible cyber threat which could lead to consequence is identified by simulating the unsafe control action sequences which transform digital harm into physical harm. Eliminating the simulation of complex digital cyber attack chains cuts out unnecessary computational overhead and focuses directly on the physics of cyber-physical attacks. This focus enables designers to make informed decisions which can entirely eliminate categories of cyber threats against advanced reactors through the physical nature of the plant design. This narrowing of cyber threat against nuclear power plants through the physics of the system is intended to make any remaining threat management and cost efficient. This is the goal of the Tiered Cyber Analysis (TCA) outlined in NRC Draft Regulation Guide (RG) 5.96, which provides a RIPB cybersecurity approach for new reactors. ARCADE has been custom developed to meet the demands of the rigorous analysis required in Tier 1 of the TCA, which forms the foundation of the TCA process. Currently, ARCADE is still under development, but has made significant leaps in capability. A pilot analysis on the opensource Asherah simulator was performed which demonstrated key functionality goals. The next stage of ARCADE development involves improvements to the applications which support the analysis system, and enabling the analysis system to utilize the full suite of unsafe control action simulations. Since the analysis method’s core functions are complete, validation of the analysis method will be started concurrent to the next development stages. The automated analysis ARCADE will provide can radically change the cybersecurity design process for advanced reactors, reducing the cost of security implementation while enhancing cyber resilience. The pathway for ARCADE’s development to this goal has become much clearer. The majority of technical hurdles have been cleared, and the remaining development needs have been solidified. ARCADE is now capable of assisting the advanced reactor design process and directly support advanced reactor industry RIPB practices.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: An Approach for Understanding an Organization’s Unique Infrastructure Environment

The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure landscape in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure landscape as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Risk-informed Physical Security Using Dynamic Force-on-Force Modelling Tools (ABSTRACT)

Physical security requirement of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the US is regulated in a mainly prescriptive manner. This “one size fits all” approach may consequently overlook plant-specific characteristics which are beneficial for the inherent safety and security of the plant. Although a performance-based security measure has been promulgated in 10 CFR 73.55(r), current evaluation methods generally emphasize static and conservative assumptions on physical security uncertainties. This conservatism contributes to the overall operational and maintenance costs, which account to 70% of total operating expenditures for an NPP. This paper describes an ongoing work at the Idaho National Laboratory within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway, which aims to optimize physical protection system with regards to system effectiveness and dollar costs. To achieve this goal, a risk-informed approach to physical security is proposed. This approach leverages the Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool to model facility infiltration and Force-on-Force (FoF) engagement in a dynamic manner. The dynamic FoF analysis was conducted by coupling human performance uncertainties modeled in EMRALD to existing commercial 3-dimensional FoF software, i.e. SCRIBE3D, AVERT and Simajin. Meanwhile, risk analysis was accomplished by coupling the attack outcomes to existing plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model with FLEX strategy. This approach reduces the conservatisms in security modeling and further acknowledges the possibility for plant operators to mitigate the attack outcomes. A sabotage attack on a hypothetical NPP facility was devised to demonstrate the proposed methodology. Dynamic FoF rules were implemented in EMRALD coupled to SCRIBE3D. This dynamic evaluation revealed an additional 21% system effectiveness in protecting the target set relative to the static modelling approach. Furthermore, the conditional core damage probability could be reduced by up to 46% by crediting operator actions in mitigating the sabotage outcomes. We evaluated the relative importance of each component of the physical security posture included in the model and assessed tradeoffs between components to identify potential opportunities for cost reduction while maintaining a specific level of system effectiveness. Results of the cost analysis will be presented in the conference. This study is expected to help NPP operators in allocating resources optimally to satisfy the security requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Potential impacts of Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge on nutrient supply and greenhouse gas emissions of food systems

Seafood plays a critical role in promoting a nutritious and climate-friendly food system but faces challenges from marine contamination that pose food safety risks. Here, to address these challenges, we developed a Marine Pollution-induced Food System Risk Assessment and Response (MP-FSRAR) model to assess the impact of consumer perceptions of marine pollution risk events on nutrient supply and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Applying this model to the proposed Fukushima Nuclear Wastewater Discharge (FNWD) into the Pacific Ocean, we identified the potential variation in nutrient supply and GHG emissions resulting from changes in Chinese consumers' willingness to consume seafood under 12 scenarios. Our analysis revealed nutrient supply gaps in daily protein, minerals, vitamins, and fatty acids, ranging from 1.5 to 2.7 g/person, 2.5–4.5 mg/person, 5.6–10.3 mcg/person, and 0.08–0.14 g/person, respectively. Closing the protein gap in China would require an additional 3.2–15.8 billion kg yr -1 protein-rich foods, including aquatic, livestock, dairy, and pulses. Additional food supply would increase extra GHG emissions by 1–79 billion kg CO 2 e yr -1 , resulting in potential GHG emissions being transmitted to other countries through the trade chain. Furthermore, we found that the livestock-based food substitution pathway had 40 times higher GHG emissions than the plant-based one. Our MP-FSRAR model provides global stakeholders with new perspectives on the potential consequences of consumer perceptions of marine pollution risks and offers valuable insights for developing countermeasures to build a more resilient and low-carbon food system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗