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NASA NTRS2002

Propulsion Ground Testing with High Test Peroxide: Lessons Learned

Propulsion Ground Testing with High Test Peroxide (85 to 98% concentration) began at the NASA John C. Stennis Space Center in calendar year 1998, when the E3 Test Facility was modified to accomodate hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) in order to suport the research and development testing of the USAF Upper Stage Flight Experiment rocket engine. Since that time, efforts have continued to provide actual and planned test services to various customers, both U.S. Government and Commercial, in the ground test of many test articles, ranging from gas generators, to catalyst beds, to turbomachinery, to main injectors, to combustion chambers, to integrated rocket engines, to integrated stages. Along this path, and over the past 4 years, there has been both the rediscovery of previously learned lessons, through literature search, archive review, and personal interviews, as well as the learning of many new lessons as new areas are explored and new endeavors are tried. This paper will summarize those lessons learned in an effort to broaden the knowledge base as High Test Peroxide is considered more widely for use in rocket propulsion applications.

Bruce, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2004

From Bridges and Rockets, Lessons for Software Systems

Although differences exist between building software systems and building physical structures such as bridges and rockets, enough similarities exist that software engineers can learn lessons from failures in traditional engineering disciplines. This paper draws lessons from two well-known failures the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940 and the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 and applies these lessons to software system development. The following specific applications are made: (1) the verification and validation of a software system should not be based on a single method, or a single style of methods; (2) the tendency to embrace the latest fad should be overcome; and (3) the introduction of software control into safety-critical systems should be done cautiously.

Holloway, C. Michael↗

NASA NTRS2006

Importance Of Quality Control in Reducing System Risk, a Lesson Learned From The Shuttle and a Recommendation for Future Launch Vehicles

This paper presents lessons learned from the Space Shuttle return to flight experience and the importance of these lessons learned in the development of new the NASA Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Specifically, the paper discusses the relationship between process control and system risk, and the importance of process control in improving space vehicle flight safety. It uses the External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience and lessons learned from the redesign and process enhancement activities performed in preparation for Return to Flight after the Columbia accident. The paper also, discusses in some details, the Probabilistic engineering physics based risk assessment performed by the Shuttle program to evaluate the impact of TPS failure on system risk and the application of the methodology to the CLV.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicle Development Approach Builds on Lessons Learned from Past and Present Missions

A viewgraph presentation of NASA crew and cargo launch vehicle development building upon lessons learned from past and present missions is shown. The topics include: 1) U.S. Vision for Space Exploration; 2) NASA's Exploration Road Map; 3) The Moon-The First Step to Mars and Beyond; 4) Building on a Foundation of Proven Technologies; 5) Constellation Launch Vehicle Elements; 6) 1.5 Launch Earth Orbit/Lunar Orbit Rendezvous; 7) The Journey Continues; 8) Design Philosophy for Mission Success; 9) Lessons Learned: Implementation Tenets; and 10) Lessons Learned: Early Integration with the Operators.

Dumbacher, Dan↗

NASA NTRS2006

Habitability and Human Factors: Lessons Learned in Long Duration Space Flight

This study documents the investigation of qualitative habitability and human factors feedback provided by scientists, engineers, and crewmembers on lessons learned from the ISS Program. A thorough review and understanding of this data is critical in charting NASA's future path in space exploration. NASA has been involved in ensuring that the needs of crewmembers to live and work safely and effectively in space have been met throughout the ISS Program. Human factors and habitability data has been collected from every U.S. crewmember that has resided on the ISS. The knowledge gained from both the developers and inhabitants of the ISS have provided a significant resource of information for NASA and will be used in future space exploration. The recurring issues have been tracked and documented; the top 5 most critical issues have been identified from this data. The top 5 identified problems were: excessive onsrbit stowage; environment; communication; procedures; and inadequate design of systems and equipment. Lessons learned from these issues will be used to aid in future improvements and developments to the space program. Full analysis of the habitability and human factors data has led to the following recommendations. It is critical for human factors to be involved early in the design of space vehicles and hardware. Human factors requirements need to be readdressed and redefined given the knowledge gained during previous ISS and long-duration space flight programs. These requirements must be integrated into vehicle and hardware technical documentation and consistently enforced. Lastly, space vehicles and hardware must be designed with primary focus on the user/operator to successfully complete missions and maintain a safe working environment. Implementation of these lessons learned will significantly improve NASA's likelihood of success in future space endeavors.

Baggerman, Susan D.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Lessons Learned and Flight Results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System Project

A viewgraph presentation on the lessons learned and flight results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project is shown. The topics include: 1) F-15 IFCS Project Goals; 2) Motivation; 3) IFCS Approach; 4) NASA F-15 #837 Aircraft Description; 5) Flight Envelope; 6) Limited Authority System; 7) NN Floating Limiter; 8) Flight Experiment; 9) Adaptation Goals; 10) Handling Qualities Performance Metric; 11) Project Phases; 12) Indirect Adaptive Control Architecture; 13) Indirect Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; 14) Gen II Direct Adaptive Control Architecture; 15) Current Status; 16) Effect of Canard Multiplier; 17) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop; 18) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop Freq. Resp.; 19) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop with Adaptation; 20) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop with Adaptation; 21) Gen 2 NN Wts from Simulation; 22) Direct Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; and 23) Conclusions

Bosworth, John↗

NASA NTRS2008

Lessons Learned from Recent Failure and Incident Investigations of Composite Structures

During the past few decades, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) has supported several large-scale failure and incident investigations and numerous requests for engineering consultations. Although various extenuating circumstances contributed to each of these incidents, in all cases, the failure resulted from accumulation and/or propagation of damage that reduced the load carrying capability of the structure to a level below that which was needed to sustain structural loads. A brief overview of various failure and incident investigations supported by LaRC, including some of the computational and experimental methodologies that have been applied, is presented. An important outcome of many of these failure and incident investigations is the development of an improved understanding of not only the state-of-the-art in experimental and analytical methods but also the state-of-the-art in the design and manufacturing processes that may contribute to such failures. In order to provide insight into such large-scale investigations, a series of lessons learned were captured. Awareness of these lessons learned is highly beneficial to engineers involved in similar investigations. Therefore, it is prudent that the lessons learned are disseminated such that they can be built upon in other investigations and in ensuing research and development activities.

Ransom, J. B.↗

NASA NTRS2009

An Overview of MODIS Calibration and Characterization and Lessons Learned

The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) is a key instrument for NASA's EOS missions. Two nearly identical copies have flown on the Terra and Aqua spacecraft for more than 9 years and 6 years since their launch in December 1999 and May 2002, respectively. MODIS observations and associated data products have been widely used by the science community and users worldwide for studies of Earth's system of land, oceans, and atmosphere. MODIS was developed based on the desire of the science community to extend and enhance heritage sensors' data records. It was designed with enhancements made over its heritage sensors in terms of its spectral, spatial, and radiometric characteristics. It is a cross-track scanning radiometer, that uses a two-sided scan mirror, collecting data in 36 spectral bands covering spectral regions of visible (VIS), near-infrared (NIR), short-wave infrared (SWIR), mid-wave infrared (MWIR), and long-wave infrared (LWIR). The VIS, NIR, and SWIR bands (bands 1-19 and 26), which make measurements of daytime surface reflected radiances, are referred to as the reflective solar bands (RSB). The MWIR and LWIR bands (20-25 and 27-36), which measure both the daytime and nighttime scene emissive radiances, are thus referred to as the thermal emissive bands (TEB). In this paper, we provide an overview of MODIS instrument calibration and characterization methodologies, activities, and results from pre-launch to post launch, with emphasis on the lessons learned from its design to on-orbit operation. Currently, both instruments are operated normally and all the on-orbit calibration activities are performed on a regular basis with some at slightly reduced frequencies. The TEB responses have been extremely stable with less than 0.3% change per year. For the RSB, the changes are wavelength and scan angle dependent with the largest changes in the VIS spectral bands. As both Terra and Aqua MODIS continue to operate beyond their prime missions, constant effort is still needed to maintain instrument and calibration and data product quality. This paper shows that the lessons from Terra MODIS design, test, and operation, have greatly benefitted Aqua MODIS. Because of this, Aqua MODIS overall performance is better than Terra MODIS. It is not surprising that lessons from MODIS calibration and characterization, from methodologies to on-orbit implementation, have also provided valuable information for the design and development of future earth observing missions/sensors, such as VHRS on the NPP and NPOESS, ABI on GOES-R, OLI on LDCM, and the reflective solar sensor on CLARREO.

Xiong, Xiaxiong↗

NASA NTRS2010

Operational Lessons Learned from the Ares I-X Flight Test

The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I. Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions. To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB, several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle s configuration had to be removed to accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing, transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B. Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than the Shuttle s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle. Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

Node 1 flew to the International Space Station (ISS) on Flight 2A during December 1998. To date the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has learned a lot of lessons from this module based on its history of approximately two years of acceptance testing on the ground and currently its twelve years on-orbit. This paper will provide an overview of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) design of the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage (ACS) and Water Recovery and Management (WRM) subsystems and it will document some of the lessons that have been learned to date for these subsystems based on problems prelaunch, problems encountered on-orbit, and operational problems/concerns. It is hoped that documenting these lessons learned from ISS will help in preventing them in future Programs.

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Cutoff System (ECO) Anomalies

The Space Shuttle Orbiter's main engine cutoff (ECO) system first failed ground checkout in April, 2005 during a first tanking test prior to Return-to-Flight. Despite significant troubleshooting and investigative efforts that followed, the root cause could not be found and intermittent anomalies continued to plague the Program. By implementing hardware upgrades, enhancing monitoring capability, and relaxing the launch rules, the Shuttle fleet was allowed to continue flying in spite of these unexplained failures. Root cause was finally determined following the launch attempts of STS-122 in December, 2007 when the anomalies repeated, which allowed drag-on instrumentation to pinpoint the fault (the ET feedthrough connector). The suspect hardware was removed and provided additional evidence towards root cause determination. Corrective action was implemented and the system has performed successfully since then. This white paper presents the lessons learned from the entire experience, beginning with the anomalies since Return-to-Flight through discovery and correction of the problem. To put these lessons in better perspective for the reader, an overview of the ECO system is presented first. Next, a chronological account of the failures and associated investigation activities is discussed. Root cause and corrective action are summarized, followed by the lessons learned.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Analysis, Top Ten Lessons-Learned

The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for over 10 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The analysis lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Node 1 Atmosphere Control and Storage and Water Recovery and Management Subsystem Design

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew Launch Vehicle Approach Builds on Lessons from Past and Present Missions

The United States Vision for Space Exploration, announced in January 2004, outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with a new human-rated system suitable for missions to the Moon and Mars. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Station and be capable of carrying crews back to lunar orbit and of supporting missions to Mars orbit. NASA is using its extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize the CLV system design approach, with the objective of reducing total lifecycle costs through operational efficiencies. To provide in-depth data for selecting this follow-on launch vehicle, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the confirmation of the new NASA Administrator. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, with a focus on human rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the reusable Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the RS-25 Space Shuttle Main Engine to deliver 25 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, was the best choice to reduce the risks associated with fielding a new system in a timely manner. The CLV Project, managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operation of this new human-rated system. The CLV Project works closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch system . leveraging a wealth of lessons learned from Shuttle operations. The CL V is being designed to reduce costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting trades studies against the concept design. Innovations such as automated processing will build on lessons learned from the Shuttle, other launch systems, Department of Defense operations experience, and subscale flight tests such as the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DCXA) vehicle operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated cryogen ic propellant loading , and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system. For the CLV, the results of hazard analyses are contributing to an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. Such advances will help streamline the mission operations process for pilots and ground controllers alike. In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.5 billion of its $16 bill ion budget on the Space Shuttle. The ultimate goal of the CLV Project is to deliver a safe, reliable system designed to minimize lifecycle costs so that NASA's budget can be invested in missions of scientific discovery. Lessons learned from developing the CLV will be applied to the growth path for future systems, including a heavy lift launch vehicle.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS2012

MODIS On-Orbit Calibration and Lessons Learned

The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) is a key instrument for NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) Terra and Aqua missions. Since launch, Terra and Aqua MODIS have successfully operated for more than 12 and 10 years, respectively, and generated an unprecedented amount of data products for the science and user community over a wide range of applications. MODIS was developed with improved design and stringent calibration requirements over its heritage sensors in order . to extend and enhance their long-term data records. Its follow-on instrument, the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), was launched on-board the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (NPP) spacecraft October 28, 2011. MODIS collects data in 36 spectral bands, covering wavelengths from 0.41 to 14.S!Jlll, and at 250m, SOOm, and lkm spatial resolutions (nadir). MODIS on-orbit calibration is provided by a set of onboard calibrators (OBC), including a solar diffuser (SO), a solar diffuser stability monitor (SDSM), a blackbody (BB), and a spectroradiometric calibration assembly (SRCA). In addition to the onboard calibrators, regular lunar observations are made by both Terra and Aqua MODIS to track their calibration stability in the reflective solar region. This tutorial session provides an overview of MODIS on-orbit calibration and characterization methodologies. It discusses challenging issues and lessons learned from sensor design, operation, calibration, and inter-comparisons. Examples of instrument on-orbit performance are illustrated with a focus on the improvements made based on various lessons learned. It is expected that MODIS experience and lessons will continue to provide valuable information for future earth observing missions/sensors.

Xiong, Jack↗

NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned for Improving Spacecraft Ground Operations

NASA has a unique history in processing the Space Shuttle fleet for launches. Some of this experience has been captured in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). This tool provides a convenient way for design engineers to review lessons from the past to prevent problems from reoccurring and incorporate positive lessons in new designs. At the Kennedy Space Center, the LLIS is being used to design ground support equipment for the next generation of launch and crewed vehicles. This paper describes the LLIS process and offers some examples.

Bell, Michael A.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Strategic Options for International Participation in Space Exploration: Lessons from U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

The President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy suggests that after NASA establishes the Space Exploration vision architecture, it should pursue international partnerships. Two possible approaches were suggested: multiple independently operated missions and an integrated mission with carefully selected international components. The U.S.-Japan defense sectors have learned key lessons from experience with both of these approaches. U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has evolved over forty years from simple military assistance programs to more complex joint development efforts. With the evolution of the political-military alliance and the complexity of defense programs, these cooperative efforts have engaged increasingly industrial resources and capabilities as well as more sophisticated forms of planning, technology transfers and program management. Some periods of this evolution have been marked by significant frictions. The U.S.Japan FS-X program, for example, provides a poor example for management of international cooperation. In November 1988, the United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to co-develop an aircraft, named FS-X and later renamed F -2, as a replacement to the aging Japan support fighter F-l. The program was marked by numerous political disputes. After over a decade of joint development and testing, F -2 production deliveries finally began in 1999. The production run was curtailed due to much higher than anticipated costs and less than desired aircraft performance. One universally agreed "lesson" from the FSX/F-2 case was that it did not represent the ideal approach to bilateral cooperation. More recent cooperative programs have involved targeted joint research and development, including component development for ballistic missile defense systems. These programs could lay the basis for more ambitious cooperative efforts. This study examines both less-than-stellar international cooperation efforts as well as more successful initiatives to identify lessons from military programs that can help NASA encourage global investment in its Space Exploration Vision. The paper establishes a basis for examining related policy and industrial concerns such as effective utilization of dual-use technologies and trans-Pacific program management of large, complex cooperative programs.

Hudiburg, John J.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Lessons from 30 Years of Flight Software

This presentation takes a brief historical look at flight software over the past 30 years, extracts lessons learned and shows how many of the lessons learned are embodied in the Flight Software product line called the core Flight System (cFS). It also captures the lessons learned from developing and applying the cFS.

Flight Software↗