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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Affordable Development and Qualification Strategy for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) is a concept which uses a nuclear reactor to heat a propellant to high temperatures without combustion and can achieve significantly greater specific impulse than chemical engines. NTP has been considered many times for human and cargo missions beyond low earth orbit. A lot of development and technical maturation of NTP components took place during the Rover/NERVA program of the 60's and early 70's. Other NTP programs and studies followed attempting to further mature the NTP concept and identify a champion customer willing to devote the funds and support the development schedule to a demonstration mission. Budgetary constraints require the use of an affordable development and qualification strategy that takes into account all the previous work performed on NTP to construct an existing database, and include lessons learned and past guidelines followed. Current guidelines and standards NASA uses for human rating chemical rocket engines is referenced. The long lead items for NTP development involve the fuel elements of the reactor and ground testing the engine system, subsystem, and components. Other considerations which greatly impact the development plans includes the National Space Policy, National Environmental Policy Act, Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25 (Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space), and Safeguards and Security. Ground testing will utilize non-nuclear test capabilities to help down select components and subsystems before testing in a nuclear environment to save time and cost. Existing test facilities with minor modifications will be considered to the maximum extent practical. New facilities will be designed to meet minimum requirements. Engine and test facility requirements are based on the driving mission requirements with added factors of safety for better assurance and reliability. Emphasis will be placed on small engines, since the smaller the NTP engine, the easier it is to transport, assemble/disassemble, and filter the exhaust during tests. A new ground test concept using underground bore holes (modeled after the underground nuclear test program) to filter the NTP engine exhaust is being considered. The NTP engine system design, development, test, and evaluation plan includes many engine components and subsystems, which are very similar to those used in chemical engines, and can be developed in conjunction with them Other less mature NTP engine components and subsystems (e.g., reactor) will be thoroughly analyzed and tested to acceptable levels recommended by the referenced standards and guidelines. The affordable development strategy also considers a prototype flight test, as a final step in the development process. Preliminary development schedule estimates show that an aggressive development schedule (without much margin) will be required to be flight ready for a 2033 human mission to Mars.

Gerrish, Harold P., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Affordable Development and Qualification Strategy for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) is a concept which uses a nuclear reactor to heat a propellant to high temperatures without combustion and can achieve significantly greater specific impulse than chemical engines. NTP has been considered many times for human and cargo missions beyond low earth orbit. A lot of development and technical maturation of NTP components took place during the Rover/NERVA program of the 60's and early 70's. Other NTP programs and studies followed attempting to further mature the NTP concept and identify a champion customer willing to devote the funds and support the development schedule to a demonstration mission. Budgetary constraints require the use of an affordable development and qualification strategy that takes into account all the previous work performed on NTP to construct an existing database, and include lessons learned and past guidelines followed. Current guidelines and standards NASA uses for human rating chemical rocket engines is referenced. The long lead items for NTP development involve the fuel elements of the reactor and ground testing the engine system, subsystem, and components. Other considerations which greatly impact the development plans includes the National Space Policy, National Environmental Policy Act, Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25 (Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space), and Safeguards and Security. Ground testing will utilize non-nuclear test capabilities to help down select components and subsystems before testing in a nuclear environment to save time and cost. Existing test facilities with minor modifications will be considered to the maximum extent practical. New facilities will be designed to meet minimum requirements. Engine and test facility requirements are based on the driving mission requirements with added factors of safety for better assurance and reliability. Emphasis will be placed on small engines, since the smaller the NTP engine, the easier it is to transport, assemble/disassemble, and filter the exhaust during tests. A new ground test concept using underground bore holes (modeled after the underground nuclear test program) to filter the NTP engine exhaust is being considered. The NTP engine system design, development, test, and evaluation plan includes many engine components and subsystems, which are very similar to those used in chemical engines, and can be developed in conjunction with them Other less mature NTP engine components and subsystems (e.g., reactor) will be thoroughly analyzed and tested to acceptable levels recommended by the referenced standards and guidelines. The affordable development strategy also considers a prototype flight test, as a final step in the development process. Preliminary development schedule estimates show that an aggressive development schedule (without much margin) will be required to be flight ready for a 2033 human mission to Mars.

Gerrish, Harold P., Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Planetary Protection↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRS1975

A study of low cost approaches to scientific experiment implementation for shuttle launched and serviced automated spacecraft

Cost reductions that can be obtained in experiment instrumentation by the use of standardized electronics and by the relaxation of instrument reliability requirements are studied. The feasibility of using standardized equipment for experiment instrumentation is assessed and a system design approach that most effectively incorporates standardized equipment is developed. The level and form of modularization that is appropriate for the standardized equipment is determined. Mission assurance aspects of instrument development are examined to determine the cost reductions that might be derived from the relaxation of reliability requirements and to formulate a systematic approach to the optimization of mission assurance cost reductions. The results of the analyses are applied to a representative model HEAO payload in order to provide a concrete example of the cost reductions that can be achieved by a standardized approach to the instrument electronics.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1978

Predetection telemetry analog recording and playback for Pioneer Venus 1978

Prediction telemetry recording and playback capability was implemented in the DSN to meet PV-78 mission requirements. Test data, along with theoretical considerations, gives assurance that the data degradation commitment of 1.5 db will be met, and it is anticipated that in actual performance the design goal of 1.0 db will be met. The major technical problems requiring solution were elimination of image in the OLR and the reduction of analog recorder instabilities. These were solved through the use of single-sideband mixing techniques and the use of newer generation analog recorders.

Kent, S. S.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Full Lunar Surface Visualization and Simulation Platform

This project created a visualization and simulation software platform for the entire lunar surface. Given the polar Artemis landing targets, the challenging terrain, lighting, and associated integrated crew / vehicle risk assessment, a more integrated approach to mission safety certification, potentially impacting equipment design and crew activity is required. This integrated capability will enable Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA), Flight Operations (FOD), and EVA to effectively collaborate to reduce human lunar exploration operational risk utilizing the identical tools to perform mission planning, rehearsal simulations, and providing the Safety Review Panel with integrated risk analysis capability.

information fusion↗
NASA NTRS2006

Temporal Investment Strategy to Enable JPL Future Space Missions

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) formulates and conducts deep space missions for NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration). The Chief Technologist of JPL has the responsibility for strategic planning of the laboratory's advanced technology program to assure that the required technological capabilities to enable future JPL deep space missions are ready as needed; as such he is responsible for the development of a Strategic Plan. As part of the planning effort, he has supported the development of a structured approach to technology prioritization based upon the work of the START (Strategic Assessment of Risk and Technology) team. A major innovation reported here is the addition of a temporal model that supports scheduling of technology development as a function of time. The JPL Strategic Technology Plan divides the required capabilities into 13 strategic themes. The results reported here represent the analysis of an initial seven.

investment strategy↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportuni-ties for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamina-tion, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR com-munity will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Evolution of the NASA Commercial Crew Program Mission Assurance Process

In 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low Earth orbit via the commercial (non-governmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA has been how to determine that the Commercial Provider's transportation system complies with programmatic safety requirements. The process used in this determination is the Safety Technical Review Board which reviews and approves provider submitted hazard reports. One significant product of the review is a set of hazard control verifications. In past NASA programs, 100% of these safety critical verifications were typically confirmed by NASA. The traditional Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) model does not support the nature of the CCP. To that end, NASA S&MA is implementing a Risk Based Assurance process to determine which hazard control verifications require NASA authentication. Additionally, a Shared Assurance Model is also being developed to efficiently use the available resources to execute the verifications.

Mission Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2008

Human Rating Requirements for NASA's Constellation Program

NASA s Constellation Program (CxP) will conduct a series of human space expeditions of increasing scope, starting with missions supporting the International Space Station and expanding to encompass the Moon and Mars. Although human-rating is an integral part of all CxP activities throughout their life cycle, NASA Procedural Requirements document NPR 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements (HRR) for Space Flight Systems, defines the additional processes, procedures, and requirements necessary to produce human-rated space systems that protect the safety of crew members and passengers on these NASA missions. In order to be in compliance with 8705.2B the CxP must show appropriate implementation or progression toward the HRR, or justification for an exception. Compliance includes an explanation of how the CxP intends to meet the HRR, analyses to be performed to determine implementation; and a matrix to trace the HRR to CxP requirements. The HRR requires the CxP to establish a human system integration team (HSIT), consisting of astronauts, mission operations personnel, training personnel, ground processing personnel, human factors personnel, and human engineering experts, with clearly defined authority, responsibility, and accountability to lead the human-system integration. For example, per the HRR the HSIT is involved in the evaluation of crew workload, human-in-the-loop usability evaluations, determining associated criteria, and in assessment of how these activities influenced system design. In essence, the HSIT is invaluable in CxP s ability to meet the three fundamental tenets of human rating: the process of designing, evaluating, and assuring that the total system can safely conduct the required human missions; the incorporation of design features and capabilities that accommodate human interaction with the system to enhance overall safety and mission success; and the incorporation of design features and capabilities to enable safe recovery of the crew from hazardous situations.

Berdich, Debbie↗
NASA NTRS1993

A low-mass faraday cup experiment for the solar wind

Faraday cups have proven to be very reliable and accurate instruments capable of making 3-D velocity distribution measurements on spinning or 3-axis stabilized spacecraft. Faraday cup instrumentation continues to be appropriate for heliospheric missions. As an example, the reductions in mass possible relative to the solar wind detection system about to be flown on the WIND spacecraft were estimated. Through the use of technology developed or used at the MIT Center for Space Research but were not able to utilize for WIND: surface-mount packaging, field-programmable gate arrays, an optically-switched high voltage supply, and an integrated-circuit power converter, it was estimated that the mass of the Faraday Cup system could be reduced from 5 kg to 1.8 kg. Further redesign of the electronics incorporating hybrid integrated circuits as well as a decrease in the sensor size, with a corresponding increase in measurement cycle time, could lead to a significantly lower mass for other mission applications. Reduction in mass of the entire spacecraft-experiment system is critically dependent on early and continual collaborative efforts between the spacecraft engineers and the experimenters. Those efforts concern a range of issues from spacecraft structure to data systems to the spacecraft power voltage levels. Requirements for flight qualification affect use of newer, lighter electronics packaging and its implementation; the issue of quality assurance needs to be specifically addressed. Lower cost and reduced mass can best be achieved through the efforts of a relatively small group dedicated to the success of the mission. Such a group needs a fixed budget and greater control over quality assurance requirements, together with a reasonable oversight mechanism.

Lazarus, A. J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Mars Technology Program

Future Mars missions require new capabilities that currently are not available. The Mars Technology Program (MTP) is an integral part of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). Its sole purpose is to assure that required technologies are developed in time to enable the baselined and future missions. The MTP is a NASA-wide technology development program managed by JPL. It is divided into a Focused Program and a Base Program. The Focused Program is tightly tied to the proposed Mars Program mission milestones. It involves time-critical deliverables that must be developed in time for infusion into the proposed Mars 2005, and, 2009 missions. In addition a technology demonstration mission by AFRL will test a LIDAR as part of a joint NASNAFRL experiment. This program bridges the gap between technology and projects by vertically integrating the technology work with pre-project development in a project-like environment with critical dates for technology infusion. A Base Technology Program attacks higher riskhigher payoff technologies not in the critical path of missions.

technology Mars exploration lander rover sample re↗
NASA NTRS2019

Challenges and Opportunities of International Cooperation for Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) on the European Service Module (ESM) of the Orion Program

ESA is providing the ESM to NASA for the Orion Program in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement (IA) established between the two Agencies in 2012. This IA is a barter agreement, in which ESA provides Service Module vehicles for the first two flights of Orion in exchange for two servicing missions to the ISS. This arrangement has provided opportunities and challenges to both communities. It represents an important opportunity for ESA to build on its experience in the development and operations of ATV and play an active role in the development and flight of a manned space vehicle. This paper will explore some of the unique aspects of this arrangement as it affects Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA).The assessment of ESM compliance with applicable safety requirements is the responsibility of the Joint Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP). The JSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering and SMA organizations co-chair this Panel. Previously, Safety has chaired, with Engineering as a member of the Panel. Inclusion of Engineering as a co-chair has offered greater leverage within the technical community. Second, the JSERP includes a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety (PA/S) organizations. This recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership.Another source of both opportunity and challenge is the differing experience base of ESA and NASA. NASA has decades of experience in manned spaceflight, dating back to the Mercury program and following through Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Shuttle and the International Space Station. The risk posture for manned missions is much more rigorous than for unmanned missions. ESA brings a wealth of knowledge as well, with their flights of Ariane and Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), development and operation of the Columbus module on ISS, and satellite programs. The result is that both parties have developed paradigms related to risk and failure that contribute to ESM discussions.Orion represents humanity's first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) in over fifty years. Much of that experience is captured in program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous spacecraft with attendant safety-related issues.This paper will explore these and other challenges as we approach the flight of the first Orion vehicle.

Ciancone, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Applied Operations Research: Operator's Assistant

NASA operates high value critical equipment (HVCE) that requires trouble shooting, periodic maintenance and continued monitoring by Operations staff. The complexity HVCE and information required to maintain and trouble shoot HVCE to assure continued mission success as paper is voluminous. Training on new HVCE is commensurate with the need for equipment maintenance. LaRC Research Directorate has undertaken a proactive research to support Operations staff by initiation of the development and prototyping an electronic computer based portable maintenance aid (Operator's Assistant). This research established a goal with multiple objectives and a working prototype was developed. The research identified affordable solutions; constraints; demonstrated use of commercial off the shelf software; use of the US Coast Guard maintenance solution; NASA Procedure Representation Language; and the identification of computer system strategies; where these demonstrations and capabilities support the Operator, and maintenance. The results revealed validation against measures of effectiveness and overall proved a substantial training and capability sustainment tool. The research indicated that the OA could be deployed operationally at the LaRC Compressor Station with an expectation of satisfactorily results and to obtain additional lessons learned prior to deployment at other LaRC Research Directorate Facilities. The research revealed projected cost and time savings.

Cole, Stuart K.↗