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DOE OSTI2024

Sampling Size Optimization for Bioburden Density Estimation in Planetary Protection

Planetary protection (PP) is a discipline that focuses on minimizing the biological contamination of spacecraft to ensure compliance with international policy. Precise estimation of bioburden - the total number of microbes in or on spacecraft hardware – and the bioburden density are of utmost importance for PP. Such estimation is the way concordance with requirements is demonstrated, and it is critical for quantifying the potential risk of inadvertently contaminating other planetary bodies. Although a suite of molecular techniques have been used to thoroughly characterize and profile the microbiome of various cleanroom environments and spacecraft, the gold standard remains the physical enumeration of microbes via culturing of samples directly taken from spacecraft and associated surfaces. However, due to technical, budgetary, and programmatic constraints, only a manageable portion (around 10%) of the entire spacecraft surface is directly sampled with cotton swabs or wipes. To generate the bioburden current best estimate (CBE) for components not directly verifiable, the accepted approach is to apply a NASA-defined bioburden estimate based on the components’ manufacturing or assembly environment. This approach utilizes a prespecified bioburden density estimation that applies a maximum value across the total surface area of the specified component. For hardware components that underwent similar assembly processes, an implied bioburden is adopted for all components, based on a direct verification of a representative component within the same lot. Once all components have a CBE, the bioburden estimates are generated. In previous publication [ 1], we have shown that statistical risks quantifying the accuracy of the estimates for sampled, prespecified, and implied components can be derived and ranked. For mean squared error (MSE) function, the risks are available analytically and hence a cost function can be obtained to optimize the risks with respect to the sampling area and sampling cost. Since the sampling area and sampling cost are two complimentary variables, their sum will have a well-defined minimum. This paper presents the multivariate optimization of the integrated risk of an empirical Bayes estimator to determine the optimal sampling schedule for a given number of components. It is assumed that given a number of components, N, the bioburden density for each component can either be sampled, implied, or prespecified. The multivariate optimization searches through different options to sample, imply or prespecify the bioburden density for a component, and account for the component’s surface area and cost of sampling. The idea of the optimization is based on the observation that the statistical risk of using an estimator is a monotonically decreasing function of the sampled area. The larger the sampled area, the lower the risk of using the estimator as the estimator becomes more and more accurate as the sampling area increases. On the other hand, the cost of sampling is monotonically increasing as the sampled surface grows. This makes the risk and total cost of sampling complimentary variables which can be counterbalanced to achieve an optimal overall value with respect to the sampled surface. In this paper, the integrated risk has been used to quantify the accuracy of the estimator. This risk has been selected because it depends on neither the true value of the parameter nor on the collected data. The cost of each sample was also available to obtain the total cost of sampling of N components. The paper will present the results based on computer-simulated data as well as the data collected during the InSight mission. The computer-simulated data have N components with randomly generated total areas and each component assigned to one of the three categories according to the method of estimating of bioburden density: sampled, implied, or prespecified. The cost of sampling is also available. The cost of sampling is estimated based on a cost model provided by the planetary protection group at JPL. For this paper, the overall cost was assumed to be a linear function of exposure. The optimization process finds the allocation of the components to the three categories that minimizes the tradeoff between integrated risk and total cost. For the InSight data, a set of components is selected representing all three categories, and optimization is performed to determine if the performed allocation was optimal or if a better allocation could have been obtained. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt not only perform an accurate estimation of bioburden density but also do it in an optimal way.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act Title II DOE Due Diligence and Lessons Learned from a Previous Site Transfer - 20352

Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) established that a government agency will provide perpetual care for closed uranium and thorium ore-processing sites that were operating under an NRC source material license in 1978 or were licensed thereafter. Commercial owners (licensees) operating under an NRC or agreement state specific license when UMTRCA was passed are responsible for conducting reclamation of any byproduct material remaining from uranium-ore processing operations in accordance with an NRC or agreement state approved reclamation plan. Reclamation includes both surface and groundwater remedies. Upon completion of reclamation and approval by NRC, the site is required to be transferred to either the host state or the DOE for long-term surveillance and maintenance. Since UMTRCA's enactment, six Title II sites have been transferred to DOE; an additional 24 Title II sites are anticipated to be transferred before 2050. DoE's role mandated under UMTRCA Title II as the long-term care custodian is to perform 'monitoring, maintenance, and emergency measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.' UMTRCA requires that the licensee pay a long-term surveillance charge 'sufficient to cover the annual costs of site surveillance.' However, at some sites such as the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site, this mandate has required additional effort and expense by DOE, beyond the originally anticipated and intended scope within UMTRCA, but within the authority of DOE under UMTRCA. In 1997, the Bluewater site became the second UMTRCA Title II site to be transferred to DOE. The site was the location of a uranium mill operated from 1953 until 1982. The specific licensee began site reclamation in 1991, and by 1995 all tailings and contaminated materials were encapsulated in two tailings disposal cells and other disposal areas. In addition to surface contamination, milling activities impacted groundwater in the two upper aquifers. In 1989, the specific licensee attempted active groundwater remediation; however, no significant reduction in contaminant concentrations was observed. As a result, the specific licensee applied to NRC for alternate concentration limits (ACLs) in 1990, which were approved in 1996 as being protective, after additional corrective actions were performed. Since transfer of the Bluewater site to DOE, unforeseen challenges have occurred, requiring additional actions. The first challenge is the occurrence of surface depressions located on the northern section of the main tailings disposal cell. The depressions were first observed during DoE's initial inspection in 1998; however, evidence of these can be observed on satellite images taken prior to transfer. Since being first observed, the depressions have continued to grow both in depth and areal extent. Due to the design of the main tailings disposal cell, the depressions impede storm water from being effectively shed off the 101- hectare (250-acre) top slope of the main tailings disposal cell. Instead, storm water accumulates in the depressions, forming a large ephemeral pond that has stored up to 16.3 x 10{sup 6} liters (4.3 million gallons) of stormwater. The ponding poses a potential risk to the integrity of the main tailings disposal cell in the case of a large storm event, with the potential to cause the pond to overtop and erode the cover material and underlying waste. DOE has taken a number of short-term actions to monitor, measure, and reduce the ponding and is currently working with the US Army Corps of Engineers to design and construct a repair. Additional challenges are associated with groundwater at the Bluewater site. Nine wells were present on the 1335-hectare (3300-acre) site upon transfer. Groundwater compliance was called into question after the State of New Mexico reduced its uranium groundwater standard from 5.0 to 0.03 milligrams per liter in 2004, and when an ACL for uranium was exceeded in a site monitoring well in 2010. Acquiring historical groundwater data and subsequent evaluations as well as additional DOE groundwater monitoring led to installing 10 new monitoring wells and performing additional site hydrogeology recharacterization. DOE continues to evaluate groundwater conditions at the site and works with the NRC to determine regulatory requirements and a path forward. As a result of lessons learned at the Bluewater site and other Title II sites, improved processes have been implemented at a programmatic level to increase due diligence before site transfer and prevent similar issues from occurring at other UMTRCA Title II sites under long-term management. DoE's due diligence process is documented in the Process for Transition of UMTRCA Title II Disposal Sites to DOE for Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance and is designed to ensure that DOE has no technical or compliance concerns with regulatory decisions that might compromise protectiveness following site transfer to DOE. Implementation of the due diligence process has increased DoE's role prior to site transfer and has been effective in identifying potential issues. Actions by NRC and specific licensees, in response to enhanced due diligence efforts by DOE, are expected to minimize, if not totally prevent, the need for unanticipated actions by DOE pertaining to the surface and groundwater remedies after site transfer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2017

2017 BEA Self-Assessment Report for Idaho National Laboratory

This report provides Battelle Energy Alliance’s (BEA) self-assessment of performance for the period of October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, as evaluated against the goals, performance objectives, and notable outcomes defined in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP). BEA took into consideration and consolidated all input provided from internal and external sources (e.g., Contractor Assurance System [CAS], program and customer feedback, external and independent reviews, and Department of Energy [DOE] Idaho Operations Office [ID] quarterly PEMP reports and Quarterly Evaluation Reports). After considering the information related to performance during the rating period, including feedback from the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Idaho Operations Office (ID), and other programmatic sponsors, BEA has self-assessed the Laboratory’s performance at a grade of A, an adjectival rating of “Excellent.” Table 1 documents BEA’s assessment of performance to the goals and individual performance Objectives. Table 2 documents completion of the Notable Outcomes. A more-detailed assessment of performance for each individual performance objective is documented in the closeout reports (see the PEMP reporting system). Table 3 includes an update to “Performance Challenges” as reported in the FY 2016 Self-Assessment Report.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2014

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Integrated Program Plan

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS2014

Low-Cost, Class D Testing of Spacecraft Photovoltaic Systems Can Reduce Risk

The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! Specifically, the standard practice for doing so is the Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulation (LAPSS). A LAPSS test can characterize a photovoltaic system's efficiency via its response to rapidly applied impulses of simulated sunlight. However, a Class D program on a constrained budget and schedule may not have the resources to ship an entire satellite for a LAPSS test alone. Such was the case with the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) program, which was also averse to the risk of hardware damage during shipment. When the Electrical Power System (EPS) team was denied a spacecraft-level LAPSS test, the lack of an end-to-end power generation test elevated to a project-level technical risk. The team pulled together very limited resources to not only eliminate the risk, but build a process to monitor the health of the system through mission operations. We discuss a process for performing a low-cost, end-to-end test of the LADEE photovoltaic system. The approach combines system-level functional test, panel-level performance results, and periodic inspection (and repair) up until launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of data. The process starts in manufacturing at the subcontractor. The panel manufacturer provides functional test and LAPSS data on each individual panel. We apply an initial assumption that the per-panel performance is sufficient to meet the power generation requirements. The manufacturer's data is also carried as the performance allocation for each panel during EPS system modeling and initial mission operations. During integration and test, a high-power, professional theater lamp system provides simulated sunlight to each panel on the spacecraft, thereby permitting a true end-to-end system test. A passing test results in a step response to nearly full-rated current at the appropriate solar array switch in the power system. A metal-halide bulb, infrared imagers, and onboard spacecraft measurements are utilized to minimize risk of thermal damage during test. Data is provided to support test results for both passing and marginal panels. Prior to encapsulation in the launch vehicle, each panel is inspected for damage by the panel manufacturer. Cracked cells or other damage is amended on-site. Because the photovoltaic test system is inexpensive and portable, each repaired panel can be re-verified immediately. Post-launch, the photovoltaic system is again characterized for per-panel deviations from the manufacturer's performance test. This proved especially tricky as the LADEE spacecraft performs only one current measurement on the entire array. The algorithm for Matlab tools to assess panel performance based on spacecraft attitude is discussed. While not as precise and comprehensive as LAPSS, the LADEE approach leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a spacecraft level performance test versus the programmatic risk of shipping the spacecraft to another facility. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility.

photovoltaic↗

NASA NTRS2008

Best Practices for Researching and Documenting Lessons Learned

Identification, resolution, and avoidance of technical and programmatic issues are important for ensuring safe and successful space missions. Although the importance of applying lessons learned to reduce risk is frequently stressed, there is little material available to help technical and management personnel research and document lessons learned. Collecting, researching, identifying, and documenting lessons learned that will be useful to current and future management and engineering personnel is not always a straightforward task. This white paper presents lessons learned and best practices concerning the research and documentation of technical and organizational lessons learned. It is intended to enable organizations to initiate or improve lessons learned research and documentation efforts. The content of this white paper is based on four technical lessons learned projects conducted by the United Space Alliance (USA) Flight Design and Dynamics Department, in support of the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Design and Dynamics Division. Each project published a report, titled as follows: (1) GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38; (2) Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions; (3) Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report; and (4) Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned. The four projects were different in availability of subject matter experts and primary source material, subject scope, and the level of effort required to produce the final report. However, generic lessons can be drawn from all of them. The best practices will be discussed by the phases of report research and development: (1) Defining Report Requirements, Project Organization, and Schedule; (2) Collection and Analysis of Source Material; (3) Writing and Integrating the Report; and (4) Review and Revision of the Report.

Goodman, John L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA's Space Launch System Marks Critical Design Review

With completion of its Critical Design Review (CDR) in 2015, NASA is deep into the manufacturing and testing phases of its new Space Launch System (SLS) for beyond-Earth exploration. This CDR was the first in almost 40 years for a NASA human launch vehicle and marked another successful milestone on the road to the launch of a new era of deep space exploration. The review marked the 90-percent design-complete, a final look at the design and development plan of the integrated vehicle before full-scale fabrications begins and the prelude to the next milestone, design certification. Specifically, the review looked at the first of three increasingly capable configurations planned for SLS. This "Block I" design will stand 98.2 meters (m) (322 feet) tall and provide 39.1 million Newtons (8.8 million pounds) of thrust at liftoff to lift a payload of approximately 70 metric tons (154,000 pounds). This payload is more than double that of the retired space shuttle program or other current launch vehicles. It dramatically increases the mass and volume of human and robotic exploration. Additionally, it will decrease overall mission risk, increase safety, and simplify ground and mission operations - all significant considerations for crewed missions and unique, high-value national payloads. The Block 1 SLS will launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) on an uncrewed flight beyond the moon and back and the first crewed flight around the moon. The current design has a direct evolutionary path to a vehicle with a 130t lift capability that offers even more flexibility to reduce planetary trip times, simplify payload design cycles, and provide new capabilities such as planetary sample returns. Every major element of SLS has hardware in production or testing, including flight hardware for the Exploration 1 (EM-1) test flight. In fact, the SLS MPCV-to-Stage-Adapter (MSA) flew successfully on the Exploration Flight Test (EFT) 1 launch of a Delta IV and Orion spacecraft in December 2014. This paper will discuss these and other technical and programmatic successes and challenges over the past year and provide a preview of work ahead before the first flight of this new capability.

Singer, Chris↗

DOE OSTI2015

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Integrated Program Plan

Nuclear power has safely, reliably, and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 60%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow by about 24% from 2013 to 2040 . At the same time, most of the currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their initial 20-year extension to their original 40-year operating license, for a total of 60 years of operation (the oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009). Figure E-1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity for 40- and 60-year license periods. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years (and new nuclear plants are not built quickly enough to replace them), the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will rapidly decline. That decline will be accelerated if plants are shut down before 60 years of operation. Decisions on extended operation ultimately rely on economic factors; however, economics can often be improved through technical advancements. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s 2010 Research and Development Roadmap (2010 Nuclear Energy Roadmap) organizes its activities around four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The four objectives are as follows: 1. Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors. 2. Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change goals. 3. Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles. 4. Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document summarizes the LWRS Program’s plans. For the LWRS Program, sustainability is defined as the ability to maintain safe and economic operation of the existing fleet of nuclear power plants for a longer-than-initially-licensed lifetime. It has two facets with respect to long-term operations: (1) manage the aging of plant systems, structures, and components so that nuclear power plant lifetimes can be extended and the plants can continue to operate safely, efficiently, and economically; and (2) provide science-based solutions to the industry to implement technology to exceed the performance of the current labor-intensive business model.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2017

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Integrated Program Plan

Nuclear power has safely, reliably, and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 60%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow by about 24% from 2013 to 2040 . At the same time, most of the currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their initial 20-year extension to their original 40-year operating license, for a total of 60 years of operation (the oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009). Figure E-1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity for 40- and 60-year license periods. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years (and new nuclear plants are not built quickly enough to replace them), the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will rapidly decline. That decline will be accelerated if plants are shut down before 60 years of operation. Decisions on extended operation ultimately rely on economic factors; however, economics can often be improved through technical advancements. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s 2010 Research and Development Roadmap (2010 Nuclear Energy Roadmap) organizes its activities around four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The four objectives are as follows: 1. Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; 2. Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change goals; 3. Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and 4. Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document summarizes the LWRS Program’s plans. For the LWRS Program, sustainability is defined as the ability to maintain safe and economic operation of the existing fleet of nuclear power plants for a longer-than-initially-licensed lifetime. It has two facets with respect to long-term operations: (1) manage the aging of plant systems, structures, and components so that nuclear power plant lifetimes can be extended and the plants can continue to operate safely, efficiently, and economically; and (2) provide science-based solutions to the industry to implement technology to exceed the performance of the current labor-intensive business model.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Integrated Program Plan

Nuclear power has safely, reliably, and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 60%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow by about 24% from 2013 to 2040 . At the same time, most of the currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their initial 20-year extension to their original 40-year operating license, for a total of 60 years of operation (the oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009). Figure E-1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity for 40- and 60-year license periods. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years (and new nuclear plants are not built quickly enough to replace them), the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will rapidly decline. That decline will be accelerated if plants are shut down before 60 years of operation. Decisions on extended operation ultimately rely on economic factors; however, economics can often be improved through technical advancements. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy's 2010 Research and Development Roadmap (2010 Nuclear Energy Roadmap) organizes its activities around four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The four objectives are as follows: 1. Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; 2. Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration's energy security and climate change goals; 3. Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and 4. Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document summarizes the LWRS Program's plans. For the LWRS Program, sustainability is defined as the ability to maintain safe and economic operation of the existing fleet of nuclear power plants for a longer-than-initially-licensed lifetime. It has two facets with respect to long-term operations: (1) manage the aging of plant systems, structures, and components so that nuclear power plant lifetimes can be extended and the plants can continue to operate safely, efficiently, and economically; and (2) provide science-based solutions to the industry to implement technology to exceed the performance of the current labor-intensive business model.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Hanford Under-tank Inspection with Ultrasonic Volumetric Non-destructive Examination Technology - 18470

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Hanford Site Tank Operations Contractor Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) are sponsoring a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technology development program to identify and mature volumetric (non-visual) NDE technology that will enable the examination of Hanford double-shell tank (DST) bottoms. NDE technology for Hanford under-tank examination will be made possible through technology maturation that includes adaptation of NDE sensor technology to overcome access challenges presented by tank risers and refractory pad air-slots, followed by integration with robotic delivery systems, and ultimately qualification and deployment of the inspection systems. The stages of technology maturation and the testing and evaluation required to support the process are organized under three program phases: Phase I - NDE Capability Testing: Identify and down-select NDE technologies based on flaw detection and characterization abilities only; Phase 2 - NDE Delivery System Testing: Mature promising NDE technologies to adapt transducer hardware and robotic delivery system to address access challenges; Phase 3 - Full-scale Demonstration of Integrated NDE System: Demonstrate adapted NDE technologies in a cold test platform to challenge flaw detection and navigation abilities. Phase I of the program, which was initiated and completed in FY2017, focused on completing the following five key activities: 1. Identifying a broad cross section of potentially applicable NDE volumetric inspection technologies for under-tank examination. 2. Down-selecting the broad set of NDE technologies to a set of strong candidates based on initial flaw detection performance and potential to be adapted/matured to overcome primary tank access challenges posed by access risers and/or refractory pad air-slots. 3. Evaluating the flaw detection performance of the candidate sensors through testing. 4. Using the test results to baseline sensor performance against the flaw detection requirements established for high-level waste tanks. 5. Assessing the trade-offs and vulnerabilities of the candidate sensors that would negatively impact sensor performance reliability or complicate tank inspection operations. The completion of the first three key activities satisfied the first two Phase I test objectives, which were to complete Technology Screening and Sensor Effectiveness Testing. Completion of the fourth key activity satisfied the final test objective of Phase I, which was to determine the extent to which the sensors can satisfy high-level waste tank flaw detection requirements. Sensor flaw detection performance testing yielded several suitable sensor technology options, although each has specific risks or challenges that would need to be accepted or overcome. Thus, the fifth key activity was performed to evaluate sensor risks and challenges for consideration with flaw detection performance. The Phase I evaluation outcomes will be used to support the Phase I programmatic objective, which is to identify one or more NDE sensor technologies for adaptation and maturation for the DST environment. Selection of one or more sensors will mark the culmination of Phase I of the NDE Technology Development Program and allow progression to Phase II.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS2007

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗

DOE OSTI2020

An Overview of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Uncertainty Assessment Accident Progression Insights

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) have completed three uncertainty analyses (UAs) as part of the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) program. The SOARCA UAs included an integrated evaluation of uncertainty in accident progression, radiological release, and offsite health consequence projections. The UA for Peach Bottom, a boiling-water reactor (BWR) with a Mark I containment located in the State of Pennsylvania, analyzed the unmitigated long-term station blackout SOARCA scenario. The UA for Sequoyah, a 4-loop Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) located in the State of Tennessee, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario, with a focus on issues unique to the ice condenser containment and the potential for early containment failure due to hydrogen deflagration. The UA for Surry, a 3-loop Westinghouse PWR with a sub-atmospheric large dry containment located in the State of Virginia, analyzed the unmitigated short-term station blackout SOARCA scenario including the potential for thermally-induced steam-generator tube rupture. These three UAs are currently documented in three NUREG/CR reports. This report provides input to planned NRC documentation on the insights and findings from the SOARCA UA program. The purpose of the summary report is to provide a useful reference for regulatory applications that require the evaluation of offsite consequence risk from beyond design basis event severe accidents. This report focuses on the accident progression and source term insights developed from the MELCOR analyses. MELCOR is the NRC's best-estimate, severe accident computer code used in the SOARCA UAs. In anticipation of the SOARCA UA insights work, NRC and Sandia benchmarked the response of the Peach Bottom model to selected reference calculations from the Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. Peach Bottom was the first SOARCA UA performed and was completed in 2015 using the MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The PWR SOARCA UAs evolved the original methodology and utilized the updated MELCOR 2.2 computer code. The Peach Bottom model has been systematically updated for other NRC research efforts and has been updated to MELCOR 2.2. computer code. The findings from the new reference calculations using the updated model with the MELCOR 2.2 code are also integrated into the report. A second objective is an assessment of the applicability of the results to the other nuclear reactors in the U.S. As the key findings are reviewed, judgments are presented on the applicability of the results to other U.S. nuclear power plants. An important objective of the SOARCA program relied on high- fidelity plant-specific modeling. However, the nature of the insights and conclusions allowed judgements to be made on the applicability of the various insights to the same general classification of plant (i.e., BWR or PWR) or the entire fleet of plants. Finally, the results from the SOARCA UA accident progression calculations contain a wealth of information not previously documented in the NUREG/CRs. This report includes new but related information that can be used to benchmark past or support future regulatory decisions related to severe accidents. The new work includes a benchmark of the NUREG-1465 licensing source term definitions, the variability of key accident progression events and timing to radionuclide release, and an improved understanding of the timing and source terms from consequential steam generator tube ruptures. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Sandia authors gratefully acknowledge the significant technical and programmatic contributions from the NRC SOARCA team which are reflected throughout the report. Dr. Tina Ghosh has been involved throughout the SOARCA UAs, providing the primary managerial and technical oversight. The long lists of NRC and Sandia contributors from the SOARCA UAs are cited in the three NUREG/CRs and are also gratefully acknowledged by the small team of authors compiling the results of their efforts. Significant technical contributions, advice, and reviews were provided by Dr. Hossein Esmaili, Dr. Alfred Hathaway, and Dr. Edward Fuller (retired) of the NRC. Dr. Randal Gauntt (retired), Mr. Patrick Mattie, Mr. Joseph Jones (retired), and Dr. Doug Osborn from Sandia are recognized as the SOARCA UA managers guiding the past efforts. There is a comparable list of project managers at the NRC including Ms. Patricia Santiago, Dr. Salman Haq, and Mr. Jon Barr. Sadly, we have lost Mr. Charlie Tinkler and Mr. Robert Prato, who were important contributors to the original SOARCA project. Finally, Mr. Kyle Ross and Mr. Mark Leonard have also retired but were significant technical contributors. Mr. Kyle Ross was the technical lead on all three SOARCA UAs and the original pressurized water reactor SOARCA study. Mr. Leonard was the technical lead on the original boiling water reactor SOARCA study and a key contributor to the first Peach Bottom SOARCA UA. iv

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗

DOE OSTI2019

Criticality Accident Alarm System Shielding Benchmark: Integral Experiment Request 498, Critical Engineering Decision 1 Report

This report supports Critical/Subcritical Experiment Decision 1 (CED-1) for Integral Experiment Request (IER) 498, a shielding benchmark produced using the Godiva IV critical assembly at the National Critical Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Shielding benchmarks are datasets collected to provide a comparison for computer models that simulate the effect of shielding on radiation transmission from a source to a detector. The purpose of a CED-1 report is to produce a conceptual design for an integral experiment and to identify the long lead-time items. The design presented in this report favors certain detailed design options such as material selections. However, alternative options can be selected as the project evolves. Dimensions are specified only as needed to evaluate feasibility and performance. Development of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmarks supports two main programmatic needs. The first need is to improve confidence in models of facilities that house nuclear material handling operations. Better models can support effective CAAS detector placement when criticality may result in dose, and it enables more accurate analysis of criticality accident impacts at various locations in a facility. A key quantity that can be verified is the secondary gamma production caused by neutron interactions with various materials. The second programmatic need supported by shielding benchmarks is the ongoing development of methods being integrated into nuclear simulation codes such as the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code and the SCALE code system used in efforts funded by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). Previous work performed under the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experimental Program (ICSBEP) to produce shielding benchmark data is primarily limited to a set of measurements at the SILENE critical assembly at the Valduc facility in France. The experiment used an open configuration and a burst mode operation, which limited detector options to thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and activation foils. Because TLDs do not record gamma spectra, it was difficult to verify the gamma energy spectrum from the experiment. In this work, the Godiva IV assembly will be used because it is a fast system capable of producing a wide range of source strengths, including super-prompt critical bursts. The room return for the facility is expected to be substantial and challenging to characterize, so a more closed, shielded experimental configuration is considered. Furthermore, because the physics of radiation transport outside the assembly does not change between the burst mode and the delayed critical mode, it is anticipated that most measurements will be made with the Godiva IV assembly in delayed critical mode, operating within a range that will allow electronic counters to collect accurate data. Scoping calculations concluded that a workable room return shield is comprised of 40 cm of 5% borated polyethylene backed by 7 cm of lead. This configuration was shown to produce a ratio of signal–to–room return of over 100 for up to 2 mean free paths of shield sample material, and over 10 for up to 4 mean free paths of shield sample material, ensuring that useful results can be obtained. With no shielding sample in the room return shield, it was shown that the neutron and gamma spectra do not appreciably change with a change in room size. This scoping calculation does not preclude the use of tungsten powder in a binder, some other effective gamma shielding material, or a hybrid design. Dose rates for various source intensities at an unshielded detector are listed herein to inform detector selection during CED-2, and calibration chains are identified. Preliminary estimates of costs and schedules are outlined but remain to be verified. Values could double or triple as estimates become more accurate and are principally included here to demonstrate feasibility. Preliminary estimates indicate that the apparatus can be installed within a feasible schedule and budget. Two measurements per day are assumed. Producing a shielding benchmark at NCERC using the Godiva IV assembly has been shown to be feasible, with manageable uncertainties and risks. A clear, continuing need for shielding benchmark data remains present, and this report identifies and evaluates a method for creating integrated shielding benchmark datasets.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗