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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Sustaining a Mature Risk Management Process: Ensuring the International Space Station for a Vibrant Future

The International Space Station (ISS) risk management methodology is an example of a mature and sustainable process. Risk management is a systematic approach used to proactively identify, analyze, plan, track, control, communicate, and document risks to help management make risk-informed decisions that increase the likelihood of achieving program objectives. The ISS has been operating in space for over 14 years and permanently crewed for over 12 years. It is the longest surviving habitable vehicle in low Earth orbit history. Without a mature and proven risk management plan, it would be increasingly difficult to achieve mission success throughout the life of the ISS Program. A successful risk management process must be able to adapt to a dynamic program. As ISS program-level decision processes have evolved, so too has the ISS risk management process continued to innovate, improve, and adapt. Constant adaptation of risk management tools and an ever-improving process is essential to the continued success of the ISS Program. Above all, sustained support from program management is vital to risk management continued effectiveness. Risk management is valued and stressed as an important process by the ISS Program.

Raftery, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management from GSFC Perspective

Risk Management is an organized, systematic decision making process that efficiently identifies, analyzes, plans, tracks, controls, communicates and documents risk

Jambulingam, Natesan↗
NASA NTRS2023

A Pilot Project for Quantifying the Effect of Medical Provider Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities on Outcomes for Spaceflight Using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool

In order to enable the future of long-duration deep space exploration we must confront the uncertainty in medical risk. Limitations of communication, resupply, and evacuation in deep space will require a high degree of crew autonomy and accurate risk assessment will be critical to ensure adequate crew training and medical system design. To address this, NASA’s Human Research Program Exploration Medical Capability Element has developed the Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces Tool (IMPACT). IMPACT is a suite of tools that can provide evidence-based, data-driven trade space assessments between available medical resources in the mass- and volume-constrained environment of a deep space exploration vehicle. In the current model, medical conditions either can or cannot be treated based on the availability of medical system resources and equipment. However, medical outcomes often depend just as much on the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) of the provider operating the system. This paper presents a method for modeling and quantifying the effect of medical officer KSA on medically relevant mission risk outcomes during spaceflight.

capabilities↗
NASA NTRS2020

EDL Simulation Results for the Mars 2020 Landing Site Safety Assessment

The Mars 2020 rover is NASA’s next flagship mission, set to explore Mars in search of scientific evidence of past microbial life. Importantly, the rover will also, for the first time, have the ability to collect and cache rock and soil samples for retrieval and return to laboratories here on Earth. A key step in the development of the Mars 2020 mission is the selection of a suitable landing site with the largest likelihood of meeting scientific goals. This decision is a complex and critical one that requires close interaction between the scientific and engineering communities. The chosen landing site must be both scientifically interesting — providing the project with the greatest possible chance of gathering credible and defendable scientific evidence — and also safe enough to attempt a landing in the first place. Thus, arguably one of the most important undertakings of the Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) team, is to effectively enumerate, quantify, and communicate the landing risks to all of the stakeholders. The culmination of this effort is the Landing Site Safety Assessment, which is a review commissioned by the project, presided over by the EDL Standing Review Board, and attended by management and science stakeholders, in which the EDL team communicates their assessment of the associated landing risks and the statistical probability of a successful landing at each of the final candidate landing sites. This paper summarizes the results of high-fidelity computer simulations of the Mars 2020 EDL sequence used in this assessment. From an EDL performance perspective, all four candidates offer similar level of robustness, which is in-family with Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). However, two new features of the Mars 2020 EDL sequence – range trigger and Terrain-Relative Navigation (TRN) – dramatically enhance the capability of the EDL system to safely land at landing sites with much more rugged terrain than ever before considered. This has allowed the landing site selection for Mars 2020 to proceed in a manner that has been unprecedentedly weighted more heavily toward scientific interest and less heavily on engineering constraints. With TRN, the overall probability of success is predicted to be approximately 99% for all of the candidates.

David Way↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS1983

Advanced communications satellite systems

There is a rapidly growing demand for satellite circuits, particularly for domestic service within the U.S. NASA's current program is aimed at developing the high risk, advanced satellite communications technologies required to significantly increase the capacity of future satellite communications systems. Attention is given to aspects of traffic distribution and service scenario, problems related to effects of rain attenuation, details regarding system configuration, a 30/20 GHz technology development approach, an experimental flight system, the communications payload for the experimental flight system, a typical experiment flight system coverage, and a typical three axis stabilized flight spacecraft.

Sivo, J. N.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Environmental Regulations as Drivers of Materials Obsolescence

This slide presentation reviews the operations of the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC-PC) and the impact of environmental regulations in making some materials obsolete. The center is NASA's resource for identifying and managing risks associated with changing environmental regulations. To this end the center acts as an regulatory early warning system, to review track and analyze emerging regulations, collaborate with the technical community on regulatory risk analysis and interpretation and to represent NASA's interests to the regulatory agencies. Regulations frequently result in making some materials unavailable forcing a change to another material. Processes may also be changed due to environmental regulations. For example some items that were sprayed with a chemical may now have to be painted or dipped with the chemical. Sometimes a regulation changes the use of a certain product, which does not affect the usage on Earth, but has significant implications in space. An example of this is the use of lead-free solders of basically tin, which don't appear to have any problem on Earth, but in space applications tin whiskers have resulted in several confirmed satellite failures.

Scroggins, Sharon↗
NASA NTRS2004

Communications: Mosquito Habitats, Land Use, and Malaria Risk in Belize from Satellite Imagery

Satellite imagery of northern Belize is used to examine the distribution of land use and breeding habitats of the malaria vector the Anopheles mosquito. A land cover classification based on multispectral SPOT and multitemporal Radarsat images identified eleven land cover classes, including agricultural, forest, and marsh types. Two of the land cover types, Typha domingensis marsh and flooded forest, are Anopheles vestitipennis larval habitats, and one, Eleocharis spp. marsh, is the larval habitat for Anopheles albimanus. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analyses of land cover demonstrate that the amount of Typha domingensis in a marsh is positively correlated with the amount of agricultural land in the adjacent upland, and negatively correlated with the amount of adjacent forest. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that nutrient (phosphorus) runoff from agricultural lands is causing an expansion of Typha domingensis in northern Belize. Thus, land use induced expansion of Anopheles vestitipennis larval habitat is potentially increasing malaria risk in Belize, and in other regions where Anopheles vestitipennis is a major malaria vector.

Pope, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2020

Reliability Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risks assessment and communication.

Reliability prediction↗
NASA NTRS2019

Vortex Radiometry: Enabling Frequency Agile Communications

Exponential proliferation of UAVs and CubeSats puts NASA's high priority communication systems at risk. UAVs and CubeSats are easy to acquire, modify and build, making it extremely likely that some will be used in unauthorized ways. While these systems provide several benefits to society, their increased use also increases the probability of unintentional signal interference, and even deliberate jamming of NASA's communication systems.This paper presents an algorithm to determine 1) when an interference induced fade will occur, 2) how long the fade will persist for and 3) how intense the fade will be. The algorithm requires data collected from Vortex Radiometers (VRs), which probe the RF environment using annular antenna beam patterns. A set of numerical simulations show that a multi-beam VR system can instruct a cognitive antenna to switch between Ka- and X-Band communications, in order to avert interference from small diameter noise sources. Analysis of the simulation results indicate that practical VR systems will require several concentric annular beam patterns, in order to mitigate fades from noise sources of various sizes. The paper concludes by identifying technology challenges that need to be overcome to achieve these capabilities.

Orbital Angular Momentum↗
NASA NTRS2020

Reliability Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risks assessment and communication.

FMEA/FMECA↗
NASA NTRS2010

From Process to Product: Your Risk Process at Work

The Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) and Human Research Program (HRP) at the NASA/Johnson Space Center work together to address and manage the human health and performance risks associated with human space flight. This includes all human system requirements before, during, and after space flight, providing for research, and managing the risk of adverse long-term health outcomes for the crew. We previously described the framework and processes developed for identifying and managing these human system risks. The focus of this panel is to demonstrate how the implementation of the framework and associated processes has provided guidance in the management and communication of human system risks. The risks of early onset osteoporosis, CO2 exposure, and intracranial hypertension in particular have all benefitted from the processes developed for human system risk management. Moreover, we are continuing to develop capabilities, particularly in the area of information architecture, which will also be described. We are working to create a system whereby all risks and associated actions can be tracked and related to one another electronically. Such a system will enhance the management and communication capabilities for the human system risks, thereby increasing the benefit to researchers and flight surgeons.

Kundrot, Craig E.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Deep Space Optical Communications (DSOC)

NASA’s future deep space science and exploration missions will require enhanced communications and navigation services. Laser communications offers expanded bandwidth and the potential for satisfying this need, with comparable mass and power as state of the art telecommunication systems. Consequently, NASA is planning a Deep Space Optical Communications (DSOC) technology demonstration, to retire the risk for future enhanced optical communication services. NASA’s upcoming Psyche Mission scheduled to launch in August of 2022 plans to host a DSOC flight laser transceiver (FLT) for demonstrating optical links from deep-space to earth. Existing ground assets retrofitted with laser transmitters and photon-counting receivers will be used for the technology demonstration. Advancing optical technology from near-Earth ranges to deep space (> 0.01 astronomical units or AU) involves orders of magnitude increased link difficulty (defined as data-rate squared distance). The plan to bridge the difficulty gap implements new technologies developed over the past two decades. These technologies emphasize high photon efficiency (HPE) with the use of high-peak-to-average power laser transmitters in space, and single photon counting sensitivity detectors, that together support signaling schemes for achieving approximately 23 information bits per detected photon. Implementing HPE schemes relies on accurate and stable pointing of narrow laser beams from space platforms using active control. Key developments needed for future technology infusion, following a successful DSOC technology demonstration, include, cost-effective ground infrastructure, long term reliability of space lasers and detection systems, and solutions for high precision laser ranging. The current status of the DSOC Project and plans for future development will be discussed in this paper.

Biswas, Abhijit↗
NASA NTRS2021

Model-Based SMA Initiative Phase 1 Report: Reliability Tips Excerpt

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. [7] The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the designs. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering, using these recommended modeling techniques, to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risk assessment and communication.

Nancy J. Lindsey↗