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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

probabilistic risk↗
NASA NTRS1998

Risk Management (RM) on JPL Projects

Risk: the combination of the likelihood of occurance and the severity of the consequences of the occurance of an event (usually undesirable).

Risk Management JPL Projects↗
NASA NTRS2004

Managing Risk to Ensure a Successful Cassini/Huygens Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI)

I. Design: a) S/C designed to be largely single fault tolerant; b) Operate in flight demonstrated envelope, with margin; and c) Strict compliance with requirements & flight rules. II. Test: a) Baseline, fault & stress testing using flight system testbeds (H/W & S/W); b) In-flight checkout & demos to remove first time events. III. Failure Analysis: a) Critical event driven fault tree analysis; b) Risk mitigation & development of contingencies. IV) Residual Risks: a) Accepted pre-launch waivers to Single Point Failures; b) Unavoidable risks (e.g. natural disaster). V) Mission Assurance: a) Strict process for characterization of variances (ISAs, PFRs & Waivers; b) Full time Mission Assurance Manager reports to Program Manager: 1) Independent assessment of compliance with institutional standards; 2) Oversight & risk assessment of ISAs, PFRs & Waivers etc.; and 3) Risk Management Process facilitator.

risk managment↗
NASA NTRS1997

Risk Management of NASA Projects

Various NASA Langley Research Center and other center projects were attempted for analysis to obtain historical data comparing pre-phase A study and the final outcome for each project. This attempt, however, was abandoned once it became clear that very little documentation was available. Next, extensive literature search was conducted on the role of risk and reliability concepts in project management. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are being used with increasing regularity both in and outside of NASA. The value and the usage of PRA techniques were reviewed for large projects. It was found that both civilian and military branches of the space industry have traditionally refrained from using PRA, which was developed and expanded by nuclear industry. Although much has changed with the end of the cold war and the Challenger disaster, it was found that ingrained anti-PRA culture is hard to stop. Examples of skepticism against the use of risk management and assessment techniques were found both in the literature and in conversations with some technical staff. Program and project managers need to be convinced that the applicability and use of risk management and risk assessment techniques is much broader than just in the traditional safety-related areas of application. The time has come to begin to uniformly apply these techniques. The whole idea of risk-based system can maximize the 'return on investment' that the public demands. Also, it would be very useful if all project documents of NASA Langley Research Center, pre-phase A through final report, are carefully stored in a central repository preferably in electronic format.

Sarper, Hueseyin↗
NASA NTRS2001

DDP - a tool for life-cycle risk management

At JPL we have developed, and implemented, a process for achieving life-cycle risk management. This process has been embodied in a software tool and is called Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP). The DDP process can be succinctly stated as: determine where we want to be, what could get in the way and how we will get there.

DDP risk management↗
NASA NTRS1990

Space Station logistics policy - Risk management from the top down

Considerations are presented in the area of risk management specifically relating to logistics and system supportability. These considerations form a basis for confident application of concurrent engineering principles to a development program, aiming at simultaneous consideration of support and logistics requirements within the engineering process as the system concept and designs develop. It is shown that, by applying such a process, the chances of minimizing program logistics and supportability risk in the long term can be improved. The problem of analyzing and minimizing integrated logistics risk for the Space Station Freedom Program is discussed.

Paules, Granville↗
NASA NTRS2022

In-Time Terminal Area Risk Management

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Commercial Operations Developing methods to Improve risk management and safety assurance processes by proactively identifying risks and causal factors before an accident/incident occurs.

Kyle Kent Edward Ellis↗
NASA NTRS2004

How Systems Engineering and Risk Management Defend Against Murphy's Law and Human Error

Systems Engineering and Risk Management processes can work synergistically to defend against the causes of many mission ending failures. Defending against mission ending failures is facilitated by fostering a team that has a healthy respect for Murphy's Law and a team with a of curiosity for how things work, how they can fail, and what they need to know. This curiosity is channeled into making the unknowns known or what is uncertain more certain. Efforts to assure mission success require the expenditure of energy in the following areas: 1. Understanding what defines Mission Success as guided by the customer's needs, objectives and constraints. 2. Understanding how the system is supposed to work and how the system is to be produced, fueled by the curiosity of how the system should work and how it should be produced. 3. Understanding how the system can fail and how the system might not be produced on time and within cost, fueled by the curiosity of how the system might fail and how production might be difficult. 4. Understanding what we need to know and what we need learn for proper completion of the above three items, fueled by the curiosity of what we might not know in order to make the best decisions.

Bay, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2011

DCS: A Case Study of Identification of Knowledge and Disposition Gaps Using Principles of Continuous Risk Management

The Human Research Program (HRP) is formulated around the program architecture of Evidence-Risk-Gap-Task-Deliverable. Review of accumulated evidence forms the basis for identification of high priority risks to human health and performance in space exploration. Gaps in knowledge or disposition are identified for each risk, and a portfolio of research tasks is developed to fill them. Deliverables from the tasks inform the evidence base with the ultimate goal of defining the level of risk and reducing it to an acceptable level. A comprehensive framework for gap identification, focus, and metrics has been developed based on principles of continuous risk management and clinical care. Research towards knowledge gaps improves understanding of the likelihood, consequence or timeframe of the risk. Disposition gaps include development of standards or requirements for risk acceptance, development of countermeasures or technology to mitigate the risk, and yearly technology assessment related to watching developments related to the risk. Standard concepts from clinical care: prevention, diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, rehabilitation, and surveillance, can be used to focus gaps dealing with risk mitigation. The research plan for the new HRP Risk of Decompression Sickness (DCS) used the framework to identify one disposition gap related to establishment of a DCS standard for acceptable risk, two knowledge gaps related to DCS phenomenon and mission attributes, and three mitigation gaps focused on prediction, prevention, and new technology watch. These gaps were organized in this manner primarily based on target for closure and ease of organizing interim metrics so that gap status could be quantified. Additional considerations for the knowledge gaps were that one was highly design reference mission specific and the other gap was focused on DCS phenomenon.

Norcross, Jason↗
NASA NTRS2002

Risk management integration into complex project organizations

This paper describes the approach used in designing and adapting the SIRTF prototype, discusses some of the lessons learned in developing the SIRTF prototype, and explains the adaptability of the risk management database to varying levels project complexity.

risk management process web tool↗
NASA NTRS2018

A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions

The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.

Bordi, Francesco↗
NASA NTRS1996

Success Criteria and Risk Management for the New Millennium Program

The NASA New Millennium Program (NMP) is a technology development and validation program that will flight-validate advanced, new technologies with space flight applications. NMP's purpose is twofold. First, it will develop technologies that will enable future spacecraft to be smaller, more capable and reliable, and to be launched more frequently. Second, it will validate the technologies in flight to reduce the risks to future science missions in flying these technologies for the first time. To measure the program's success, NMP has devised a set of criteria that stresses the relevance of technologies selected for flight validation to NASA's 21st-century science mission needs. Also, NMP has instituted a 'risk management' policy, where, through a combination of adequate resources and early risk assessment and risk mitigation plans for the technologies, the overall risk of the NMP flights can be rendered acceptable.

New↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Building Supply Chain Visibility for Risk Management: Illuminating the COVID-19 Pandemic Impact Upon NASA Suppliers

NASA mission projects rely upon global supply chains subject to an array of risks that threaten to disrupt or deny the timely, affordable provision of products and services as required for mission success. Visibility into these supply chains is key to the management of risks, such as those stemming from the coronavirus pandemic and its associated effects upon suppliers. Accordingly, the Supplier Research and Analysis (SRA) Program within Goddard Space Flight Center’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate produced the COVID-19 pandemic/NASA suppliers dashboard as part of the NASA Meta Information System. The dashboard provides visibility and situational awareness to aid risk assessment, planning and decision-making over the course of the pandemic recovery phase. The approach of integrating data and information into visual dashboard displays has also been employed by the SRA Program to focus on specific risks pertaining to foreign-based suppliers. This webinar is presented by the NASA Office of SMA and its Supply Chain Risk Management Program, in collaboration with the NASA Safety Center and Goddard’s SMA Directorate.

supplier research and analysis, supply chain risk ↗
NASA NTRS1993

Risk management in fly-by-wire systems

A general description of various types of fly-by-wire systems is provided. The risks inherent in digital flight control systems, like those used in the Space Shuttle, are identified. The results of a literature survey examining risk management methods in use throughout the aerospace industry are presented. The applicability of these methods to the Space Shuttle program is discussed.

Knoll, Karyn T.↗
NASA NTRS2011

A Risk Management Architecture for Emergency Integrated Aircraft Control

Enhanced engine operation--operation that is beyond normal limits--has the potential to improve the adaptability and safety of aircraft in emergency situations. Intelligent use of enhanced engine operation to improve the handling qualities of the aircraft requires sophisticated risk estimation techniques and a risk management system that spans the flight and propulsion controllers. In this paper, an architecture that weighs the risks of the emergency and of possible engine performance enhancements to reduce overall risk to the aircraft is described. Two examples of emergency situations are presented to demonstrate the interaction between the flight and propulsion controllers to facilitate the enhanced operation.

McGlynn, Gregory E.↗