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At least 91 records · Page 5

Dynamic attenuation scheme in measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution over turbulent channels

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) offers great security in practice because it removes all detector side channels. However, conducting MDI QKD over free-space channels is challenging. One of the largest culprits is the mismatched transmittance of the two independent turbulent channels causing a reduced Hong-Ou-Mandel visibility and thus a lower secret key rate. Here we introduce a dynamic attenuation scheme, where the transmittance of each of the two channels is monitored in real time by transmitting bright light pulses from each users to the measurement device. Based on the measured channel transmittance, a suitable amount of attenuation is introduced to the low-loss channel at the measurement device. Our simulation results show a significant improvement of QKD performance, especially when using short raw keys.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

HOP and Cybersecurity: Leveraging safety and reliability experience to improve digital security culture

This presentation will introduce participants to key mental models on how to think about and understand safety and the organizational attributes that support it from three of the leading voices in the discipline – David Marx, Dr. Erik Hollnagel and Dr. Todd Conklin – and from there we ask the simple question of “how can we apply this to cybersecurity?” Opportunities, similarities, and differences from the history of accomplishment applying human and organizational performance principles to safety and reliability can be collectively leveraged to the meet the challenge of cybersecurity for OT/ICS/cyber-physical systems. This is the same intent as the "Cybersecurity Culture" principle of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Best Practices for Grid Communications

As the grid evolves, the communications architecture will need to evolve with it. That architecture affords a structured means by which the evolving complexities of the modern electric grid can be managed. This document provides best practices that can be implemented in the grid of today and evolve towards the grid and grid architecture of the future. The evolving grid and its control communications increasingly rely on commercial communications providers and a variety of technologies, from wireless (e.g., 5G, microwave, Wi-Fi) to wireline (fiber, copper) to radio communications (P25, other repeater-based systems), and all these communications systems rely on electric power. A reliable and resilient grid must account for this complex set of interdependencies in its planning activities, especially those involving restoration and recovery. The participation of all relevant parties in both planning and exercising of plans can prevent unexpected conditions that impede the reliable operation and recovery of the grid. Best practices for grid communications include using a Network Management System to document the operational state, define and monitor baselines, detect changes, and accelerate response to abnormalities. If transitioning from SONET to IP/packet-based systems, translating grid requirements into communications requirements for latency, bandwidth and throughput, IP packet delay variation, packet loss, and availability should inform and drive technology planning and selection as well as that communication system’s Quality of Service (QoS) policies and Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Secure and reliable timing is another key component of a reliable and resilient grid that can operate through adverse events. A trusted internal NTP configuration, an integrated and diverse timing delivery system, optimizing the timing architecture based on the transport technologies of the communications system, and using established standards can deliver the level of timing accuracy required by a range of time-sensitive power system applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Interactive effects of precipitation, temperature, and grazing pressure on the net ecosystem carbon balance of grazing lands across the continental United States

Grazing lands cover approximately one-third of the contiguous United States, support much of the nation's beef production, and are an important component of the U.S. terrestrial carbon budget. In this study, we quantified net ecosystem carbon balance (NECB), the net status of grazing lands as a carbon sink (C-sink) or source (C-source) and a key determinant of soil health and productivity. Our primary objective was to synthesize multiple years of annual NECB across heterogeneous grazing lands across the continental U.S and evaluate annual NECB against physical drivers (mean annual precipitation (MAP), mean annual temperature (MAT), vegetation, and moisture condition) and management practices (grazing pressure index (GPI) and fertilization history). We hypothesized that (1) NECB is higher in mesic and fertilized grasslands; (2) NECB increases with MAP and MAT but decreases with GPI; and (3) interactive effects exist among MAP, MAT, and GPI. Using carbon fluxes measured by eddy covariance towers and methane emissions including both enteric methane and manure derived from stocking rates across seven USDA Long-term Agroecosystem Research Network sites, we found: (1) grazing lands were a C-sink or carbon neutral at most sites; (2) vegetation type, moisture conditions, or fertilization had no significant effect on NECB; (3) NECB increased with MAP and MAT, but decreased with a higher GPI; and (4) MAT had a significant positive effect on NECB when MAP exceeded 750 mm (greater water availability). The effect of GPI on NECB was significantly negative when MAP was below 1000 mm, significantly negative when MAT < 12 °C and significantly positive when MAT > 16 °C. Thus, most grazing lands in our study acted as C-sinks unless water deficit, low temperature, or heavy grazing were interactively present. Understanding how climate and management influence NECB of grazing lands is key to maintaining resilient agroecosystems that secure beef production and sustain rural prosperity.

LTAR↗

Constant Overhead Entanglement Distillation via Scrambling

High-fidelity quantum entanglement enables key quantum networking capabilities such as secure communication and distributed quantum computing, but long-distance entanglement distribution is limited by noise and loss. Entanglement distillation protocols address this problem by extracting high-fidelity Bell pairs from multiple noisy ones. The primary objective is minimizing the resource overhead: the number of noisy input pairs needed to distill each high-fidelity output pair. While protocols achieving optimal overhead are known in theory, they often require complex decoding operations that make practical implementation challenging. We circumvent this challenge by introducing protocols that use quantum scrambling—the spreading of quantum information under chaotic dynamics—through random Clifford operations. Based on this scrambling mechanism, our protocol maintains asymptotically constant overhead, independent of the desired output error rate $\bar{𝜖}$ , and can be implemented with shallow quantum circuits of depth 𝑂⁡(poly log log⁡ $\bar{𝜖}$ −1 ) and memory 𝑂⁡(poly log⁡ $\bar{𝜖}$ −1 ). Our protocol remains effective even with noisy quantum gates. By incorporating error correction, our protocol achieves state-of-the-art performance: starting with pairs of 10% initial infidelity, we require only seven noisy inputs per output pair to distill a single Bell pair with infidelity $\bar{𝜖}$ =10 −12 , substantially outperforming existing schemes. We demonstrate the utility of our protocols for quantum repeater networks.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Prototype X-ray and Gamma Detection with Cyclotron Radiation Emission Spectroscopy

Cyclotron radiation emission spectroscopy, or CRES, is a novel approach to measuring the energy of an electron. By trapping a free electron in a high magnetic field, it undergoes cyclotron motion and emits radiofrequency (RF) waves. The frequency of this RF radiation is directly related to the energy of the electron. Because many cycles of the RF emission are recorded, the energy resolution of the CRES system is on the order of a single electron volt. To make a CRES system sensitive to photons, a target gas is used to induce a photoelectric effect, producing the electron that is subsequently trapped. By adding the binding energy of the target atom, the energy of the incident photon may be reconstructed. Using a xenon target gas, photoelectric interactions dominate up to approximately 300 keV, covering not only all atomic shell X-rays of the elements, but many low-lying nuclear states as well, including key transuranic elements related to nuclear security. CRES holds the potential of maintaining single-eV resolution up to this 300-keV range, thereby surpassing current state-of-the-art detectors by a factor of 10-100. The instrumental resolution of the system is limited by the uniformity of the applied magnetic field.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Active High Assurance Authentication Protocol (AHAAP)

The AHAAP Maturation Project involves maturation and evaluation of a patented zero-trust tamper-resistant high-assurance session-less dynamic and active device authentication protocol that simultaneously authenticates identity and provides integrity verification in a single step, substantially reducing the risk of cyberattack, and eliminating the need for costly and complex conventional communication security systems requirements (i.e., cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and key management). These cybersecurity attributes of the technology must be preserved when applying the technology to different cybersecurity solutions, including Command & Control (C&C), Over-the-Air (OTA) update, Common Access Card (CAC), and distributed energy resource (DER) implementations, among others. The technology research objective is to test and verify that the cybersecurity attributes of the technology are not degraded in different cybersecurity applications. The primary technology development objective is to build minimum viable products to demonstrate the technology addresses today’s cybersecurity threats so that prospective investors, strategic partners, regulatory agencies, and commercial customers can interact with and assess the protection assured by the technology. The AHAAP Maturation Project goal is to develop, test, and validate one or more AHAAP implementations. The AHAAP Maturation Project tasks are: (i) engineer AHAAP implementation software, (ii) build a functional prototype that implements the AHAAP software for demonstration, testing, analysis, and evaluation purposes, and (iii) generate a report detailing the results of the AHAAP C&C software and hardware implementation. The final project deliverables are: (i) AHAAP software implementation and prototype, (ii) a report from Sandia National Laboratories detailing the results of the AHAAP implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Monitoring the Structural Health of the Stage-Four Gibbs Resistor In Order to Maintain a Functioning Pulse-Forming Network

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a critical facility used for nuclear weapons research and development (Los Alamos National Laboratory). Its primary function is to provide high-resolution, real-time images of the behavior of materials under extreme conditions, specifically during the hydrodynamic testing of nuclear weapons surrogates. The facility uses advanced radiographic techniques, such as dual-axis X-ray imaging, to capture detailed snapshots of these materials as they react to high-pressure environments. DARHT plays a key role in maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, supporting the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The facility helps ensure that nuclear weapons perform as designed without the need for nuclear tests. Its dual-axis radiography provides more precise data than traditional single-axis imaging, offering a comprehensive view of the internal dynamics of a weapon's primary stage.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear and Chemical Sciences Division: Investment Strategy 2023

The mission of the Nuclear and Chemical Sciences (NACS) Division within the Physical and Life Sciences (PLS) Directorate is to advance scientific understanding, capabilities, and technologies in nuclear and particle physics, radiochemistry, forensic science, and isotope systems to support LLNL’s national security mission. NACS Division personnel conduct a diverse range of research activities in particle physics, nuclear physics, radiation detection, nuclear measurements, chemical and nuclear forensic science, nuclear and radiochemistry, isotope geochemistry, and environmental science. These areas are leveraged to address evolving national security challenges. Scientific research provides the foundation for addressing these challenges, and it is also the principal means of attracting, training, and retaining staff scientists who can deliver solutions across the Laboratory’s mission space. The overarching strategy is to position the NACS Division at the nexus between fundamental nuclear and chemical science research and nuclear security applications. This approach will support efforts to recruit, train, and retain top-flight scientists and engineers who will play a key role in executing the Laboratory’s core nuclear security missions, while also enhancing LLNL’s reputation as a center for innovative scientific research. This document describes the strategic vision that will be used to guide key investments aimed at enabling NACS scientists to lead new efforts and meet future challenges.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Secure Firmware Update and Device Authentication for Smart Inverters using Blockchain and Physically Uncloable Function (PUF)-Embedded Security Module

Cybersecurity of inverters has been significantly important as inverters become smarter in cyber-physical environments. However, firmware security of smart inverters against firmware attacks from various attack vectors has been less studied. Furthermore, this paper proposes a secure firmware update and device authentication method using a blockchain-based public key infrastructure (PKI) management system and a physically unclonable function (PUF)-embedded security module in a smart inverter. The proposed method is validated by experiments.

blockchain↗

An August boost for key roles in Weapons Production

In August, the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production (ALDWP) hosted two virtual hiring events and welcomed the first cohort of a new college pipeline program. With hiring steadily on the increase in support of the national security mission, creative methods like these have been key to finding successful candidates.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Ion Channel Laser Based on Direct Laser Acceleration of a Shaped Beam Driver (Final Technical Report)

The main focus of our research was to understand the synergies between an electron bunch and a laser pulse when the two co-propagate through the plasma. We have clearly demonstrated using theoretical and computational modeling that the propagation distance of both the bunch and the laser pulse could be extended. The ability of the combined bunch/pulse system to extend the propagation distance and the size of the plasma bubble enables highly-efficient sources of relativistic electrons. As pointed out by the Plasma Decadal Study, such electron sources can be used for generating extremely bright x-rays for a variety of applications can serve as probes and diagnostics for other plasma experiments: high energy density (HED) sciences, inertial confinement fusion (ICF), and potentially Fusion Materials and Technology (FM&T). Development of advanced diagnostics of plasma-based accelerators is yet another key area identified by recent reports. Even broader security and medical applications of compact accelerator-based radiation sources, such as very high energy electron (VHEE) sources for FLASH radiobiology, have been identified by a recent multi-agency panel. A number of key technical issues were considered and successfully resolved during the course of the grant. Those include: beam loading effect of both the driver and witness bunches on the wake, laser channeling by the bunch, and the direct laser acceleration (DLA) of the driver bunch by the laser pulse. To demonstrate clear synergy, we were able to ascertain that the total energy gain of a witness bunch in the wake of the combined bunch/laser complex is large than the sum of the energy gains in the wake of the laser pulse alone, and the driver bunch alone. We have also demonstrated that not only the energy gain is improved, but the energy spread is not sacrificed. To carry out these simulations, we have to develop a range of in-house computational tools, including a fully-3D code WAND-PIC.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

CRADA Number NFE-20-08292 with Quantum Lock Technologies LLC (CRADA Final Report)

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Quantum Lock Technologies: Innovation Crossroads Final Report

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022). Below is a photograph of myself at an energy substation where we plan to eventually apply our technology.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Quantum Lock Technologies: Innovation Crossroads Final CRADA Report

At Quantum Lock Technologies, our mission is to use future-proof hardware and software to bridge the gap between physical access control and cyber security. Physical security includes access to doors, lockboxes/containers, and machinery/robots. Connecting physical access control to the cloud allows for remote detection, fast ledger updates, and mobile or remote access. However, this also opens physical security up to the world of cyber-attacks. At Quantum Lock, we use quantum random number generation to generate completely random and unpredictable digital keys to be used by connected equipment in a facility. This quantum technology is then paired with end-to-end encryption and a one-time-key communication protocol to ensure the highest level of security. Through the Innovation Crossroads program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we have developed benchtop prototypes of our technology, connected with utility boards as our first target customers, and prepared for our first pilot with customers (target end of summer 2022). Below is a photograph of myself at an energy substation where we plan to eventually apply our technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗