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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2022

Cross-Cutting Flight Infrastructure Improvements on M2020

Mars2020 (M2020) was formulated as a mission that leveraged as much Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) heritage as possible, while focusing major new development efforts on the original and unique elements needed to accomplish the different mission objectives. Well publicized examples of high profile new developments include precision landing, the sampling and caching system, the specific instrument suite, improved mobility via Autonomous Navigation, and later the addition of the Ingenuity helicopter. Less well known are the refinements to the core flight infrastructure, primarily in the cross-cutting functions of Telecom, Avionics, Data Management, Communications Behaviors, and Parameter Management. These enhancements are introduced predominately via flight software, and represent increases in capability that justified their inclusion in an otherwise heritage-focused project environment.Perseverance’s cross-cutting flight infrastructure improvements fall into and across the following five categories. First is a trimming of the software footprint of infrastructure modules, in order to make room for memory demands elsewhere in the system. Second is the minimization of data volume to be downlinked, through various methods such as the incorporation of new compression options. Third is the maximization of the available downlink bandwidth for data, by curtailing content-less data (fill) and introducing an improved UHF proximity link protocol. Fourth is a reduction in vulnerabilities, through increased file system redundancy, robustness, and software process monitoring. Fifth is an increase in operations efficiency by lowering file system mount times, improving parallelism between simultaneous events, minimizing the time to recover from file system errors, streamlining the purging of obsolete data, and reducing the number of commands to service parameters by a factor of 100.Individually, none of the cross-cutting infrastructure improvements are likely to garner headlines, but collectively they appreciably improve the safety and operability of Perseverance over its predecessor. This paper will describe the improvements, their promise, and where applicable, their actual impact in operations.

Bohannon, Emily↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) [Poster]

Cybersecurity companies such as CrowdStrike, Dragos, Microsoft and Unit 42 categorize Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using their own naming schemes. As a result, these APTs are mapped to different malware sources and campaigns, all from differing sources, leading to inconsistent mapping. Inconsistent mapping causes confusion and adds further obscurity around these groups, making it difficult to track and mitigate APT cyberattacks. The Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) tool remediates the mapping challenge by collecting, updating and converting adversary data and their sources into a valid, codified STIX v2.1 bundle which is then stored in a Neo4j graph database. It utilizes graph traversal methods and centrality analysis to generate actionable information as a Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG), based on user queries. EGRAM exists as Python code and a Jupyter Notebook that acts as a searchable, evidence-based, source of intelligence for APT groups’ artifacts and cyber campaigns.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Essence of Cryptol: A Denotational Cryptol Interpreter in Coq for Foundational Assurances for Quantum Resistant Cryptosystems

Systems of the utmost consequence need a means to establish authenticity of software and data. Cryptosystems implement authentication, but can be vulnerable to cryptographic and implementation attacks. With the threat of quantum cryptographic attacks, “post-quantum” cryptosystems (PQCs) must be henceforth used in these systems. However, the new cryptography needs new ways to, rigorously and machine-checkably, prove systems free of vulnerabilities. We propose a retargetable capability to rapidly instantiate proven correct postquantum cryptosystems through novel proof-carrying synthesis and proof-automation technique, extending those proven successful on existing systems. This capability is crucial to meeting the cryptographic requirements for future high-consequence systems. Since specifications for high consequence cryptography are presently captured in a domain specific language known as Cryptol. While this can enable convenient fully automated reasoning about Cryptol specificaitons and implementations via the Software Analysis Workbench (SAW), Cryptol has expressivity gaps, so that cryptosystems with probabilistic programming features like Falcon cannot be fully expressed in the language. Moreover, SAW’s automation fails for programs and specificaitons with inductive and recursive structure, as in the Sphincs+ PQC. Finally, Cryptol and SAW together represent some 200,000 lines of unverified Haskell, so that the any guarantees about high consequence cryptography are presently contingent on a large, unverified, yet trusted computing base. The first step of the larger project of agile, assured crpytography is therefore to provide a formal, mechanized semantics for Cryptol, so that the specifications expressed by cryptographers in Cryptol can be reasoned about and compiled into performant implementations with a foundational, machine checkable certificate of correctness. This report describes our work on this first step, culminating in the design of a certified denotational interpreter, in Coq, for core Cryptol.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2008

Information Extraction for System-Software Safety Analysis: Calendar Year 2007 Year-End Report

This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis on the models to identify possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations; 4) perform discrete-time-based simulation on the models to investigate scenarios where these paths may play a role in failures and mishaps; and 5) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. This paper describes new challenges in a NASA abort system case, and enhancements made to develop the integrated tool set.

Malin, Jane T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Information Extraction for System-Software Safety Analysis: Calendar Year 2008 Year-End Report

This annual report describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

Malin, Jane T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Automation for System Safety Analysis

This presentation describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

Malin, Jane T.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Evaluation of Hardware and Software Bill of Materials (HBOMs/SBOMs) Extraction Methods

Hardware and software bills of materials (HBOMs and SBOMs) provide important visibility into the components, dependencies, and supply chain relationships within programmable digital devices. This visibility is critical for advanced nuclear reactor applications, where use of common or shared hardware components, software libraries, suppliers, or manufacturing processes may create common cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities despite apparent diversity. This paper evaluates current approaches for obtaining and analyzing HBOMs and SBOMs in support of CCF, diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessments, and begins to explore potential methods for artificial intelligence/machine learning-based analysis. The availability of BOM information from advanced reactor manufacturers and vendors, representative hardware and software categories found in advanced reactor systems continues to limit research [13]. This paper compares commonly used BOM formats, including CycloneDX, SPDX, and SWID. It also surveys publicly available tools for generating BOMs from source code, compiled binaries, and hardware-related information, noting limitations in language coverage, system age, and format interoperability. Finally, this paper evaluates methods for correlating BOM data with vulnerability and exploitability information, including VEX, CVE, and CWE resources. The findings indicate that publicly available nuclear-vendor BOMs are limited, making third-party extraction and research into novel analysis techniques necessary.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2026

Assessing Energy Infrastructure Devices for Vulnerabilities

Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Model checking for software security properties

This paper describes the use of the Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) for model checking (MC) to perform and search for vulnerabilities in the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol.

model checking formal methods software security↗
DOE OSTI2026

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗