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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Disposition Options for Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor (A White Paper)

The sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design concept is one of the six classes of nuclear reactors in the GenIV initiative. SFRs are uranium or plutonium-fueled reactors operating in the fast neutron spectrum using liquid sodium as the coolant. SFRs can be designed as a breeder reactor or actinide-burning reactor in addition to operating the thorium fuel cycle. While having different fuel designs, the anticipated waste streams, and the necessary management strategies for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive wastes from SFRs are very similar. This includes the SNF, activated sodium coolant, in-core stainless-steel components, piping, resins and filters, solidified liquid waste, contaminated equipment, and other radioactive wastes. Modern SFR designs are based on a long and rich operating history of several liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors with sodium coolant. Several of these reactors have been shut down, the fuel has been placed in safe storage, and they have undergone some degree of decommissioning. As such, there is significant experience in the management of the SNF and radioactive wastes associated with operating these reactors. This white paper will identify the definitions and regulations that apply to the safe and secure management, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste and identify the key radioactive waste streams from SFRs. Idaho National Laboratory has significant experience in the management of the SNF from the SFR predecessors. This experience should form the basis for the management and disposition efforts of the radioactive waste from any new SFR-type small modular reactor or microreactor intended for deployment at the Idaho National Laboratory Site

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

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DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

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DOE OSTI2020

A White Paper: Disposition Options for a High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) is a uranium-fueled, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled nuclear reactor design concept capable of producing very high core outlet temperatures. Both types of HTGR have the tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel kernel at the heart of the fuel design. For the prismatic block-type HTGR, the TRISO particles are overcoated with a resinated graphitic matrix and pressed into fuel compacts, which are then heat treated and placed in the fuel channels of the prismatic-block-shaped fuel assemblies. For the pebble-bed-type HTGR, the TRISO particles are dispersed in a graphitic-matrix sphere, which is the basic unit for the reactor core. Despite having very different fuel designs, both types of HTGR are graphite-moderated, gas-cooled, thermal reactors using many of the same materials. As a result, both prismatic-block-type and pebble-bed-type HTGRs have similar radioactive waste streams, all of which require safe and secure storage and eventual disposition. Modern HTGR designs are based on a long and rich operating history of several different graphite-moderated, gas-cooled, thermal reactors. Several of these reactors have been shut down, the fuel has been placed in safe storage, and they have undergone some degree of decommissioning. As such, there is significant experience in the management of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive wastes associated with operating these reactors. This white paper will, (1) identify the definitions and regulations that apply to the safe and secure management, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste; and (2) identify the key radioactive waste streams from HTGRs and their characteristics. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has significant experience in the management of SNF from HTGR predecessors. This experience should form the basis for the management and disposition efforts of the radioactive waste from any new HTGR-type small modular reactor, or microreactor intended for deployment at the INL site.

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DOE OSTI2020

Spent Nuclear Fuel Exploratory Roadmaps - 20054

The U.S. Department of Energy manages nearly 2,500 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from several decades of research, testing, and production reactors [DOE 1995]. This SNF is managed at the DOE Hanford Site in Washington State (Hanford), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site in South Carolina (SRS). From 1995 to 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) made several key programmatic decisions, supported by appropriate documentation in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for the management of SNF [DOE 1995]. These decisions have provided an overarching framework for SNF management, as well as site-specific and SNF-related management decisions for the past two decades. In the years since these decisions were made, with the notable exception of the successful drying and packaging of the production reactor fuel at Hanford, a majority of the decisions have been largely unimplemented. Also, since these decisions were made, a number of changes that bear on considerations relative to the path forward have occurred. A SNF Exploratory Road map activity, identified reasonable alternate pathways for DoE's inventory of SNF. Three fundamental pathways were identified in this activity for the long-term management and disposition of DOE SNF: Direct Disposal Pathway, Existing Processing Pathway and Alternate Processing Pathway. Further actions would be required (e.g., evaluation of NEPA analysis, technology maturity evaluations, refinement of cost and risks, benefits and advantages relative to other alternate paths) to define and inform many key decisions that will result in the selection of the disposition pathways that are most beneficial to the US Government in dispositioning DoE's SNF inventory. DOE is currently managing all SNF safely; however, the age of DOE-owned SNF and facilities for storing and processing SNF, coupled with the uncertainty of the storage duration, necessitates decisions and actions to ensure that the infrastructure will be in place to ensure continued safe and effective long-term management and eventual disposal. The identification of reasonable alternate pathways took these considerations into account in an effort to proactively manage conditions that could challenge the safety of storing and managing DOE SNF over the time periods now contemplated and also to ensure that flexibility is preserved to ensure that the DOE SNF remains compatible with final disposition pathways when they become available. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Grain boundary facilitated dissolution of nanocrystalline NpO 2 (s) from legacy waste processing

Dissolution of actinide dioxides, including neptunium dioxide (NpO 2 (s)), is paramount for the prediction of the environmental fate of nuclear materials. Quantifying dissolution rates, as well as understanding qualitative dissolution mechanisms, informs performance assessment for geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel and management of legacy radioactive waste. The aim of this research was to measure the dissolution rate of nanocrystalline NpO 2 (s), produced through legacy nuclear waste processing, under oxidizing conditions, as well as to characterize surface alteration to the material. The solid phase was characterized using electron microscopy techniques (SEM/STEM) and X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), indicating preferential dissolution of Np-hydroxide contained in the grain boundaries of NpO 2 (s) and fragmentation of grains from the matrix. The oxidative dissolution was monitored over 40 weeks, yielding a two-step kinetic dissolution model involving hydration of NpO 2 (s) and subsequent oxidation and dissolution of the hydroxide phase. Here, the proposed dissolution models for nanocrystalline NpO 2 (s) suggest that microstructural features such as grain boundaries are key factors affecting dissolution, including release of colloidal particles, and ultimately, environmental fate and transport of nuclear materials.

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DOE OSTI2020

Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs. Placing large, heavy waste packages containing DPCs into a repository for direct disposal has not yet been implemented domestically or internationally. Therefore, direct disposal of DPCs represents new engineering and scientific challenges. Some of the engineering challenges that have already been addressed include handling and placement, use of ramps vs. shafts, use of hoists, use of transport equipment, and thermal management. Additionally, some studies have been conducted in the past regarding the feasibility of direct disposal from a criticality analysis perspective and have concluded that while possible, demonstrating subcriticality over the disposal time period is a challenge. The alternative to direct disposal of DPCs into a repository is to repackage the SNF into different canisters. The direct disposal of DPCs without cutting them open and repackaging is appealing because it could be more cost-effective, reduce the complexity of fuel management operations both in and outside reactor facilities, and result in less cumulative worker dose during interim storage and handling before eventual disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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DOE OSTI2021

Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses (Rev. 7)

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs.

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DOE OSTI2022

Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs. Placing large, heavy waste packages containing DPCs into a repository for direct disposal has not yet been implemented domestically or internationally. Therefore, direct disposal of DPCs represents new engineering and scientific challenges. Some of the engineering challenges that have already been addressed include handling and placement, use of ramps vs. shafts, use of hoists, use of transport equipment, and thermal management. Additionally, some studies have been conducted in the past regarding the feasibility of direct disposal from a criticality analysis perspective and have concluded that while possible, demonstrating subcriticality over the disposal time period is a challenge. The alternative to direct disposal of DPCs into a repository is to repackage the SNF into different canisters. The direct disposal of DPCs without cutting them open and repackaging is appealing because it could be more cost-effective, reduce the complexity of fuel management operations both in and outside reactor facilities, and result in less cumulative worker dose during interim storage and handling before eventual disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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DOE OSTI2022

Development of a MOOSE thermal model of the MPC-32 canister and HI-STORM overpack

Nuclear power is a significant source of electricity in the United States, but the average age of nuclear power plants is around 40 years old. Safe management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is a key aspect of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, and SNF dry storage systems are becoming a popular, effective solution in this area, given the absence of a final disposal system. The spent fuel cask system (dry cask method) provides a feasible solution for maintaining SNF (~60 years) prior to final disposal. This project aims to develop a thermal model of the MPC-32 canister and HI-STORM overpack, using the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE). MOOSE is an open-source framework developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for multiscale, multiphysics simulations. This study will investigate and demonstrate the thermal-hydraulics capabilities of the MOOSE framework, including natural circulation, heat transfer, porous flows, etc. The ultimate goal of the project is to verify whether MOOSE tools (including Pronghorn) can be used to study the thermal performance of the SNF dry cask storage system. This study provides reliable and inclusive solving strategy for dry cask problems. The detailed information about the solving scheme and the governing equations related to the physics of the system is provided in the report. The results for thermal-hydraulic analysis of the HI-STORM system is produced with using open source modules of the MOOSE framework. This results highlights the flexibility and modularity of the MOOSE which makes it a unique candidate for the frameworks and code packages. Therefore, integration of the MOOSE to UNF ST&DARDS will improve the thermal-hydraulic capability of the system while providing distinctive features to users.

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DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Analysis of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation, and Disposal

Due to increased interest in advanced reactor deployment and their associated potential new fuel cycles, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long term management and final disposition of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated. Safely managing and dispositioning this SNF, along with any other associated radioactive waste, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment. This paper summarizes efforts to evaluate the characteristics and packaging options for three types of advanced reactor SNF forms: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) irradiated fuel salt presented in the report titled “Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste”. TRISO and metallic SNF and their associated waste streams were emphasized because of the near-term anticipated demonstrations of X-energy’s Xe-100 and TerraPower and GE Hitachi’s Natrium advanced reactors. Preliminary information on spent fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) was also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions were based on publicly available information. This paper identifies several different reactors that produce either TRISO or metallic SNF as well as a few of the reactor and fuel characteristics used for the assessments. Based on these characteristics, calculations were performed to determine the applicability of packaging SNF into existing canister designs. The evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, and as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints on storage, transportation, and disposal. Gaps in publicly available data pertaining to reactor operation and/or fuel composition provide increased uncertainty in some evaluations. Additionally, uncertainty in packaging and SNF management operations provide additional uncertainty. However, preliminary conclusions can still be assessed through this work and are presented in this paper.

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DOE OSTI2024

A Review of Remote Welding and Nondestructive Examination Technologies for the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) manages a wide variety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that poses a unique management challenge. To help address this challenge, the DOE Standard Canister (DOESC), designed to remain sealed during handling, storage, transportation, and disposal, was conceptualized as a standardized containment vessel to accommodate DOE-managed SNF. Since 1999, several welding and examination processes have been independently developed for the DOESC’s closure welds. However, neither the DOESC nor these processes have been realized in an operational capacity. This review paper seeks to present and compare previously developed DOESC closure weld, nondestructive examination, and repair processes and technologies. Specific processes developed for the Idaho Spent Fuel Facility, in preparation for the Yucca Mountain geological repository, and the recent Road-Ready Demonstration Project are discussed. Further, specific focus is given to how different operating constraints and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) have driven certain welding and nondestructive examination requirements. Historical DOESC welding and examination strategies are assessed against current regulatory and BPVC requirements. The comparison of welding processes, technologies, and DOESC designs presented in this review paper will inform further construction efforts for other commercial and DOE-managed SNF containments, including the DOESC.

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DOE OSTI2024

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Department of Energy Standard Canisters

This paper presents bounding pressure and flammability evaluations for DOE Standard Canister loaded with DOE-managed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). The objective of these evaluations is to gain confidence in the safety and feasibility of possible loading configurations for extended (>50 years) periods of dry storage, with particular focus on the dry storage canister pressures and potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere. The primary concern about the extended dry storage of ASNF is radiolytic gas generation. The aluminum cladding of these materials tends to corrode, and these corrosion products—typically aluminum oxides, such as boehmite, bayerite, or gibbsite—could carry water. This makes ASNF dry storage canisters difficult to dry. The gamma radiation field in dry storage environments could cause a radiolytic breakdown of residual water, forming chemical species such as molecular hydrogen (H2). The release of these species could increase the canister pressure and lead to the generation of a flammable canister atmosphere. The bounding evaluations presented within this study surmise conservative, but credible, conditions and processes. This includes the assumption of a full breakdown of a large quantity of free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed water (bound in a trihydrate, i.e., Al2O3 • 3H2O, layer). The considered dry storage configurations include a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~46 cm (18 in) diameter (10 x 18) DOE Standard Canister loaded with 32 Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) ASNF elements, and a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~61 cm (24 in) (10 x 24) diameter DOE Standard Canister loaded with 40 ATR ASNF elements. While the results of this study indicate the possibility of atmospheric hydrogen concentrations above the lower flammability limit, insufficient concentrations of oxygen will prevent the formation of flammable atmospheres. The maximum credible pressures remain well within the structural limits of the DOE Standard Canister.

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DOE OSTI2022

System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy is applying knowledge and understanding in the areas of systems level engineering, analysis, and decision making to better inform the waste management pathways for U.S. spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently there are 93 operating and 23 shutdown commercial nuclear reactors in the United States. SNF at most of these locations is being stored in spent fuel pools, dry storage, or both [1, 2]. This paper initially goes over the basics of the agent-based simulation tool known as the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) that has the capability to model interaction and movements of individual components or groups like casks, railcars etc. The next section covers some of the methods implemented in the Java Transportation Operations Model (JTOM) to facilitate the movement of assemblies, casks, railcars etc. and the various intermodal transfer options. This section also covers the current cask loading and intermodal transfer times implemented in NGSAM. The last section goes over the proposed values for intermodal transportation, and cask transfer/loading operations.

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DOE OSTI2022

Knowledge Management: FY22 Los Alamos National Laboratory Hydrothermal Lab for Spent Fuel Campaign R&D

The use of Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) for spent nuclear fuel disposal is being investigated by the U.S. Department of Energy as a part of the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) Campaign. Such dry spent fuel canisters would be loaded with fuel bundles, and then transported and stored at a nuclear waste repository. Once the canisters are in place underground, the space between the canister and the wall rock will be filled with bentonite clay. Recent research has prioritized high temperature interactions of EBS materials, including phase transitions in bentonite clay, in order to reduce worker dose and repository cost. Higher temperature (i.e., 200ºC) thermal limits are a new area of investigation by the U.S. and international repository science programs. The hydrothermal experimental laboratory at Los Alamos, consisting of rocking autoclaves and cold seal assemblies, is critical to the campaign and presents a significant temperature / pressure safety hazard. Therefore, working competently and safely with these systems is very important to the knowledge management procedures developed at this laboratory. Therefore, the operation of these two systems (rocking autoclaves and cold seal assemblies) will be discussed first.

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DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Increased Peak Temperatures for Spent Fuel Cladding Performance during Dry Storage (Rev.1)

NUREG-2214, “Managing Aging Processes in Storage (MAPS) Report,” (2019) documents the technical basis for age-related degradation mechanisms on spent nuclear fuel assemblies during dry storage operations. The technical bases have been reviewed, and hoop cladding stress calculations were conducted using the Fuel Analysis under Steady-state and Transients (FAST) code at elevated normal condition temperatures of 425°C and 450°C, and at an off-normal and accident conditions temperature of 600°C. The NUREG-2214 conclusions are substantiated by the referenced literature. The calculations demonstrate that the aging mechanisms primarily driven by hoop stress such as hydride reorientation, delayed hydride cracking, thermal and athermal (low-temperature) creep, and localized mechanical overload are either not credible or do not compromise the fuel assembly’s performance for increased peak normal condition temperatures of 425°C or 450°C during the up to 60-year dry storage period. Other aging mechanisms considered are also not credible for compromising the fuel assembly’s performance during 60-year dry storage with a peak temperature of 400ºC as specified in ISG – 11 Rev. 3, and the same is indicated for the increased peak normal condition temperatures of 425°C or 450°C.

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