NASA Activities and Perspectives on Standardization in the AM Certification Process: NASA-STD-6030 and Beyond
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The modern power grid is seeing more and more electricity come from renewable sources like wind farms, which use sophisticated power electronics instead of traditional spinning generators. To keep everything running smoothly and meet industry standards such as IEEE 2800, these systems need smart control strategies. In our work, we built a flexible computer model of a full-scale wind farm converter that can handle grid disturbances without shutting down. When a fault or storm hits, the model’s built-in logic automatically adjusts the currents it sends to the grid and protects its internal energy storage, ensuring the wind farm stays connected and doesn’t damage its own equipment. Once the disturbance clears, the model restores normal operation seamlessly, so there’s no long interruption in power delivery. At the same time, it carefully regulates the voltage where the wind farm ties into the larger grid, helping to maintain safe voltage levels across the network. Our simulations show that this control setup not only meets all the requirements of IEEE Standard 2800 but also allows the wind farm to recover quickly and predictably, keeping the lights on no matter what happens on the grid.
NASA has a critical need for the development of Agency standards for the certification of additively manufactured (AM) components. This is necessary since the current version of NASA standards for manned and noncrewed spaceflight hardware do not contain sufficient detail and the development of documents by the international standards organizations are not mature enough for implementation. AM parts are currently flying or in development for nearly all NASA flight programs. To bridge the gap prior to the release of Agency standards MSFC released two documents, MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717. These documents were written specifically for laser power fusion of metallic powder, but the principles defined were used for tailoring requirements for current NASA manned missions. In 2018 a team of Agency AM experts was assembled and development of standards for the certification of additively manufactured components. These standards are design for use by all NASA programs and a broader spectrum of mature materials and processes. Four documents are being planned; NASA-STD-6030 (add title), NASA-STD-6032 (add title), NASA-STD-6033 (add title) and NASA-HNBK-6034 (add title). Two of these documents, NASA-STD-6030 and NASA-STD-6033, are being finalized for release in late 2020. These standards contain requirements that address part classification, metallurgical process control, material property development, part process control, part inspection and acceptance, equipment process control and vendor process control. This paper will present a summary of the status of each document and provide an overview of the content of NASA-STD-6030.
The objective of this test guide is to document appropriate unit level test methods and techniques for the performance of EMI testing of Direct Sequence (DS) spread spectrum receivers. Consideration of EMI test methods tailored for spread spectrum receivers utilizing frequency spreading, techniques other than direct sequence (such as frequency hopping, frequency chirping, and various hybrid methods) is beyond the scope of this test guide development program and is not addressed as part of this document EMI test requirements for NASA programs are primarily developed based on the requirements contained in MIL-STD-46 1 D (or earlier revisions of MIL-STD-46 1). The corresponding test method guidelines for the MIL-STD-461 D tests are provided in MIL-STD-462D. These test methods are well documented with the exception of the receiver antenna port susceptibility tests (intermodulation, cross modulation, and rejection of undesired signals) which must be tailored to the specific type of receiver that is being tested. Thus, test methods addressed in this guide consist only of antenna port tests designed to evaluate receiver susceptibility characteristics. MIL-STD-462D should be referred for guidance pertaining to test methods for EMI tests other than the antenna port tests. The scope of this test guide includes: (1) a discussion of generic DS receiver performance characteristics; (2) a summary of S-band TDRSS receiver operation; (3) a discussion of DS receiver EMI susceptibility mechanisms and characteristics; (4) a summary of military standard test guidelines; (5) recommended test approach and methods; and (6) general conclusions and recommendations for future studies in the area of spread spectrum receiver testing.
A compact, reliable controller for an electrically erasable, programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) has been developed specifically for a space-flight application. The design may be adaptable to other applications in which there are requirements for reliability in general and, in particular, for prevention of inadvertent writing of data in EEPROM cells. Inadvertent writes pose risks of loss of reliability in the original space-flight application and could pose such risks in other applications. Prior EEPROM controllers are large and complex and do not provide all reasonable protections (in many cases, few or no protections) against inadvertent writes. In contrast, the present controller provides several layers of protection against inadvertent writes. The controller also incorporates a write-time monitor, enabling determination of trends in the performance of an EEPROM through all phases of testing. The controller has been designed as an integral subsystem of a system that includes not only the controller and the controlled EEPROM aboard a spacecraft but also computers in a ground control station, relatively simple onboard support circuitry, and an onboard communication subsystem that utilizes the MIL-STD-1553B protocol. (MIL-STD-1553B is a military standard that encompasses a method of communication and electrical-interface requirements for digital electronic subsystems connected to a data bus. MIL-STD- 1553B is commonly used in defense and space applications.) The intent was to both maximize reliability while minimizing the size and complexity of onboard circuitry. In operation, control of the EEPROM is effected via the ground computers, the MIL-STD-1553B communication subsystem, and the onboard support circuitry, all of which, in combination, provide the multiple layers of protection against inadvertent writes. There is no controller software, unlike in many prior EEPROM controllers; software can be a major contributor to unreliability, particularly in fault situations such as the loss of power or brownouts. Protection is also provided by a powermonitoring circuit.
Spacecraft now and of the future are being controlled by EMC requirements of the past. Little has been done by the launch vehicle/spacecraft manufacturers to abandon MIL-STD-461C which was released in 1986 because most of the electronics equipment being used aboard current launch vehicles is approved by similarity and heritage to MIL-STD-46 1 C and its predecessors. Twenty years later these electronic equipment items are still not tested to today's MIL-STD-461E requirements because there is a risk that the items will fail to meet the requirements and thus the cost will increase if it becomes necessary to redesign the equipment. That cost is insignificant compared with the cost of losing an entire mission! In the 20 years that have elapsed since MIL-STD-461C was released, the EMC environment has undergone major changes. High speed digital devices have been created that have fundamental clock and bus frequencies that span the entire LV/SC frequency range from the Flight Termination Systems through C and S-Band telemetry. Personnel involved in ground operations routinely carry and use hand held transceivers and cellular telephones close by sensitive electronics equipment. There are now many more orbiting receivers and emitters, plus range assets have increased dramatically since 2001. It's way past time to bring requirements up-to-date!
This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.