MIL-STD-1580 (DPA for EEE Parts) Task Group Status
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Michael Cozzolino↗
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NASA TECHNICAL STANDARD, NASA-STD-7012A, LEAK TEST REQUIREMENTS
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Leak Test↗
Lattices & Additive Manufacturing How Nasa-STD-6030 Can Help Make Your Designs A Reality
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Andrew Glendening↗
NASA Standards Update: Electrical, Electronic, Electromechanical, and Electro-optical (EEEE or Quad-E) Parts Selection, Testing and Derating Standard (NASA-STD-8739.11)
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Peter Majewicz↗
NASA’s Plans for the Release of Standards for Additive Manufactured Components
NASA has a critical need for the development of Agency standards for the certification of additively manufactured (AM) components. This is necessary since the current version of NASA standards for manned and noncrewed spaceflight hardware do not contain sufficient detail and the development of documents by the international standards organizations are not mature enough for implementation. AM parts are currently flying or in development for nearly all NASA flight programs. To bridge the gap prior to the release of Agency standards MSFC released two documents, MSFC-STD-3716 and MSFC-SPEC-3717. These documents were written specifically for laser power fusion of metallic powder, but the principles defined were used for tailoring requirements for current NASA manned missions. In 2018 a team of Agency AM experts was assembled and development of standards for the certification of additively manufactured components. These standards are design for use by all NASA programs and a broader spectrum of mature materials and processes. Four documents are being planned; NASA-STD-6030 (add title), NASA-STD-6032 (add title), NASA-STD-6033 (add title) and NASA-HNBK-6034 (add title). Two of these documents, NASA-STD-6030 and NASA-STD-6033, are being finalized for release in late 2020. These standards contain requirements that address part classification, metallurgical process control, material property development, part process control, part inspection and acceptance, equipment process control and vendor process control. This paper will present a summary of the status of each document and provide an overview of the content of NASA-STD-6030.
Richard Russell↗
Spread Spectrum Receiver Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Test Guide
The objective of this test guide is to document appropriate unit level test methods and techniques for the performance of EMI testing of Direct Sequence (DS) spread spectrum receivers. Consideration of EMI test methods tailored for spread spectrum receivers utilizing frequency spreading, techniques other than direct sequence (such as frequency hopping, frequency chirping, and various hybrid methods) is beyond the scope of this test guide development program and is not addressed as part of this document EMI test requirements for NASA programs are primarily developed based on the requirements contained in MIL-STD-46 1 D (or earlier revisions of MIL-STD-46 1). The corresponding test method guidelines for the MIL-STD-461 D tests are provided in MIL-STD-462D. These test methods are well documented with the exception of the receiver antenna port susceptibility tests (intermodulation, cross modulation, and rejection of undesired signals) which must be tailored to the specific type of receiver that is being tested. Thus, test methods addressed in this guide consist only of antenna port tests designed to evaluate receiver susceptibility characteristics. MIL-STD-462D should be referred for guidance pertaining to test methods for EMI tests other than the antenna port tests. The scope of this test guide includes: (1) a discussion of generic DS receiver performance characteristics; (2) a summary of S-band TDRSS receiver operation; (3) a discussion of DS receiver EMI susceptibility mechanisms and characteristics; (4) a summary of military standard test guidelines; (5) recommended test approach and methods; and (6) general conclusions and recommendations for future studies in the area of spread spectrum receiver testing.
Wheeler, M. L.↗
Compact, Reliable EEPROM Controller
A compact, reliable controller for an electrically erasable, programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) has been developed specifically for a space-flight application. The design may be adaptable to other applications in which there are requirements for reliability in general and, in particular, for prevention of inadvertent writing of data in EEPROM cells. Inadvertent writes pose risks of loss of reliability in the original space-flight application and could pose such risks in other applications. Prior EEPROM controllers are large and complex and do not provide all reasonable protections (in many cases, few or no protections) against inadvertent writes. In contrast, the present controller provides several layers of protection against inadvertent writes. The controller also incorporates a write-time monitor, enabling determination of trends in the performance of an EEPROM through all phases of testing. The controller has been designed as an integral subsystem of a system that includes not only the controller and the controlled EEPROM aboard a spacecraft but also computers in a ground control station, relatively simple onboard support circuitry, and an onboard communication subsystem that utilizes the MIL-STD-1553B protocol. (MIL-STD-1553B is a military standard that encompasses a method of communication and electrical-interface requirements for digital electronic subsystems connected to a data bus. MIL-STD- 1553B is commonly used in defense and space applications.) The intent was to both maximize reliability while minimizing the size and complexity of onboard circuitry. In operation, control of the EEPROM is effected via the ground computers, the MIL-STD-1553B communication subsystem, and the onboard support circuitry, all of which, in combination, provide the multiple layers of protection against inadvertent writes. There is no controller software, unlike in many prior EEPROM controllers; software can be a major contributor to unreliability, particularly in fault situations such as the loss of power or brownouts. Protection is also provided by a powermonitoring circuit.
Katz, Richard↗
Modern Space Craft - Antique Specifications
Spacecraft now and of the future are being controlled by EMC requirements of the past. Little has been done by the launch vehicle/spacecraft manufacturers to abandon MIL-STD-461C which was released in 1986 because most of the electronics equipment being used aboard current launch vehicles is approved by similarity and heritage to MIL-STD-46 1 C and its predecessors. Twenty years later these electronic equipment items are still not tested to today's MIL-STD-461E requirements because there is a risk that the items will fail to meet the requirements and thus the cost will increase if it becomes necessary to redesign the equipment. That cost is insignificant compared with the cost of losing an entire mission! In the 20 years that have elapsed since MIL-STD-461C was released, the EMC environment has undergone major changes. High speed digital devices have been created that have fundamental clock and bus frequencies that span the entire LV/SC frequency range from the Flight Termination Systems through C and S-Band telemetry. Personnel involved in ground operations routinely carry and use hand held transceivers and cellular telephones close by sensitive electronics equipment. There are now many more orbiting receivers and emitters, plus range assets have increased dramatically since 2001. It's way past time to bring requirements up-to-date!
Brewer, Ron↗
Gateway Modeling and Simulation Plan
This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.
NASA-STD-7009↗
Development of a software interface for optical disk archival storage for a new life sciences flight experiments computer
The current Life Sciences Laboratory Equipment (LSLE) microcomputer for life sciences experiment data acquisition is now obsolete. Among the weaknesses of the current microcomputer are small memory size, relatively slow analog data sampling rates, and the lack of a bulk data storage device. While life science investigators normally prefer data to be transmitted to Earth as it is taken, this is not always possible. No down-link exists for experiments performed in the Shuttle middeck region. One important aspect of a replacement microcomputer is provision for in-flight storage of experimental data. The Write Once, Read Many (WORM) optical disk was studied because of its high storage density, data integrity, and the availability of a space-qualified unit. In keeping with the goals for a replacement microcomputer based upon commercially available components and standard interfaces, the system studied includes a Small Computer System Interface (SCSI) for interfacing the WORM drive. The system itself is designed around the STD bus, using readily available boards. Configurations examined were: (1) master processor board and slave processor board with the SCSI interface; (2) master processor with SCSI interface; (3) master processor with SCSI and Direct Memory Access (DMA); (4) master processor controlling a separate STD bus SCSI board; and (5) master processor controlling a separate STD bus SCSI board with DMA.
Bartram, Peter N.↗
Clementine Sensor Processing System
The design of the DSPSE Satellite Controller (DSC) is baselined as a single-string satellite controller. The DSC performs two main functions: health and maintenance of the spacecraft; and image capture, storage, and playback. The DSC contains two processors: a radiation-hardened Mil-Std-1750, and a commercial R3000. The Mil-Std-1750 processor performs all housekeeping operations, while the R3000 is mainly used to perform the image processing functions associated with the navigation functions, as well as performing various experiments. The DSC also contains a data handling unit (DHU) used to interface to various spacecraft imaging sensors and to capture, compress, and store selected images onto the solid-state data recorder. The development of the DSC evolved from several key requirements; the DSPSE satellite was to do the following: (1) have a radiation-hardened spacecraft control system and be immune to single-event upsets (SEU's); (2) use an R3000-based processor to run the star tracker software that was developed by SDIO (due to schedule and cost constraints, there was no time to port the software to a radiation-hardened processor); and (3) fly a commercial processor to verify its suitability for use in a space environment. In order to enhance the DSC reliability, the system was designed with multiple processing paths. These multiple processing paths provide for greater tolerance to various component failures. The DSC was designed so that all housekeeping processing functions are performed by either the Mil-Std-1750 processor or the R3000 processor. The image capture and storage is performed either by the DHU or the R3000 processor.
Feldstein, A. A.↗
Earth Observing System (EOS)/Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit A (AMSU-A) configuration management plan
This plan describes methods and procedures Aerojet will follow in the implementation of configuration control for each established baseline. The plan is written in response to the GSFC EOS CM Plan 420-02-02, dated January 1990, and also meets he requirements specified in DOD-STD-480, DOD-D 1000B, MIL-STD-483A, and MIL-STD-490B. The plan establishes the configuration management process to be used for the deliverable hardware, software, and firmware of the EOS/AMSU-A during development, design, fabrication, test, and delivery. This revision includes minor updates to reflect Aerojet's CM policies.
Cavanaugh, J.↗
Earth Observing System/Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (EOS/AMSU-A): Developer derating policy
The derating requirements/factors tabulated in Appendix B of the Goddard Space Flight Center Preferred Parts List (GSFC PPL) and Appendix A of MIL-STD-975 (NASA Standard Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts List) should be used. Where differences occur, the PPL derating factors should have precedence over the derating factors of MIL-STD-975. When a derating factor is not provided in either the PPL or MIL-STD-975, the GSFC EOS Parts Branch Specialist should be consulted. In addition, the Performance Assurance Requirement (PAR) stipulates that all piece parts shall function at or above twice the expected ionizing radiation dose.
Maciel, Roberto M.↗
Determination of an Optimal Commercial Data Bus Architecture for a Flight Data System
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is continually looking for methods to reduce cost and schedule while keeping the quality of work high. MSFC is NASA's lead center for space transportation and microgravity research. When supporting NASA's programs several decisions concerning the avionics system must be made. Usually many trade studies must be conducted to determine the best ways to meet the customer's requirements. When deciding the flight data system, one of the first trade studies normally conducted is the determination of the data bus architecture. The schedule, cost, reliability, and environments are some of the factors that are reviewed in the determination of the data bus architecture. Based on the studies, the data bus architecture could result in a proprietary data bus or a commercial data bus. The cost factor usually removes the proprietary data bus from consideration. The commercial data bus's range from Versa Module Eurocard (VME) to Compact PCI to STD 32 to PC 104. If cost, schedule and size are prime factors, VME is usually not considered. If the prime factors are cost, schedule, and size then Compact PCI, STD 32 and PC104 are the choices for the data bus architecture. MSFC's center director has funded a study from his discretionary fund to determine an optimal low cost commercial data bus architecture. The goal of the study is to functionally and environmentally test Compact PCI, STD 32 and PC 104 data bus architectures. This paper will summarize the results of the data bus architecture study.
Crawford, Kevin↗
Advanced Observation Operators for GPS Radio Occultation: Validation of the 2D Ray Tracing Approach with CHAMP and SAC-C bending angle and refractivity data - Part 1
Global Positioning System (GPS) Radio Occultations (RO) bending angles and refractivity data characterize mostly the vertical structure of the Earth's atmosphere. We answer the question whether proper simulation of GPS RO data for data assimilation can be obtained with one-dimensional vertical operators, or if accounting also for horizontal atmospheric structures via ray-tracing makes a positive difference when compared with real data. We present a detailed implementation of a geometrical optics multi-plane two-dimensional (2D) ray-tracing as an observation operator to simulate GPS RO bending angles and refractivities within the Finite Volume Data Assimilation System (FVDAS). Comparisons of the outputs of that 2D observation operator with those of simpler ID observation operators are used to generate estimates of errors induced by neglecting tangent point drift (TPD) and horizontal gradients (HG). These error estimates are then confronted with errors estimates derived using 6335 real CHAMP and SAC-C occultations. The agreement for TPD-induced (HG-induced) errors is remarkably positive at altitudes 10-30 km (below 10 km). Comparisons in bending angles O - B STD of the outputs of the multi-plane 2D ray-tracer with those of a vertical Abel transform show reductions of about 8% of the usual O - B bending angle STD due to TPD in the stratosphere (3% due to HG, in the troposphere only). In terms of refractivity, the O - B STD reductions are about 1520% for TPD and 3-5% for HG in the same regions. These reductions are obtained using either 6-hour forecasts or analyses as backgrounds, and using Geometrical Optics (GO) or Canonical Transform (CT) data.
Poli, P.↗
Comanche Helmet-Mounted Display Symbology Simulation
The Aeroflightdynamics Directorate (AMRDEC) conducted a simulation to examine the performance of the Comanche Contact Analog world-referenced symbology displayed on the Comanche HIDSS when compared with a compressed symbology design similar to that specified by the former MIL-STD 1295. Six experimental test pilots flew one modified ADS-33 maneuver (hover turn, bob-up), an unusual attitude recovery, and two terrain flight tactical tasks in the NASA Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS). Analysis of the pilot objective performance data and subjective data showed the following results. Objective test results showed that 1295 symbology yielded more rapid maneuvering in the hover turn bob-up than Contact Analog symbology. The average margin of difference in the time to complete the maneuver was approximately two seconds, which was statistically significant. There were no significant differences measured between symbology sets with respect to altitude or position performance measures for all other maneuvers. The NOE target ID task data showed improved accuracy in determining heading to target when using Contact Analog over MIL-STD-1295. Subjective test results, including handling qualities ratings (HQRs) and NASA-TLX workload ratings, showed small but consistent advantages of 1295 symbology over Contact Analog for most parameters. For the bob-up maneuver, 1295 symbology handling qualities were rated Desired for lateral position error and time to complete whereas Contact Analog was rated adequate. The average HQRs for all other maneuvers were rated the same for both symbology sets. Pilot comments and the results of an online questionnaire more strongly favored 1295 over Contact Analog. Repeated comments from all six pilots led to a focus on design issues with six Contact Analog symbols. Those symbols were the heading tape, horizon line, radar altitude six-second predictor, the position of the torque symbol, the absence of a hover position cue, and the widespread positioning of the symbology to the outer edges of the display field-of-view. Pilots rated the present design of three of the six symbols as having safety-of-flight implications. Those symbols were the heading tape, horizon line, and six-second predictor. To summarize, test results showed no objective data that would warrant restricting experimental test pilots from flying constrained tasks. Small but consistent advantages were recorded for the MILSTD-1295 symbology design when executing ADS-33 constrained tasks. No general performance differences were recorded for the operational maneuvers (NOE, contour flight modes) except for the azimuth-to-target task, which favored the Contact Analog heading tape design. There were consistent and strong pilot comments supporting the MIL-STD-1295 design over Contact Analog in both this current simulation and in Comanche Sim I. Three Contact Analog symbols warrant modification and further evaluation to mitigate safety-of-flight implications noted by participating test pilots. A plan for symbology redesign and testing was developed. However, the Comanche program was cancelled by Department of Army in February 2004.
Turpin, Terry S.↗
Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health and the Human Integration Design Handbook
For decades, Space Life Sciences and NASA as an Agency have considered NASA-STD-3000, Man-Systems Integration Standards, a significant contribution to human spaceflight programs and to human-systems integration in general. The document has been referenced in numerous design standards both within NASA and by organizations throughout the world. With research program and project results being realized, advances in technology and new information in a variety of topic areas now available, the time arrived to update this extensive suite of requirements and design information. During the past several years, a multi-NASA center effort has been underway to write the update to NASA-STD-3000 with standards and design guidance that would be applicable to all future human spaceflight programs. NASA-STD-3001 - Volumes 1 and 2 - and the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH) were created. Volume 1, Crew Health, establishes NASA s spaceflight crew health standards for the pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight phases of human spaceflight. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health, focuses on the requirements of human-system integration and how the human crew interacts with other systems, and how the human and the system function together to accomplish the tasks for mission success. The HIDH is a compendium of human spaceflight history and knowledge, and provides useful background information and research findings. And as the HIDH is a stand-alone companion to the Standards, the maintenance of the document has been streamlined. This unique and flexible approach ensures that the content is current and addresses the fundamental advances of human performance and human capabilities and constraints research. Current work focuses on the development of new sections of Volume 2 and collecting updates to the HIDH. The new sections in development expand the scope of the standard and address mission operations and support operations. This effort is again collaboration with representatives from the Johnson Space Center Missions Operations and Space Life Sciences Directorates and the Engineering Directorate from Kennedy Space Center as well as discipline experts from across the Agency.
Houbec, Keith↗
Effect of Liquid Penetrant Sensitivity on Probability of Detection
The objective of the task is to investigate the effect of liquid penetrant sensitivity level on probability of detection (POD) of cracks in various metals. NASA-STD-5009 currently requires the use of only sensitivity level 4 liquid penetrants for NASA Standard Level inspections. This requirement is based on the fact that the data used to establish the reliably detectable flaw sizes penetrant inspection was from studies performed in the 1970s using penetrant deemed to be equivalent only to modern day sensitivity level 4 penetrants. However, many NDE contractors supporting NASA Centers routinely use sensitivity level 3 penetrants. Because of the new NASA-STD-5009 requirement, these contractors will have to either shift to sensitivity level 4 penetrants or perform formal POD demonstration tests to qualify their existing process. We propose a study to compare the POD generated for two penetrant manufactures, Sherwin and Magnaflux, and for the two most common penetrant inspection methods, water washable and post emulsifiable, hydrophilic. NDE vendors local to GSFC will be employed. A total of six inspectors will inspect a set of crack panels with a broad range of fatigue crack sizes. Each inspector will perform eight inspections of the panel set using the combination of methods and sensitivity levels described above. At least one inspector will also perform multiple inspections using a fixed technique to investigate repeatability. The hit/miss data sets will be evaluated using both the NASA generated DOEPOD software and the MIL-STD-1823 software.
Parker, Bradford H.↗