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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2001

Use of System Safety Risk Assessments for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)

This paper discusses the System Safety approach used to assess risk for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). Previous to the first RSRM flight in the fall of 1988, all systems were analyzed extensively to assure that hazards were identified, assessed and that the baseline risk was understood and appropriately communicated. Since the original RSRM baseline was established, Thiokol and NASA have implemented a number of initiatives that have further improved the RSRM. The robust design, completion of rigorous testing and flight success of the RSRM has resulted in a wise reluctance to make changes. One of the primary assessments required to accompany the documentation of each proposed change and aid in the decision making process is a risk assessment. Documentation supporting proposed changes, including the risk assessments from System Safety, are reviewed and assessed by Thiokol and NASA technical management. After thorough consideration, approved changes are implemented adding improvements to and reducing risk of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Capability for Integrated Systems Risk-Reduction Analysis

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) is working to increase the likelihoods of human health and performance success during long-duration missions, and subsequent crew long-term health. To achieve these goals, there is a need to develop an integrated understanding of how the complex human physiological-socio-technical mission system behaves in spaceflight. This understanding will allow HRP to provide cross-disciplinary spaceflight countermeasures while minimizing resources such as mass, power, and volume. This understanding will also allow development of tools to assess the state of and enhance the resilience of individual crewmembers, teams, and the integrated mission system. We will discuss a set of risk-reduction questions that has been identified to guide the systems approach necessary to meet these needs. In addition, a framework of factors influencing human health and performance in space, called the Contributing Factor Map (CFM), is being applied as the backbone for incorporating information addressing these questions from sources throughout HRP. Using the common language of the CFM, information from sources such as the Human System Risk Board summaries, Integrated Research Plan, and HRP-funded publications has been combined and visualized in ways that allow insight into cross-disciplinary interconnections in a systematic, standardized fashion. We will show examples of these visualizations. We will also discuss applications of the resulting analysis capability that can inform science portfolio decisions, such as areas in which cross-disciplinary solicitations or countermeasure development will potentially be fruitful.

Mindock, J.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Managing Programmatic Risk for Complex Space System Developments

Risk management strategies have become a recent important research topic to many aerospace organizations as they prepare to develop the revolutionary complex space systems of the future. Future multi-disciplinary complex space systems will make it absolutely essential for organizations to practice a rigorous, comprehensive risk management process, emphasizing thorough systems engineering principles to succeed. Project managers must possess strong leadership skills to direct high quality, cross-disciplinary teams for successfully developing revolutionary space systems that are ever increasing in complexity. Proactive efforts to reduce or eliminate risk throughout a project's lifecycle ideally must be practiced by all technical members in the organization. This paper discusses some of the risk management perspectives that were collected from senior managers and project managers of aerospace and aeronautical organizations by the use of interviews and surveys. Some of the programmatic risks which drive the success or failure of projects are revealed. Key findings lead to a number of insights for organizations to consider for proactively approaching the risks which face current and future complex space systems projects.

Panetta, Peter V.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Non-GEO mobile satellite systems: A risk assessment

Since 1991, The MITRE Corporation has performed several independent evaluations of proposed mobile satellite service (MSS) systems that would operate from low Earth orbit (LEO) or medium Earth orbit (MEO), also known as intermediate circular orbit (ICO). This paper introduces a top level Risk Taxonomy tailored to summarize the technical and programmatic risks that MITRE has identified. In general, as risks are identified and addressed, a system's technical characteristics, cost and schedule are affected. This paper traces changes in three key parameters - satellite launch mass, system cost, and system schedule - for each of the five original non-GEO MSS systems for which license applications were made to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from November 1990 until June 1991. Finally, specific risk areas are identified using the Risk Taxonomy as a framework for discussion.

Gaffney, Leah M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Machine Learning for the Validation of Expert-Elicited Causal Risk Diagrams

Exposure to spaceflight poses risk to human health in complex ways. To help manage this risk, the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a set of causal diagrams that attempt to explain how spaceflight hazards generate health risks and lead to adverse outcomes both in-mission, immediately post-mission, and over the long term. These causal risk diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and can function as knowledge graphs of connected risks and outcomes. These DAGs have proven useful for communication, and, through network analysis, have allowed for the identification of structurally important factors in the risk network. However, the utility these DAGs provide is directly proportional to their verisimilitude, making assessment of this trait using empirical data – whether from actual human spaceflight or various spaceflight analogue exposures and model organisms – a high priority. In this research we explore the use of machine learning algorithms to learn DAG structure from empirical data as a means of evaluating human-elicited DAG structures. To do so, we test several different graph structure-learning algorithms on data concerning changes in the bones of rats and mice after exposure to either spaceflight or a spaceflight analogue. We explore potential methods for indexing the similarity between each algorithm’s output DAG with all the others and with that of the expert-elicited DAG. We discuss next steps in this ongoing line of research and open science initiatives underway to complete them.

directed acyclic graphs↗
NASA NTRS2004

Requirements based system level risk modeling

The problem that we address in this paper is assessing the expected degree of success of the system or mission based on the degree to which each requirement is satisfied and the relative weight of the requirements.

risk↗
NASA NTRS2004

Requirements based system level risk modeling

The problem that we address in this paper is assessing the expected degree of success of the system or mission based on the degree to which each requirement is satisfied and the relative weight of the requirements.

risk dependency probability requirement↗
NASA NTRS2005

On Space Exploration and Human Error: A Paper on Reliability and Safety

NASA space exploration should largely address a problem class in reliability and risk management stemming primarily from human error, system risk and multi-objective trade-off analysis, by conducting research into system complexity, risk characterization and modeling, and system reasoning. In general, in every mission we can distinguish risk in three possible ways: a) known-known, b) known-unknown, and c) unknown-unknown. It is probably almost certain that space exploration will partially experience similar known or unknown risks embedded in the Apollo missions, Shuttle or Station unless something alters how NASA will perceive and manage safety and reliability

Bell, David G.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Harnessing the Risk-Related Data Supply Chain: An Information Architecture Approach to Enriching Human System Research and Operations Knowledge

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) and Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD), not unlike many NASA organizations today, struggle with the inherent inefficiencies caused by dependencies on heterogeneous data systems and silos of data and information spread across decentralized discipline domains. The capture of operational and research-based data/information (both in-flight and ground-based) in disparate IT systems impedes the extent to which that data/information can be efficiently and securely shared, analyzed, and enriched into knowledge that directly and more rapidly supports HRP's research-focused human system risk mitigation efforts and SLSD s operationally oriented risk management efforts. As a result, an integrated effort is underway to more fully understand and document how specific sets of risk-related data/information are generated and used and in what IT systems that data/information currently resides. By mapping the risk-related data flow from raw data to useable information and knowledge (think of it as the data supply chain), HRP and SLSD are building an information architecture plan to leverage their existing, shared IT infrastructure. In addition, it is important to create a centralized structured tool to represent risks including attributes such as likelihood, consequence, contributing factors, and the evidence supporting the information in all these fields. Representing the risks in this way enables reasoning about the risks, e.g. revisiting a risk assessment when a mitigation strategy is unavailable, updating a risk assessment when new information becomes available, etc. Such a system also provides a concise way to communicate the risks both within the organization as well as with collaborators. Understanding and, hence, harnessing the human system risk-related data supply chain enhances both organizations' abilities to securely collect, integrate, and share data assets that improve human system research and operations.

Buquo, Lynn↗
NASA NTRS2001

A Synthetic Vision Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis

This report documents efforts to analyze a sample of aviation safety programs, using the LMI-developed integrated safety analysis tool to determine the change in system risk resulting from Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) technology implementation. Specifically, we have worked to modify existing system safety tools to address the safety impact of synthetic vision (SV) technology. Safety metrics include reliability, availability, and resultant hazard. This analysis of SV technology is intended to be part of a larger effort to develop a model that is capable of "providing further support to the product design and development team as additional information becomes available". The reliability analysis portion of the effort is complete and is fully documented in this report. The simulation analysis is still underway; it will be documented in a subsequent report. The specific goal of this effort is to apply the integrated safety analysis to SV technology. This report also contains a brief discussion of data necessary to expand the human performance capability of the model, as well as a discussion of human behavior and its implications for system risk assessment in this modeling environment.

Hemm, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk as a Driver for Innovation

The Space Life Sciences directorate (SLSD) and Human Research Program (HRP) at NASA Johnson Space Center has implemented a system for managing human systems risks. These risks are defined as the health and performance risks posed to crew during and after spaceflight. Identification and evaluation of these risks has led to the identification of gaps in knowledge about the risks as well as gaps in technology needed to mitigate them. Traditional routes of closing technology gaps have, in some cases, proven to be too slow when a solution was required quickly. Therefore, certain gaps were used to drive the development of "challenges" for the scientific community. Partnering with open innovation service providers such as InnoCentive and Yet2.com, SLSD and HRP have decreased the amount of time from identification of a need to the evaluation of a solution. Although not all proposed solutions will result in a risk mitigation strategy or tool, the process has allowed faster evaluation of proposed solutions providing the researcher the ability to move to another possible solution if the first does not sufficiently address the problem. Moreover, this process engages the community outside of NASA and broadens the population from which to draw solutions. In the traditional grant funding structure, only those in the specific field will apply for the grant. However, using open innovation, solutions can come from individuals in many different fields. This can expand the general view of a field (way of thinking within a field) and the application of solutions form new fields while providing a pathway for the acquisition of novel solutions or refinements of current mitigations. Identification of the human systems risks has helped drive the development and evaluation of innovative solutions as well as engaging a broader scientific audience in working with NASA.

Davis, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2011

Integration of an Evidence Base into a Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model. The Integrated Medical Model Database: An Organized Evidence Base for Assessing In-Flight Crew Health Risk and System Design

This slide presentation reviews the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) database, which is an organized evidence base for assessing in-flight crew health risk. The database is a relational database accessible to many people. The database quantifies the model inputs by a ranking based on the highest value of the data as Level of Evidence (LOE) and the quality of evidence (QOE) score that provides an assessment of the evidence base for each medical condition. The IMM evidence base has already been able to provide invaluable information for designers, and for other uses.

Saile, Lynn↗
NASA NTRS2003

Biotechnology System Facility: Risk Mitigation on Mir

NASA is working with its international partners to develop space vehicles and facilities that will give researchers the opportunity to conduct scientific investigations in space. As part of this activity, NASA's Biotechnology Cell Science Program (BCSP) at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is developing a world-class biotechnology laboratory facility for the International Space Station (ISS). This report describes the BCSP, including the role of the BTS. We identify the purpose and objectives of the BTS and a detailed description of BTS facility design and operational concept, BTS facility and experiment-specific hardware, and scientific investigations conducted in the facility. We identify the objectives, methods, and results of risk mitigation investigations of the effects of microgravity and cosmic radiation on the BTS data acquisition and control system. These results may apply to many other space experiments that use commercial, terrestrial-based data acquisition technology. Another focal point is a description of the end-to-end process of integrating and operating biotechnology experiments on a variety of space vehicles. The identification of lessons learned that can be applied to future biotechnology experiments is an overall theme of the report. We include a brief summary of the science results, but this is not the focus of the report. The report provides some discussion on the successful 130-day tissue engineering experiment performed in BTS on Mir and describes a seminal gene array investigation that identified a set of unique genes that are activated in space.

Gonda, Steve R., III↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2015

Appendix A: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES)

Regulations that establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions. Those requirements will apply to detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the overall level of safety required to operate in the airspace. Several key gaps must be addressed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace level of safety. Foremost among these is the calculation of the relative effectiveness of a particular system to mitigate violations of a separation standard with other aircraft, which is known as the systems risk ratio. The risk ratio is calculated as the probability of mid-air collision with a DAA system divided by the probability of mid-air collision without a DAA system. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with the risk ratios of other collision avoidance mitigations, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of mid-air collisions per flight hour. Defining the required risk ratio that the DAA system needs to ensure the safety of the airspace requires an evaluation of the current airspace and a simulated evaluation that incorporates UAS aerodynamic performance and the mission characteristics of future UAS operations that are projected to be conducted in areas that interact with current operations. These evaluations will produce the frequency of encounters that currently exist in the airspace and those that could be generated with the introduction of UAS. Together, the frequency of encounters, an evaluation of unmitigated risk of collision, and a desired level of safety of the airspace will yield a required risk ratio of the DAA system. This study will focus on evaluating the encounter rates between aircraft based on historical radar data and encounter rates that could occur based on simulated UAS missions.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems↗