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NASA NTRS2016

A Cognitive Systems Engineering Approach to Developing HMI Requirements for New Technologies

This document examines the challenges inherent in designing and regulating to support human-automation interaction for new technologies that will deployed into complex systems. A key question for new technologies, is how work will be accomplished by the human and machine agents. This question has traditionally been framed as how functions should be allocated between humans and machines. Such framing misses the coordination and synchronization that is needed for the different human and machine roles in the system to accomplish their goals. Coordination and synchronization demands are driven by the underlying human-automation architecture of the new technology, which are typically not specified explicitly by the designers. The human machine interface (HMI) which is intended to facilitate human-machine interaction and cooperation, however, typically is defined explicitly and therefore serves as a proxy for human-automation cooperation requirements with respect to technical standards for technologies. Unfortunately, mismatches between the HMI and the coordination and synchronization demands of the underlying human-automation architecture, can lead to system breakdowns. A methodology is needed that both designers and regulators can utilize to evaluate the expected performance of a new technology given potential human-automation architectures. Three experiments were conducted to inform the minimum HMI requirements a detect and avoid system for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The results of the experiments provided empirical input to specific minimum operational performance standards that UAS manufacturers will have to meet in order to operate UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS). These studies represent a success story for how to objectively and systematically evaluate prototype technologies as part of the process for developing regulatory requirements. They also provide an opportunity to reflect on the lessons learned from a recent research effort in order to improve the methodology for defining technology requirements for regulators in the future. The biggest shortcoming of the presented research program was the absence of the explicit definition, generation and analysis of potential human-automation architectures. Failure to execute this step in the research process resulted in less efficient evaluation of the candidate prototypes technologies in addition to the complete absence of different approaches to human-automation cooperation. For example, all of the prototype technologies that were evaluated in the research program assumed a human-automation architecture that relied on serial processing from the automation to the human. While this type of human-automation architecture is typical across many different technologies and in many different domains, it ignores different architectures where humans and automation work in parallel. Defining potential human-automation architectures a priori also allows regulators to develop scenarios that will stress the performance boundaries of the technology during the evaluation phase. The importance of adding this step of generating and evaluating candidate human-automation architectures prior to formal empirical evaluation is discussed.

human systems integration↗

NASA NTRS2018

Metrology and Calibration

The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to ensure the accuracy of measurements affecting safety and mission success through the proper selection, calibration, and use of Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE).

Mathews, Kenneth W.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)

NASA's Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) integration into the National Air Space (NAS) project has been working closely with the FAA and RTCA Special Committee 228 to identify and break down barriers to UAS integration. A focus of this work is on detect and avoid (DAA) technologies. A pilot has responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and to remain "well clear," using their best judgment (Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Sec. 91.113). For UAS to perform this function, the see function is replaced by sensors to detect the other aircraft. Secondly, the pilot judgment of well clear has to be replaced by a mathematical expression. For Phase 1 of this effort, a well clear violation was defined if all three of these conditions are true: a) the horizontal clearance is less than 4000 ft., and b) the vertical clearance is less than 450 ft., and c) the time to loss of well clear is less than 35 seconds. This definition was developed with a great deal of community input and testing to ensure interoperability with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots of manned aircraft. Appropriate guidance, alerting and displays were developed to allow UAS, with the appropriate sensors, to effectively maintain well clear. This work contributed to FAA Technical Standard Orders: TSO-C211, Detect and Avoid and TSO-C212, ATAR for Traffic Surveillance. Phase 2 of this work extends the operational environment to include the terminal area and lesser capable aircraft that might not have the payload capability to carry the RADAR defined in Phase 1. This session reports on work from Phase 1 and initial work in Phase 2.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2018

Detect and Avoid: Efforts from NASA's UAS Integration into the NAS Project

Detect and Avoid (DAA)↗

NASA NTRS2018

An Exploratory Evaluation of UAS Detect and Avoid Operations in the Terminal Environment

New technical standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems mark recent progress toward realizing the goal of full integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). The DAA system is intended to provide a means of compliance with operating regulations that required pilots on board manned aircraft to remain "well clear" of other aircraft which is accomplished through out-the-window visual acquisition of other aircraft and application of a subjective judgment of safe separation. The requirements for the DAA system, including the specification of a DAA well clear threshold as well as functional requirements for detecting, tracking, alerting and guidance processing, and displays, are specified in DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA Systems developed within RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228). Intended as the first in a series of phased versions, these requirements are frequently referred to as the "Phase 1" DAA system. The Phase 1 DAA system is limited for use by aircraft transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace, through Class D, E, and G airspace. In particular, the Phase 1 DAA MOPS are not intended for terminal airspace operations, a critical gap for enabling a full range of UAS operations. The application of the Phase 1 DAA system and DAA well clear threshold within the terminal area is predicted to result in a high number of unnecessary alerts when the UAS is safely separated from other traffic. The goal of the present study was to examine pilot performance and operational issues related to the operation of the Phase 1 DAA system in a terminal area. This experiment was intended as an exploratory study that would be used to inform the development of a new terminal area-specific DAA well clear definition, and associated alerting and guidance requirements. The two main objectives of this study were to: 1) characterize pilot behavior in the terminal environment with the Phase 1 DAA system, and 2) investigate the effect of modifications to the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance structure. In particular, the authors were interested in determining whether the removal of specific alerting and guidance levels, without changing the DAA well clear definition or alerting thresholds, would impact pilot performance while conducting terminal operations. The results indicate that the Phase 1 well clear definition and alerting and guidance resulted in frequent alerting that degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where another aircraft was safely separated versus when a maneuver was necessary. The resulting impact on pilot performance was slower response times and higher frequency and severity of losses of DAA well clear compared to those observed for experiments examining pilot performance in the en route environment. There was no significant effect of alerting and guidance display configuration on pilot performance.

Rorie, Conrad↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Status and Technology Investments Overview

The presentation provides an updated, high-level overview of the NEPP Program. The latest organizational chart is presented that shows the names of the Program and Assistant Program Managers. Additionally, the recent work that is on-going with the updating of several NASA NPDs, NPRs and technical standards is reviewed. Internal and external organizational interfaces are described. Finally, the current technology focus areas are described. These areas include passives, wide-band gap power devices, processor units (CPUs and GPUs), 2.5D and 3D device architectures, memories, and data analytics.

NEPAG↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Comparison of Two Terminal Area Detect and Avoid Well Clear Definitions

Technical requirements are currently under development for a detect and avoid system (DAA) that would support the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) within the National Airspace System (NAS). Such a system would aid UAS operators in maintaining sufficient separation, or "well clear", from other aircraft in their vicinity. The first set of technical standards for a UAS DAA system (referred to as "Phase 1" requirements) was limited to UAS operations transiting through Class D, E, and G airspace to, or from, Class A (or special-use) airspace. Explicitly out of scope of the Phase 1 requirements was the operation of UAS within terminal airspace in the NAS. Fern, Rorie, Roberts and Monk (2018) explored the application of a Phase 1 DAA system within Class D terminal airspace in a human-in-the-loop simulation. The results of the study demonstrated a poor fit of the Phase 1 DAA well clear (DWC) definition to these terminal operations. The original DWC definition was designed for the en-route environment and could not account for the complex, tightly-choreographed nature of traffic typically found near an airport. The interaction of the en-route DWC definition and the terminal area traffic led to excessive DAA alerting against safely-separated traffic. The frequent alerting quickly degraded pilots' ability to discriminate between encounters where a maneuver was or was not necessary. This resulted in slower response times, higher rates of losses of DAA well clear, and more severe losses of DAA well clear than had been observed in previous DAA research (e.g., Rorie et al., 2017). The current paper reports on a follow-on study to Fern et al. (2018) that tested two DWC definitions designed to accommodate standard terminal area operating procedures, such as traffic in the downwind leg of a VFR traffic pattern while the UAS is on final. The two definitions utilized identical horizontal and vertical thresholds but differed in whether or not Tau (a function that takes into account the closure rate of two aircraft) was included as a part of the DWC hazard zone. The "Tau" DWC candidate definition nominally extended the DWC hazard zone by 15 seconds in the direction of the intruder aircraft, while the "No Tau" DWC candidate definition did not extend the DWC hazard zone. The results of this follow-on study indicated that both candidate definitions improved pilot and DAA system performance relative to Fern et al (2018). Pilot response times and rates of losses of DWC returned to levels comparable to earlier research in the en-route environment. Several important differences between the two DWC candidate definitions, however, are also discussed.

Terminal Area↗

NASA NTRS2019

Orbital Debris Quarterly News

Inside - NASA Technical Standard Process for Limiting Orbital Debris Revision Ratified - Testing and Modeling the Demisability of Fiber-Reinforced Plastics - An Extended Parametric Study of the Effects of Large Constellations on the Future Debris Environment - Meeting Reports - Abstracts from the NASA HVIT - Abstracts from the NASA ODPO - ODQN Vol. 23, Issue 1&2 Errata - Orbital Debris Analyst - Space Missions/Satellite Box Score

Phillip Anz-Meador↗

NASA NTRS2021

Classifications and Requirements for Testing Systems and Hardware to be Exposed to Dust in Planetary Environments

The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to establish minimum requirements and provide effective guidance regarding methodologies and best practices for testing systems and hardware to be exposed to dust in dust laden and generating environments. The intent is to facilitate consistency and efficiency in testing space systems, subsystems, or components with operations and missions in dusty environments.

Kristen Kathleen John↗

NASA NTRS2022

Repeatable Method for Conducting Chamber Studies of Aerosolized Lunar Simulant

The Artemis Mission goal of returning humans to the Moon requires new solutions to engineering problems posed by the extremely harsh environment of the lunar surface. Using the Apollo missions as historical evidence, dust will be a significant obstacle in the success of a sustained human and robotic presence. Hardware such as tools, machinery, extra-vehicular activity (EVA) suits, and components of landers and habitats will all be subject to various degrees of contamination by lunar dust, and each piece of hardware has its own considerations for performance under dusty conditions. Such hardware must be tested and verified for use during lunar missions under guidance from NASA technical standards. Aerosolized dust can be used to test and verify hardware in two ways: volumetric and surface area loading. Volumetric loading (measured in mass of airborne dust per volume of air) may cause hardware to malfunction via dust ingestion or other mechanisms. Surface area loading (measured in mass of settled dust per surface area) may cause hardware to malfunction by altering its thermal properties or by fouling optical surfaces such as camera lenses. This publication describes a method to achieve a stable, user-determined volumetric loading in an arbitrary chamber along with recommendations for how to use such chambers for customized hardware testing.

Benjamin J Sumlin↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adopting an Objectives-Driven Assurance Case Approach for Achieving Space Flight Mission Planetary Protection Objectives

Traditionally, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has utilized prescriptive technical and process requirements to ensure safety and mission assurance performance objectives for planetary protection are achieved during space flight missions. While prescriptive requirements may be easier to communicate and manage throughout the systems engineering process, the highly constrained nature of prescriptive requirements can limit the ability to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities and offer limited ability to explore other options or alternative designs, processes, and methods. It can also be difficult to develop prescriptive requirements for objectives that are probabilistic in nature or that cannot be satisfied by direct verification. In contrast, the development of an assurance case allows for a compelling, comprehensible, and valid argument to be developed with supporting evidence that shows safety and mission assurance objectives have been satisfied. Analogous to how patent applications are constructed for inventions, an assurance case has a high-level claim of meeting a safety and mission assurance objective, followed by a more specific set of sub-claims and technical evidence which supports the claims. The objectives-driven assurance case approach allows for a better understanding and exploration of the trade space, more flexibility to balance trades, and the ability to realize and implement technical and process innovations for resource, time, and cost savings. The assurance case is a living case that evolves over the entire program life cycle. Recently, NASA’s Office of Planetary Protection (OPP) has adopted the assurance case approach as an acceptable methodology for demonstrating avoidance of contamination of target solar system bodies explored by NASA space flight missions. This methodology has been incorporated into NASA’s new technical standard for planetary protection and is currently being utilized by the Mars Sample Return campaign for safe sample containment during sample return.

Assurance Case↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advancing Dust Tolerant Mechanisms for a Sustained Exploration of the Moon

Introduction: “I think dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon. I think we can overcome other physio-logical or physical or mechanical problems except dust.”– Gene Cernan, Apollo 17 Technical Debrief The Apollo missions revealed the impact of lu-nar dust on mechanisms. Lunar dust particles are jagged and electrostatically charged, giving them the ability to bind or damage mechanisms and alter thermal properties. Reports documented clogged equipment and jammed mechanisms in every mission, regardless of surface duration, as well as clogged mechanisms in the Extravehicular Mobility Suit (EMS), including zippers, wrist and hose locks, faceplates, and sunshades [1-2]. Several astronauts remarked they could not have sustained surface activity much longer because clogged joints would have frozen up completely [2]. Effective dust mitigation strategies are need-ed to support longer duration stays on the lunar surface [3-4]. State of the Art: Technology for mechanisms able to operate in dusty enviroments is advancing rapidly due to the needs of both Mars rovers and the Artemis program. Vacuum-tight connectors are essential for spacesuits and habitats, and their performance can be dependent on cleaning technologies, which have proven difficult on the lunar surface. Several TRL 3-5 technologies are undergoing tests with the expectation to reach TRL 6 within 1-2 years. Some mechanisms will be infused and tested on the VIPER (Volatiles Inves-tigating Polar Exploration Rover) mission planned for mid-2020s. NASA Funded Efforts: NASA has recognized the need for dust tolerant mechanisms, and has partnered with industry to advance the state-of-the-art. At NASA GRC, KSC, and JSC, the Dust Tolerant Mechanisms Project is working to devel-op advanced actuator seals for rotary joints and rotary bearing technologies for long-term sus-tained operation in lunar dust environments. An-other NASA project at NASA GRC, partnered with GSFC, JPL, and KSC is Motors for Dusty & Ex-treme Cold Environments (MDECE). MDECE is developing an unheated magnetically-geared mo-tor that can operate continuously for a long dura-tion at an ambient temperature of -243 ºC (33 K). NASA GRC has the capability to characterize the effects of dust on seals, mechanisms, and other mating surfaces and components under lunar conditions [5]. Through the SBIR/STTR program, NASA has funded several companies to advance dust toler-ant mechanisms via the Dust Tolerant Mecha-nisms sub-topic with applications in surface mobil-ity, spacesuits, connectors, joints, and more. LSIC and Community Efforts: The Lunar Surface Innovation Consortium (LSIC) Dust Miti-gation focus group has fostered collaborations across NASA, industry, and academia to develop solutions that minimizes the impact of lunar dust on robotic and human systems. Community ef-forts have included topical meetings on dust tol-erant mechanisms, featured technology presenta-tions, and feedback to NASA on potential gaps and needs. Testing: In 2021, NASA released NASA-STD-1008 [6]. This NASA Technical Standard estab-lishes minimum requirements and provides guid-ance for testing systems and hardware to be ex-posed to dust in planetary environments. The standard has specific sections dedicated to Mechanisms Testing (e.g. bearings, gears) as well as Seals and Mating Surfaces Testing (e.g. hatches, docking systems). Gaps and Needs: NASA is tracking dust tol-erant mechanisms as a gap in a cross-directorate analysis of capability areas needed to enable fu-ture human space-flight architectures. Two high-priority gap areas include additional facilities for testing mechanisms in lunar-surface conditions, and a better understanding of vulnerabilities to the smallest, nanometer-scale dust particles. Conclusion: Understanding and mitigating lu-nar dust is critical to successful, sustained opera-tions on the lunar surface – whether autonomous or otherwise. This presentation will discuss both the state-of-the-art and open needs in lunar dust tolerant mechanisms, technology impacts, mitiga-tion approaches, testing, LSIC community efforts, and more. References: [1] Gaier, J. R. (2020). The Im-pact of Dust on Lunar Surface Equipment During Apollo. Lunar Dust 2020. [2] GRC, & Gaier, J. R. (2005). The Effects of Lunar Dust on EVA Sys-tems During the Apollo Missions. [3] Johansen, M. R. (2020). An Update on NASA’s Lunar Dust Mitigation Strategy. Lunar Dust 2020. [4] ASI, CSA, ESA, JAXA, & NASA. (2016). Dust Mitiga-tion Gap Assessment Report. [5] Jimenez, N. et al (2022), LPSC Abstract 2572. [6] NASA-STD-1008, 2021.

J I Nunez↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrating Human System Information with the Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities (SPARC)

Within Human Health and Performance, there exists a wealth of human system information that’s used a regular basis in support of NASA human exploration objectives, but the challenge is that all of this information was stored in multiple different locations and organized for specific uses, limiting its effectiveness and straining communication across multiple groups. To address this challenge, our project, the Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities (SPARC) was tasked with developing a new NASA internal web application that aggregates and relates multiple programs’ human system products, such as technical standards, program requirements and verifications, human system risks, research and evidence, and exploration capabilities, into one centralized platform that addresses the needs of human health and performance from multiple different perspectives. Using agile development methodologies, user-experience (UX) driven design principles, data visualization, and a strong emphasis on continuous improvement though consistent stakeholder engagement, the SPARC project released a beta version in less than 4 months, broadly launched version 1.0.0 Agency-wide three months after the beta, and has over 180 users in the first year of development. Our second year of development will see us moving from our initial capabilities to increasingly robust and complex integrations and visualizations, including Directed Acyclical Graphs (DAGs), natural language processing (NLP) for dynamic generation of relationships between the sources of truth, and an expansion into hierarchical levels of system design in support of the human exploration programs.

Data science↗

NASA NTRS2023

National Campaign Development Test Executive Summary

NASA’s vision for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is to provide safe, sustainable, accessible, and affordable aviation for transformational local and intraregional missions and includes the transportation of passengers and cargo as well as aerial work missions, such as infrastructure inspection or search and rescue operations. NASA’s technical expertise, intergovernmental relationships, and high level of public trust will help this technology come to market concurrent with infrastructure readiness, public acceptance, and constructive regulation. By advising and integrating disparate AAM efforts across the country and working collaboratively with the FAA, the National Campaign (NC) objective is to motivate industry progress and support the development of policy, regulatory, and technical standards in a manner that best ensures public safety and benefit to the American people. NC began with the Dry Run and Developmental Test (NC-DT), which served as a pathfinder for collaboration and direct involvement with industry partners in integrated simulation exercises and flight tests. NC-DT culminated with an acoustics-gathering flight test in September 2021 with industry partner Joby’s prototype S4 2.0 air vehicle, which delivered the first foundational baseline of noise levels present in Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles. Through the DT phase, the NC team built and tested the airspace and range infrastructure while assessing the readiness level of industry partners leading up to future NC events. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of NC-DT.

National Campaign↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA'S Use of Ground-Based Multi-Layered Pressure Vessels (MLPV)

NASA has taken the US technical lead in assessing and reducing risks associated with operations of non-code MLPVs, with the goal of developing technical standards and processes for continued use, maintenance, inspection, and repair of MLPVs

Clifton T Arnold, Jr.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigating the Complexities of Safety and Mission Assurance Across NASA's Partnership Landscape

As NASA increasingly pursues collaborative public-private partnerships and international efforts to advance space exploration goals, ensuring robust safety and mission assurance protocols has become more complex. The evolving dynamics introduce multifaceted challenges spanning regulatory oversight, governance and acquisition models, and technical standardization. To address these issues, NASA plans to prioritize deeper integration of safety and mission assurance principles from the formulation and acquisition stages when structuring partnerships and contracts. This embeds appropriate oversight from the start. Additionally, it is vital to establish an enterprise-level capability focused on identifying and resolving cross-cutting risks that transcend individual missions. Together, all these initial thoughts will form the basis of a broad roadmap of decisions that aims to ensure strategic alignment from policy to implementation allowing NASA to harmonize the currently fragmented safety and mission assurance ecosystem as it navigates the complexities introduced by the new era of public-private space partnerships.

Johnny T Nguyen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigating the Complexities of Safety and Mission Assurance Across NASA's Partnership Landscape

Johnny T Nguyen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Frank Discussion on Lessons Learned From Adopting and Applying NASA-STD-6030 for Spaceflight Systems

With the advancement and adoption of Additive Manufacturing (AM) for spaceflight systems, numerous lessons have been learned during the qualification and certification of AM components. The lessons learned covered in this presentation will provide an overview of the challenges faced by NASA centers and commercial partners working to design AM hardware that complies with NASA-STD-6030 Additive Manufacturing Requirements (AMR). Topics of interest include tailoring of requirements for specific projects, documentation requirements, and addressing conservative approaches towards mechanical property development and analysis. In addition to that, this presentation aims to impress that these lessons learned will influence the future revisions of the NASA technical standard to facilitate and advance AM technology adoption on NASA projects.

Additive Manufacturing↗