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Re-evaluation of the Gamma Radiolysis Radiation Chemistry of Neptunium

The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel by solvent extraction techniques starts with dissolving fuel in concentrated nitric acid (HNO{sub 3}). The resulting radioactive liquor is subjected to multiple stages of solvent extraction to partition desired metal ions (e.g. uranium, plutonium, and neptunium) into an organic phase using specialized extractants. Under process conditions the solvent system is continuously exposed to a high intensity radiation field, which induces radiolytic degradation of both the diluent and extractants. This degradation occurs through the formation of radicals, as well as degradation products. Moreover, both radicals and degradation products can undergo redox chemistry with metal ions within the solvent system. This can be particularly problematic for metals such as neptunium which depend on the maintenance of a particular valence state amenable to complexation by extractants such as tributylphosphate in the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction) process. Neptunium (Np) is well extracted when it is Np(IV) and Np(VI) but almost unextractable when Np(V). A recently study showed that the radiolysis of Np (VI) in acidic (4 M HNO{sub 3}) solution underwent reduction to Np(V). This reduction only occurred after sufficient production of nitrous acid (HNO{sub 2}) which countered the action of radiolytically-produced oxidizing free radicals (nitrate radical, NO{sub 3}{sup .} and hydroxyl radical, {sup .}OH). This radiation-induced chemistry was successfully modeling using a simplified kinetic model, that included a reaction set for water radiolysis, plus published rate constants for the reactions of free radicals with Np(VI) and Np(V). The most sensitive reaction rate constants were identified in this model, and optimization of the five most sensitive was performed to get excellent model agreement with the experimental data. No Np(IV) was observed or predicted by the model under these conditions. The present research re-evaluates this radiation chemistry of neptunium in aerated aqueous solutions of HNO; by using a far more comprehensive FACSIMILE code. We have also extended this modeling to study the radiolytically-induced Np redox chemistry occurring under multiple other nitric acid acidities, to fully characterize the importance of the oxidizing radical and reducing nitrous acid reactions under a range of conditions relevant to large-scale process conditions. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Mox powder calculation improvement: OECD Benchmark proposal and cristal - Rib results - 14228

In the framework of the WPNCS Expert Group on Uncertainty Analysis for Criticality Safety Assessment, we propose a blind numerical benchmark. Since the WPNCS Expert Group on Experimental Needs had highlighted the poor database of representative experiments of low-moderated MOX powders, this blind benchmark is focused on MOX wet powders Three PuO{sub 2} contents are proposed: 100%, 30% and 12.5%. Two Pu isotopic vectors are considered: a conservative one (0%, 71%, 17%, 11%, 1% for {sup 238}Pu up to {sup 242}Pu) and a realistic one obtained from reprocessed LWR 30 GWd/T fuels. For these 6 cases the powder moisture rate is 3%. The MOX fissile medium is a sphere surrounded by 20 cm water reflector. The required results are the calculated k{sub eff} and the associated prior uncertainty. Using benchmarks experiments, contributors should provide the projected-k{sub eff} and the corresponding posterior uncertainty. CRISTAL-V2 results based on JEFF3.1.1 nuclear data are presented. As an example, in the 30% PuO{sub 2} challenging case, the calculation uncertainty is decreased from 1160 pcm (1 σ) down to 450 pcm using EOLE and MASURCA critical Pu experiments. This uncertainty depends slightly on 'conservative' or 'realistic' Pu because the representativity factor does not vary significantly with the Pu vector. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Acoustic Monitoring of Pyroprocessing for Safeguards

As pyroprocessing continues to be an attractive option for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel worldwide, safeguards technologies are needed to address the monitoring capabilities that can help state level authorities, or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintain continuity of knowledge of the plant operations. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is studying the possibility of using acoustic monitoring as a means to monitor a pyroprocessing facility for safeguards purposes. This paper discusses the experimental design and some preliminary results of tests conducted at the Fuel Conditioning Facility, a pyrochemical capable facility, at INL.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Treatment of Uranium Slugs at the CEA Marcoule site - 12026

The decladding units on the Marcoule nuclear site in southeast France were commissioned in the early 1960's to receive spent fuel cartridge for interim storage in pools and to prepare them for dissolution. After decladding, the uranium slugs were sent to the reprocessing plant for dissolution. The units were shut down in 1997. All the operational and process equipment was dismantled and transferred to the ANDRA waste repository between 1998 and 2001. During cleanup of the G2-G3 interim storage pool all the internal components (baskets and machinery) mounted on the civil engineering structures were cut up. In November 2007, a UNGG fuel slug in its aluminum cartridge was found at the bottom of the pool. Similarly, while iron slugs (used to control plutonium-producing reactors) were being sorted, five de-cladded uranium slugs were found between 2006 and 2008. As the processing facilities had already been dismantled, it was decided to send these fuel cartridges to a laboratory for dissolution. The project was to recover and condition the cartridge and slugs and transport them safely to the laboratory. This required the design of dedicated equipment due in particular to the high dose rate and pyro-phoricity hazard. The procedure also required safety clearance by the regulatory authorities for the operations within the facility and for the transport of radioactive materials. The cartridge was dissolved in May 2009, 18 months after it was discovered. Based on the experience acquired, the retrieval of the uranium slugs was completed in March 2011 after a year of preparation. (authors)

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Improving the Estimates of Waste from the Recycling of Used Nuclear Fuel - 13410

Estimates are presented of wastes arising from the reprocessing of 50 GWD/tonne, 5 year and 50 year cooled used nuclear fuel (UNF) from Light Water Reactors (LWRs), using the 'NUEX' solvent extraction process. NUEX is a fourth generation aqueous based reprocessing system, comprising shearing and dissolution in nitric acid of the UNF, separation of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium using solvent extraction in a development of the PUREX process using tri-n-butyl phosphate in a kerosene diluent, purification of the plutonium and uranium-plutonium products, and conversion of them to uranium trioxide and mixed uranium-plutonium dioxides respectively. These products are suitable for use as new LWR uranium oxide and mixed oxide fuel, respectively. Each unit process is described and the wastes that it produces are identified and quantified. Quantification of the process wastes was achieved by use of a detailed process model developed using the Aspen Custom Modeler suite of software and based on both first principles equilibrium and rate data, plus practical experience and data from the industrial scale Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at the Sellafield nuclear site in the United Kingdom. By feeding this model with the known concentrations of all species in the incoming UNF, the species and their concentrations in all product and waste streams were produced as the output. By using these data, along with a defined set of assumptions, including regulatory requirements, it was possible to calculate the waste forms, their radioactivities, volumes and quantities. Quantification of secondary wastes, such as plant maintenance, housekeeping and clean-up wastes, was achieved by reviewing actual operating experience from THORP during its hot operation from 1994 to the present time. This work was carried out under a contract from the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and, so as to enable DOE to make valid comparisons with other similar work, a number of assumptions were agreed. These include an assumed reprocessing capacity of 800 tonnes per year, the requirement to remove as waste forms the volatile fission products carbon-14, iodine-129, krypton-85, tritium and ruthenium-106, the restriction of discharge of any water from the facility unless it meets US Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standards, no intentional blending of wastes to lower their classification, and the requirement for the recovered uranium to be sufficiently free from fission products and neutron-absorbing species to allow it to be re-enriched and recycled as nuclear fuel. The results from this work showed that over 99.9% of the radioactivity in the UNF can be concentrated via reprocessing into a fission-product-containing vitrified product, bottles of compressed krypton storage and a cement grout containing the tritium, that together have a volume of only about one eighth the volume of the original UNF. The other waste forms have larger volumes than the original UNF but contain only the remaining 0.1% of the radioactivity. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Why reconsider the thorium fuel cycle?

In this paper we have endeavored to present the available technical information on the potential use of Th in nuclear fuel cycle (FC) applications as compared to U without subjective evaluations. Where helpful, we have compared the technical attributes of Th-232 as a fertile isotope and U-233 as a fissile isotope with other similar isotopes (i.e., U-238, and U-235 and Pu-239, respectively). In addition, we have summarized (a) experience gained to-date with fabricating and reprocessing of Th-232/U-233 fuels, (b) factors concerning Th fuel irradiation in both test reactors and power reactors, and (c) differences in the backend of the FC with emphasis on repository risks. As might be expected, many technical aspects of Th vs. U have not changed since the sixties. However, there are some factors elaborated in this paper that have changed. Changes potentially encouraging Th use are: (a) the ability to recover large amounts of Th as a byproduct with small attendant costs and environmental impacts, (b) the potential to produce fewer minor actinides (MA) and less Pu during power production, and (c) increased concerns about proliferation which might be somewhat mitigated by the high radioactivity and amenability to isotopic dilution of U-233. Changes challenging Th utilization are: (a) obtaining sufficient experience handling Th/U-233 fuels, (b) the existence of large inventories of depleted U and continuing discovery of large U resources, and (c) recognition that the extent to which U-233 might mitigate proliferation concerns is not as large as originally hoped.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decommissioning, Dismantling and Disarming: a Unique Information Showroom Inside the G2 Reactor at Marcoule Centre (France) - 12068

The paper aims at presenting the new information showroom called 'Escom G2' (for 'Espace Communication') inaugurated by the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) in spring 2011. This showroom is settled directly inside the main building of the G2 nuclear reactor: a facility formerly dedicated to weapon-grade plutonium production since the late 1950's at the Marcoule nuclear centre, in south of France. After its shutdown, and reprocessing of the last spent fuels, a first dismantling step was successfully completed from 1986 to 1996. Unique in France and in Europe, Escom G2 is focused on France dismantling expertise and its action for disarmament. This showroom comprises of a 300-square meters permanent exhibition, organized around four themes: France strategy for disarmament, decommissioning and dismantling technical aspects, uranium and plutonium production cycles. Each of these topics is illustrated with posters, photos, models and technical pieces from the dismantled plants. It is now used to present France's action in disarmament to highly ranked audiences such as: state representatives, diplomats, journalists... The paper explains the background story of this original project. As a matter of fact, in 1996 France was the first nuclear state to decide to shut down and dismantle its fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons. First, the paper presents the history of the G2 reactor in the early ages of Marcoule site, its operating highlights as well as its main dismantling operations, are presented. In Marcoule, where the three industrial-scale reactors G1, G2 and G3 used to be operated for plutonium production (to be then reprocessed in the nearby UP1 plant), the initial dismantling phase has now been completed (in 1980's for G1 and in 1996 for G2 and G3). The second phase, aimed at completely dismantling these three reactors, will restart in 2020, and is directly linked to the opening of a future national storage facility for irradiated graphite waste. Then, the paper recalls communication events and official visits hosted in Pierrelatte and Marcoule, following a formal invitation from the French President Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy. These visits, which were organized in order to illustrate the irreversibility of these dismantling operations, allowed visitors to discovers places that used to be former highly classified areas. Three official visits were organized in 2008 and 2009 for representatives of the Conference on Disarmament Member States, non-governmental experts and journalists. All participants visited the dismantled uranium enrichment plant in Pierrelatte, the G2 reactor and the UP1 plant in Marcoule. The visits were successful and visitors were especially impressed by the G2 reactor and its massive industrial architecture, symbolic of the early ages of nuclear history. In late 2010, this feedback convinced CEA Military Application Directorate (CEA DAM) that a permanent showroom could be installed inside the reactor, making it possible to preserve the cultural value of this historical landmark, and to continue its ongoing effort of communication and outreach. The paper explains the design of this concept: the museography project with a professional designer, the communication material conception and the features of such an original place. (authors)

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Decision Analysis Methods For the Analysis of Nuclear Terrorism Threats with Imperfect Information

Protection of commercial nuclear fuel cycles against adversary groups who may attempt to steal weapons-usable material is an issue of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The wide array of potential nuclear fuel cycle configurations and the security measures that could be deployed to protect them pose a daunting system design problem. In general, there are billions of potential design configurations. Moreover, the design choices are not independent – the effectiveness of one design feature or security measure can affect the desirability of other design choices. To explore this issue, we develop a mixed-integer optimization problem that solves a complex decision tree to allocate security resources across a commercial nuclear fuel cycle configuration. A nominal UREX+ reprocessing facility is used to demonstrate how the model allocates resources across a particular fuel cycle facility and shows how the problem can be scaled up to include other facilities and design features in the fuel cycle. In our model, the defender first chooses a set of safeguards to implement in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist theft from various unit operations in the reprocessing facility. The attacker observes the defender’s strategy choice and executes an attack to acquire material, including the possibility of declining to attack at all. The model considers the terrorist as an intelligent adversary with a set of attack strategies known to the defender. The strategic choices made by both the defender and attacker affect the probability of a successful attack by the terrorist and in turn affect the distribution of consequences to the defender. We use a decision tree to illustrate the interactions among costs, decisions, correlated uncertainties, and outcomes, and then show how to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer program with an equivalent solution. The novel features of our formulation include the following. First, as discussed above, we use a sequential game-theoretic formulation (a Stackelberg game). This formulation assumes the attacker can observe the defender’s actions before the attack is executed. Many previous game-theoretic studies have assumed attacker and defender act simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s strategy choice. We believe the sequential game formulation is more applicable for knowledgeable insider adversaries, the focus of this study. Second, we build on our previous work that has developed a methodology to reflect the correlation among probability distributions represented as discrete chance nodes in a decision tree. We illustrate how this methodology can be applied to two chance nodes in a decision tree that relate the quality of the materials that might be stolen or diverted by an adversary with the yield of a weapon that might be constructed from that material. In a decision tree, the dependence of the yield on the quality of the material could be modeled with conditional probabilities of the weapon yield given the quality of the materials obtained. For three outcome discretizations, this would require the assessment of nine conditional probabilities from domain experts as part of the model building effort. In contrast, our methodology will allow this same representation of the tree based on the assessment of the correlation between these two chance nodes by the experts, which we believe is a much easier and more reliable assessment task. The advantage of this approach increases as the number of dependent chance nodes grows in a decision tree representation of this problem. Third, we extend this approach to the approximation of the dependence between discrete binary events such as success or failure represented by binary chance nodes in a decision tree or in the special case of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) based on an event tree. This extension is a novel application in this domain, and uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate conditional probabilities on the binary chance nodes when the number of correlated uncertainties is more than two. Fourth, we show how these decision trees or probability trees can be formulated and solved as equivalent integer programming (IP) problems. The advantages of the IP representation include the opportunity to use the computing power associated with powerful optimization solver algorithms available on high speed computers to solve very large versions of these trees, and the ability to include several such models of different facilities into a much larger IP with connecting constraints that represent budget restrictions, number of available inspection opportunities in a given time window, or other dependencies among these facilities. Policy makers can use the resulting model to inform their decisions about how to assess terrorism risk and to safeguard the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Separation of Plutonium from Irradiated Fuels and Targets

Spent nuclear fuel from power production reactors contains moderate amounts of transuranium (TRU) actinides and fission products in addition to the still slightly enriched uranium. Originally, nuclear technology was developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel for military purposes. Military plutonium separations had essentially ceased by the mid-1990s. Reprocessing, however, can serve multiple purposes, and the relative importance has changed over time. In the 1960’s the vision of the introduction of plutonium-fueled fast-neutron breeder reactors drove the civilian separation of plutonium. More recently, reprocessing has been regarded as a means to facilitate the disposal of high-level nuclear waste, and thus requires development of radically different technical approaches. In the last decade or so, the principal reason for reprocessing has shifted to spent power reactor fuel being reprocessed (1) so that unused uranium and plutonium being recycled reduce the volume, gaining some 25% to 30% more energy from the original uranium in the process and thus contributing to energy security and (2) to reduce the volume and radioactivity of the waste by recovering all long-lived actinides and fission products followed by recycling them in fast reactors where they are transmuted to short-lived fission products; this reduces the volume to about 20%, reduces the long-term radioactivity level in the high-level waste, and complicates the possibility of the plutonium being diverted from civil use – thereby increasing the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle. In general, reprocessing schemes can be divided into two large categories: aqueous/hydrometallurgical systems, and pyrochemical/pyrometallurgical systems. Worldwide processing schemes are dominated by the aqueous (hydrometallurgical) systems. This document provides a historical review of both categories of reprocessing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fuel Pond Sludge - Lessons Learned from Initial De-sludging of Sellafield's Pile Fuel Storage Pond - 12066

The Pile Fuel Storage Pond (PFSP) at Sellafield was built and commissioned between the late 1940's and early 1950's as a storage and cooling facility for irradiated fuel and isotopes from the two Windscale Pile reactors. The pond was linked via submerged water ducts to each reactor, where fuel and isotopes were discharged into skips for transfer along the duct to the pond. In the pond the fuel was cooled then de-canned underwater prior to export for reprocessing. The plant operated successfully until it was taken out of operation in 1962 when the First Magnox Fuel Storage Pond took over fuel storage and de-canning operations on the site. The pond was then used for storage of miscellaneous Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) and fuel from the UK's Nuclear Programme for which no defined disposal route was available. By the mid 1970's the import of waste ceased and the plant, with its inventory, was placed into a passive care and maintenance regime. By the mid 1990s, driven by the age of the facility and concern over the potential challenge to dispose of the various wastes and fuels being stored, the plant operator initiated a programme of work to remediate the facility. This programme is split into a number of key phases targeted at sustained reduction in the hazard associated with the pond, these include: - Pond Preparation: Before any remediation work could start the condition of the pond had to be transformed from a passive store to a plant capable of complex retrieval operations. This work included plant and equipment upgrades, removal of redundant structures and the provision of a effluent treatment plant for removing particulate and dissolved activity from the pond water. - Canned Fuel Retrieval: Removal of canned fuel, including oxide and carbide fuels, is the highest priority within the programme. Handling and export equipment required to remove the canned fuel from the pond has been provided and treatment routes developed utilising existing site facilities to allow the fuel to be reprocessed or conditioned for long term storage. - Sludge Retrieval: In excess of 300 m{sup 3} of sludge has accumulated in the pond over many years and is made up of debris arising from fuel and metallic corrosion, wind blown debris and bio-organic materials. The Sludge Retrieval Project has provided the equipment necessary to retrieve the sludge, including skip washer and tipper machines for clearing sludge from the pond skips, equipment for clearing sludge from the pond floor and bays, along with an 'in pond' corral for interim storage of retrieved sludge. Two further projects are providing new plant processing routes, which will initially store and eventually passivate the sludge. - Metal Fuel Retrieval: Metal Fuel from early Windscale Pile operations and various other sources is stored within the pond; the fuel varies considerably in both form and condition. A retrieval project is planned which will provide fuel handling, conditioning, sentencing and export equipment required to remove the metal fuel from the pond for export to on site facilities for interim storage and disposal. - Solid Waste Retrieval: A final retrieval project will provide methods for handling, retrieval, packaging and export of the remaining solid Intermediate Level Waste within the pond. This includes residual metal fuel pieces, fuel cladding (Magnox, aluminium and zircaloy), isotope cartridges, reactor furniture, and miscellaneous activated and contaminated items. Each of the waste streams requires conditioning to allow it to be and disposed of via one of the site treatment plants. - Pond Dewatering and Dismantling: Delivery of the above projects will allow operations to progressively remove the radiological inventory, thereby reducing the hazard/risk posed by the plant. This will then allow subsequent dewatering of the pond and dismantling of the structure. (authors)

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New AREVA's Investment in Continuous Improvement to Increase Efficiency of La Hague Reprocessing Lines - 18588

New AREVA currently operates 2 commercial reprocessing lines at their La Hague facility in France. Each line is capable of reprocessing up to 800 tHM/year of commercial spent light water reactor fuel. The site and process is self-contained with all waste arising from the reprocessing operations segregated into various waste streams and stabilized at the site. New AREVA operates a culture of continuous improvement and continues to invest in new technology, processes, waste management and procedures that have increased plant throughput while reducing waste volumes, operating cost while at the same time maintaining our strong safety culture. New investments have also been driven by changing customer needs and new markets. A good example of this has emerged over the last several years as New AREVA has been transporting a large amount of Research Reactor (RR) Uranium-Aluminum (UAl) type spent fuel (SF) on behalf of international RR operators to the La Hague site. Last year more than 100 RR fuel elements shipments were carried out by New AREVA (for fresh and spent fuel). In our current commercial lines the reprocessing of RRSF has been limited to approximately 1.4 ton a year. To meet increasing demand for reprocessing of RRSF, the range of RRSF that can now be reprocessed at La Hague has been extended to include Uranium-Aluminium-Silicium fuel (USi also called Silicide fuel) and also non-intact RRSF. In addition, New AREVA supported large scale research, development and engineering programs to identify processes/technology to allow the La Hague Facilities to reprocess a targeted average of additional 25 tons/year of non-commercial fuel types (RRSF and also fast reactor fuel, specific MOX fuel... ). A new facility head end called Traitement de Combustibles Particuliers (TCP) facility is currently planned to be implemented in the La Hague plant allowing reprocessed special fuels to be introduced into the existing commercial processing lines. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate New AREVA's culture of continuous improvement that has been implemented at our commercial reprocessing facility highlighting how we have invested in processes and procedures for improving services to the nuclear operators. A case study will be presented related to our latest development of the TCP head end that will allow New AREVA to reprocess a targeted average of additional 25 tons/year of specialized fuels. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Adsorption of Iodine and Tritium from UNF Reprocessing Off-Gas Streams

The need to control emissions of the gaseous radionuclides to the air during nuclear fuel recycling is widely recognized. Gaseous radionuclides can partition to off-gas streams emanating from the various individual processes used in the recycle plant, such as from the mechanical head end (shear), tritium pretreatment, fuel dissolver, vessel vents, cell ventilation, and conversion operations. In traditional recycle plants, the bulk of the four primary volatile fission products (i.e., {sup 3}H, {sup 14}C, {sup 85}Kr, and {sup 129}I) is released in the head-end processes, for example, the dissolution process. The usual off-gas treatment sequence of operations targets removal of tritium (as {sup 3}HHO), iodine, carbon (as {sup 14}CO{sub 2}), and the noble gases, in that order. Water and iodine are captured first because the other species are relatively unimpeded by the sorbents used for water and iodine, so they flow downstream to additional treatment processes. Water and iodine do react with one another, and many techniques used to collect one of these species also collect some fraction of the other. It is quite desirable to sequester the iodine and water separately because the tritiated water may be disposed of as a low level waste. If not cleanly separated, contamination of the low-level waste by iodine may elevate its classification to high-level waste and result in greater costs for disposal. The proposed sorption sequence was tested in the laboratory. Use of a second column of AgZ permits the detection of breakthrough from the primary AgZ column while protecting the downstream 3AMS column from collecting iodine. (This arrangement is equivalent to enabling intra-column sampling of the primary column.) Neutron activation analysis of the 3AMS revealed that iodine was below, or at, the level of detection. The results successfully demonstrated that iodine can be sequestered in the AgZ while the water is collected free of iodine in the 3AMS column. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Epsilon Metal Waste Form for Immobilization of Noble Metals from Used Nuclear Fuel

Epsilon metal (ε-metal), an alloy of Mo, Pd, Rh, Ru, and Tc, is being developed as a waste form to treat and immobilize the undissolved solids and dissolved noble metals from aqueous reprocessing of commercial used nuclear fuel. Epsilon metal is an attractive waste form for several reasons: increased durability relative to borosilicate glass, it can be fabricated without additives (100% waste loading), and in addition it also benefits borosilicate glass waste loading by eliminating noble metals from the glass and thus the processing problems related there insolubility in glass. This work focused on the processing aspects of the epsilon metal waste form development. Epsilon metal is comprised of refractory metals resulting in high reaction temperatures to form the alloy, expected to be 1500 - 2000°C making it a non-trivial phase to fabricate by traditional methods. Three commercially available advanced technologies were identified: spark-plasma sintering, microwave sintering, and hot isostatic pressing, and investigated as potential methods to fabricate this waste form. Results of these investigations are reported and compared in terms of bulk density, phase assemblage (X-ray diffraction and elemental analysis), and microstructure (scanning electron microscopy).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Non-Equilibrium Actinide Radiation Chemistry and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Invited John and Naomi Fackler Lectureship in Chemistry and English seminar at Valparaiso University, IN, USA. Actinides are inherently unstable elements that frequently coexist with other radioisotopes, generating intense ionizing radiation fields that drive the formation of non-equilibrium oxidation states. These transient species exert a profound mechanistic influence on the radiation response of actinide-containing systems due to their unique redox chemistry. Despite their importance, they remain poorly understood, yet such insight is essential for advancing actinide science and accurately predicting radiation-driven behavior. Actinide separations—critical for nuclear energy technologies, strategic deterrence, space exploration, and nuclear medicine—depend on precise control of actinide oxidation states to recover targeted elements from complex matrices such as used nuclear fuel. However, during these processes, actinides, their coordination complexes, and the separation media are all exposed to intense, multicomponent (alpha, beta, gamma, etc.) radiation fields that can alter process efficiency, selectivity, and chemical stability. Understanding, controlling, and mitigating radiation-induced reactions is therefore key to innovating and optimizing next-generation separation technologies. This seminar will provide an overview of the nuclear fuel cycle and non-equilibrium actinide radiation chemistry in the context of recovering actinides from used nuclear fuel, with a particular emphasis on direct-dissolution–based reprocessing strategies. We will explore time-resolved electron pulse radiolysis and gamma dose accumulation studies to elucidate the molecular-level roles of radiation-driven, non-equilibrium actinide species in process performance and in the radiolytic stability of organic ligands used for actinide recovery. These insights offer new pathways for designing advanced separation methods and next-generation solvent systems, with broad implications for the future of the nuclear fuel cycle.

37 - INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL AND ANALYTICAL C↗

Criticality concerns of a group actinide co-crystallization separations approach to used nuclear fuel recycling

We report the co-crystallization of hexavalent actinides with uranyl nitrate hexahydrate has been established as a viable approach to achieving group actinide separation in used nuclear fuel recycle while avoiding the difficulties associated with the solvent-extraction process altogether. A preliminary neutronics safety analysis has been performed to alleviate criticality concerns associated with this group hexavalent actinide co-crystallization approach. The basic uranyl nitrate hexahydrate material compositions used are representative of used fuel found at commercial pressurized water reactors all around the U.S. This material is subsequently doped with various percentages of either typical reactor grade plutonium or with the total transuranic vector, replacing the uranium atoms in the crystal lattice structure. Infinite and effective neutron multiplication factors were calculated using the state-of-the-art Monte Carlo neutron transport code MCNP in a variety of plausible material configurations, assuming an acceptable safety limit for criticality to be an effective neutron multiplication factor less than 0.95. The results indicate that the crystal structures form a very subcritical intrinsic geometry even with six water molecules being incorporated into the crystal structure. In conclusion, the results of this research suggest that significant opportunity exists for the safe transfer of the group actinide separation approach from a laboratory to an operational scale.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Reconstituted asbestos matrix for fuel cells

Method is described for reprocessing commercially available asbestos matrix stock to yield greater porosity and bubble pressure (due to increased surface tension), improved homogeneity, and greater uniformity.

Mcbryar, H.↗

Fusion-fission hybrid for fissile fuel production without processing

Two scenarios are typically envisioned for thorium fuel cycles: “open” cycles based on irradiation of 232 Th and fission of 233 U in situ without reprocessing or “closed” cycles based on irradiation of 232 Th followed by reprocessing, and recycling of 233 U either in situ or in critical fission reactors. This study evaluates a third option based on the possibility of breeding fissile material in a fusion-fission hybrid reactor and burning the same fuel in a critical reactor without any reprocessing or reconditioning. This fuel cycle requires the hybrid and the critical reactor to use the same fuel form. TRISO particles embedded in carbon pebbles were selected as the preferred form of fuel and an inertial laser fusion system featuring a subcritical blanket was combined with critical pebble bed reactors, either gas-cooled or liquid-salt-cooled. The hybrid reactor was modeled based on the earlier, hybrid version of the LLNL Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) system, whereas the critical reactors were modeled according to the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the Pebble Bed Advanced High Temperature Reactor (PB-AHTR) design. An extensive neutronic analysis was carried out for both the hybrid and the fission reactors in order to track the fuel composition at each stage of the fuel cycle and ultimately determine the plant support ratio, which has been defined as the ratio between the thermal power generated in fission reactors and the fusion power required to breed the fissile fuel burnt in these fission reactors. It was found that the maximum attainable plant support ratio for a thorium fuel cycle that employs neither enrichment nor reprocessing is about 2. This requires tuning the neutron energy towards high energy for breeding and towards thermal energy for burning. A high fuel loading in the pebbles allows a faster spectrum in the hybrid blanket; mixing dummy carbon pebbles with fuel pebbles enables a softer spectrum in the critical reactors. This combination consumes about 20% of the thorium initially loaded in the hybrid reactor (~200 GWd/tHM), partially during hybrid operation, but mostly during operation in the critical reactor. The plant support ratio is low compared to the one attainable using continuous fuel chemical reprocessing, which can yield a plant support ratio of about 20, but the resulting fuel cycle offers better proliferation resistance as fissile material is never separated from the other fuel components.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Benefits from developments in the field of Decommissioning for Fukushima Daiichi fuel debris retrieval: Remote-Controlled Laser Cutting Process - 17110

Among the numerous challenges towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors, removing fuel debris is certainly one of the tougher ones, requiring several technical developments. One of them, related to laser cutting of fuel debris is being developed by a French consortium 'ONET Technologies, CEA and IRSN'. Remote controlled laser cutting was implemented for the first time in a real decommissioning workshop in 2015, in UP1 reprocessing plant. In addition to laser cutting development in air and underwater, key aspects of fuel debris cutting of representative of corium debris simulants was performed to test the quantities of aerosols, gas and dusts released during the debris laser cutting. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗