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Sharing Experiences within AREVA D and D Project Portfolio: Four Illustrations - 13049

Over the past ten years, AREVA has performed D and D operations on a wide range of nuclear sites, such as Marcoule and La Hague recycling plants, to Cadarache MOX fuel fabrication plant or Veurey and Annecy metallic Uranium machining plants. Each site is different from the other but some lessons can be shared through this D and D portfolio. In that respect, knowledge management is one of AREVA D and D Technical Department main missions. Four illustrations demonstrate the interest of knowledge share. Waste management is one of the key activities in D and D; It requires a specific characterization methodology, adapted logistics, and optimized waste channels, all of which have been developed over the years by AREVA teams on the site of Marcoule while they are rather new to La Hague, whose main activity remains fuel reprocessing despite the launch of UP2 400 D and D program. The transfer of know how has thus been organized over the past two years. Plasma cutting has been used extensively in Marcoule for years, while prohibited on the site of La Hague following questions raised about the risks associated wit Ruthenium sublimation. La Hague Technical Department has thus developed an experimental protocol to quantify and contain the Ruthenium risk, the result of which will then be applied to Marcoule where the Ruthenium issue has appeared in recent operations. Commissioning and operating fission products evaporators is a rather standard activity on UP2 800 and UP3, while the associated experience has been decreasing in Marcoule following final shutdown in 1998. When the French atomic Energy commission decided to build and operate a new evaporator to concentrate rinsing effluents prior to vitrification in 2009, AREVA La Hague operators were mobilized to test and commission the new equipment, and train local operators. Concrete scabbling is the final stage prior to the free release of a nuclear facility. In the context of Veurey and Annecy final cleanup and declassification, large scale concrete scabbling operations were conducted, and lead to the industrialization of the process and qualification of a new process, NiThrow{sup TM} scabbling technology, developed by AREVA. This experience has now been injected into La Hague D and D scenario and has allowed a significant gain in time and cost for scabbling operations. In short, the variety of experiences and sites under the responsibility of AREVA D and D teams present significant challenges, and yet provide a unique opportunity to innovate and qualify new tools and methods which can then be shared throughout the sites. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Use of advanced optimization algorithms for the design of critical experiments

The need for validating molybdenum and rhodium cross sections in the thermal energy range has arisen for many years for reprocessing activities and burnup credit calculations. An Integral Experimental Request (IER) sheet was submitted by IRSN to the NCSP (Nuclear Criticality Safety Program) in 2015. A preliminary design was therefore proposed for review. In order to define experiments that meet the requirements and that exhibit optimized sensitivities of k{sub eff} to the capture cross sections of {sup 95}Mo and {sup 103}Rh, advanced algorithms of the PROMETHEE workbench, developed at IRSN, were used. The methodology as well as the main results are presented in this paper, which focuses only on the molybdenum experiments design. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The Satellite Nuclear Power Station - An option for future power generation.

A new concept in nuclear power generation is being explored which essentially eliminates major objections to nuclear power. The Satellite Nuclear Power Station, remotely operated in synchronous orbit, would transmit power safely to the ground by a microwave beam. Fuel reprocessing would take place in space and no radioactive materials would ever be returned to earth. Even the worst possible accident to such a plant should have negligible effect on the earth. An exploratory study of a satellite nuclear power station to provide 10,000 MWe to the earth has shown that the system could weigh about 20 million pounds and cost less than $1000/KWe. An advanced breeder reactor operating with an MHD power cycle could achieve an efficiency of about 50% with a 1100 K radiator temperature. If a hydrogen moderated gas core reactor is used, its breeding ratio of 1.10 would result in a fuel doubling time of a few years. A rotating fluidized bed or NERVA type reactor might also be used. The efficiency of power transmission from synchronous orbit would range from 70% to 80%.

Williams, J. R.↗

The Reactor Graphite Handling. Problems and Solutions - 17208

The problem of industrial uranium-graphite reactors and NPP units decommissioning is one of the urgent tasks that require efficient and cost-effective solutions. To date, only Russia has already shut down and subject to decommissioning more than 120 objects. World-wide, more than 260,000 ton of irradiated graphite have arisen from the commercial nuclear power operations, research reactors, and defense production reactors. Under the circumstances the problem to develop cost-effective methods of the irradiated graphite management has appeared. Alternative disposal options for the irradiated graphite were discussed for at least 25-30 years. To date, various methods of irradiated graphite reprocessing have been proposed. They are based on the application of different physical and chemical processes, most of which involve incineration of the entire mass of graphite. However, they all have disadvantages, and do not solve the whole complex of problems. The primary goal of the research presented here was to carry out a study aimed at the development of a more simple technology (as compared to the incineration of the entire mass of graphite) that would provide for the graphite purification and allow the possibility of its transfer to the less hazardous waste category followed by the disposal of it in a near-surface repository. To achieve it is proposed to consider two directions, each of them reducing the cost of graphite reprocessing and the waste volume disposed of in the repository. The first alternative is based on the principle of partitioning radionuclides of different nature from the graphite, thus allowing to transfer it into the LLW category and minimize the volume of secondary waste products. The second option to change the reprocessing technology is the idea to use reactor graphite as the starting material to produce stable final waste form compositions intended for the long-term storage of radioactive waste including transuranic elements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A study on the criticality safety for the direct disposal of used nuclear fuel in Japan: Application of burnup credit to the criticality safety evaluation for the disposal canister - 14049

Japan has recently started the technical development of the direct disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) to prepare various disposal options. Unlike the disposal of radioactive waste from UNF reprocessing, criticality safety is important here because of the presence of a certain amount of fissile nuclides in UNF. This paper provides an outline of the research to be addressed in this field and the relevant studies in Japan. It especially includes the first result of a criticality safety evaluation of a disposal canister model adopting burnup credit. In this evaluation, it was assumed that a steel disposal canister loaded with fuel assemblies was surrounded by a clay buffer material, and the fuel assemblies and the disposal canister were intact. Conditions representative of discharged pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuel were applied in this study - initial U-235 enrichment of 4.5 wt% and burnup of 45 GWd/t. The isotopic composition of the burnt fuel was evaluated using SWAT3.1 code. In the depletion calculation, conservative parameters were applied within the typical PWR operation range. The effective neutron multiplication factor (k{sub eff}) was then calculated using a continuous-energy Monte Carlo code MVP-2.0, adopting the JENDL-4.0 nuclear data library. Uncertainty in k{sub eff} due to depletion calculation errors was evaluated using the correction factors of isotopic composition, which were obtained via multiple comparisons between the calculated and measured isotopic concentrations of irradiated fuels. In addition, the effects of axial burnup profile and horizontal burnup gradient on k{sub eff} were evaluated using the open burnup distribution database. The k{sub eff} including the uncertainties and conservatism was found to be below 0.95 for both actinide-only and actinide and fission product considerations when the fuel assemblies and the disposal canister were assumed to be intact. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Used Fuel Disposition Campaign International Activities Implementation Plan

The management of used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is required for any country using nuclear energy. This includes the storage, transportation, and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (LILW), used nuclear fuel (UNF), and high level waste (HLW). The Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT), is responsible for conducting research and development pertaining to the management of these materials in the U.S. Cooperation and collaboration with other countries would be beneficial to both the U.S. and other countries through information exchange and a broader participation of experts in the field. U.S. participation in international UNF and HLW exchanges leads to safe management of nuclear materials, increased security through global oversight, and protection of the environment worldwide. Such interactions offer the opportunity to develop consensus on policy, scientific, and technical approaches. Dialogue to address common technical issues helps develop an internationally recognized foundation of sound science, benefiting the U.S. and participating countries. The UNF and HLW management programs in nuclear countries are at different levels of maturity. All countries utilizing nuclear power must store UNF, mostly in wet storage, and HLW for those countries that reprocess UNF. Several countries either utilize or plan to utilize dry storage systems for UNF, perhaps for long periods of time (several decades). Geologic disposal programs are at various different states, ranging from essentially 'no progress' to selected sites and pending license applications to regulators. The table below summarizes the status of UNF and HLW management programs in several countriesa. Thus, the opportunity exists to collaborate at different levels ranging from providing expertise to those countries 'behind' the U.S. to obtaining access to information and expertise from those countries with more mature programs. The U.S. fuel cycle is a once through fuel cycle involving the direct disposal of UNF, as spent nuclear fuel, in a geologic repository (previously identified at Yucca Mountain, Nevada), following at most a few decades of storage (wet and dry). The geology at Yucca Mountain, unsaturated tuff, is unique among all countries investigating the disposal of UNF and HLW. The decision by the U.S. Department of Energy to no longer pursue the disposal of UNF at Yucca Mountain and possibly utilize very long term storage (approaching 100 years or more) while evaluating future fuel cycle alternatives for managing UNF, presents a different UNF and HLW management R&D portfolio that has been pursued in the U.S. In addition, the research and development activities managed by OCRWM have been transferred to DOE-NE. This requires a reconsideration of how the UFDC will engage in cooperative and collaborative activities with other countries. This report presents the UFDC implementation plan for international activities. The DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) has cooperated and collaborated with other countries in many different 'arenas' including the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and through bilateral agreements with other countries. These international activities benefited OCRWM through the acquisition and exchange of information, database development, and peer reviews by experts from other countries. DOE-NE cooperates and collaborates with other countries in similar 'arenas' with similar objectives and realizing similar benefits. However the DOE-NE focus has not typically been in the area of UNF and HLW management. This report will first summarize these recent cooperative and collaborative activities. The manner that the UFDC will cooperate and collaborate in the future is expected to change as R&D is conducted regarding long-term storage and the potential disposal of UNF and HLW in different geologic environments. While some continuation of on-going or recent cooperative and collaborative activities are expected to continue, the approach taken in these activities may be different than past activities given the changes in the U.S. waste management program. In addition, new cooperative and collaborative activities with different scope than in the past may be undertaken. Such potential future cooperative and collaborative activities will be discussed. The last part of the plan includes the implementation of the UFDC international activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design should have such features in it if it is seen to have intrinsic proliferation resistance. The technical difficulty in diverting material from the ESFR is at least as strongly impacted by the adversaries overall technical capabilities as it is by the effort required to overcome those barriers intrinsic to the nuclear fuel cycle. The intrinsic proliferation resistance of the ESFR will affect how extrinsic measures in the safeguards approach for the ESFR will provide overall proliferation resistance.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safeguards Lessons Learned from the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant - 19502

Once operational, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) will have an operating throughput of 800 MT of uranium in irradiated LWR fuel per year. In order to establish effective and efficient safeguards at RRP, the safeguards discussion with the IAEA was initiated in 1988. However, at that time there were no available models or guidelines that could be used as a reference and multiple difficulties were recognized for the implementation of safeguards into a large scale reprocessing plant. Therefore, from 1988 to 1992, a multinational forum, referred to as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) [1], provided the recommendations on how an effective safeguards approach could be implemented into a large scale reprocessing plant while efficiently using existing resources. During the course of safeguards discussions between the IAEA, the State, and JNFL, the use of operator's equipment and measurement systems (by signal splitting with authentication) for inspections was studied. JNFL also examined incorporating inspection requirements into the process design: to reduce the costs associated with system installation and future system maintenance and to ensure effective, efficient, and credible safeguards implementation into the RRP (this approach has essentially become the 'Safeguards by Design (SBD)' process). From these studies and JNFL's experience of implementing safeguards into a new plant [2], JNFL established and applied signal splitting from operator's equipment as a means for providing inspectors required safeguards information. In addition, the LASCAR findings were utilized to establish the safeguards implemented into the RRP. Safeguards implementation into RRP commenced March 31, 2006. On June 4, 2008, the IAEA approved the 'integrated safeguards approach' for RRP. This paper provides a high level overview of the major safeguards implemented at RRP and the lessons learned from this implementation that can be applied to existing or future similar facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of fuel options for the breakeven core configuration of the Advanced Recycling Reactor

A trade-off study is performed to determine the impacts of various fuel forms on the core design and core physics characteristics of the sodium-cooled Toshiba- Westinghouse Advanced Recycling Reactor (ARR). The fuel forms include oxide, nitride, and metallic forms of U and Th. The ARR core configuration is redesigned with driver and blanket regions in order to achieve breakeven fissile breeding performance with the various fuel types. State-of-the-art core physics tools are used for the analyses. In addition, a quasi-static reactivity balance approach is used for a preliminary comparison of the inherent safety performances of the various fuel options. Thorium-fueled cores exhibit lower breeding ratios and require larger blankets compared to the U-fueled cores, which is detrimental to core compactness and increases reprocessing and manufacturing requirements. The Th cores also exhibit higher reactivity swings through each cycle, which penalizes reactivity control and increases the number of control rods required. On the other hand, using Th leads to drastic reductions in void and coolant expansion coefficients of reactivity, with the potential for enhancing inherent core safety. Among the U-fueled ARR cores, metallic and nitride fuels result in higher breeding ratios due to their higher heavy metal densities. On the other hand, oxide fuels provide a softer spectrum, which increases the Doppler effect and reduces the positive sodium void worth. A lower fuel temperature is obtained with the metallic and nitride fuels due to their higher thermal conductivities and compatibility with sodium bonds. This is especially beneficial from an inherent safety point of view since it facilitates the reactor cool-down during loss of power removal transients. The advantages in terms of inherent safety of nitride and metallic fuels are maintained when using Th fuel. However, there is a lower relative increase in heavy metal density and in breeding ratio going from oxide to metallic or nitride Th fuels relative to the U counterpart fuels. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 181 Attitudes and Practices Regarding Disposal of Liquid Nuclear Waste at Clinton Laboratories in the Very Early Years: A Historical Analysis, S. H. Stow; 202 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Management in Germany Under the Auspices of the Federal Structure, A. Bayer, S. Bittner, and H. Korn; DESIGN FEATURES: 211 Twenty-Fourth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, R. D. Porco, and M. W. First; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 222 Explosion in the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Plant on April 6, 1993, M. L. Hyder, W. G. Lussie, and F. E. Witmer; 234 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 237 Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling, J. G. Ibarra, W. R. Jones, G. F. Lanik, H. L. Ornstein, and S. V. Pullani; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 256 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 260 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1996; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 210 Tennessee Industries Week; 221 21st International Symposium on The Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 259 IAEA Programme of Scientific Meetings for 1997; 270 PSAM 4 (International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management); 265 The Authors; 268 Errata.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗

Assessment of uranium nitride interatomic potentials

Uranium mononitride (UN) is a promising nuclear fuel due to its high fissile density, high thermal conductivity, and suitability for reprocessing. In this study, two uranium nitride interatomic potentials are assessed: Tseplyaev and Starikov's angular-dependent potential and Kocevski et al.'s embedded atom model potential. Predictions of the thermophysical and elastic properties of UN, UN 2 , and α- and β-U 2 N 3 computed using both potentials are assessed and compared to available experimental data. Notably, the Tseplyaev potential performs better with the energetic aspects of UN, e.g., specific heat capacity and point defect formation energies, whereas the Kocevski potential performs better with the structural aspects of UN, e.g., thermal expansion as well as with the elastic properties. The reasons why the Kocevski potential underestimates the UN specific heat are explained by examining the UN phonon properties modeled using both potentials. The Kocevski potential shows better identification of the mechanical stability ranges of UN, UN 2 , and α- and β-U 2 N 3 , reasonably predicting the melting point of UN and predicting stable structures for UN 2 and α- and β-U 2 N 3 . On the other hand, the Tseplyaev potential predicts a premature phase change of both UN and UN 2 and cannot stabilize α- nor β-U 2 N 3 . However, the Kocevski potential cannot predict a stable α-U phase and is thus not suitable for the calculation of formation energies for non-stoichiometric point defects.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Detection limits for actinides in a monochromatic, wavelength-dispersive x-ray fluorescence instrument

Recent developments in x-ray optics have made it possible to examine the L x-rays of actinides using doubly-curved crystals in a bench-top device. A doubly-curved crystal (DCC) acts as a focusing monochromatic filter for polychromatic x-rays. A Monochromatic, Wavelength-Dispersive X-Ray Fluorescence (MWDXRF) instrument that uses DCCs to measure Cm and Pu in reprocessing plant liquors was proposed in 2007 by the authors at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A prototype design of this MWDXRF instrument was developed in collaboration with X-ray Optical Systems Inc. (XOS), of East Greenbush, New York. In the MWDXRF instrument, x-rays from a Rhodium-anode x-ray tube are passed through a primary DCC to produce a monochromatic beam of 20.2-keV photons. This beam is focused on a specimen that may contain actinides. The 20.2-keV interrogating beam is just above the L3 edge of Californium; each actinide (with Z = 90 to 98) present in the specimen emits characteristic L x-rays as the result of L3-shell vacancies. In the LANL-XOS prototype MWDXRf, these x-rays enter a secondary DCC optic that preferentially passes 14.961-keV photons, corresponding to the L-alpha-1 x-ray peak of Curium. In the present stage of experimentation, Curium-bearing specimens have not been analyzed with the prototype MWDXRF instrument. Surrogate materials for Curium include Rubidium, which has a K-beta-l x-ray at 14.961 keV, and Yttrium, which has a K-alpha-1 x-ray at 14.958 keV. In this paper, the lower limit of detection for Curium in the LANL-XOS prototype MWDXRF instrument is estimated. The basis for this estimate is described, including a description of computational models and benchmarking techniques used. Detection limits for other actinides are considered, as well as future safeguards applications for MWDXRF instrumentation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Principles of Product Quality Control of German Radioactive Waste Forms from the Reprocessing of Spent Fuel: Vitrification, Compaction and Numerical Simulation - 12529

The German product quality control is inter alia responsible for control of two radioactive waste forms of heat generating waste: a) homogeneous vitrified HLW and b) heterogeneous compacted hulls, end-pieces and technological metallic waste. In either case, significantly different metrology is employed at the site of the conditioning plant for the obligatory nuclide inventory declaration. To facilitate an independent evaluation and checking of the accompanying documentation numerical simulations are carried out. The physical and chemical properties of radioactive waste residues are used to assess the data consistency and uncertainty margins, as well as to predict the long-term behavior of the radioactive waste. This is relevant for repository acceptance and safety considerations. Our new numerical approach follows a bottom-up simulation starting from the burn-up behavior of the fuel elements in the reactor core. The output of these burn-up calculations is then coupled with a program that simulates the material separation in the subsequent dissolution and extraction processes normalized to the mass balance. Follow-up simulations of the separated reprocessing lines of a) the vitrification of highly-active liquid and b) the compaction of residual intermediate-active metallic hulls remaining after fuel pellets dissolution, end-pieces and technological waste, allows calculating expectation values for the various repository relevant properties of either waste stream. The principles of the German product quality control of radioactive waste residues from the spent fuel reprocessing have been introduced and explained. Namely, heat generating homogeneous vitrified HLW and heterogeneous compacted metallic MLW have been discussed. The advantages of a complementary numerical property simulation have been made clear and examples of benefits are presented. We have compiled a new program suite to calculate the physical and radio-chemical properties of common nuclear waste residues. The immediate benefit is the independent assessment of radio-active inventory declarations and much facilitated product quality control of waste residues that need to be returned to Germany and submitted to a German HLW-repository requirements. Wherever possible, internationally accepted standard programs are used and embedded. The innovative coupling of burn-up calculations (SCALE) with neutron and gamma transport codes (MCPN-X) allows an application in the world of virtual waste properties. If-then-else scenarios of hypothetical waste material compositions and distributions provide valuable information of long term nuclide property propagation under repository conditions over a very long time span. Benchmarking the program with real residue data demonstrates the power and remarkable accuracy of this numerical approach, boosting the reliability of the confidence aforementioned numerous applications, namely the proof tool set for on-the-spot production quality checking and data evaluation and independent verification. Moreover, using the numerical bottom-up approach helps to avoid the accumulation of fake activities that may gradually build up in a repository from the so-called conservative or penalizing nuclide inventory declarations. The radioactive waste properties and the hydrolytic and chemical stability can be predicted. The interaction with invasive chemicals can be assessed and propagation scenarios can be developed from reliable and sound data and HLW properties. Hence, the appropriate design of a future HLW repository can be based upon predictable and quality assured waste characteristics. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System PPT

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed for the packaging demonstration. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced dismantling techniques applied in an industrial project for the dismantling of highly activated equipment - 15446

Commissioned in 1958 on the CEA nuclear site of Marcoule (France) and shut down in 1997, the former UP1 plant was dedicated to reprocess the spent fuel from G1, G2 and G3 GCR reactors. Since 1998, a wide program for cleaning-up and dismantling the plant has been developed in order to dismantle the process equipment, eliminate any radiological risk in all buildings concerned and remove all the resulting waste. Major technical challenges are related to the wide range of complex components and equipment in the facilities such as chemical dissolvers, extractor batteries, evaporators, tanks; and to a high risk of exposure, due to the presence of fission products. To address these challenges, CEA led R and D programs to develop advanced tools for complex dismantling projects: immersive virtual reality, laser cutting techniques, special remote-controlled arms combining dexterity and high resistance to irradiation The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of a practical implementation and to show first results of these advanced techniques on a real case: the dismantling of dissolver's equipment from the dissolution workshop of UP1 plant. ONET Technologies has been chosen by CEA to design, build and operate the overall dismantling and waste treatment system for this project. ONET Technologies designed two main subsystems to meet all the requirements for this project: first, the 'Remotely-Operated Handling and Cutting Unit' and second the 'Waste Extraction and Conditioning Unit' and the combining innovative technologies. During the design phase, the 'Immersive Virtual Reality' has been used to qualify the kinematics in the final environment and the preliminary dismantling scenario. Following a first R and D program of CEA regarding the laser cutting technique applied to nuclear decommissioning, ONET Technologies and CEA realized elementary inactive tests based on a 6 kW Nd-Yag laser source to qualify the cutting performance according to material and thickness. Main objective was to meet the safety criteria and to check the physical characteristics of waste resulting from the laser cutting operation. The Remotely-Operated Handling and Cutting Unit was equipped with a MAESTRO manipulator, resulting from ten years of research and development cooperation between CEA and Cybernetix. This manipulator, a 6 axis hydraulic manipulator-arm specifically designed to work in harsh environment, entered in its industrial phase. ONET Technologies was responsible for the overall system integration, confinement and performance. A comprehensive qualification program in real conditions has been driven during 2014. The dismantling scenario was tested with a mockup at a full scale of dissolver equipment and confirmed at this stage the expected level of performance and safety. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sensitivity analysis and optimization of the nuclear fuel cycle

A sensitivity study has been conducted to assess the robustness of the conclusions presented in the MIT Fuel Cycle Study. The Once Through Cycle (OTC) is considered as the base-line case, while advanced technologies with fuel recycling characterize the alternative fuel cycles. The options include limited recycling in LWRs and full recycling in fast reactors and in high conversion LWRs. Fast reactor technologies studied include both oxide and metal fueled reactors. The analysis allowed optimization of the fast reactor conversion ratio with respect to desired fuel cycle performance characteristics. The following parameters were found to significantly affect the performance of recycling technologies and their penetration over time: Capacity Factors of the fuel cycle facilities, Spent Fuel Cooling Time, Thermal Reprocessing Introduction Date, and in core and Out-of-core TRU Inventory Requirements for recycling technology. An optimization scheme of the nuclear fuel cycle is proposed. Optimization criteria and metrics of interest for different stakeholders in the fuel cycle (economics, waste management, environmental impact, etc.) are utilized for two different optimization techniques (linear and stochastic). Preliminary results covering single and multi-variable and single and multi-objective optimization demonstrate the viability of the optimization scheme. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Regulation of the First British Power Reactor to Enter into an Extended Period of 'Care and Maintenance' - 18028

All eleven of the British first-generation Magnox nuclear power plants have now ceased operating and are in various stages of decommissioning. The Magnox reactors were graphite moderated, using carbon dioxide as the primary coolant. The reactor cores are contained in steel reactor pressure vessels, except for the last two stations which have pre-stressed concrete pressure vessels. All but two of the Magnox reactor stations have been completely de-fueled. The spent fuel removed has been despatched for reprocessing at Sellafield in the north-west of England. On behalf of the UK government the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is responsible for cleaning up the majority of the civil nuclear legacy. The current NDA decommissioning strategy is to prepare the Magnox reactor sites for an extended period of Care and Maintenance (C and M), during which quiescent safe storage will take place (also known as safe enclosure), whereby the cores and associated structures will accrue the benefits of radioactive decay over a period of decades. This will reduce the radiation doses to workers during final dismantling and site clearance. The two Magnox rector units at the Bradwell licensed nuclear site in the south-east of England are the first scheduled to enter this quiescent safe-storage period. This is planned to commence in the second-half of 2018, and is scheduled to last for around 70 years. The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the independent regulatory body, responsible for enforcing safety and security requirements at nuclear installations in Great Britain (GB). This paper outlines the national strategic context and how ONR's regulatory regime is applied to nuclear power plant decommissioning. It addresses some of the specific challenges posed at Bradwell during the preparatory works for entry to C and M and how ONR has addressed these. It describes how this will culminate in a regulatory decision on the acceptability of the safety and security of the Bradwell site to enter this new stage of its life cycle. Over the last few years ONR has assessed and inspected various safety aspects of decommissioning, radioactive waste management and other preparations for Bradwell's entry into C and M. Some of the operator's proposals have provided challenges to ONR, particularly where there have been changes to established approaches taken at other sites, as the licensee seeks to minimise its costs. These have included how far to remove redundant structures, systems and components prior to C and M; how to define interim and end-states for fuel cooling ponds and other contaminated areas; and how to treat and store Intermediate Level Waste (ILW), for which there is no geological disposal facility yet available. ONR has begun its final assessment of safety and security justifications supplied by the site licensee, Magnox Ltd (ML). ONR is using its legal powers conferred to it under the site licence conditions to authorise this first-of-a-kind transition into a 70 year period of safe storage. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗