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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 901 records · Page 50

Intrinsic use control for system and use controlled component security

An Initialization Unit (IU) initiates an initial secure connection with an Intrinsic Use Control (IUC) Chip based on very large random numbers (VLRNs). The IUC Chip in turn initiates a secondary secure connection between it and one or more Use Controlled Components (UCCs). Polling by the IU allows confirmation of an ongoing secure connection, and also allows the IUC Chip to confirm the secondary secure connection to the UCCs. Removal or improper polling response from one of the UCCs results in a response from the IUC Chip that may include notification of tampering, or temporary or permanent discontinued operation of the offending UCC. Permanent discontinued operation may include destruction of the offending UCC, and cascaded discontinued operation of all other UCCs secured by the IUC Chip. A UCC may in turn be another nested layer of IUC Chips, controlling a corresponding layer of UCCs, ad infinitum.

Hart, Mark Miles↗

Communication system and method for applying security for a time sensitive network

A method includes identifying power connections between plural components of a time sensitive network (TSN) that are interconnected via a predetermined connection plan. The method also includes determining a topology of the components of the TSN based on the power connections. Also, the method includes scheduling flows for the TSN based on the topology determined based on the power connections.

Bush, Stephen Francis↗

Achieving American Leadership in the Hydrogen Supply Chain Factsheet

Hydrogen has been identified as a key energy option to enable full decarbonization of the energy system. A secure, resilient supply chain will be critical to achieving emissions reductions and capturing the economic opportunity inherent in the energy sector transition. Electrolyzers and fuel cells are two critical components of the hydrogen supply chain that today are largely nascent industries with limited data on supply chain needs and constraints. This fact sheet summarizes findings from an accompanying report that is one in a series of deep dive assessments of the energy industrial base called for in Executive Order 14017 on America’s supply chains. The report identifies key considerations for the development of water electrolyzer and fuel cell supply chains and materials, focusing on polymer electrolyte and solid oxide technologies, to meet future demand for hydrogen produced by electrolysis and achieve U.S. decarbonization goals.

Source record↗

CyTRICS: Vulnerability Analysis Tailored for Critical Infrastructure

Society and modern life are dependent on critical infrastructure that is composed of expensive, special purpose devices that have long life cycles and may be in use for decades before being replaced. There are an abundance of organizations and individuals doing vulnerability analysis on a variety of systems, but what makes the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program unique and valuable is its strategic focus on high-priority critical infrastructure, close partnership with vendors, and ability to leverage bills of materials (BOMs) to identify and relate vulnerabilities to affected systems. Creating a bill of materials is a formal way of understanding and documenting the components of a system, including everything from integrated circuits to operating systems to third-party libraries. This is beneficial for connecting known vulnerabilities to affected devices, since vulnerabilities in a specific component are often not mapped to all systems that use that vulnerable component. Additionally, CyTRICS finds novel vulnerabilities through its vulnerability testing process and works closely with vendor partners to provide vulnerability reports so that affected systems can be patched in a timely manner. This presentation will describe the interrelated technical processes CyTRICS uses to create bills of materials and conduct vulnerability analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

K-25 D and D Challenges - 12170

Decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) of the K-25 former gaseous diffusion plant provides lessons learned applicable to other D and D projects in the DOE Complex. The 175,000- square-meter, 1.6-kilometer-long building is contaminated with highly enriched uranium (HEU), Tc-99, trace quantities of other fission products, asbestos, PCBs, and other hazardous wastes. Safety challenges include deteriorated electrical systems, significant structural degradation, and criticality and exposure risks. The project completely revised the D and D approach after a worker fell through an operating floor and was seriously injured. For protection from deteriorated building conditions, the project reduced the number of workers in the facility, limited their hours in the building, and installed nets and barriers to protect them from falls through weakened floors and from falling material. The new plan involved removing high-risk components, removing motors and compressors, and demolishing the building from the outside with heavy equipment with most of the piping and components inside the building during demolition. The team provided temporary electrical power; reconfigured the criticality alarm system; upgraded security; performed sampling and analysis to locate and characterize HEU deposits and Tc-99; and, to establish 'criticality incredible' conditions, conducted a nondestructive assay program and injected foam into equipment and piping as a contamination fixative. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Real-time supervisory control implementation of SmAHTR power plant - 143

This paper discusses an implementation of a supervisory control system for a nuclear power plant model using Small modular Advanced High Temperature Reactors (SmAHTR). The simulation operates in real-time using a network of computer agents, implemented on Raspberry Pi's (RPi's), where each major task is performed by one or more RPi's running calculations in parallel. The system architecture contains local, module, master, and operator actions to automate all aspects of the plant. Local level controllers run individual control loops to ensure the desired reference signals are met. The module level controllers set the local level reference signals within each SMR unit and detect sensor and actuator failures to adjust those reference signals as needed. Master level controllers balance plant power by calculating required heat power from each reactor and electric power from each generator and sending that data to the module controllers. Finally, the operator level contains an operator interface to summarize data and faults gathered through the controller levels, with options to review plant and reactor details as desired. This control implementation allows the plant to run autonomously, load follow a desired electrical power curve, and detect a growing number of fault scenarios. Ultimately, this type of supervisory control system will reduce labor-intensive surveillance and testing and allow fewer operators to more safely monitor an entire plant. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

FARM : an automated malware analysis environment.

We present the forensic analysis repository for malware (FARM), a system for automating malware analysis. FARM leverages existing dynamic and static analysis tools and is designed in a modular fashion to provide future extensibility. We present our motivations for designing the system and give an overview of the system architecture. We also present several common scenarios that detail uses for FARM as well as illustrate how automated malware analysis saves time. Finally, we discuss future development of this tool.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Seven Deadliest Network Attacks

Do you need to keep up with the latest hacks, attacks, and exploits effecting networks? Then you need "Seven Deadliest Network Attacks". This book pinpoints the most dangerous hacks and exploits specific to networks, laying out the anatomy of these attacks including how to make your system more secure. You will discover the best ways to defend against these vicious hacks with step-by-step instruction and learn techniques to make your computer and network impenetrable. Attacks detailed in this book include: Denial of Service; War Dialing; Penetration 'Testing'; Protocol Tunneling; Spanning Tree Attacks; Man-in-the-Middle; and, Password Replay. Knowledge is power, find out about the most dominant attacks currently waging war on computers and networks globally. Discover the best ways to defend against these vicious attacks; step-by-step instruction shows you how. Institute countermeasures, don't be caught defenseless again, learn techniques to make your computer and network impenetrable.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Augmenting Trust Establishment in Dynamic Systems with Social Networks

Social networking has recently flourished in popularity through the use of social websites. Pervasive computing resources have allowed people stay well-connected to each other through access to social networking resources. We take the position that utilizing information produced by relationships within social networks can assist in the establishment of trust for other pervasive computing applications. Furthermore, we describe how such a system can augment a sensor infrastructure used for event observation with information from mobile sensors (ie, mobile phones with cameras) controlled by potentially untrusted third parties. Pervasive computing systems are invisible systems, oriented around the user. As a result, many future pervasive systems are likely to include a social aspect to the system. The social communities that are developed in these systems can augment existing trust mechanisms with information about pre-trusted entities or entities to initially consider when beginning to establish trust. An example of such a system is the Collaborative Virtual Observation (CoVO) system fuses sensor information from disaparate sources in soft real-time to recreate a scene that provides observation of an event that has recently transpired. To accomplish this, CoVO must efficently access services whilst protecting the data from corruption from unknown remote nodes. CoVO combines dynamic service composition with virtual observation to utilize existing infrastructure with third party services available in the environment. Since these services are not under the control of the system, they may be unreliable or malicious. When an event of interest occurs, the given infrastructure (bus cameras, etc.) may not sufficiently cover the necessary information (be it in space, time, or sensor type). To enhance observation of the event, infrastructure is augmented with information from sensors in the environment that the infrastructure does not control. These sensors may be unreliable, uncooperative, or even malicious. Additionally, to execute queries in soft real-time, processing must be distributed to available systems in the environment. We propose to use information from social networks to satisfy these requirements. In this paper, we present our position that knowledge gained from social activities can be used to augment trust mechanisms in pervasive computing. The system uses social behavior of nodes to predict a subset that it wants to query for information. In this context, social behavior such as transit patterns and schedules (which can be used to determine if a queried node is likely to be reliable) or known relationships, such as a phone's address book, that can be used to determine networks of nodes that may also be able to assist in retrieving information. Neither implicit nor explicit relationships necessarily imply that the user trusts an entity, but rather will provide a starting place for establishing trust. The proposed framework utilizes social network information to assist in trust establishment when third-party sensors are used for sensing events.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Multi stage attack Detection system for Network Administrators using Data Mining

In this paper, we present a method to discover, visualize, and predict behavior pattern of attackers in a network based system. We proposed a system that is able to discover temporal pattern of intrusion which reveal behaviors of attackers using alerts generated by Intrusion Detection System (IDS). We use data mining techniques to find the patterns of generated alerts by generating Association rules. Our system is able to stream real-time Snort alerts and predict intrusions based on our learned rules. Therefore, we are able to automatically discover patterns in multistage attack, visualize patterns, and predict intrusions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Opdefender Network Monitoring And Control System

OpDefender is a new system designed to enhance the cyber security of control system networks. It accomplishes this by inspecting each network packet using a novel, patent-pending method that extends software defined networking into the application/ICS protocol layer. OpDefender consists of two key components: 1. Smart, “ICS-aware” network switches that analyze and filter network traffic in real time. 2. A network management human machine interface (HMI) that allows an operator to monitor and control network traffic in real time. The “ICS-aware” switches can serve as a drop-in replacement for typical network switches, or they can be used in conjunction with existing network switches. OpDefender is configured and controlled in real time via a custom-built, web-based HMI designed with the operator in mind.

Johnson, BriamE.↗