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SLOPE STABILITY EVALUATION AND EQUIPMENT SETBACK DISTANCES FOR BURIAL GROUND EXCAVATIONS

After 1970 Transuranic (TRU) and suspect TRU waste was buried in the ground with the intention that at some later date the waste would be retrieved and processed into a configuration for long term storage. To retrieve this waste the soil must be removed (excavated). Sloping the bank of the excavation is the method used to keep the excavation from collapsing and to provide protection for workers retrieving the waste. The purpose of this paper is to document the minimum distance (setback) that equipment must stay from the edge of the excavation to maintain a stable slope. This evaluation examines the equipment setback distance by dividing the equipment into two categories, (1) equipment used for excavation and (2) equipment used for retrieval. The section on excavation equipment will also discuss techniques used for excavation including the process of benching. Calculations 122633-C-004, 'Slope Stability Analysis' (Attachment A), and 300013-C-001, 'Crane Stability Analysis' (Attachment B), have been prepared to support this evaluation. As shown in the calculations the soil has the following properties: Unit weight 110 pounds per cubic foot; and Friction Angle (natural angle of repose) 38{sup o} or 1.28 horizontal to 1 vertical. Setback distances are measured from the top edge of the slope to the wheels/tracks of the vehicles and heavy equipment being utilized. The computer program utilized in the calculation uses the center of the wheel or track load for the analysis and this difference is accounted for in this evaluation.

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PILOT-SCALE TEST RESULTS OF A THIN FILM EVAPORATOR SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENT OF LIQUID HIGH-LEVEL WASTES AT THE HANFORD SITE WASHINGTON USA -11364

A modular, transportable evaporator system, using thin film evaporative technology, is planned for deployment at the Hanford radioactive waste storage tank complex. This technology, herein referred to as a wiped film evaporator (WFE), will be located at grade level above an underground storage tank to receive pumped liquids, concentrate the liquid stream from 1.1 specific gravity to approximately 1.4 and then return the concentrated solution back into the tank. Water is removed by evaporation at an internal heated drum surface exposed to high vacuum. The condensed water stream will be shipped to the site effluent treatment facility for final disposal. This operation provides significant risk mitigation to failure of the aging 242-A Evaporator facility; the only operating evaporative system at Hanford maximizing waste storage. This technology is being implemented through a development and deployment project by the tank farm operating contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), for the Office of River Protection/Department of Energy (ORPIDOE), through Columbia Energy and Environmental Services, Inc. (Columbia Energy). The project will finalize technology maturity and install a system at one of the double-shell tank farms. This paper summarizes results of a pilot-scale test program conducted during calendar year 2010 as part of the ongoing technology maturation development scope for the WFE.

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Repository Performance Confirmation - 12119

Repository performance confirmation links the technical bases of repository science and societal acceptance. Among the countless aspects of monitoring, performance confirmation holds a special place, involving distinct activities combining technical and social significance in radioactive waste management. Discussion is divided into four themes: 1. A distinction is drawn between performance confirmation monitoring and other testing and monitoring objectives, 2. A case study illustrates confirmation activities integrated within a long-term testing and monitoring strategy for Yucca Mountain, 3. A case study reviews compliance monitoring developed and implemented for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and 4. An approach for developing, evaluating and implementing the next generation of performance confirmation monitoring is presented. International interest in repository monitoring is exhibited by the European Commission Seventh Framework Programme 'Monitoring Developments for Safe Repository Operation and Staged Closure' (MoDeRn) Project. The MoDeRn partners are considering the role of monitoring in a phased approach to the geological disposal of radioactive waste. As repository plans advance in different countries, the need to consider monitoring strategies within a controlled framework has become more apparent. The MoDeRn project pulls together technical and societal experts to assimilate a common understanding of a process that could be followed to develop a monitoring program. Experience from two repository programs in the United States sheds light on how performance confirmation has been executed. Lessons learned can help the next generation of performance confirmation. (author)

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Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

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SCALE Validation Experience Using an Expanded Isotopic Assay Database for Spent Nuclear Fuel

The availability of measured isotopic assay data to validate computer code predictions of spent fuel compositions applied in burnup-credit criticality calculations is an essential component for bias and uncertainty determination in safety and licensing analyses. In recent years, as many countries move closer to implementing or expanding the use of burnup credit in criticality safety for licensing, there has been growing interest in acquiring additional high-quality assay data. The well-known open sources of assay data are viewed as potentially limiting for validating depletion calculations for burnup credit due to the relatively small number of isotopes measured (primarily actinides with relatively few fission products), sometimes large measurement uncertainties, incomplete documentation, and the limited burnup and enrichment range of the fuel samples. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) recently initiated an extensive isotopic validation study that includes most of the public data archived in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) electronic database, SFCOMPO, and new datasets obtained through participation in commercial experimental programs. To date, ORNL has analyzed approximately 120 different spent fuel samples from pressurized-water reactors that span a wide enrichment and burnup range and represent a broad class of assembly designs. The validation studies, completed using SCALE 5.1, are being used to support a technical basis for expanded implementation of burnup credit for spent fuel storage facilities, and other spent fuel analyses including radiation source term, dose assessment, decay heat, and waste repository safety analyses. This paper summarizes the isotopic assay data selected for this study, presents validation results obtained with SCALE 5.1, and discusses some of the challenges and experience associated with evaluating the results. Preliminary results obtained using SCALE 6 and ENDF/B-VII cross sections libraries are also briefly summarized. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been performing spent-fuel isotopic validation studies using the depletion analysis methods in the SCALE [1] code system for the past 20 years. These studies involve comparisons of calculated inventories against measured isotopic composition data obtained from destructive radiochemical analysis of commercial spent nuclear fuel samples. The results of these benchmark studies are used to quantify the bias and uncertainties associated with isotopic calculations and ultimately determine appropriate margins for uncertainty that can be applied in safety-related analyses such as burnup credit in criticality calculations, decay heat analysis, and source terms. Previous studies using several versions of SCALE and nuclear data libraries have been published in multiple validation reports [2-6] that evaluate selected experimental data obtained largely from public sources. A study was recently initiated at ORNL with the objectives of updating and expanding the validation calculations using a comprehensive database of experimental isotopic assay data that includes isotopic composition data obtained from both publicly available sources and international commercial programs. As part of the study, an extensive isotopic database of nearly 120 measured spent fuel samples with an expanded range of initial enrichments and burnup values compared to previously analyzed data was reviewed and analyzed. The calculations were performed using two-dimensional (2-D) assembly models and a consistent set of modeling assumptions using the SCALE 5.1 code system and ENDF/B-V 44-group cross section library. As part of the current study, detailed benchmark modeling information and measurement data are being documented in a format that is readily usable for validating depletion and decay codes. The work is being extended to include analysis results using SCALE 6 and the ENDF/B-VII 238-group cross section library. This paper describes the isotopic composition data evaluated in this study and highlights the preliminary findings to date.

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There is Nothing Here for You: Passive Institutional Controls and Preemptive Resource Exploitation - 16197

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is required by Title 40 CFR Part 191.14(c) and Title 40 CFR Part 194.43 to develop a Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) program to prevent the likelihood for future human intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The purpose of this paper is to explore how the exploitation of resources under nuclear waste repositories as a part of PICs could reduce the risk of future human intrusion. The WIPP, located in the northern Permian Basin near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a geologic repository for the permanent isolation of defense-related transuranic waste. In 1995, a series of geophysical surveys by the New Mexico Bureau of Mines and Mineral Resources estimated the total hydrocarbon reserves underneath the WIPP, which included a 16-section area plus a one mile buffer. Since that time the Delaware Basin well database has been maintained to closely monitor hydrocarbon extraction activities. The database was used in compiling relevant oil and gas extraction data retrieved from The New Mexico Oil Conservation Division. The volume of hydrocarbons extracted from 1995 to the present suggests that if current extraction growth trends continue (as historic market and production data indicate they will), all known crude oil reserves under the WIPP, obtainable through current extraction technology, will be depleted within approximately 10 years, i.e., by 2026. This is well before the anticipated WIPP closure and start of the Active Institutional Controls (AICs) program called for in 40 CFR Part 194.41(b). In addition, gas resources, although more difficult to forecast, are not expected to last beyond 2137. Title 40 CFR 194.33 states, 'Inadvertent and intermittent intrusion by drilling for resources... is the most severe human intrusion scenario'. This human intrusion scenario is the feature, event, and process (FEP) that performance assessment (PA) has identified as having the most significant impact on radionuclide releases during the 10,000 year regulatory period for the WIPP. Title 40 CFR 194.43 requires a PICs program which contains '... [records] in the international archives that would likely be consulted by individuals in search of unexploited resources'. Due to political, social, and economic motivators for resource exploration and exploitation, the potential future absence of hydrocarbon resources under the WIPP is important in deterring possible human intrusion. To minimize the risk of future human intrusion, it may be necessary to consider actively removing as many of the exploitable hydrocarbon resources under and around a nuclear waste repository as is practicable before the end of the period of AICs (i.e., 100 years after closure of the repository). Additionally, communicating the absence of hydrocarbon resources under a nuclear repository should take a prominent role in any PICs program. Due to its high-cost nature, exploratory drilling of any kind currently involves cost/benefit analysis. If in the future the economic realities of resource exploration remain similar to today, and future oil companies know the resources for a particular area have already been heavily exploited, hypothetically, they would become less motivated to drill in that area. They would instead opt to explore an area with better prospects. It is important then that the remaining hydrocarbon reserves be clearly stated and prominently displayed. In essence we should communicate the message, loud and clear, 'There is nothing here for you'. (authors)

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Status Update on IAEA MODARIA II Working Group 1 (Assessment and Decision Making) - 19391

During WM2018, the work being done under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Programme (https://wwwns.iaea.org/projects/modaria/modaria2.asp?s=8 and l=129) was introduced. The Programme comprises seven working groups covering a wide range of topics. Amongst them, Working Group 1 (WG1) is focused on dose assessment and decision aiding tools to address existing exposure situations due to past practices involving naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and nuclear legacy sites. Specifically, this covers the development of methods and toolsets for risk-informed decision-making for such complex sites, and includes practical demonstration of decision-making processes and tools through case studies. During 2018 WG1 participants met twice to discuss the status and plans of work being conducted by the WG. The group held its Second Interim Meeting from 7 to 11 May 2018 at the Jozef Stefan Institute (JSI) in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The objectives of the meeting were to: (1) Discuss the status of WG1 work; (2) Start preparation of the interim draft version of the MODARIA II WG1 Report (herein referred to as the 'Interim Report'); (3) Review the progress of planned data analyses, model-model comparisons, and model-data comparisons being conducted through case studies for the Tessenderlo Chemie Site in Belgium, the Zapadnoe Uranium Mill Tailings Site in Ukraine, and a Former Tin Processing Facility Site in Brazil; (4) Discuss calculations conducted for a NORM Site in China for potential addition to the WG1 case studies; (5) Report on progress on topical studies and other assignments performed to support the preparation of several sections of the Interim Report; and (6) Discuss plans for incorporating some preliminary case studies considered by MODARIA I WG1 and MODARIA I WG3. During the meeting in Slovenia, WG1 participants also visited the Zirovski vrh (RZV) Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings Site near Ljubljana. From 22 to 25 October 2018, WG1 members also participated in the MODARIA II Third Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria. The meeting facilitated analysis of the progress made so far by the seven working groups, as well as exploration of the dissemination of the results of the MODARIA II Programme through publication in scientific journals dealing with the various subject areas covered by the Programme. WG1 participants focused on the preparation of its Interim Report, and engaged in technical exchanges with the IAEA Le Trench Project on characterization, assessment, remediation and management of buried waste at legacy trench sites, as well as the To Enhance uncertainties Reduction and stakeholders Involvement Towards integrated and graded Risk management of humans and wildlife In long-lasting radiological Exposure Situations (TERRITORIES) project (https://territories.eu/). Currently, WG1 is in the process of preparing a draft report to document the results of its various case studies and special topics, and is preparing for the final Interim Meeting in May 2019 and the final Technical Meeting in October 2019, before the conclusion of the MODARIA II Program at the end of 2019. This paper will provide a status update of these activities, along with preliminary information on the WG1 report, including potential recommendations for future activities. (authors)

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Surveillance Report on SAVY 4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers for Fiscal Year 2018

A Surveillance Program is in place to assess how nuclear material storage containers at LANL are aging in-service. This program is guided by the LANL Surveillance Plan [1] which is required by DOE M441.1-1 requirements, and is modified as necessary to ensure that any issues identified during surveillance or laboratory studies are examined in future surveillances, and that any lifetime implications are taken into account. Under the plan, overall container integrity is evaluated (visual inspections and photographs), and helium leakage rate, O-ring durometer and compression set, and filter performance are measured. The containers for surveillance are chosen annually based on the previous surveillance program results and observations. The surveillance plan targets items believed to provide the greatest challenge to the SAVY-4000 container integrity.

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Nye County Nevada Perspectives on the State of the Yucca Mountain Project - 12388

Responding to the Department of Energy decision to try to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application and the Administration actions to close down the Yucca Mountain project, Nye County undertook a number of activities to articulate its support for continuing the Yucca Mountain project. The activities included responding to inquiries from federal agencies, including investigations undertaken by the Government Accountability Office addressing other potential uses for the Yucca Mountain site, responding to a Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the possible use of Yucca Mountain for disposal of Greater than Class C wastes, testifying in hearings, and interacting with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. The paper summarizes Nye County's position on the Yucca Mountain repository, Nye County's perspectives on the various activities that were developed and considered by the Government Accountability Office, Nye County's concerns with the use of the Nevada National Security Site for Disposal of Greater than Class C Low-Level Radioactive Wastes, testimony of Nye County officials expressing local community support for the Yucca Mountain project, and Nye County's perspectives on recommendations provided by the Blue Ribbon Commission to move the nation's high-level radioactive waste disposal programs forward without consideration of the role Yucca Mountain could have served in those recommendations. Nye County believes that every effort should be made to, at a minimum, fund the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to complete the license application review. Then, if Congress does decide to change the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there will be valuable information available to support new policy development. This administration contends that Congressional language associated with the FY2010 and FY2011 appropriations and authorization process is sufficient evidence of its intent to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program. The appropriation process needs to be explicit that, absent explicit language to the contrary, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act stands. It also should include language that requires the Department of Energy to preserve all necessary records until the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is amended or rescinded by specific Congressional action. (authors)

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French Innovative Thermal Treatment Processes for The Management Radioactive Organic Liquid Waste - 19017

The nuclear industry as well as hospitals or some research laboratories produce Radioactive Organic Liquid Waste (ROLW) such as scintillation cocktails for medical imaging, labeled molecules for medical research or liquids from former activities. In order to be compatible with disposal facilities requirements, this waste must be inerted and stabilized in solid matrix. The route generally used is incineration in the Centraco facilities at the Marcoule site (Gard, France), ashes produced being cemented downstream. However, liquids whose chemical or radiological characteristics are not compatible with the incinerator operating rules (high level of {sup 14}C or halogen content, corrosive gas production etc.) cannot follow this path. The purpose of the MILOR project is then to propose alternative paths to treat all kinds of ROLW. Initiated in September 2017, this project has the technical objective of developing, over a four-year period, two pilot-scale mineralization processes. Two variants of complementary plasma technologies are evaluated: aerial plasma with the 'IDOHL' process and submerged plasma with the 'ELIPSE' process. Compared with other methods, thermal plasmas have unique characteristics such as rapid decomposition with high throughput, fast startup and shutdown, and high-energy delivery. The process called IDOHL consists of a process involving an induction plasma in which the liquids are directly introduced. It has been designed for organic liquids without mineral load and for treatment rates less than 0.5 l/h. This type of plasma allows the destruction of liquid organohalogens without any prior evaporation or treatment. Specific gas treatment systems have been developed to direct the gas produced to a dry or wet gas treatment system. One aim of the project is to subsequently install the process in a radioactive zone at Saclay DRF. The second called ELIPSE consists of a breakthrough process involving a submerged plasma at the heart of which organic liquids are also introduced. Current research has demonstrated that such a technique may enable the instantaneous and complete destruction of liquids with a wide variety of constituents, such as chlorine, fluorine, or phosphorus. The submersion solution offers many advantages: quenching and cleaning of combustion gases; filtering of the particles they contain; and cooling maintained for the entire process, which guarantees excellent corrosion control. An advantage of this type of design is that the gas treatment system can be reduced to a demister-condenser followed by a simple safety filter, thereby offering the additional advantage of an extremely compact treatment system. This design also allows the ELIPSE process to become by this way an embeddable process if required. The MILOR project, financed by the French State through investment program is a tripartite project bringing together Andra, in charge of radioactive waste management, the CEA in charge of leading scientific and technological researches to propose effective ways of treatment and the company A3i whose role is to ensure the subsequent industrial development. (authors)

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Fuel cycle analysis of once-through nuclear systems.

Once-through fuel cycle systems are commercially used for the generation of nuclear power, with little exception. The bulk of these once-through systems have been water-cooled reactors (light-water and heavy water reactors, LWRs and HWRs). Some gas-cooled reactors are used in the United Kingdom. The commercial power systems that are exceptions use limited recycle (currently one recycle) of transuranic elements, primarily plutonium, as done in Europe and nearing deployment in Japan. For most of these once-through fuel cycles, the ultimate storage of the used (spent) nuclear fuel (UNF, SNF) will be in a geologic repository. Besides the commercial nuclear plants, new once-through concepts are being proposed for various objectives under international advanced nuclear fuel cycle studies and by industrial and venture capital groups. Some of the objectives for these systems include: (1) Long life core for remote use or foreign export and to support proliferation risk reduction goals - In these systems the intent is to achieve very long core-life with no refueling and limited or no access to the fuel. Most of these systems are fast spectrum systems and have been designed with the intent to improve plant economics, minimize nuclear waste, enhance system safety, and reduce proliferation risk. Some of these designs are being developed under Generation IV International Forum activities and have generally not used fuel blankets and have limited the fissile content of the fuel to less than 20% for the purpose on meeting international nonproliferation objectives. In general, the systems attempt to use transuranic elements (TRU) produced in current commercial nuclear power plants as this is seen as a way to minimize the amount of the problematic radio-nuclides that have to be stored in a repository. In this case, however, the reprocessing of the commercial LWR UNF to produce the initial fuel will be necessary. For this reason, some of the systems plan to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. Examples of systems in this class include the small modular reactors being considered internationally; e.g. 4S [Tsuboi 2009], Hyperion Power Module [Deal 2010], ARC-100 [Wade 2010], and SSTAR [Smith 2008]. (2) Systems for Resource Utilization - In recent years, interest has developed in the use of advanced nuclear designs for the effective utilization of fuel resources. Systems under this class have generally utilized the breed and burn concept in which fissile material is bred and used in situ in the reactor core. Due to the favorable breeding that is possible with fast neutrons, these systems have tended to be fast spectrum systems. In the once-through concepts (as opposed to the traditional multirecycle approach typically considered for fast reactors), an ignition (or starter) zone contains driver fuel which is fissile material. This zone is designed to last a long time period to allow the breeding of sufficient fissile material in the adjoining blanket zone. The blanket zone is initially made of fertile depleted uranium fuel. This zone could also be made of fertile thorium fuel or recovered uranium from fuel reprocessing or natural uranium. However, given the bulk of depleted uranium and the potentially large inventory of recovered uranium, it is unlikely that the use of thorium is required in the near term in the U.S. Following the breeding of plutonium or fissile U-233 in the blanket, this zone or assembly then carries a larger fraction of the power generation in the reactor. These systems tend to also have a long cycle length (or core life) and they could be with or without fuel shuffling. When fuel is shuffled, the incoming fuel is generally depleted uranium (or thorium) fuel. In any case, fuel is burned once and then discharged. Examples of systems in this class include the CANDLE concept [Sekimoto 2001], the traveling wave reactor (TWR) concept of TerraPower [Ellis 2010], the ultra-long life fast reactor (ULFR) by ANL [Kim 2010], and the BNL fast mixed spectrum reactor (FMSR) concept [Fisher 1979]. (3) Thermal systems for resource extension - These systems were primarily considered during the INFCE/NASAP evaluations [NASAP 1979] and include various LWR designs for increasing resource utilization (both uranium and thorium). This class would include the Radkowsky seed-blanket concept. Also included in this class are the thermal reactor systems being considered for deployment as small modular reactors, such as IRIS [Carelli 2004], mPower [mPower], and NuScale [NuScale] that are all water cooled reactors. The purpose of this work is to provide relevant systems and fuel cycle information for some of these once-through fuel cycle systems. In this report, the intent is on providing information on most of the systems from open sources and from scoping studies recently done within the program. As there is insufficient fuel cycle information on the first class of systems, they are not discussed in this report.

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The INFODEM Information Centre at CEA Marcoule: A Unique Information Tool in Europe About Nuclear Decommissioning - 16217

In September 2014, the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) inaugurated a unique information center focused on decommissioning of its nuclear facilities. This facility, named INFODEM information center, is inside the main building of the G1 nuclear reactor at Marcoule, a nuclear site in the south of France with world-recognized expertise in decommissioning. Constructed in the 1950's, the G1 reactor was the first industrial-scale reactor for plutonium production in France; it was also used to produce electricity. Operations ceased in 1968, and it was progressively dismantled (through removal of fuel and main components) and placed in monitoring status. In the 1980s, mockups of fuel cycle process equipment were built under a temporary mission to support development activities for the La Hague reprocessing plant. When that ended, further dismantling occurred, and during 1996 through 2010, the site established itself as a reference example for worldwide nuclear dismantling activities. In 2012, the project to establish an information center at the reactor began, targeting three main audiences: the public, agency personnel and politicians, and technical professionals. Considerable thought went into the facility design, to address the interests and information needs of these three audiences. The INFODEM concept extended over 800 square meters (about 960 square yards), to host an informative tour addressing several major themes: CEA's D and D strategy, programs, skills, tools and methodologies and 'everyday life' on decommissioning projects. Illustrating its unique value and considerable success, INFODEM received the Public Information Prize from the French Nuclear Energy Society (SFEN) in June 2015. (authors)

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Characterization of high level nuclear waste glass samples following extended melter idling

The Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) melter was recently idled with glass remaining in the melt pool and riser for approximately three months. This situation presented a unique opportunity to collect and analyze glass samples since outages of this duration are uncommon. The objective of this study was to obtain insight into the potential for crystal formation in the glass resulting from an extended idling period. The results will be used to support development of a crystal-tolerant approach for operation of the high-level waste melter at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Two glass pour stream samples were collected from DWPF when the melter was restarted after idling for three months. The samples did not contain crystallization that was detectible by X-ray diffraction. Electron microscopy identified occasional spinel and noble metal crystals of no practical significance. Occasional platinum particles were observed by microscopy as an artifact of the sample collection method. Reduction/oxidation measurements showed that the pour stream glasses were fully oxidized, which was expected after the extended idling period. Chemical analysis of the pour stream glasses revealed slight differences in the concentrations of some oxides relative to analyses of the melter feed composition prior to the idling period. While these differences may be within the analytical error of the laboratories, the trends indicate that there may have been some amount of volatility associated with some of the glass components, and that there may have been interaction of the glass with the refractory components of the melter. These changes in composition, although small, can be attributed to the idling of the melter for an extended period. The changes in glass composition resulted in a 70-100 °C increase in the predicted spinel liquidus temperature (TL) for the pour stream glass samples relative to the analysis of the melter feed prior to the outage. This indicates that the potential for spinel crystallization increased as a result of idling for an extended period. However, the predicted TL of the pour stream glasses remained 150-200 °C below the mean melt pool temperature of about 1125 °C during the idling period. Given the change in predicted TL over the three month outage, the results indicate that it is important to have a thorough understanding of spinel crystallization within the melter for WTP to operate with a volume percent crystallization constraint. This knowledge will enable process control routines to be developed that avoid bulk crystallization in the melter and allow for recovery from off-normal events. The current WTP crystal-tolerant glass program will develop an improved understanding of spinel crystallization in the WTP melter to allow for operation at maximum waste loading in glass composition systems limited by predictions of spinel crystallization.

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Investigating suspension of mst slurries in a pilot-scale waste tank

The Small Column Ion Exchange (SCIX) process is being developed to remove cesium, strontium, and actinides from Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste using an existing waste tank (i.e., Tank 41H) to house the process. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is conducting pilot-scale mixing tests to determine the pump requirements for suspending monosodium titanate (MST), crystalline silicotitanate (CST), and simulated sludge. The purpose of this pilot scale testing is for the pumps to suspend the MST particles so that MST can be removed from the tank. The pilot-scale tank is a 1/10.85 linear scaled model of Tank 41H. The tank diameter, tank liquid level, pump nozzle diameter, pump elevation, and cooling coil diameter are all 1/10.85 of their dimensions in Tank 41H. The pump locations correspond to the proposed locations in Tank 41H by the SCIX program (Risers B5 and B2 for two pump configurations and Risers B5, B3, and B1 for three pump configurations).

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STATISTICAL SAMPLING FOR IN-SERVICE INSPECTION OF LIQUID WASTE TANKS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR) is implementing a statistical sampling strategy for In-Service Inspection (ISI) of Liquid Waste (LW) Tanks at the United States Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina. As a component of SRS's corrosion control program, the ISI program assesses tank wall structural integrity through the use of ultrasonic testing (UT). The statistical strategy for ISI is based on the random sampling of a number of vertically oriented unit areas, called strips, within each tank. The number of strips to inspect was determined so as to attain, over time, a high probability of observing at least one of the worst 5% in terms of pitting and corrosion across all tanks. The probability estimation to determine the number of strips to inspect was performed using the hypergeometric distribution. Statistical tolerance limits for pit depth and corrosion rates were calculated by fitting the lognormal distribution to the data. In addition to the strip sampling strategy, a single strip within each tank was identified to serve as the baseline for a longitudinal assessment of the tank safe operational life. The statistical sampling strategy enables the ISI program to develop individual profiles of LW tank wall structural integrity that collectively provide a high confidence in their safety and integrity over operational lifetimes.

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LAWPS Technology Maturation Program and Scaled Testing - 16589

The Technology Maturation Program for the Low-Activity Waste Pre-Treatment System (LAWPS) had been developed utilizing the guidance of DOE-Order 413.3B for Technology Readiness and Technology Maturation. The technology maturation plan (TMP) for LAWPS established principal technology elements (TEs) for the proposed process, designated critical technology elements (CTEs), and identified the necessary activities to mature the technologies for successful deployment of the LAWPS System. The TMP is being utilized to guide the CTEs advancement to Technical Readiness Level (TRL) 6 for the combined Critical Decision 2 and 3 Milestones (CD-2/3) in the 413.3B process. The development of the TMP, the multi-scale testing program, culminating in the integrated scale testing as a predecessor to achieve TRL 6 are presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Progress report on the mechanical testing and thermal aging of Zr-bearing ferritic steels

The mission of the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technology (NEET) program is to develop cross-cutting technologies for nuclear energy applications. Advanced structural materials with superior performance at elevated temperatures are always desired for nuclear reactors, which can improve reactor economics, safety margins, and design flexibility. They benefit not only new reactors including advanced light water reactors (LWRs) and fast reactors such as sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) primarily designed for management of high-level wastes, but also the extension of the existing fleet when component exchange is needed. Developing and utilizing the modern materials science tools (experimental, theoretical, and computational tools) is an important path to more efficient alloy development and process optimization.

Tan, Lizhen↗

Optimization and testing results of Zr-bearing ferritic steels

The mission of the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) program is to develop crosscutting technologies for nuclear energy applications. Advanced structural materials with superior performance at elevated temperatures are always desired for nuclear reactors, which can improve reactor economics, safety margins, and design flexibility. They benefit not only new reactors, including advanced light water reactors (LWRs) and fast reactors such as sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) that is primarily designed for management of high-level wastes, but also life extension of the existing fleet when component exchange is needed. Developing and utilizing the modern materials science tools (experimental, theoretical, and computational tools) is an important path to more efficient alloy development and process optimization. Ferritic-martensitic (FM) steels are important structural materials for nuclear reactors due to their advantages over other applicable materials like austenitic stainless steels, notably their resistance to void swelling, low thermal expansion coefficients, and higher thermal conductivity. However, traditional FM steels exhibit a noticeable yield strength reduction at elevated temperatures above ~500°C, which limits their applications in advanced nuclear reactors which target operating temperatures at 650°C or higher. Although oxide-dispersion-strengthened (ODS) ferritic steels have shown excellent high-temperature performance, their extremely high cost, limited size and fabricability of products, as well as the great difficulty with welding and joining, have limited or precluded their commercial applications. Zirconium has shown many benefits to Fe-base alloys such as grain refinement, improved phase stability, and reduced radiation-induced segregation. The ultimate goal of this project is, with the aid of computational modeling tools, to accelerate the development of a new generation of Zr-bearing ferritic alloys to be fabricated using conventional steelmaking practices, which have excellent radiation resistance and enhanced high-temperature creep performance greater than Grade 91.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗