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Assessment and Coordination of EVSE Cybersecurity Standards

Cybersecurity certification programs for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) are fragmented due to no single certification covering all aspects of the device and additionally the existence of multiple programs and under different levels of regulation. These devices are also confronted by the intricate assembly of product software, firmware, and hardware. Devices contain both logical and physical interfaces. These multifaceted devices have vulnerabilities at many levels and interconnect with other potentially vulnerable systems including the electric vehicle, the cloud where data and payment information are stored, and the electric grid and electric grid equipment including utilities. Of the EVSE certification programs that are found, none are directly for the cybersecurity of EVSE. Many standards are for safety, specifically battery safety, some are cybersecurity standards for other types of equipment and can be modeled for EVSE. In specific, ISA/IEC 62443 is found to be significantly in line with EVSE security needs and will be used in future testing to certify EVSE and help guide the project to demonstrate where gaps exist, where strengths lie in the standard and how this can be used to lead the certification efforts in harmonizing EVSE cybersecurity standards. In addition, there are multiple efforts that are currently seeking to build EVSE standards or revise existing standards to address gaps. This effort is seeking to establish a cybersecurity program for EVSE that will inform customers and help increase the level of security across products and state EVSE procurements to achieve consistency across different jurisdictions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

IAEA Domestic Inspections in the US

The Voluntary Offer Agreement between the United States and the IAEA for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the United States, INFCIRC/288, entered into force in 1980. Under this Agreement, the United States provides to the IAEA an Eligible Facilities List, which lists facilities eligible for IAEA inspection and verification of compliance through either a reporting-only process or for full-scope safeguards (to include inspections). Approximately 300 facilities are currently listed on the Eligible Facilities List. Since 1981, the IAEA has conducted over 700 inspections on ~20 of these facilities. Currently, four NRC-licensed facilities have been selected under the Initial (Reporting) Protocol, and one DOE facility, KAMS at the SRS, has been selected for full-scope safeguards. These IAEA inspections are documented in the ID/288 database managed by staff at ORNL and the Y-12 National Security Complex for the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This database also maintains records of US designated inspectors, the status of indices checks, and inspection schedules. The database was most recently updated in FY 2014 to include information related to the IAEA visit to URENCO-USA in New Mexico and will be upgraded again via proposal in FY 2017 to include the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) inspections in the US Caribbean territories, associated with INFCIRC/366. During the FY 2017 upgrade, the system will also be overhauled to allow for quicker updates and to improve performance using a modern software package.

White-Horton, Jessica↗

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗

Sparow-Examples

SAND2026-16701O SPAROW-Examples software provides a repository of stochastic programming examples designed to demonstrate Sandia's SPAROW optimization library. This resource helps users learn to develop complex applications with SPAROW by offering reference implementations that can be used to test and enhance new optimization solvers. The library offers a diverse range of simple and complex exemplars, including those related to power grid applications such as unit commitment and expansion planning. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Hart, William [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Live↗

Waste Characterization Process

The purpose is to provide guidance to the Radiological Characterization Reviewer to complete the radiological characterization of waste items. This information is used for Department of Transportation (DOT) shipping and disposal, typically at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Complete characterization ensures compliance with DOT shipping laws and NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). The fines for noncompliance can be extreme. This does not include possible bad press, and endangerment to the public, employees and the environment. A Radiological Characterization Reviewer has an important role in the organization. The scope is to outline the characterization process, but does not to include every possible situation. The Radiological Characterization Reviewer position requires a strong background in Health Physics; therefore, these concepts are minimally addressed. The characterization process includes many Excel spreadsheets that were developed by Michael Enghauser known as the WCT software suite. New Excel spreadsheets developed as part of this project include the Ra- 226 Decider and the Density Calculator by Jesse Bland, MicroShield Density Calculator and Molecular Weight Calculator by Pat Lambert.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗

Adoption of a token-based authentication model for the CMS Submission Infrastructure

The CMS Submission Infrastructure (SI) is the main computing resource provisioning system for CMS workloads. A number of HTCondor pools are employed to manage this infrastructure, which aggregates geographically distributed resources from the WLCG and other providers. Historically, the model of authentication among the diverse components of this infrastructure has relied on the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI), based on identities and X509 certificates. In contrast, commonly used modern authentication standards are based on capabilities and tokens. The WLCG has identified this trend and aims at a transparent replacement of GSI for all its workload management, data transfer and storage access operations, to be completed during the current LHC Run 3. As part of this effort, and within the context of CMS computing, the Submission Infrastructure group is in the process of phasing out the GSI part of its authentication layers, in favor of IDTokens and Scitokens. The use of tokens is already well integrated into the HTCondor Software Suite, which has allowed us to fully migrate the authentication between internal components of SI. Additionally, recent versions of the HTCondor-CE support tokens as well, enabling CMS resource requests to Grid sites employing this CE technology to be granted by means of token exchange. After a rollout campaign to sites, successfully completed by the third quarter of 2022, the totality of HTCondor CEs in use by CMS are already receiving Scitoken-based pilot jobs. On the ARC CE side, a parallel campaign was launched to foster the adoption of the REST interface at CMS sites (required to enable token-based job submission via HTCondor-G), which is nearing completion as well. In this contribution, the newly adopted authentication model will be described. We will then report on the migration status and final steps towards complete GSI phase out in the CMS SI.

Pérez-Calero Yzquierdo, Antonio↗

Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Patching

While computer systems, software applications, and operational technology (OT)/Industrial Control System (ICS) devices are regularly updated through automated and manual processes, there are several unique challenges associated with distributed energy resource (DER) patching. Millions of DER devices from dozens of vendors have been deployed in home, corporate, and utility network environments that may or may not be internet-connected. These devices make up a growing portion of the electric power critical infrastructure system and are expected to operate for decades. During that operational period, it is anticipated that critical and noncritical firmware patches will be regularly created to improve DER functional capabilities or repair security deficiencies in the equipment. The SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup created a Patching Subgroup to investigate appropriate recommendations for the DER patching, holding fortnightly meetings for more than nine months. The group focused on DER equipment, but the observations and recommendations contained in this report also apply to DERMS tools and other OT equipment used in the end-to-end DER communication environment. The group found there were many standards and guides that discuss firmware lifecycles, patch and asset management, and code-signing implementations, but did not singularly cover the needs of the DER industry. This report collates best practices from these standards organizations and establishes a set of best practices that may be used as a basis for future national or international patching guides or standards.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

ACES: Infrastructure As Code. Model Optimization and Performance Capability

Infrastructure as Code (IaC) refers to managing infrastructure (networks, physical/virtual machines, storage, and connection topology) in a descriptive model/language, rather than configuring it manually or using interactive configuration tools. Just like source code can be compiled to generate the same binary code, IaC enables generating the same environment every time it is applied. IaC is a key DevOps practice and is generally used in conjunction with continuous integration (CI) and continuous delivery (CD). In CI, all code changes are merged into a mainline branch and validated multiple times a day as developers check in their changes to the source code. In CD on the other hand, code changes are automatically packaged for a new release-to-production on a regular basis. This typically enables teams to deliver software changes much more quickly and often. Developing and managing the ACES platform using (IaC) is vital for the robust deployment and continued sustainment of this foundational computing capability. IaC and DevOps practices will help us solve many of the common challenges often encountered in developing and maintaining compute infrastructure. First, it will make the provisioning, deployment, and maintenance of the compute infrastructure across multiple environments much more efficient. Second, these processes help make the overall system much more stable by continuously testing new changes as they are introduced to the system. Third, it allows us to be much more confident of the security controls in place since they can be tested as part of the CI process and all new changes can be audited and tracked. Finally, IaC enables the ACES Platform to be adaptable to the emerging technologies due to its ability to spin up different test beds to evaluate and incorporate these technologies. This document addresses common infrastructure-management challenges, describes what happens if they are not addressed, and highlights the value of utilizing IaC to tackle them. Finally, we will provide a high-level overview of the IaC and DevOps practices being utilized by the ACES Platform team.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Enhancing the Earth System Grid Authentication Infrastructure through Single Sign-On and Autoprovisioning

Climate scientists face an overarching need to efficiently access and manipulate climate model data. Increasingly, researchers must assemble and analyze large datasets that are archived in different formats on disparate platforms and must extract portions of datasets to compute statistical or diagnostic metrics in place. The need for a common virtual environment in which to access both climate model datasets and analysis tools is therefore keenly felt. The software infrastructure to support such an environment must not only provide ready access to climate data but must also facilitate the use of visualization software, diagnostic algorithms, and related resources. To this end, the Earth System Grid Center for Enabling Technologies (ESG-CET) was established in 2006 by the Scientific Discovery through Advanced Computing program of the U.S. Department of Energy through the Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research and the Office Biological and Environmental Research within the Office of Science. ESG-CET is working to advance climate science by developing computational resources for accessing and managing model data that are physically located in distributed multiplatform archives. In this paper, we discuss recent development and implementation efforts by the Earth System Grid (ESG) concerning its security infrastructure. ESG's requirements are to make user logon as easy as possible and to facilitate the integration of security services and Grid components for both developers and system administrators. To meet that goal, we leverage existing primary authentication mechanisms, deploy a 'lightweight' but secure OpenID WebSSO, deploy a 'lightweight' X.509-PKI, and use autoprovisioning to ease the burden of security configuration management. We are close to completing the associated development and deployment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

EAM-X Potential Generator

SAND2023-06608O The EAM-X Potential Generator code establishes parameters that describe interactions between atoms in pure metals and alloys. The open-source software allows for the understanding of the relationship between general properties of atoms and macroscopic properties of metals. The code reads in values for the parameters of the model and outputs a table that describes the interactions. This code will be published by Acta Materialia along with two papers describing the method. The output of this code is meant for use by the LAMMPS simulation code created by Sandia. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Chandross, Michael↗

Statistical physics of networks, information and complex systems

In this project we explore the mathematical methods and concepts of statistical physics that are fmding abundant applications across the scientific and technological spectrum from soft condensed matter systems and bio-infonnatics to economic and social systems. Our approach exploits the considerable similarity of concepts between statistical physics and computer science, allowing for a powerful multi-disciplinary approach that draws its strength from cross-fertilization and mUltiple interactions of researchers with different backgrounds. The work on this project takes advantage of the newly appreciated connection between computer science and statistics and addresses important problems in data storage, decoding, optimization, the infonnation processing properties of the brain, the interface between quantum and classical infonnation science, the verification of large software programs, modeling of complex systems including disease epidemiology, resource distribution issues, and the nature of highly fluctuating complex systems. Common themes that the project has been emphasizing are (i) neural computation, (ii) network theory and its applications, and (iii) a statistical physics approach to infonnation theory. The project's efforts focus on the general problem of optimization and variational techniques, algorithm development and infonnation theoretic approaches to quantum systems. These efforts are responsible for fruitful collaborations and the nucleation of science efforts that span multiple divisions such as EES, CCS, 0 , T, ISR and P. This project supports the DOE mission in Energy Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation by developing novel infonnation science tools for communication, sensing, and interacting complex networks such as the internet or energy distribution system. The work also supports programs in Threat Reduction and Homeland Security.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Smart Planning for Radioactive Source Transport Advanced Tools for Increased Safety and Efficiency

End-of-life (EOL) management of high-activity radioactive sources is made uniquely challenging by the inherent risks associated with storage and transportation of these sources, the complex logistics involved, and the strict requirements for regulatory compliance. Traditional methods lack comprehensive tools for accurate site assessments and precision planning for the transportation of radioactive sources. They also frequently fail to provide the adaptability required to consider diverse operational environments, resulting in inefficiencies and potential safety concerns. This paper introduces a novel software solution developed to address these issues by integrating advanced technologies such as light detection and ranging (LiDAR)-based 3D environment modeling, smart dynamic route planning, and customizable measurement functionalities. This software enables detailed terrain visualizations, facilitating thorough environmental assessments and enabling users to virtually navigate, analyze, and plan site-specific operations. Among the key features are a user-centric interface for virtual navigation, precise site measurement tools for site evaluations, interactive visualizations that highlight potential operational hazards, dynamic route planning capabilities, and real-time collision detection to promote safe workflows. By demonstrating the effectiveness of this tool through real-world application, the present work underscores the tool’s potential to revolutionize radioactive source EOL management by improving operational efficiencies, minimizing risk, and advancing the state of practice to achieve suitable and secure radioactive material handling.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

TChem-atm v1.0

SAND2024-11300O TChem-atm is a software library that was developed to solve complex kinetic models for atmospheric chemistry applications. TChem-atm interface employs a hierarchical parallelism design to exploit the massive parallelism available from modern computing platforms. It also supports gas atmospheric chemistry applications, e.g., the energy exascale earth system model. TChem can be used as a box model or coupled with a climate model to compute the time evolution of gas tracer species. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Safta, Cosmin↗

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process for Digital Instrumentation and Control Upgrades of Nuclear Power Plants

Most of the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the world rely on traditional analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for monitoring, control, and protection functions. With the industrial base largely moving to digital systems, the operation and maintenance of plants involves managing issues including lack of needed analog spare parts, increasing maintenance costs, and the loss of vendor support. Compared with existing analog I&C systems, digital I&C systems have significant functional advantages, such as reliable system performance in terms of accuracy and computational capability, high data handling and storage capabilities to fully measure and display operating conditions, and improved capabilities (e.g., fault tolerance, self-testing, signal validation, process system diagnostics). Therefore, the U.S. nuclear power industry has initiated the replacement of existing, aging analog systems with digital I&C technology, and is developing new designs for advanced plants using digital systems in integrated control rooms to provide modern control and protection systems. However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. A CCF is the malfunction of two or more plant components or functions due to a single failure source. CCFs have the potential to generate unanalyzed events or sequences that may not be bounded by previous plant accident analyses, therefore, to challenge the plant safety. Existing analyses on CCF in I&C systems are mainly focusing on hardware failures. With the application and upgrades of new digital I&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws have become a potential threat to plant safety considering most redundancy designs are using the similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Therefore, there is a need to develop an integrated risk assessment strategy with digital CCF and plant transient responses considered to assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital digital systems and reduce uncertainties in costs, time, and support integration of digital systems in the plant. The overall goal of this project is to deliver a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure digital I&C technologies for the digital upgrades to existing NPPs. To deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, this technical basis is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed-up industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for digital I&C upgrades including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis; (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address CCFs and quantify responding failure probabilities for digital I&C technologies; (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level; and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced digital I&C technologies on NPPs. Upgrading digital I&C (safety and non-safety related) systems in existing NPPs within a cost-effective and regulatory acceptable way offers the foremost means of performance improvements and cost-reductions for existing NPPs. One key outcome of this project is to perform plant-specific risk assessment to provide a sustainable scientific support for enabling industry to balance the digital-related risks, costs, reliability, and safety.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

TINES - Time Integration, Newton and Eigen Solver v. 1.0

SAND2021-1505 O. TINES is an open source software providing math infrastructure for solving many stiff time ordinary differential equations (ODEs) and/or differential algebraic equations (DAEs) using a batch hierarchical parallelism. The code is written using a parallel programming model (i.e., Kokkos) to future-proof the next generation parallel computing platforms such as GPU accelerators. This code is developed to support Exascale Catalytic Chemistry (ECC) Project. The code provides fundamental math helpers that can aid other research projects. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Kim, Kyungjoo↗

Using the Domain Name System to Thwart Automated Client-Based Attacks

On the Internet, attackers can compromise systems owned by other people and then use these systems to launch attacks automatically. When attacks such as phishing or SQL injections are successful, they can have negative consequences including server downtime and the loss of sensitive information. Current methods to prevent such attacks are limited in that they are application-specific, or fail to block attackers. Phishing attempts can be stopped with email filters, but if the attacker manages to successfully bypass these filters, then the user must determine if the email is legitimate or not. Unfortunately, they often are unable to do so. Since attackers have a low success rate, they attempt to compensate for it in volume. In order to have this high throughput, attackers take shortcuts and break protocols. We use this knowledge to address these issues by implementing a system that can detect malicious activity and use it to block attacks. If the client fails to follow proper procedure, they can be classified as an attacker. Once an attacker has been discovered, they will be isolated and monitored. This can be accomplished using existing software in Ubuntu Linux applications, along with our custom wrapper application. After running the system and seeing its performance on three popular Web browsers Chromium, Firefox and Internet Explorer as well as two popular email clients, Thunderbird and Evolution, we found that not only is this system conceivable, it is effective and has low overhead.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Empirical Estimates of 0Day Vulnerabilities in Control Systems

We define a 0Day vulnerability to be any vulnerability, in deployed software, which has been discovered by at least one person but has not yet been publicly announced or patched. These 0Day vulnerabilities are of particular interest when assessing the risk to well managed control systems which have already effectively mitigated the publicly known vulnerabilities. In these well managed systems the risk contribution from 0Days will have proportionally increased. To aid understanding of how great a risk 0Days may pose to control systems, an estimate of how many are in existence is needed. Consequently, using the 0Day definition given above, we developed and applied a method for estimating how many 0Day vulnerabilities are in existence on any given day. The estimate is made by: empirically characterizing the distribution of the lifespans, measured in days, of 0Day vulnerabilities; determining the number of vulnerabilities publicly announced each day; and applying a novel method for estimating the number of 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day using the number of vulnerabilities publicly announced each day and the previously derived distribution of 0Day lifespans. The method was first applied to a general set of software applications by analyzing the 0Day lifespans of 491 software vulnerabilities and using the daily rate of vulnerability announcements in the National Vulnerability Database. This led to a conservative estimate that in the worst year there were, on average, 2500 0Day software related vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. Using a smaller but intriguing set of 15 0Day software vulnerability lifespans representing the actual time from discovery to public disclosure, we then made a more aggressive estimate. In this case, we estimated that in the worst year there were, on average, 4500 0Day software vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. We then proceeded to identify the subset of software applications likely to be used in some control systems, analyzed the associated subset of vulnerabilities, and characterized their lifespans. Using the previously developed method of analysis, we very conservatively estimated 250 control system related 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. While reasonable, this first order estimate for control systems is probably far more conservative than those made for general software systems since the estimate did not include vulnerabilities unique to control system specific components. These control system specific vulnerabilities were unable to be included in the estimate for a variety of reasons with the most problematic being that the public announcement of unique control system vulnerabilities is very sparse. Consequently, with the intent to improve the above 0Day estimate for control systems, we first identified the additional, unique to control systems, vulnerability estimation constraints and then investigated new mechanisms which may be useful for estimating the number of unique 0Day software vulnerabilities found in control system components. We proceeded to identify a number of new mechanisms and approaches for estimating and incorporating control system specific vulnerabilities into an improved 0Day estimation method. These new mechanisms and approaches appear promising and will be more rigorously evaluated during the course of the next year.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗