Safeguards inventory and process monitoring regulatory comparison
Detecting the theft or diversion of the relatively small amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon given the normal operating capacity of many of today’s running nuclear production facilities is a difficult task. As throughput increases, the ability of the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) Program to detect the material loss decreases because the statistical measurement uncertainty also increases. The challenge faced is the ability of current accounting, measurement, and material control programs to detect small yet significant losses under some regulatory approaches can decrease to the point where it is extremely low if not practically non-existent at normal operating capacities. Adding concern to this topic is that there are variations among regulatory bodies as far as what is considered a Significant Quantity (SQ). Some research suggests that thresholds should be lower than those found in any current regulation which if adopted would make meeting detection goals even more difficult. This paper reviews and compares the current regulatory requirements for the MA elements related to physical inventory, uncertainty of the Inventory Difference (ID), and Process Monitoring (PM) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Rosatom of the Russian Federation and the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) of China. The comparison looks at how the regulatory requirements for the implementation of various MA elements perform across a range of operating capacities in example facilities.