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At least 955 records · Page 53

Uranus Flagship-class Orbiter and Probe Using Aerocapture

Exploration of the Ice Giants, especially Uranus, via orbiter and atmospheric probes, is required to answer pressing science questions that have been raised in the latest National Academies of Sciences Planetary Decadal Survey. Since the Ice Giants are the farthest planets from Earth, traditional fully-propulsive orbit insertion missions have transit times to the planetary bodies bordering 13-15 years and require a large amount of propellant (wet mass percentages of around 60-70%) for the orbit insertion maneuver, leaving less mass for the scientific payload and a planetary probe. Aerocapture uses aerodynamic forces generated by flight within a planetary atmosphere to decelerate and achieve orbit insertion. Aerocapture has been considered for several past missions but it has not been demonstrated. However, recent developments in thermal protection systems (TPS), guidance and control (G&C), and interplanetary navigation capabilities show the potential for using rigid, heritage entry vehicle configurations already flown at other planetary bodies for Ice Giants aerocapture. Aerocapture can robustly deliver spacecraft to Ice Giant orbits, while substantially increasing on-orbit payload mass (more than 40%) that can be used for a robust atmospheric entry probe. Additionally, the aerocapture maneuver would reduce the interplanetary transit time by 2-5 years (15-30%) relative to fully-propulsive orbit insertion. Recent work has shown that a flagship-class mission can be conducted in a shorter time than fully-propulsive missions if using aerocapture. This paper will consider the merits of including aerocapture as the orbit-insertion mechanism for a Uranus mission. Specifically, the implications of aerocapture orbit insertion for in-situ atmospheric probes will be discussed. The Uranus Orbiter and Probe concept mission study [3] is considered as the potential payload. Results from a recent NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD)-funded activity that is designing an aerocapture mission for a Uranus orbiter will be presented.

Soumyo Dutta↗

Campus Challenge - Part 2: Benefits and Challenges of BACnet

Additional challenges of implementing a BACnet network in a large campus environment are explored in this article: providing BACnet campus connectivity, protecting BACnet network traffic, and controlling the resulting broadcast traffic. An example of BACnet implementation is also presented, unifying concepts presented in this and Part One of the article.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Methods and systems for evaluating data transportability in distribution grids

This document describes systems and techniques for evaluating and improving distribution-grid data transportability. These systems and techniques allow engineers to quantify the data transportability of a communication system within or connected to a distribution grid, which represents an ability to transport in real-time telemetry from source locations (e.g., sensors in the distribution grid) to control mechanisms. Distribution engineers can use the sensor readings to perform grid analytics, control operating parameters, and operate protection systems. Distribution engineers can also use the transportability of the communication system to evaluate the observability of the distribution grid, which represents an ability to combine actual measurements and various types of computations (e.g., analytics, estimators, forecasters) from a system model. Distribution engineers can then generate a sensor allocation plan that indicates the number and location of sensors to maximize observability for a fixed sensor cost and/or minimize sensor cost for predetermined observability.

Taft, Jeffrey D.↗

Regulatory Framework for Salt Waste Disposal and Tank Closure at the Savannah River Site - 13663

The end of the Cold War has left a legacy of approximately 37 million gallons of radioactive waste in the aging waste tanks at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). A robust program is in place to remove waste from these tanks, treat the waste to separate into a relatively small volume of high-level waste and a large volume of low-level waste, and to actively dispose of the low-level waste on-site and close the waste tanks and associated ancillary structures. To support performance-based, risk-informed decision making and to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its current and past contractors have worked closely with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop and implement a framework for on-site low-level waste disposal and closure of the SRS waste tanks. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides DOE the authority to manage defense-related radioactive waste. DOE Order 435.1 and its associated manual and guidance documents detail this radioactive waste management process. The DOE also has a requirement to consult with the NRC in determining that waste that formerly was classified as high-level waste can be safely managed as either low-level waste or transuranic waste. Once DOE makes a determination, NRC then has a responsibility to monitor DOE's actions in coordination with SCDHEC to ensure compliance with the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 61 (10CFR61), Subpart C performance objectives. The management of hazardous waste substances or components at SRS is regulated by SCDHEC and the EPA. The foundation for the interactions between DOE, SCDHEC and EPA is the SRS Federal Facility Agreement (FFA). Managing this array of requirements and successfully interacting with regulators, consultants and stakeholders is a challenging task but ensures thorough and thoughtful processes for disposing of the SRS low-level waste and the closure of the tank farm facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Panel Session 12: Effective Aspects of the 2016 Consent Order between DOE-EM-LA Field Office - NM Environment Department and Identifying Comparable Approaches

This panel focused on the extremely effective 2016 Compliance Order on Consent executed between the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management - Los Alamos Field Office (EM-LA) and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and highlights practices and concepts toward developing an environmental compliance agreement that is mutually productive to both the NMED and the DOE. To further demonstrate successful practices, the panel also highlighted another very effective compliance agreement with comparable approaches - the 1993 Savannah River Site (SRS) Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) executed between DOE, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EM-LA, NMED, SRS, and SCDHEC representatives provided attendees an opportunity to understand and compare extremely effective approaches to regulatory compliance across the complex.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Control Systems Design for STS Accelerator

The Second Target Station (STS) Project will expand the capabilities of the existing Spallation Neutron Source (SNS), with a suite of neutron instruments optimized for long wavelengths. A new accelerator transport line will be built to deliver one out of four SNS pulses to the new target station. The Integrated Control Systems (ICS) will provide remote control, monitoring, OPI, alarms, and archivers for the accelerator systems, such as magnets power supply, vacuum devices, and beam instrumentation. The ICS will upgrade the existing Linac LLRF controls to allow independent operation of the FTS and STS and support different power levels of the FTS and STS proton beam. The ICS accelerator controls are in the phase of preliminary design for the control systems of magnet power supply, vacuum, LLRF, Timing, Machine protection system (MPS), and computing and machine network. The accelerator control systems build upon the existing SNS Machine Control systems, use the SNS standard hardware and EPICS software, and take full advantage of the performance gains delivered by the PPU Project at SNS.

Yan, Jay↗

Variable-frequency inverter controls torque, speed, and braking in ac induction motors

Dc to ac inverter provides optimum frequency and voltage to ac induction motor, in response to different motor-load and speed requirements. Inverter varies slip frequency of motor in proportion to required torque. Inverter protects motor from high current surges, controls negative slip to apply braking, and returns energy stored in momentum of load to dc power source.

Nola, F. J.↗

Policy, Regulatory, Legal, and Permitting Case Study Subtask 3.2 – Topical Report

This report summarizes the policy, regulatory, legal, and permitting requirements to-date for the siting of a CO 2 injection and storage project in the CarbonSAFE Illinois East Sub-Basin pre-feasibility study area. Where applicable, the East Sub-Basin case study focuses on a proposed carbon capture and storage (CCS) site location in West Terre Haute, Indiana. Indiana has established the legal mechanisms to obtain rights to the subsurface mineral estate with the expectation to apply to reservoir pore space for CO 2 storage in an analogous manner to storage of natural gas, which is a common practice in Indiana. There is, however, no precedent in Indiana to take liability for stored CO 2 . There are currently no Indiana State incentives for CCS, but at the Federal level, tax credits for carbon capture and storage under 26. U.S. Code § 45Q constitute the greatest incentive targeted at CCS projects. The amendment to these credits put forth in the Bipartisan Budget Act (the FUTURE Act) of 2018 substantially increases the per-ton incentive for CCS—from $22.66 per ton in tax year 2017 up to $50 per ton in tax year 2027, for CO 2 not used as an injectant (i.e. saline storage). Additional economic opportunities may exist for the provision of CO 2 for potential EOR in the Illinois Basin. Policies that may support the development of CO 2 pipelines and/or CCS projects in Indiana include: 1) Title 41 of the FAST Act (2015), which created a new governance structure, procedures, and funding authorities in order to improve and expedite Federal review and authorization of covered infrastructure projects, including pipelines, and 2) the Eminent Domain for Transportation of Carbon Dioxide by Pipeline (IC 14-39, Indiana State, 2011), which declares pipeline transportation of CO 2 exclusively to a carbon management application, including sequestration, enhanced oil recovery, and deep saline injection as a benefit to the welfare of Indiana and the people. The US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI rule and permit requirements address all components pertaining to CO 2 injection and monitoring for long-term storage, and outline the minimum technical criteria to protect underground sources of drinking water at, and surrounding, injection well sites. The Class VI requirements also address financial responsibility for corrective action, post-injection site care, and site closure. In addition, UIC Program public notice requirements include that the EPA issue notice of the draft permit preparation to key stakeholders, and open a public comment period of not less than 30 days. A public hearing about the permit would also be held, if specifically requested by the public. A potential Class VI CO 2 injection well permit for the East Sub-Basin case study site would be obtained through the US EPA Region 5, because the State of Indiana does not have UIC Class VI primacy. Although no CO 2 injection wells have been permitted in Indiana, the US EPA Region 5 (which covers Illinois and Indiana) and the East Sub-Basin CarbonSAFE team (via the Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium [MGSC]) have Class VI permitting experience from several projects located in Illinois. Based on our experience, applying for a Class VI permit can be an intensive and iterative process requiring clear communication and numerous interactions with EPA staff. In addition to gathering and preparing the data/models and documentation necessary for a permit application’s initial submittal, the subsequent public comments, EPA response and review, and answering of any follow-up questions/requests by the EPA could significantly increase the timeframe of draft permit issuance. The US EPA offers guidance documents regarding the specific Class VI permit requirements, and shows a general permitting timeline example from the FutureGen Alliance 2.0 covering one-and-a-half years from permit submittal to issuance. However, the overall permitting process to-date has a high degree of variability, and in MGSC’s project experience we observed a more extended timeline to receive Class VI permits for each of two CO 2 injection wells.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Impact of The Protective Renin-Angiotensin System (RAS) on The Vasoreparative Function of CD34+ CACs in Diabetic Retinopathy

Purpose: In diabetes, the impaired vasoreparative function of Circulating Angiogenic Cells (CACs) is believed to contribute to the progression of diabetic retinopathy (DR). Accumulating evidence suggests that the protective arm of renin-angiotensin system (RAS) ACE2 Angiotensin-(1-7) Mas plays an important role in restoring the function of diabetic CACs. We examined the protective RAS in CACs in diabetic individuals with different stages of retinopathy. Methods: Study subjects (n43) were recruited as controls or diabetics with either no DR, mild non-proliferative DR (NPDR), moderate NPDR, severe NPDR or proliferative DR (PDR). Fundus photography and fluorescein angiograms were analyzed using Vessel Generation Analysis (VESGEN) software in a cohort of subjects. CD34+ CACs were isolated from peripheral blood of diabetics and control subjects. RAS gene expressions in CACs were measured by qPCR. The vasoreparative function of CACs was assessed by migration ability toward CXCL12 using the QCM 5M 96-well chemotaxis cell migration assay. Results: ACE2 gene is a key enzyme converting the deleterious Angiotensin II to the beneficial Angiotensin-(1-7). ACE2 expression in CACs from diabetic subjects without DR was increased compared to controls, suggestive of compensation (p0.0437). The expression of Mas (Angiotensin-(1-7) receptor) in CACs was also increased in diabetics without DR, while was reduced in NPDR compared to controls (p0.0002), indicating a possible loss of compensation of the protective RAS at this stage of DR. The presence of even mild NPDR was associated with CD34+ CAC migratory dysfunction. When pretreating CACs of DR subjects with Angiotensin-(1-7), migratory ability to a chemoattractant CXCL12 was restored (p0.0008). By VESGEN analysis, an increase in small vessel density was observed in NPDR subjects when compared with the controls. Conclusions: These data suggest the protective RAS axis within diabetic CACs may help maintain their vasoreparative potential. The VESGEN analysis supports the presence of retinal repair in small vessels. The loss of the protective arm of RAS may predict the progression of DR.

diabetes↗

Design implications from AFTI/F-16 flight test

Advanced fighter technologies are evolving into highly complex systems. Flight controls are being integrated with advanced avionics to achieve a total system. The advanced fighter technology integration (AFTI) F-16 aircraft is an example of a highly complex digital flight control system integrated with advanced avionics and cockpit. The architecture of these new systems involves several general issues. The use of dissimilar backup modes if the primary system fails requires the designer to trade off system simplicity and capability. This tradeoff is evident in the AFTI/F-16 aircraft with its limited stability and fly-by-wire digital flight control systems. In case of a generic software failure, the backup or normal mode must provide equivalent envelope protection during the transition to degraded flight control. The complexity of systems like the AFTI/F-16 system defines a second design issue, which can be divided into two segments: the effect on testing, and the pilot's ability to act correctly in the limited time available for cockpit decisions. The large matrix of states possible with the AFTI/F-16 flight control system illustrates the difficulty of both testing the system and choosing real-time pilot actions.

Ishmael, S. D.↗

Controlling the corrosion resistance of multi-principal element alloys

Multi-principal element alloys (MPEAs) offer the possibility of many degrees of freedom in the choice of alloying elements to produce either single phase solid solutions or more complex multiphase microstructures. Large ranges of material properties have been observed for MPEAs and mastery of the selection of elements and their compositions can enable novel combinations of properties not possible in traditional alloys. From the aqueous corrosion perspective, optimization of phase stability, control of heterogeneities, passive film identity and its protectiveness, as well as substrate properties such as metal-metal bond strength and activation energy associated with dissolution, can all be controlling factors governed by alloy composition and structure. These factors can mediate the electrochemical reactions controlling spontaneous corrosion. The quest for superior properties based on well-informed element choice is suggested as a path forward guiding MPEA formulations for corrosion performance. However, gaps in fundamental knowledge exist regarding (a) the specific functions of each element, (b) the behavior of elements in unusual combinations, and (c) the formation of complex protective oxides. These issues currently hold back progress in optimization of corrosion properties.

Scully, John R.↗

A comparison of two multi-variable integrator windup protection schemes

Two methods are examined for limit and integrator wind-up protection for multi-input, multi-output linear controllers subject to actuator constraints. The methods begin with an existing linear controller that satisfies the specifications for the nominal, small perturbation, linear model of the plant. The controllers are formulated to include an additional contribution to the state derivative calculations. The first method to be examined is the multi-variable version of the single-input, single-output, high gain, Conventional Anti-Windup (CAW) scheme. Except for the actuator limits, the CAW scheme is linear. The second scheme to be examined, denoted the Modified Anti-Windup (MAW) scheme, uses a scalar to modify the magnitude of the controller output vector while maintaining the vector direction. The calculation of the scalar modifier is a nonlinear function of the controller outputs and the actuator limits. In both cases the constrained actuator is tracked. These two integrator windup protection methods are demonstrated on a turbofan engine control system with five measurements, four control variables, and four actuators. The closed-loop responses of the two schemes are compared and contrasted during limit operation. The issue of maintaining the direction of the controller output vector using the Modified Anti-Windup scheme is discussed and the advantages and disadvantages of both of the IWP methods are presented.

Mattern, Duane↗

Spacecraft Escape Capsule

A report discusses the Gumdrop capsule a conceptual spacecraft that would enable the crew to escape safely in the event of a major equipment failure at any time from launch through atmospheric re-entry. The scaleable Gumdrop capsule would comprise a command module (CM), a service module (SM), and a crew escape system (CES). The CM would contain a pressurized crew environment that would include avionic, life-support, thermal control, propulsive attitude control, and recovery systems. The SM would provide the primary propulsion and would also supply electrical power, life-support resources, and active thermal control to the CM. The CES would include a solid rocket motor, embedded within the SM, for pushing the CM away from the SM in the event of a critical thermal-protection-system failure or loss of control. The CM and SM would normally remain integrated with each other from launch through recovery, but could be separated using the CES, if necessary, to enable the safe recovery of the crew in the CM. The crew escape motor could be used, alternatively, as a redundant means of de-orbit propulsion for the CM in the event of a major system failure in the SM.

Robertson, Edward A.↗

MO-E-213-02: Medical Physicist Involvement in Implementing Patient Protection Standards

The focus of work of medical physicists in 1980’s was on quality control and quality assurance. Radiation safety was important but was dominated by occupational radiation protection. A series of over exposures of patients in radiotherapy, nuclear medicine and observation of skin injuries among patients undergoing interventional procedures in 1990’s started creating the need for focus on patient protection. It gave medical physicists new directions to develop expertise in patient dosimetry and dose management. Publications creating awareness on cancer risks from CT in early part of the current century and over exposures in CT in 2008 brought radiation risks in public domain and created challenging situations for medical physicists. Increasing multiple exposures of individual patient and patient doses of few tens of mSv or exceeding 100 mSv are increasing the role of medical physicists. Expansion of usage of fluoroscopy in the hands of clinical professionals with hardly any training in radiation protection shall require further role for medical physicists. The increasing publications in journals, recent changes in Safety Standards, California law, all increase responsibilities of medical physicists in patient protection. Newer technological developments in dose efficiency and protective devices increase percentage of time devoted by medical physicists on radiation protection activities. Without radiation protection, the roles, responsibilities and day-to-day involvement of medical physicists in diagnostic radiology becomes questionable. In coming years either medical radiation protection may emerge as a specialty or medical physicists will have to keep major part of day-to-day work on radiation protection. Learning Objectives: To understand how radiation protection has been increasing its role in day-to-day activities of medical physicist To be aware about international safety Standards, national and State regulations that require higher attention to radiation protection than in past To be aware about possible emergence of medical radiation protection as a specialty and challenges for medical physicists.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Evolution of the Hubble Space Telescope Safing Systems

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was launched on April 24 1990, with an expected lifespan of 15 years. Central to the spacecraft design was the concept of a series of on-orbit shuttle servicing missions permitting astronauts to replace failed equipment, update the scientific instruments and keep the HST at the forefront of astronomical discoveries. One key to the success of the Hubble mission has been the robust Safing systems designed to monitor the performance of the observatory and to react to keep the spacecraft safe in the event of equipment anomaly. The spacecraft Safing System consists of a range of software tests in the primary flight computer that evaluate the performance of mission critical hardware, safe modes that are activated when the primary control mode is deemed inadequate for protecting the vehicle, and special actions that the computer can take to autonomously reconfigure critical hardware. The HST Safing System was structured to autonomously detect electrical power system, data management system, and pointing control system malfunctions and to configure the vehicle to ensure safe operation without ground intervention for up to 72 hours. There is also a dedicated safe mode computer that constantly monitors a keep-alive signal from the primary computer. If this signal stops, the safe mode computer shuts down the primary computer and takes over control of the vehicle, putting it into a safe, low-power configuration. The HST Safing system has continued to evolve as equipment has aged, as new hardware has been installed on the vehicle, and as the operation modes have matured during the mission. Along with the continual refinement of the limits used in the safing tests, several new tests have been added to the monitoring system, and new safe modes have been added to the flight software. This paper will focus on the evolution of the HST Safing System and Safing tests, and the importance of this evolution to prolonging the science operations of the telescope.

Pepe, Joyce↗

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗

Impact of Active Control on Passive Safety Response Characteristics of Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors: II-Model Implementation and Simulations

Advanced reactors are often claimed to be passively safe against unprotected upset events. In common practice, these events are not considered in the context of the plant control system, i.e., the reactor is subjected to classes of unprotected upset events while the normally programmed response of the control system is assumed not to be present. However, this approach constitutes an oversimplification since, depending on the upset involving the control system, an actuator does not necessarily go in the same direction as needed for safety. In this work, dynamic simulations are performed to assess the degree to which the inherent self-regulating plant response is safe from active control system override. The simulations are meant to characterize the resilience of the plant to unprotected initiators. The initiators were represented and modeled as an actuator going to a hard limit. Consideration of failure is further limited to individual controllers as there is no cross-connect of signals between these controllers. The potential for passive safety override by the control system is then relegated to the single-input single-output controllers. Here, the results show that when the plant control system is designed by taking into account and quantifying the impact of the plant control system on accidental scenarios there is very limited opportunity for the preprogrammed response of the control system to override passive safety protection in the event of an unprotected initiator.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗