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At least 955 records · Page 53
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DOE OSTI2013

Hydrologic Nuclide Transport Models in Cyder, A Geologic Disposal Software Library - 13328

Component level and system level abstraction of detailed computational geologic repository models have resulted in four rapid computational models of hydrologic radionuclide transport at varying levels of detail. Those models are described, as is their implementation in Cyder, a software library of interchangeable radionuclide transport models appropriate for representing natural and engineered barrier components of generic geology repository concepts. A proof of principle demonstration was also conducted in which these models were used to represent the natural and engineered barrier components of a repository concept in a reducing, homogenous, generic geology. This base case demonstrates integration of the Cyder open source library with the Cyclus computational fuel cycle systems analysis platform to facilitate calculation of repository performance metrics with respect to fuel cycle choices. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Nuclear Industry Input to the Development of Concepts for the Consolidated Storage of Used Nuclear Fuel - 13411

EnergySolutions and its team partners, NAC International, Exelon Nuclear Partners, Talisman International, TerranearPMC, Booz Allen Hamilton and Sargent and Lundy, have carried out a study to develop concepts for a Consolidated Storage Facility (CSF) for the USA's stocks of commercial Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF), and the packaging and transport provisions required to move the UNF to the CSF. The UNF is currently stored at all 65 operating nuclear reactor sites in the US, and at 10 shutdown sites. The study was funded by the US Department of Energy and followed the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC), one of which was that the US should make prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities for commercial UNF. The study showed that viable schemes can be devised to move all UNF and store it at a CSF, but that a range of schemes is required to accommodate the present widely varying UNF storage arrangements. Although most UNF that is currently stored at operating reactor sites is in water-filled pools, a significant amount is now dry stored in concrete casks. At the shutdown sites, the UNF is dry stored at all but two of the ten sites. Various types of UNF dry storage configurations are used at the operating sites and shutdown sites that include vertical storage casks that are also licensed for transportation, vertical casks that are licensed for storage only, and horizontally orientated storage modules. The shutdown sites have limited to nonexistent UNF handling infrastructure and several no longer have railroad connections, complicating UNF handling and transport off the site. However four methods were identified that will satisfactorily retrieve the UNF canisters within the storage casks and transport them to the CSF. The study showed that all of the issues associated with the transportation and storage of UNF from all sites in the US can be accommodated by adopting a staged approach to the construction of the CSF. Stage 1 requires only a cask storage pad and railroad interface to be constructed, and the CSF can then receive the UNF that is in transportable storage casks. Stage 2 adds a canister handling facility, a storage cask fabrication facility and an expanded storage pad, and enables the receipt of all canistered UNF from both operating and shutdown sites. Stage 3 provides a repackaging facility with a water-filled pool that provides flexibility for a range of repackaging scenarios. This includes receiving and repackaging 'bare' UNF into suitable canisters that can be placed into interim storage at the CSF, and enables UNF that is being received, or already in storage onsite, to be repackaged into canisters that are suitable for disposal at a geologic repository. The study used the 'Total System Model' (TSM) to analyze a range of CSF capacities and operating scenarios with differing parameters covering UNF pickup orders, one or more CSF sites, CSF start dates, CSF receipt rates and geologic repository start dates. The TSM was originally developed to model movement of UNF to the Yucca Mountain repository and was modified for this study to enable the CSF to become the 'gateway' to a future geologic repository. The TSM analysis enabled costs to be estimated for each scenario and showed how these are influenced by each of the parameters. This information will provide essential underpinning for a future Conceptual Design preparation. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Industrial Program of Waste Management - Cigeo Project - 13033

The French Planning Act of 28 June 2006 prescribed that a reversible repository in a deep geological formation be chosen as the reference solution for the long-term management of high-level and intermediate-level long-lived radioactive waste. It also entrusted the responsibility of further studies and design of the repository (named Cigeo) upon the French Radioactive Waste Management Agency (Andra), in order for the review of the creation-license application to start in 2015 and, subject to its approval, the commissioning of the repository to take place in 2025. Andra is responsible for siting, designing, implementing, operating the future geological repository, including operational and long term safety and waste acceptance. Nuclear operators (Electricite de France (EDF), AREVA NC, and the French Commission in charge of Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies (CEA) are technically and financially responsible for the waste they generate, with no limit in time. They provide Andra, on one hand, with waste packages related input data, and on the other hand with their long term industrial experiences of high and intermediate-level long-lived radwaste management and nuclear operation. Andra, EDF, AREVA and CEA established a cooperation agreement for strengthening their collaborations in these fields. Within this agreement Andra and the nuclear operators have defined an industrial program for waste management. This program includes the waste inventory to be taken into account for the design of the Cigeo project and the structural hypothesis underlying its phased development. It schedules the delivery of the different categories of waste and defines associated flows. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

LL/ILW: Post-Qualification of Old Waste through Non-Destructive Extraction of Barrels from Cement Shields - 13535

Currently there is a large number of radioactive waste drums entombed in cement shields at German nuclear power plants. These concrete containers used in the past for the waste are not approved for the final repository. Compliance with current acceptance criteria of the final repository has to be proven by qualification measures on the waste. To meet these criteria, a new declaration and new packing is necessary. A simple non-destructive extraction of about 2000 drums from their concrete shields is not possible. So different methods were tested to find a way of non-destructive extraction of old waste drums from cement shields and therefore reduce the final repository volume and final repository costs by using a container accepted and approved for Konrad. The main objective was to build a mobile system to offer this service to nuclear plant stations. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Memory Saves Lives: Inter-generational Warnings Effectiveness - 13556

The 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami was a world-class natural disaster. It has been described as the most powerful earthquake ever in Japan, and as one of the most powerful earthquakes ever noted in the world. The toll in terms of human lives lost and property destruction was unimaginable. Even the word 'horrible' is inadequate to describe the suffering and misery that resulted. Nations with nuclear power programs are engaged in, or at least planning to become engaged in, arranging to eventually dispose of their higher-level radioactive waste materials in deep geologic repositories. Geologic repositories are passive safety systems, and if undisturbed isolate these dangerous materials form the biosphere for extremely long times. The key words, however, are 'if undisturbed'. To assure that future generations do not inadvertently drill into repositories, national programs, and the international community (the Records, Knowledge and Memory (RK and M) preservation project of the Nuclear Energy Agency, for example), are proposing to place markers and/or monuments on closed repository sites that say 'do not drill here, and this is why' in various sophisticated ways. Such markers or monuments are attempts at providing passive institutional controls. The effectiveness of messages from past generations to a present generation may give an indication of how effective such passive institutional controls may be. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

A Bottom's-Up Model for Siting and Developing Consent-Based Disposal Solutions for SNF and HLW in the USA - 17332

At the end of 2016, the licensing and continued development of the USA's only candidate HLW-repository since 1987 at the Yucca Mountain (YM) site in Nevada had been on hold since 2010 pending the enactment of enabling legislation for one or more of the following paths forward: 1. Re-start of the YM HLW repository. 2. Consent-based siting and development (S and D) of new HLW-repositories for commingled disposal of commercially- (CHLW) and defense-generated (DHLW) HLW. 3. Consent-based S and D of a repository and/or deep boreholes for DHLW only. Public trust in the implementing and regulating entities and a definitive say in an apolitical S and D process by the directly affected parties (DAPs) are historical imperatives for gaining public acceptance and maintaining sustained support of any or all of them. However, due to the widespread negative legacy currently attributed to past politically-controlled S and D organizations, an even more politically controlled organizational structure and an amorphous, 'consent-based', S and D model like that introduced twice in proposed Senate bills since June 2013 will exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the main root causes to past contentions, lawsuits, delays, and cost-increases. We therefore recommend: 1) Assigning the responsibility for safe disposal of CHLW to an independent, chartered public corporation with requisite subject-matter expertise and adequate financial resources. 2) Enacting a related law that: a. Defines 'consent-based' in measurable terms; b. Assigns irrevocable veto rights to facility host state(s) based upon the majority opinion of its legal residents at pre-determined S and D milestones. c. Requires Congressional approval before the facility can open and close. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Communicating with future generations - Major obstacles to overcome - 15009

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of transuranic (TRU) and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 2150 feet (655 meters) below the land surface, at the WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191.14(c) [1] and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194.43 [2] require a Passive Institutional Controls program be developed for the WIPP. The primary purpose of the Passive Institutional Controls program is to indicate the location of the repository and the risk it presents to an intruder, thus reducing the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion into the repository. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts, including languages, graphics and engineered drawings, plus testing schedules for materials and structures. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the regulatory requirements. But will it really work? Will future generations a thousand years, two thousand years, or seven thousand years from now really be able to decipher and understand the message? This is the challenge international constructors, operators, and regulators of repositories for the disposal of any hazardous materials must face. It is important to explore the history of language, both written words and graphics; and what we can learn from the past to assist us in communicating with the future. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

WIPP - February 2014 operational events and the compliance re-certification application (CRA) 2014 - 15293

On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, an underground mine fire involving a salt haul truck occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). There were 86 workers in the mine when the fire occurred. All workers were evacuated. Nine days later, on Friday, February 14, 2014, there was an incident in the underground repository at WIPP which resulted in the release of americium and plutonium from one or more transuranic (TRU) waste containers into the environment. The release was detected by an underground continuous air monitor and then directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks located in the surface exhaust building. However, a measurable portion bypassed the HEPA filters via leakage through two ventilation system dampers and was discharged directly to the environment from an exhaust duct. No personnel were determined to have received external contamination; however, some individuals that were on site were identified through bioassay to have initially tested positive for low level amounts of internal contamination. Trace amounts of americium and plutonium were detected off-site.While significant to day-to-day operations, these events have no impact to the long-term performance of the repository. Because WIPP's re-certification is based solely on the post-closure performance of the repository (40 CFR 191, Subparts B and C), these recent events do not affect the long-term performance predictions or its technical and scientific basis. In this paper we will further explore the requirements for WIPP's re-certification, and the basis for our contention that the recent WIPP operational events do not impact long-term repository performance or have any implications on salt as a geologic disposal media, and that re-certification efforts should continue uninterrupted. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Influencing future exploratory drilling rates-a potential approach for the waste isolation pilot plant - 15307

The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP Compliance Certification Application had a reference concerning natural resources at the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This reference suggested that resources could be withdrawn from under the repository area from a distance and not affect the integrity of the repository. This would not eliminate, but would certainly diminish, the rate of exploratory drilling in the distant future. Currently the only scenarios that result in releases from the repository are human intrusion scenarios, without human intrusion radioactive releases to the accessible environment are essentially zero for the very long term future. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Installation and operation of GeoMelt{sup R} in container vitrification in NNL Central Lab active rig hall at Sellafield - 15328

Cleanup and subsequent immobilization of wastes on the UK's NDA estate brings major challenges. With the exception of HLW where vitrification is utilized for immobilization, cement is typically used in the management and immobilization of non-heat generating wastes. However some legacy feeds such as those containing reactive metals can be incompatible with cementation technologies, and the application of engineered cement encapsulating product to raw wastes increases wasteform volume. Cementation has also been developed to be compatible with the repository concept, which provides it with a level of protection from the environment. Potential delays in repository implementation and as yet to be determined repository waste form acceptance criteria for some wastes may require the duration of above ground storage of immobilized wastes to be extended with potential effect on the integrity of the wasteform. Vitrification is a treatment option which destroys organics and hazardous inorganics such as asbestos, reduces wasteform volume, and produces a robust leach resistant wasteform. Kurion's GeoMelt{sup R} In-container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} is a vitrification process wherein the treatment vessel can serve as an interim-storage, transport, and final long-term storage vessel - thus negating the need to pour glass into a separate container, effectively leading to a much simpler system than traditional waste melters. The inherent volume reduction from vitrification results in a dense product with self-shielding properties, and the GeoMelt treatment process has been demonstrated to homogenize elemental metals and radionuclide contaminants of concern, eliminating hot spots and mitigating criticality concerns. All of which opens up alternatives strategies for storage and disposal. GeoMelt has been proven in the commercial and US DOE waste treatment environment with over 26,000 tonnes of hazardous waste treated to date (half of this radioactive). Kurion and the UK's National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) plan to demonstrate its application to Sellafield radioactive wastes. A small (engineering) scale demonstrator is being installed in the active rig hall at NNL's Central Laboratory at Sellafield UK with a twofold mission; 1) demonstration of the vitrification of ILW/LLW, and 2) processing of smaller volume orphan wastes that currently have no treatment path. The NNL facility will allow the handling of uranium containing materials which form a substantial component of ILW currently stored on the Sellafield site. Accurate DFs across the melter and off gas system are often difficult to obtain using inactive materials at the low concentrations present in radioactive wastes. Installation in the NNL facility will allow trace quantities of active species such as Cs-137 and Tc-99 to be processed as part of a simulant ILW stream and monitoring will allow accurate decontamination factors (DFs) to be established to support future vitrification facility design. In addition to underpinning melter operation and obtaining DFs across the system, the facility will allow the processing of radioactive waste arisings of low activity which may either be typical of larger waste volumes or may present as orphans without a disposition route. In either case the melter facility will be able to vitrify these wastes into a form that will be suitable for interim storage and disposal. Among the feeds envisaged for processing will be asbestos from power stations, contaminated soils, feeds containing uranium metals, ponds solids, sludge, and miscellaneous active laboratory wastes. The NNL Central Lab capability will be used to analyze the active product to support disposal requirements whether through letters of compliance for the Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) or waste acceptance criteria for the Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR). (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

System-level logistics modeling of DPC direct disposal - 15511

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition, has been conducting a study of the technical feasibility of direct disposal of existing dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) loaded with commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The system-level logistical modeling described here is a part of this study with the primary goals to project the inventory of DPCs in the future and to understand the timing of DPC disposal constrained by thermal power limits for disposal and other key parameters of the waste management system. The logistics simulations also allow for estimating fuel age at emplacement, an important consideration if storage time is limited. This analysis evaluated the effects on DPC direct disposal from uncertainty in repository emplacement power limits, the repository start date, and whether or when the nuclear industry could transition to loading SNF into the smaller capacity multi-purpose canisters (MPCs). MPCs implemented at a future date would likely contain the youngest fuel with highest burnup, but smaller MPCs would cool to the emplacement power limits relatively quickly. The results of this analysis demonstrate that DPC direct disposal could be complete by about 2070 to 2170 depending on the repository emplacement power limit. These completion dates can be expedited by approximately 10 to 40 years in some scenarios through the transition to MPCs. The greatest average SNF age at emplacement is 88 years in the scenarios with the smallest repository thermal power limit in which no transition to MPCs is considered. Transition to MPCs could decrease the average age at emplacement, to as low as 42 years in some scenarios. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Remote Dismantling and Packaging of the RPV and Thermal Shield at the Obrigheim NPP - 16073

The Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant (KWO) is located in the Federal State of Baden- Wuerttemberg in Germany and was operated by the EnKK-KWO. The Nuclear Power Plant - a light water pressurized water reactor with 357 MW of electrical power - was operated from 1968 to 2005. In June 2009 the Energiewerke Nord GmbH (EWN) was charged with the dismantling planning and dismantling of the reactor. According to the German nuclear and radiation protection law, several licenses will be required for the realisation of this task. This also applies to the disposal of the waste produced by dismantling, which must finally be stored in the German final repository for low and medium-radioactive waste (underground repository 'Konrad'). In spring 2010 EWN completed all application documents for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the RPV internals and EnKK-KWO delivered them to the responsible Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Since then it has been worked intensively on the design, construction and manufacturing of the facilities for dismantling. With a separate notification of amendment, it was applied for the license to install and commission the facilities for the dismantling of the RPV and the RPV internals at the Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg in October 2010. This notification of amendment was confirmed in summer 2012. In September 2011 the work process and test plan and the technical information about the campaign for the removal of the radioactive waste resulting from the RPV with internals, peripheral components and secondary waste with the aim of final disposal in the Federal Repository 'Konrad' was submitted to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. The evaluation and assessment of the work process and test plan was concluded in August 2013, when it was audited by TUV Nord EnSys without any further measures and indications. On September 10 the work process and test plan was released by the Federal Office for radiation protection. The dismantling of the RPV internals upper core and lower core structure started in September 2013 in the wet cutting area in room 01.106/306 and were finished in October 2014. In the presentation 'Dismantling of the Obrigheim NPP Reactor and Waste Management' held on the WM Symposia in Phoenix, 2014, an overview about the remote cutting and packaging of the upper and lower core structure was given. In today's presentation the subsequent dismantling activities will be outlined and evaluated. The presentation will start with the short description of the basic frame conditions for the nuclear licensing procedure, important procedural principles, and necessary plant-specific conditions. After the remote cutting and packing of the reactor internals of the upper and lower core structure was completed, the wet cutting area 'reactor room 01.106/306' was cleaned and the reactor room rebuilt into a cutting area for peripheral components. After the peripheral components were dismantled, all preconditions were set to lift the RPV from its mounting position and to arrange it in the upper reactor room 01.306. After these activities were completed, the lifting of the RPV was prepared and the cutting area 'Dismantling of the RPV insulation in the reactor room 01.106/306' was set up. To carry out this task, a strand jack unit with connection block was installed on the bridge of the reactor building crane. The opening created by the dismantling of the pool plate was closed with a flap door. The manipulators used for the wet cutting of the RPV internals were also used for the remote dismantling of the RPV insulation and mounted in the cutting area. The remote facilities were handled from a control centre and/or control stand. The air-technical housing which has already been used for the remote dismantling of the RPV internals was designed for the dismantling of the RPV insulation and was extended for this dismantling scope with appropriate ventilation systems. A special feature is the fixation of the RPV insulation at the RPV corpus. The RPV insulation consists of insulation wool, wire mesh and metal-sheet insulation. This 'Sandwich Construction' is detached with a steel corset at the RPV corpus and partly tightened. The insulation of the RPV bottom dome is tightened at the supporting frame. Due to the activation of the material in the core area and the resulting high ambient dose rate the RPV insulation can only be dismantled remotely. Additionally, as asbestos fibers are expected to be found in the insulation the dismantling has to be performed according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances. The demolition, restoration or maintenance works have to be performed remotely according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances when the RPV is located in the cutting area. But in case of dismantling of a power reactor no such experience can be found. Beginning with the explanation of the technical, radiological and substantial boundary conditions this presentation will not only impart knowledge about the dismantling of the RPV insulation but also about the remote controlled packaging of the metal sheet insulation and the manual conditioning of the RPV insulation. Subsequently, reports on the remotely controlled cutting and packaging of the RDB are given. Here is particularly interesting that cutting methods have been used and how the activity determination of the segments was carried out. On the basis of the evaluation of the realisation the subsequent dismantling activities will be lined out. In parallel to the dismantling tasks, the waste package documentation for the final repository was issued, checked and confirmed for the containers loaded with parts of the RDB internals. The most important stages are exemplified in this presentation. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

New High-Throughput Measurement Systems for Radioactive Wastes Segregation and Free Release - 16166

The European Metrology Research Program (EMRP) is a coordinated research-and-development program that pursues the closer integration of national research programs. The EMRP Metrology for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities 'MetroDecom' Joint Research Project ENV54 (JRP ENV54), a 36-month project started in September 2014, delivers research products addressing all aspects of the decommissioning process. This includes the characterization of waste materials present on the decommissioning site, pre-selection prior to free release or repository acceptance measurement, free-release measurement, the measurement of waste packages thermal power prior to the repository storage, and the monitoring of stored wastes and repositories in the very long term. This paper describes the track record of two JRP ENV54 working packages, which address the measurement facilities for pre-selection of waste materials prior to measurement for repository acceptance or possible free release (segregation measurement system); and free release (free release measurement system), based on a single standardized concept characterized by unique, patented lead-free shielding. The key objective is to improve the throughput, accuracy, reliability, modularity and mobility of segregation and free-release measurement. This will result in more reliable decision-making with regard to the safe release and disposal of radioactive wastes into the environment and, resulting in positive economic outcomes. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

As Permanent as Practicable: The reality of Permanent Markers - 16191

The regulatory requirements in the United States do not require any specific time frame for the duration of permanent marker systems to inform future generations of the presence of deep geologic nuclear waste repositories. The requirement is for markers to be 'as permanent as practicable'. For the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, the U.S. Department of Energy chose a 10,000 year Passive Institutional Controls program goal. Passive Institutional Controls are to be designed prior to facility closure and implemented prior to the completion of the Active Institutional Controls program. Nuclear waste repositories across the world are actively developing marker and message systems, as required by their own regulations, for time frames either specified in those regulations or to be proposed to the regulator by the implementing organization. Time frames may be based upon the radioactive characteristics of the various isotopes being disposed of in the repository under consideration, or they may be based on some utility function that balances investment, practicability and risk. Scientifically, there are a number of time frames that make sense. However, an important determinant of effectiveness that has not been taken into consideration is the impact of the human connection, the receiver of the message. The major obstacle that the permanent marker systems need to overcome is the impact that humans will have over time. Historically, no monument has ever survived more than a few thousand years when humans come in contact with it. No matter what size of monument or topic the monument represents, humans have a history of destroying monuments beginning just a few generations after the monument's construction. The only way to ensure that a monument system can endure long time frames is to isolate it from humans. Eliminating contact with humans for whom the messages are meant defeats the very purpose of having an informative marker and message system. A more reasonable and historically supported time frame of 1,000 years would assure that no unreasonable cost would be incurred by current generations. Future generations could decide to continue maintaining the message, or not; and the likelihood of destruction of the markers by subsequent generations would be reduced since the knowledge of the markers and messages would have been transmitted within a more reasonable time frame over which language continuity, for example, would likely be manageable. Future preservation of the marker system and future human actions cannot be controlled, but the goal is to build a marker and message delivery system that reduces the likelihood of inadvertent future human disturbance of a deep geologic repository. This is the typical regulatory requirement on future information systems. Regulators who insist on an extremely long time frame for marker effectiveness should consider the historical realities of 'permanent' markers and monuments and propose a more reasonable time frame. Perhaps it would be more practicable to require 1,000 years for informing future generations and then allow them to determine what they wish to do to protect the future for another, perhaps similar, period of time. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Building a Credible and Updated WIPP Performance Assessment - New Knowledge Versus Conservative Assumptions and FEP Analysis, A Balancing Act - 16299

Conservative assumptions are important components in conceptual model development where limited data is available. And, as appropriate, during the early 1990's Department of Energy (DOE) adopted many conservative assumptions in the development of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's (WIPP's) 24 Conceptual Models incorporated in DOE's 1996 Compliance Certification Application (CCA) performance assessment (PA). Many of these assumptions were formulated and documented in the WIPP relevant features, events and processes (FEPs) analyses; others were adopted when developing input parameter values and their distributions that were used as inputs to computer models. The Agency accepted these conservative assumptions during their 1996 CCA assessment for several reasons; 1) at the time there was a scarcity of data related to long-term behavior of many parameters needed to be incorporated in the PA, 2) sensitivity studies performed during this time period determined that the affected 'conservative' assumptions adopted for some parameters had minimal to no impact on repository performance; and, 3) DOE could demonstrate compliance with EPA's radioactive waste disposal regulations while adopting conservative assumptions and data. Since the initial 1996 CCA DOE has modified the repository panel closure design, and the repository footprint in the experimental areas has expanded. These modifications were incorporated into DOE's 2014 Compliance Re-certification Application for WIPP. Additionally, there have been numerous investigations related to both the short- and long-term behavior of salt in a repository setting. As a result, the Agency is reassessing the use of these conservative assumptions and the continued applicability of the original FEP analyses, primarily developed during DOE's 1996 PA and carried forward to the current re-certification. This paper examines some of these analyses. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Low- and Intermediate-Active Waste Management in the Federal Republic of Germany - 16567

Waste with negligible heat generation (low- and intermediate-active waste) generated in Germany is to be emplaced in the Konrad repository. As the start of operation of the Konrad repository is expected in 2022, regulations have been developed that allow a longer storage period while keeping the same high level of safety. The guidelines for the storage of radioactive waste with negligible heat-generation have become part of the regulatory framework and its enforcement is thoroughly guided by the responsible Federal Ministry. Radioactive waste generated during the operation or the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle facilities has to be stored by the operator until the Konrad repository is available. In contrast, radioactive waste generated from other industrial, medical and research applications including spent nuclear sources, initially has to be delivered to a Land collecting facility and has to be registered, treated and stored there. The Land collecting facilities will deliver the resulting waste packages to the disposal facility as of 2022. While the operation of the Land Collecting Facilities is a task of the responsible Laender authorities, the operation of the repository Konrad is a federal task. The interaction of the involved different parties will be described. This paper will focus on the management of low- and intermediate-active waste. It will give an insight to the expected amounts and different kinds of waste streams. The different concepts for collecting and qualification procedures for waste packages depending on the origin of the waste will be presented. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

A National Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste for Iraq - 16610

Radioactive waste resulted in the past in Iraq from a number of nuclear activities and facilities all of them seriously damaged or destroyed during the Gulf war. The task of decommissioning such facilities and managing the resulting waste is being supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), and the United States (US). A national policy for radioactive waste management for Iraq has been drafted by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST); a draft strategy for radioactive waste management implementation is in preparation. In this framework, Iraq is considering locating a radioactive waste disposal facility at the Al-Tuwaitha site, near the capital city of Bagdad. In the framework of its Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation the EU has recently started a cooperation project named 'Feasibility Study, Basic Design, and Engineering Design of an Engineered Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility' for Iraq (Project IQ4.01/11). The project aims at producing the design of a repository for the radioactive waste resulting from the decommissioning activities and from the continuing use of radioisotopes in medicine and the oil and gas industry in the country. The contract for this cooperation project was awarded by the European Commission in April 2015 to the consortium of two international engineering companies, Nukem Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and DBE Technology GmbH, both of Germany, and Javys a.s., the national waste management agency of Slovakia. The planned Iraqi near-surface repository is constrained by the complex security conditions in the country. This has led to the decision of using whenever possible the Al-Tuwaitha site, were most of the waste is located, as the repository location. The project work will therefore focus on assessing whether and which part of the waste expected to result from the decommissioning and remediation activities is amenable for surface disposal in an appropriately engineered facility. In addition, careful review of the site characteristics shall provide enough elements to justify and validate the political decision of disposing of the waste in Al Tuwaitha. Thereafter, the project work will focus on the conceptual and later the engineering design of the repository. Finally, a Safety Analysis will provide the basis for regulatory decisions about the further steps for realization of the Iraqi final disposal facility. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Robotics on KM-IT platform - 19107

The Knowledge Management Information Tool (KM-IT) is a web-based system developed to maintain and preserve the Department of Energy's (DoE's) knowledge base. The system was developed by Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU-ARC) with the support of the D and D community including the DOE Office of Environmental Management, and with the collaboration and support of the DoE's Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) and the former ALARA Centers at Hanford and Savannah. The KM-IT system is a community driven system tailored to serve the technical issues faced by the workforce across the DOE Complex. This KM-IT web-based interactive system is operational and available for use at www.dndkm.org and is currently comprised of the following modules: Web Crawler, Hotline, Technology, Hanford's ALARA Center Reports, Specialist Directory, Lessons Learned, Best Practices, Video/Picture Library, Vendors and Industry News. The Web Crawler dynamically searches through the KM-IT repository as well as the web and displays search results based on the search criteria. The Hotline allows registered users to post questions/problems related to D and D and to receive solutions from a subject-matter specialist. The Technology module serves as repository of D and D technologies and contains technology/ demonstration fact sheets and vendor information. D and D community members can add Lessons Learned, Best Practices, and Pictures/Videos to the D and D repository, after a formal approval process. The Vendor module provides a directory of commercial vendors who provide D and D related technologies, supplies, and services. KM-IT makes an excellent use of the knowledge that exists within the D and D community by allowing D and D project managers around the DOE complex to collaborate by sharing innovative ideas, past experiences, and practices and by maintaining a directory of subject matter specialists. FIU is working on developing a new knowledge base using the existing KM-IT framework to provide focused information on robotics. FIU will develop the robotics technology and vendor modules to provide information related to robotics technologies and its application to many different areas including D and D, remote systems and waste processing. This robotics knowledge base will provide the ability to search through the information repository as well as display customized summary information including robotics technology descriptions, benefits, limitations, videos and pictures. The vendor module will provide information related to industry vendors for these technologies and include updated vendor contact information. The vendor module will also provide a search capability based on keywords as well as categories. The robotics knowledge base will publish commercially available technologies as well as the technologies that are still in the research and development phase with national laboratories and academic universities. The robotics KM-IT will be developed in phases to support all of the features of the KM-IT platform and will be published on www.rkmit.org. (authors)

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