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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 973 records · Page 54
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NASA NTRS2004

Flight software issues in onboard automated planning: lessons learned on EO-1

This paper focuses on the onboard planner and scheduler CASPER, whose core planning engine is based on the ground system ASPEN. Given the challenges of developing flight software, we discuss several of the issues encountered in preparing the planner for flight, including reducing the code image size, determining what data to place within the engineering telemetry packet, and performing long term planning.

planning↗
NASA NTRS2004

Distributed operations as applied in a large multi-instrument space mission: lessons learned from the Cassini-Huygens Program

Launched in 1997, the Cassini-Huygens Mission sent the largest interplanetary spacecraft ever built in the service of science. Carrying a suite of 12 scientific instruments and an atmospheric entry probe, this complex spacecraft to explore the Saturn system may not have gotten off the ground without undergoing significant design changes and cost reductions.

distributed↗
NASA NTRS2006

Leadership Challenges in ISS Operations: Lessons Learned from Junior and Senior Mission Control Personnel

The International Space Station (ISS) is operated by a multi-national, multi-organizational team that is dispersed across multiple locations, time zones, and work schedules. At NASA, both junior and senior mission control personnel have had to find ways to address the leadership challenges inherent in such work, but neither have had systematic training in how to do so. The goals of this study were to examine the major leadership challenges faced by ISS mission control personnel and to highlight the approaches that they have found most effective to surmount them. We pay particular attention to the approaches successfully employed by the senior personnel and to the training needs identified by the junior personnel. We also evaluate the extent to which responses are consistent across the junior and senior samples. Further, we compare the issues identified by our interview survey to those identified by a standardized questionnaire survey of mission control personnel and a contrasting group of space station crewmembers. We studied a sample of 14 senior ISS flight controllers and a contrasting sample of 12 more junior ISS controllers. Data were collected using a semi-structured qualitative interview and content analyzed using an iterative process with multiple coders and consensus meetings to resolve discrepancies. To further explore the meaning of the interview findings, we also conducted new analyses of data from a previous questionnaire study of 13 American astronauts, 17 Russian cosmonauts, and 150 U.S. and 36 Russian mission control personnel supporting the ISS or Mir space stations. The interview data showed that the survey respondents had substantial consensus on several leadership challenges and on key strategies for dealing with them, and they offered a wide range of specific tactics for implementing these strategies. Interview data from the junior respondents will be presented for the first time at the meeting. The questionnaire data showed that the US mission control sample reported a level of support from their management that compared favorably to national norms. American mission control personnel and Russian crewmembers reported higher supervisor support than American crewmembers and Russian mission control personnel. We will present the specific issues underlying these findings and compare and contrast the results from the two datasets. Although specific to space station personnel, our results are consistent with recent management, cultural, and aerospace research. We aim to use our results to improve training for current and future mission control personnel.

Clement, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

The Apollo Experience Lessons Learned for Constellation Lunar Dust Management

Lunar dust will present significant challenges to NASA's Lunar Exploration Missions. The challenges can be overcome by using best practices in system engineering design. For successful lunar surface missions, all systems that come into contact with lunar dust must consider the effects throughout the entire design process. Interfaces between all these systems with other systems also must be considered. Incorporating dust management into Concept of Operations and Requirements development are the best place to begin to mitigate the risks presented by lunar dust. However, that is only the beginning. To be successful, every person who works on NASA's Constellation lunar missions must be mindful of this problem. Success will also require fiscal responsibility. NASA must learn from Apollo the root cause of problems caused by dust, and then find the most cost-effective solutions to address each challenge. This will require a combination of common sense existing technologies and promising, innovative technical solutions

Wagner, Sandra↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Flight Requirements for Fiber Optic Components: Qualification Testing and Lessons Learned

This viewgraph presentation reviews the qualification testing requirements for Fiber Optic Components used during space flight. Since most components for space flight fiber optic components are now commercial of the shelf (COTS) products, and the changes at Goddard Space Flight Center, such as short term projects, and low budgets and other changes, have made full qualification of Fiber Optic Components not only too expensive also impossible. This presentation reviews the environmental parameters, the testing and or testing requirements of some optical components on board some NASA satellites.

Ott, Melanie N.↗
NASA NTRS2007

The X-43A Flight Research Program: Lessons Learned on the Road to Mach 10

During an aerospace engineer's undergraduate studies, he or she will attend classes in aerodynamics, thermodynamics, structures, stability and control, dynamics, design, propulsion, and computer science, along with the related courses in mathematics, physics, statistics, and chemistry required to understand the material. Upon graduation, the new engineer will have acquired a basic knowledge of how to build an aerospace vehicle. What only comes through experience, however, is the understanding of the inevitable imperfect process through which an aerospace vehicle is built. This is the adventure of turning a basic concept into functional hardware. Engineers working on a project must often deal with ambiguous situations. They are routinely asked by management to provide risk assessments of a project, yet even after careful analysis uncertainties remain. The project must be accomplished within finite limits of time and money. The question an engineer answers is whether the solution to potential problem is worth the cost and schedule delay, or if the solution might actually be worse than the problem it is meant to solve. Review protocols are established to ensure that an unknown has not been overlooked. But these cannot protect against an unknown unknown. Examples of these situations can be found in the history of the X-43A Hyper-X (Hypersonic Experiment) program. In this NASA project, a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engine was flight tested on a subscale vehicle. The X-43A Hyper-X Research Vehicle (HXRV) was launched from a B-52B mothership, then boosted to the test speed by a modified Pegasus rocket first stage, called the Hyper-X Launch Vehicle (HXLV). Once at the proper speed and altitude, the X-43A separated from the booster, stabilized itself, and then the engine test began. Although wind-tunnel scramjet engine tests had begun in the late 1950s, before the Hyper-X program there had never been an actual in-flight test of such an engine integrated with an appropriate airframe. Thus, while the scramjet had successfully operated in the artificial airflow of wind tunnels, the concept had yet to be proven in real air. These conditions meant changes in density and temperature, as well as changes in angle of attack and sideslip of a free-flying vehicle. A wind tunnel is limited in its ability to simulate these subtle factures, which have a major impact on almost any vehicle, but especially that of a scramjet's performance. The Hyper-X project was to provide a real-world benchmark of the ground test data. The full scale X-43A engine would be operated in the wind tunnel, and then flown, and the data from its operation would then be compared with projections. If these matched, the wind tunnel data would be considered a reliable design tool for future scramjet. If there were significant differences, the reasons for these would have to be identified. Until such information was available, scramjets would lack the technological maturity to be considered for future space launch or high-speed atmospheric flight vehicles.

Peebles, Curtis↗