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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 973 records · Page 54

Prototyping and validating requirements of radiation and nuclear emergency plan simulator

Organizational incapability in developing unrealistic, impractical, inadequate and ambiguous mechanisms of radiological and nuclear emergency preparedness and response plan (EPR) causing emergency plan disorder and severe disasters. These situations resulting from 65.6% of poor definition and unidentified roles and duties of the disaster coordinator. Those unexpected conditions brought huge aftermath to the first responders, operators, workers, patients and community at large. Hence, in this report, we discuss prototyping and validating of Malaysia radiation and nuclear emergency preparedness and response plan simulation model (EPRM). A prototyping technique was required to formalize the simulation model requirements. Prototyping as systems requirements validation was carried on to endorse the correctness of the model itself against the stakeholder’s intensions in resolving those organizational incapability. We have made assumptions for the proposed emergency preparedness and response model (EPRM) through the simulation software. Those assumptions provided a twofold of expected mechanisms, planning and handling of the respective emergency plan as well as in bringing off the hazard involved. This model called RANEPF (Radiation and Nuclear Emergency Planning Framework) simulator demonstrated the training emergency response perquisites rather than the intervention principles alone. The demonstrations involved the determination of the casualties’ absorbed dose range screening and the coordination of the capacity planning of the expected trauma triage. Through user-centred design and sociotechnical approach, RANEPF simulator was strategized and simplified, though certainly it is equally complex.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment

MCRE will be the first fast spectrum, molten chloride reactor in operation. Small critical experiment to provide data for future reactors. - Collaboration between Southern Company Services, TerraPower, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL), as well as other partners. - Expected to be built and operated at the LOTUS testbed (ZPPR). - Authorized by the U.S. Department of Energy. - Technology development of salt synthesis.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Novel rotating field probe for inspection of tubes

Inspection of steam generator tubes in nuclear power plants is extremely critical for safe operation of the power plant. In the nuclear industry, steam generator tube inspection using eddy current techniques has evolved over the years from a single bobbin coil, to rotating probe coil (RPC) and array probe, in an attempt to improve the speed and reliability of inspection. The RPC probe offers the accurate spatial resolution but involves complex mechanical rotation. This paper presents a novel design of eddy current probes based on rotating fields produced by three identical coils excited by a balanced three-phase supply. The sensor thereby achieves rotating probe functionality by electronic means and eliminates the need for mechanical rotation. The field generated by the probe is largely radial that result in induced currents that flow circularly around the radial axis and rotating around the tube at a synchronous speed effectively producing induced eddy currents that are multidirectional. The probe will consequently be sensitive to cracks of all orientations in the tube wall. The finite element model (FEM) results of the rotating fields and induced currents are presented. A prototype probe is being built to validate simulation results.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Spurious actuations in digital instrumentation and control systems - evaluation framework - 137

When a digital Instrumentation and Control (I and C) system or its associated components produce an unintended operation, it is known as a spurious actuation. Spurious actuations could lead to unnecessary challenges to safety equipment, challenge the ability of safety systems to provide their intended functions, or place the plant in an un-analyzed state. There is arguably a lack of clear and sufficient regulatory guidance for assessing spurious actuations. In an attempt to address this guidance gap, this paper provides a generic framework for evaluating spurious actuations in digital I and C systems, components, or supporting systems that are important to safety. The framework provides a methodology for: (1) defining the scope of the evaluation including supporting assumptions; (2) providing options for excluding a spurious actuation from the evaluation; (3) assessing the potential consequences from the assessed spurious actuations; and, (4) defining a high-level acceptance criteria. The methodology discussed by this paper is not to be construed as a requirement, regulation, or acceptable guidance by either domestic or international regulators; instead, it is intended to serve as a potential foundation or technical basis to be used for developing clear and sufficient regulatory guidance for assessing spurious actuations in digital I and C systems. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A novel priority selection system for nuclear power plant - 287

The priority selection system is an important component of security level instrument control platform for nuclear power plant, the main function of which is priority processing the manual or automatic command with various security levels and driving engineering safety features and field devices, such as pump and valve. Its stability and safety plays a crucial role in the operation of the power plant. The main objective of the present paper is to describe the new nuclear power plant-oriented priority selection system, which is developed independently by China Nuclear Control System Engineering Company. In this system, the control commands from 1E DCS, ECP and DAS systems are transmitted via hardwire, while those from NC DCS are transmitted by field-bus. The control commands experience priority output to control the field actuators. Meanwhile, in order to control key field devices when failure of the instrument control systems occurs, the issuing interface for native instructions with permissions setting is also offered. The whole system provides collection-feedback functions for field devices, high coverage self-diagnostic functions and periodic test functions for safety systems. Moreover, the feedback information of field devices, the results of self-diagnosis and periodic test will be submitted to DCS of nuclear power plant. In addition, the core part of priority selection system, namely priority selection module, is obtained by pure FPGA technology, which is different from DCS systems and could avoid common cause failure of software effectively. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk informed cyber security for nuclear power plants - 342

Nuclear power plants are increasingly adding digital components for plant operation, safety, and security. These digital components fill a gap with legacy equipment where replacement components no longer exist. They also benefit operation of the plant by increasing efficiency in power generation, monitoring of equipment and plant parameters, as well as aiding operator control. However, the addition of digital components and systems also adds cyber risks with previously unanalyzed failure modes and attack vectors are introduced with these new systems. These risks are difficult to identify, analyze, and mitigate due to the increasingly complex nature of the digital components and the integration of these components with additional plant processes and communication networks. The research presented in this paper develops a new method that addresses the cyber risk to inform appropriate levels of protection. EPRI and Sandia are working under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to develop an effective method of evaluating the cyber risk in production nuclear power facilities. The Cyber Hazards Analysis Risk Methodology (CHARM) focuses on ensuring adequate controls are in place for appropriate cyber protection of the plant from radiological release or generation risk. Existing plant hazards analyses (e.g., PRA, FTA) do not account for software deficiencies or adversarial intent. This method leverages existing plant analyses and MIT's Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to create cyber informed fault trees. These new fault trees will provide the basis for comprehensive cyber risk analysis and help ensure potential gaps in cyber security controls are identified and corrected. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Build-to-Replace Strategy to Reduce Operations and Maintenance Costs for Advanced Reactors

This paper targets the reduction of fixed operations and maintenance (O&M) costs for advanced reactor (AR) designs. This goal will be severely constrained if the underlying assumptions of O&M approaches and practices are not questioned and reexamined, especially today when changes can be implemented effectively and efficiently. Achieving a reduction in AR O&M costs requires a completely new way of thinking -a paradigm shift- not through incremental, technology-focused approaches alone. Here, we address this challenge by evaluating the impact of moving to a shorter design life for major structures, systems, and components and shorter, more predictable refurbishment cycles as modeled by the commercial airline industry: the build-to-replace approach. This paper provides a brief overview of this different mindset to O&M applied to ARs and it provided a set of analytical tools based on multi-objective optimization to identify the benefits of such an approach. In conclusion, we provide a direct example analysis of a build-to-replace scenario by identifying and evaluating scenarios for reduced system and component lifetimes and associated replacement and refurbishment schedules to evaluate impacts on O&M costs and other lifecycle elements, such as structure, system, and component reliability.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Reactor Vessel and Reactor Vessel Internals Segmentation at Zion Nuclear Power Station - 13230

Zion Nuclear Power Station (ZNPS) is a dual-unit Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) nuclear power plant located on the Lake Michigan shoreline, in the city of Zion, Illinois approximately 64 km (40 miles) north of Chicago, Illinois and 67 km (42 miles) south of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Each PWR is of the Westinghouse design and had a generation capacity of 1040 MW. Exelon Corporation operated both reactors with the first unit starting production of power in 1973 and the second unit coming on line in 1974. The operation of both reactors ceased in 1996/1997. In 2010 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the transfer of Exelon Corporation's license to ZionSolutions, the Long Term Stewardship subsidiary of EnergySolutions responsible for the decommissioning of ZNPS. In October 2010, ZionSolutions awarded Siempelkamp Nuclear Services, Inc. (SNS) the contract to plan, segment, remove, and package both reactor vessels and their respective internals. This presentation discusses the tools employed by SNS to remove and segment the Reactor Vessel Internals (RVI) and Reactor Vessels (RV) and conveys the recent progress. SNS's mechanical segmentation tooling includes the C-HORCE (Circumferential Hydraulically Operated Cutting Equipment), BMT (Bolt Milling Tool), FaST (Former Attachment Severing Tool) and the VRS (Volume Reduction Station). Thermal segmentation of the reactor vessels will be accomplished using an Oxygen- Propane cutting system. The tools for internals segmentation were designed by SNS using their experience from other successful reactor and large component decommissioning and demolition (D and D) projects in the US. All of the designs allow for the mechanical segmentation of the internals remotely in the water-filled reactor cavities. The C-HORCE is designed to saw seven circumferential cuts through the Core Barrel and Thermal Shield walls with individual thicknesses up to 100 mm (4 inches). The BMT is designed to remove the bolts that fasten the Baffle Plates to the Baffle Former Plates. The FaST is designed to remove the Baffle Former Plates from the Core Barrel. The VRS further volume reduces segmented components using multiple configurations of the 38i and horizontal reciprocating saws. After the successful removal and volume reduction of the Internals, the RV will be segmented using a 'First in the US' thermal cutting process through a co-operative effort with Siempelkamp NIS Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH using their experience at the Stade NPP and Karlsruhe in Germany. SNS mobilized in the fall of 2011 to commence execution of the project in order to complete the RVI segmentation, removal and packaging activities for the first unit (Unit 2) by end of the 2012/beginning 2013 and then mobilize to the second unit, Unit 1. Parallel to the completion of the segmentation of the reactor vessel internals at Unit 1, SNS will segment the Unit 2 pressure vessel and at completion move to Unit 1. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and Insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

The Stuxnet attack at the Natanz facility is an example of a targeted and successful cyber attack on a nuclear facility. Snowden's release of National Security Agency documents demonstrated the consequences of the insider threat. More recently, the United States tried to attack North Korea but failed, South Korea was attempting to attack North Korea, and both applied Stuxnet-like approaches. These sophisticated targeted attacks differ from web-site hacking events that are reported almost daily in the news mainly because targeted attacks require detailed design and operation information of the systems attacked and/or are often carried out by insiders. For instance, in order to minimize disruption of facilities around the world, Stuxnet remained idle until it recognized the specific configuration of the Natanz facility, demonstrating that the attackers possessed extremely detailed information about the facility. Such targeted cyber attacks could become a national-level military weapon and be used in coercion of hostile countries. While U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) are well designed and protected and not easily attacked through internet hacking, there have been a few digital-system-related incidents. For example, in 2003, the Slammer worm breached the private network of the Davis Besse plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for almost five hours. The breach did not pose a safety hazard because the plant was offline, but it demonstrates the vulnerability of NPP systems. The worm did not enter the plant systems directly; it began by entering the systems of a Davis Besse contractor, and entered through the T1 line bridging the contractor's computer and Davis Besse's corporate networks. The T1 line was not protected by the plant's firewall. The success of the Stuxnet-Natanz case demonstrates that supply-chain level attack (i.e., physically tampering with digital systems to install undetectable malware for the purpose of bringing harm to a player further down the supply chain network) plays a crucial role in a successful attack. Although attacking an NPP naturally requires more complex strategies and tactics than internet hacking, NPP's have a variety of sophisticated and possibly sensitive systems that may be attacked. Previous studies, for example, Baylon, have identified and confirmed that such attack strategies and tactics can be designed and could produce severe damage to an NPP. Current NPPs were designed according to design basis accidents that predate use of the internet by the general public and did not take into consideration potential cyber attacks that could be carried out by state-sponsored attackers and malicious insiders. To date, no detailed engineering analysis has been performed to realistically examine the consequences these attacks may have on the plants. In this paper, we discuss an approach for assessing the potential consequences of Stuxnet type of attacks. We will examine the engineering criteria used in designing the plants, develop possible attack scenarios in terms of the structures, components, and systems (SSCs) being controlled by digital systems at the NPPs, perform engineering analysis to determine if the attacks would impose conditions that are beyond design bases, and categorize the consequences of the potential accidents. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Simulation Results of a Thermal Power Dispatch System from a Generic Pressurized Water Reactor in Normal and Abnormal Operating Conditions

Amid economic pressures in the U.S. electricity market, nuclear utilities are exploring new revenue streams, including hydrogen production. A generic pressurized water reactor simulator was modified to incorporate a novel design for a TPD system coupled to a hydrogen production plant. Standard malfunctions were included in the simulation design, including steam line breaks at various system locations and flow interruptions in the hydrogen plant due to multiple faults, reflecting anticipated operational challenges. It is imperative that the TPD system operation has a minimal effect on the reactor power, primary coolant system, and turbine system operation and performance. Due to the specific design and application of this TPD system, with the proposed turbine control system changes, the overall impact on the existing plant systems is low. Normal TPD operating scenarios resulted in minor effects on the existing plant systems: reactor power changes by at most 0.2%, and gross generator output changes by 20.5 MWe from 100 MWt of TPD. The most severe malfunction analyzed in this work is a full TPD steam line break downstream of the extraction location, which results in an increase in reactor power of about 0.5%. The gross generator output decreases by 36 MWe, a total decrease of 60 MWe from the full power steady state (FPSS) condition. These results indicate that an industrial hydrogen production plant could be coupled thermally to a nuclear power plant with limited effects on the existing system operation and safety.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Irradiation campaign in the EOLE critical facility of fiber optic Bragg gratings dedicated to the online temperature measurement in zero power research reactors

The control of temperature during operation of zero power research reactors participates to the overall control of experimentation conditions and reveals itself of a major importance more especially when measuring small multiplication factor variations. Within the framework of the refurbishment of the MASURCA facility, the development of a new temperature measurement system based on the optical fiber Bragg grating (FBG) technology is under consideration. In a first step, a series of FBGs is irradiated in the EOLE critical facility with the aim to select the most appropriate. Online temperature measurements are performed during a set of irradiations that should allow reaching a fast neutron fluence of some 10{sup 14} n.cm{sup -2}. The results obtained, more especially the Bragg wavelength shifts during the irradiation campaign, are discussed in this paper and compared to data from standard PT100 temperature sensors to highlight possible radiation effects on sensor performances. Work to be conducted during the second step of the project, aiming to a feasibility demonstration using a MASURCA assembly, is also presented. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Framework to Assess Advanced Reactor Spent Fuel Management Facility Deployment

Advanced nuclear reactors offer various operational advantages over existing light water reactors but could produce types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with a wide variety of forms and characteristics depending on how many different concepts are deployed. Each advanced reactor SNF type potentially poses unique management challenges. New planning efforts will be necessary to anticipate how the management requirements of advanced reactor SNF will affect the deployment of an integrated waste management system. This paper applies a framework of high-level facility deployment milestones to a generic SNF management system, reviewing them together with the advanced reactor SNF characteristics and management requirements. This allows for the investigation of factors that influence facility and system deployment, and ultimately, the identification of challenges facing the deployment of different kinds of SNF management facilities. Here, the back end of the once-through fuel cycle is examined for four advanced reactor system technology types: sodium-cooled fast reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid-fuel molten salt reactors, and lead-cooled fast reactors. It is observed that milestones earlier in the facility deployment process (e.g., siting and facility design) are more impacted by the uniqueness of advanced reactor SNF characteristics than others (e.g., construction and testing). Ultimately, none of the differences are seen as fundamentally disqualifying in a technical sense; however, they should be considered early, potentially as part of reactor design, to avoid issues in the future.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pressure Composition Temperature Curves of Hydride Moderators

Microreactors are compact and mobile reactors which operate at low power and high temperatures. These reactors generate heat which is then converted to electricity for use in a variety of special purpose applications. Microreactors are of interest due to their light weight, compact size and the ability to meet the needs for high energy in difficult or remote areas. Metal hydrides have been studied for nuclear and aviation applications. The emergence of microreactors the interest in metal hydrides is significant due to their ability to moderate neutrons in a light weight and solid form. In case of an off normal event, more accurate data is needed for the absorption/desorption rates of the hydrides due to the high uncertainties on hydrogen redistribution in the moderator. The literature shows considerable discrepancies in the PCT curves for yttrium and zirconium. The uncertainty is much more notable at higher stoichiometries of the hydride phase at high temperature. To understand the in-pile performance, a detailed understating of the impurities and microstructure is needed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗