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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 991 records · Page 55
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Post-Closure Environmental Sampling and Inspection at the Amchitka Island, Alaska, Site - 17251

In the 1960's and early 1970's, three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island, Alaska. In 1965, the US Department of Defense-in conjunction with the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-conducted the first of these nuclear tests, Long Shot, to provide data that would improve US capabilities for detecting underground nuclear explosions. In 1969, AEC conducted the second test, Milrow, to explore the feasibility of detonating a much larger device. In 1971, AEC conducted the third test, Cannikin, which was the largest underground test ever conducted by the US. The Long-Term Surveillance Plan (LTSP) for the Amchitka, Alaska, Site details how the US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) intends to fulfill its mission to protect human health and the environment at and around the Amchitka Island site. The LTSP calls for monitoring to be performed every 5 years, at least during the initial phase of the project. The purpose of the monitoring is to develop a baseline of activity concentrations for selected radionuclides in biota, water, and soil, both on Amchitka Island and at the reference location on Adak Island, approximately 322 kilometers (200 miles) northeast of Amchitka. In addition to the environmental monitoring activities, seven mud pit caps that contain diesel-contaminated soils are inspected. The plan for biological and water sampling (both seawater and freshwater) during the May 2016 sampling event was developed through close coordination with the primary stakeholders, including the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The environmental sampling in 2016 is a continuation of LM's evaluation of Amchitka Island's environment. Previous results from similar monitoring programs in 2004 and 2011 indicate that the environment is not being impacted by radionuclide migration and uptake from the underground nuclear testing conducted beneath Amchitka Island; consequently, subsistence and commercial-catch seafood is safe for human consumption. The collection of biota samples (rockfish, Irish lords, greenling, and rockweed) for cesium-134 ({sup 134}Cs), cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs), plutonium-239 ({sup 239}Pu), plutonium-240 ({sup 240}Pu), and freshwater and seawater samples for {sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, and tritium ({sup 3}H) was the primary objective of the 2016 sampling effort. Rockfish, Irish lords, and greenling are resident, nonmigratory fish species that spend their entire life cycle in the marine environment, and rockweed is an inter-tidal species that may concentrate cesium. The seawater samples were collected primarily to determine if leakage from the Long Shot detonation could be detected and, secondarily, to compare with the background seawater samples collected from Adak Island. Cesium isotopes are also being analyzed to better understand the potential impact that the Fukushima-Daiichi release might have on the Amchitka and Adak environments. The target detection limits used for the 2016 sampling are lower than those used in previous studies. The lower detection limits make it possible for LM to delineate background activity levels for the radionuclides of interest. Data from the 2016 sampling event go beyond assessing food safety and focus on detecting leakage from the underground nuclear explosions. Additionally, the baseline activity concentrations obtained for the reference area (Adak Island) will enable identification of quantitative statistical trends in the results of future sampling programs. Sampling programs conducted in 2021 and beyond will have an objective to assess the statistical trends of radioactivity levels in the Amchitka Island environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

The Role of Technical Guidance and Analysis Tools in Remedy Decisions, Implementation, and Closure - 18307

Selection, design, and implementation of environmental remedies are conducted under regulatory frameworks that define the activities, communication, and documentation requirements for the remediation process. However, there are site situations that are not well described in the basic regulatory frameworks, and technical guidance and analysis tools can help facilitate remedy decisions and actions. An example where technical guidance and analysis tools are helpful is in the transition from pump-and-treat (P and T) remediation to monitored natural attenuation (MNA). Standard MNA regulatory guidance does not account for a plume initially controlled by P and T hydraulic conditions rather than natural-gradient conditions. For instance, MNA guidance discusses demonstrating plume stability as a means to evaluate the suitability of MNA. However, plume stability under long-term natural gradient conditions cannot be directly demonstrated while the plume is being contained by a P and T system. Thus, additional guidance is needed to describe other measures that can be used to support transition from P and T to MNA. As an additional example, standard MNA regulatory guidance is not written to provide suitable information for application to vadose-zone contamination; discussion and examples in the regulatory guidance are predominantly for groundwater. Use of contaminant transport assessments is an important component of vadose-zone remedy decisions where technical guidance and analysis tools can facilitate these decisions. For volatile compounds, the assessment may need to also consider flux to the surface and constraints associated with vapor intrusion. Recent technical guidance and associated analysis tools provide sites with approaches to support remedy decisions for the above conditions. In particular, these recent approaches target developing and implementing P and T and soil vapor extraction remediation exit strategies and facilitating assessment and implementation of remedies for coupled vadose-zone/groundwater contamination. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Use of Robotics in Liquid Waste System - {sup 3}H Evaporator, Tank Closure and Defense Waste Processing Facility - 18525

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) safely stores and treats high-level radioactive waste. The LWS consists of 51 waste storage tanks (eight of which are operationally closed and filled with grout), waste evaporators, treatment facilities, and solidification facilities such as the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and Salt-stone Production Facility (SPF). At Savannah River Remediation (SRR), the liquid waste contractor, robotic technologies are needed to enter areas and spaces that are otherwise inaccessible or prohibit direct access by workers due to unsafe, unstable, or unknown physical or structural conditions; or configurations that are hard to reach or beyond reach without taking extraordinary mechanical measures. As discussed below, SRR uses robotic technologies at various LWS facilities to reduce dose to the workers as well as provide access to unreachable locations due to the presence of radiological or chemical hazards. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Postclosure Safety Assessment for the Nuclear Power Demonstration Closure Project - 19158

Following 30 years in a safe shutdown state, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) is proposing the final decommissioning of the Nuclear Power Demonstration Waste Facility (NPDWF). A Postclosure Safety Assessment (PostSA) has been prepared as part of this process. The present PostSA represents the second assessment, following an iterative approach. The PostSA considered Normal Evolution of the facility, as well as several Disruptive Events and other cases to show robustness and account for uncertainties. The results of the PostSA show that the NPDWF is a robust design that will contain and limit release of contaminants long into the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems for Post-closure Waste Site Maintenance and Surveillance - 20143

The P- and R-Area Reactor buildings, located at SRS near Aiken, SC, were in-situ decommissioned by grouting below-grade portions of the buildings and demolishing some above-grade structures to grade level. Other reactor building structures were left above-grade and sealed to prevent human or animal access. Because the above grade-structures are expected to continue in their present state for hundreds of years, the condition of the building roofs is critical to mitigate rainwater intrusion. For this reason, building roof areas were strengthened with high strength concrete to ensure the long-term integrity of the roof structure. Periodic inspections of the roof structures are required to ensure that the roofs are functioning properly and to identify damage areas. The traditional method of inspecting closed reactor buildings requires the use of a helicopter and photographer to generate photographs and videos for review. This method proved sufficient but lacked the resolution and clarity that is required for a thorough inspection of the building structure. Fortunately, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has established a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) program using commercially available and custom-built remote-controlled aircraft. EC and ACP contacted the SRNL program to evaluate whether the sUAS technology could be employed for periodic reactor building inspections. The sUAS can fly within a few meters of the reactor buildings and hover, allowing for a more thorough aerial inspection. The initial sUAS inspection of the P-Area Reactor building was completed in February 2018 and at the R-Area Reactor building in August 2018 and were successful in providing higher resolution photos and videos. The sUAS inspections also revealed that vegetation had begun to grow on the roofs that could potentially damage the structure integrity. SRNL partnered with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University to build a custom heavy lift sUAS that could be equipped with herbicides to remotely treat the vegetative growth. Herbicides were successfully applied to the R-Area Reactor building roof using the custom sUAS in September 2018. The use of unmanned aircraft systems at SRS to perform aerial inspections and herbicide treatment in otherwise inaccessible areas has proven to be an efficient and cost-effective technology that provides high value, increases knowledge of facility conditions, and provides for early detection of damage. Periodic inspections of the reactor building roofs using sUAS technology are performed safely, efficiently, and at a significant cost and schedule savings while reducing emissions, noise, and fossil fuel use. The use of sUAS equipment for building inspections and herbicide application at SRS is unique within the DOE complex. The goal of SRS is to apply this remote technology to other waste unit operations and maintenance activities in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

GSI 191 Closure Issue for EDF PWR Fleet: The Fuel Assembly Test Results

EDF has re started recirculation studies within the international GSI 191 framework by 2002, when EDF decided to join the NEI sump strainers task force. All the EDF PWR fleet have been upgraded, with major strainer modifications, according to the NEI 04-07 guideline. The so-called chemical effects have been carefully studied by EDF and demonstration have been released that there are no chemical effects on EDF fleet, owing to the nature of our debris. The study of strainer downstream effects started by 2009, with decoupling Downstream Sump Debris Source Term (DST) and by the end of 2016, all the equipment have been successfully qualified. At a previous ANS meeting,it was said that core fuel tests were scheduled. They have started at the beginning of 2014 and they have been closed by mid 2016 for AREVA Fuel type at ERLANGEN facility (Germany). The present presentation is aimed at describing the test facility, the test specifications and the main results. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗