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At least 991 records · Page 55

DHS-Postdoc Mid- and year-end report for FY13

The focus of my effort during the second half of FY13 was planning and performing experiments that enable the high precision isotopic measurement of the heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) gadolinium (Gd) and dysprosium (Dy). The isotopic compositions of these elements will be used as forensic signatures in a variety of nuclear materials.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Quantification and Uncertainty in Particle Morphological Analysis

A key part of forensic analysis of interdicted nuclear materials is examining the microstructure of the materials, which are frequently in the form of particulates. We are developing methods for quantifying the morphology of particle sets imaged using scanning electron microscopy. In order to use this data effectively, we need to understand the uncertainties involved in measuring the morphology of particles. This presentation discusses the sources of uncertainty in scanning electron microscopy, and presents the results of an internal user test of the MAMA software package being developed under a DHS Transformational and Applied Research program. The steps required to establish morphological standards similar to NIST standards are discussed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Fukushima Daiichi—A Case Study for BWR Instrumentation and Control Systems Performance During a Severe Accident, Rev 1

This report provides an assessment of the performance of various instrumentation and control (I&C) and monitoring systems, with a focus on the first few days of the Fukushima Daiichi accident starting on March 11, 2011. Similar to what occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident in 1979, operator responses were challenged when information on key parameters was lost, erroneous, or misleading. While numerous improvements in instrumentation capabilities have been made since the TMI-2 event, the accident at Fukushima Daiichi suggests the potential for further improvement. The objective of this research is to review the performance of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 instrumentation systems that could have helped ensure that plant operators and emergency responders had relevant, accurate, and timely knowledge of plant conditions as they managed the accident response. As was the case with TMI-2, forensic analyses of plant instrumentation failures will be a long-term effort. As an introduction to this long-term research, this report focuses on the information available in the control room during the accident and illustrates the challenges to operators in their understanding of plant conditions during the progression of the accident. I&C systems monitor the success or failure of achievement of light water reactor safety principles in which the protection of the reactor fuel, reactor coolant system, and reactor containment is accomplished. This report (1) provides an overview of the safety principles; (2) notes parameters associated with the boiling water reactor (BWR)/3 and BWR/4 protection, actuation, and monitoring systems as they relate to the achievement of these principles; (3) presents data from past research on predicted instrumentation performance during severe accidents, and (4) assesses performance of the key I&C and monitoring systems associated with BWR/3 and BWR/4 reactors like those at Fukushima Daiichi. Lessons learned or potential improvements associated with the performance of these systems in the context of severe accidents are delineated. As background information, an overview of key BWR/3- and BWR/4-Mark I reactor designs (BWR/3 and BWR/4 with a Mark I containment) reactor protection, engineered safety features actuation, and accident monitoring systems is provided. A brief description of plant safety systems used to prevent or mitigate reactor accidents is also provided. This background information provides context for the brief discussion of previous research that has been conducted on BWR severe accidents and for the discussion of the accident sequences, which led to core damage at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3. The progression of the accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 occurred very much as predicted in prior severe accident research conducted in the United States and internationally, given the complete station blackout that occurred when the tsunami generated by one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded rolled onshore.

Accident Tolerant Equipment↗

DNDO Analysis Cell Concept

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has a mission of implementing rad/nuc interdiction capabilities for a managed and coordinated response to threats, integration of federal nuclear forensics programs, and coordinating the development of the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture. In the process of executing this mission, DNDO has generated substantial information, data, technical results, operational workflows and analytical tools. The effective utilization of these resources is an overarching goal of the organization. After nearly a decade of performing work, DNDO faces a challenge in capitalizing on the large amount of data, reports, processes, tools, and people. As new work is being planned, managers and researchers need to have an understating of what information has been collected, what tools are available, the collaborations which can be utilized to propel the work forward, processes to plan and execute, and how to present conclusions and results that can assist the government in making decisions. This type of challenge can be met through the use of a series of organized and connected elements which form a broader structure (cell) that promotes cross utilization of elements such that they can be tailored (analyzed) to fit the context of the problem to be solved. The development of an analysis cell for DNDO will address the challenges of utilizing existing elements, identifying gaps, annually reporting the performance of rad/nuc interdiction instrumentation, and planning the execution of future work.

Pagh, Richard T.↗

Conceptual Design for the Pilot-Scale Plutonium Oxide Processing Unit in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory

This report describes a conceptual design for a pilot-scale capability to produce plutonium oxide for use as exercise and reference materials, and for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. This capability is referred to as the Pilot-scale Plutonium oxide Processing Unit (P3U), and it will be located in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The key unit operations are described, including plutonium dioxide (PuO2) dissolution, purification of the Pu by ion exchange, precipitation, and conversion to oxide by calcination.

plutonium oxide↗

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗

Nested Narratives Final Report

In cybersecurity forensics and incident response, the story of what has happened is the most important artifact yet the one least supported by tools and techniques. Existing tools focus on gathering and manipulating low-level data to allow an analyst to investigate exactly what happened on a host system or a network. Higher-level analysis is usually left to whatever ad hoc tools and techniques an individual may have developed. We discuss visual representations of narrative in the context of cybersecurity incidents with an eye toward multi-scale illustration of actions and actors. We envision that this representation could smoothly encompass individual packets on a wire at the lowest level and nation-state-level actors at the highest. We present progress to date, discuss the impact of technical risk on this project and highlight opportunities for future work.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Annual Report on the Activities and Publications of the DHS-DNDO-NTNFC Sponsored Post-doctoral Fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory

This report is a summary of the projects Jung Rim is working on as a DHS postdoctoral fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory. These research projects are designed to explore different radioanalytical methods to support nuclear forensics applications. The current projects discussed here include development of alpha spectroscopy method for 240/239 Pu Isotopic ratio measurement, non-destructive uranium assay method using gamma spectroscopy, and 236 U non-destructive uranium analysis using FRAM code. This report documents the work that has been performed since the start of the postdoctoral appointment.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Design of the Laboratory-Scale Plutonium Oxide Processing Unit in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory

This report describes a design for a laboratory-scale capability to produce plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production, as well as for use as exercise and reference materials. This capability will be located in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The key unit operations are described, including PuO 2 dissolution, purification of the Pu by ion exchange, precipitation, and re-conversion to PuO 2 by calcination.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium disposition treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The LANL C-NR counting room and fission product yields

This PowerPoint presentation focused on the following areas: LANL C-NR counting room; Fission product yields; Los Alamos Neutron wheel experiments; Recent experiments ad NCERC; and Post-detonation nuclear forensics

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Qualification of Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3 Data for Severe Accident Evaluations - Process and Illustrative Examples from Prior TMI-2 Evaluations

The accidents at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and the Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3 Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) provide unique opportunities to evaluate instrumentation exposed to severe accident conditions. Conditions associated with the release of coolant and the hydrogen burn that occurred during the TMI-2 accident exposed instrumentation to harsh conditions, including direct radiation, radioactive contamination, and high humidity with elevated temperatures and pressures. As part of a program initiated in 2012 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), a review was completed to gain insights from prior TMI-2 sensor survivability and data qualification efforts. This initial review focused on the set of sensors deemed most important by post-TMI-2 instrumentation evaluation programs. Instrumentation evaluation programs focused on data required by TMI-2 operators to assess the condition of the reactor and containment and the effect of mitigating actions taken by these operators. In addition, prior efforts focused on sensors providing data required for subsequent forensic evaluations and accident simulations. To encourage the potential for similar activities to be completed for qualifying data from Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3, this report provides additional details related to the formal process used to develop a qualified TMI-2 data base and presents data qualification details for three parameters: primary system pressure; containment building temperature; and containment pressure. As described within this report, sensor evaluations and data qualification required implementation of various processes, including comparisons with data from other sensors, analytical calculations, laboratory testing, and comparisons with sensors subjected to similar conditions in large-scale integral tests and with sensors that were similar in design to instruments easily removed from the TMI-2 plant for evaluations. As documented in this report, results from qualifying data for these parameters led to key insights related to TMI-2 accident progression. Hence, these selected examples illustrate the types of activities completed in the TMI-2 data qualification process and the importance of such a qualification effort. These details are documented in this report to facilitate implementation of similar process using data and examinations at the Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3 reactors so that BWR-specific benefits can be obtained.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

UVI Cyber-security Workshop Workshop Analysis.

The cybersecurity consortium, which was established by DOE/NNSA’s Minority Serving Institutions Partnerships Program (MSIPP), allows students from any of the partner schools (13 HBCUs, two national laboratories, and a public school district) to have all consortia options available to them, to create career paths and to open doors to DOE sites and facilities to student members of the consortium. As a part of this year consortium activities, Sandia National Laboratories and the University of Virgin Islands conducted a week long cyber workshop that consisted of three courses; Digital Forensics and Malware Analysis, Python Programming, and ThunderBird Cup. These courses are designed to enhance cyber defense skills and promote learning within STEM related fields.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Technical Report on the Behavior of Trace Elements, Stable Isotopes, and Radiogenic Isotopes During the Processing of Uranium Ore to Uranium Ore Concentrate

The goals of this SP-1 effort were to understand how isotopic and elemental signatures behave during mining, milling, and concentration and to identify analytes that might preserve geologic signatures of the protolith ores. The impurities that are preserved through the concentration process could provide useful forensic signatures and perhaps prove diagnostic of sample origin.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

U/Pu Analysis with Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy

This report presents an overview of the nuclear materials for the international workshop on nuclear, material forensics methodologies.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Livermore Accelerator Source for Radionuclide Science (LASRS)

The Livermore Accelerator Source for Radionuclide Science (LASRS) will generate intense photon and neutron beams to address important gaps in the study of radionuclide science that directly impact Stockpile Stewardship, Nuclear Forensics, and Nuclear Material Detection. The co-location of MeV-scale neutral and photon sources with radiochemical analytics provides a unique facility to meet current and future challenges in nuclear security and nuclear science.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DCNL 4-Hour Report

This document is a mock data report for training purposes by the Delegate's Country National Laboratory in their Nuclear Forensics department.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

MAMA User Guide v2.0.1

Morphological signatures of bulk SNM materials have significant promise, but these potential signatures are not fully utilized. This document describes software tools, collectively called the MAMA (Morphological Analysis for Material Attribution) software that can help provide robust and accurate quantification of morphological features in bulk material microscopy images (Optical, SEM). Although many of the specific tools are not unique to Mama, the software package has been designed specifically for nuclear material morphological analysis, and is at a point where it can be easily adapted (by Los Alamos or by collaborators) in response to new, different, or changing forensics needs. The current release of the MAMA software only includes the image quantification, descriptions, and annotation functionality. Only limited information on a sample, its pedigree, and its chemistry are recorded inside this part of the software. This was decision based on initial feedback and the fact that there are several analytical chemistry databases being developed within the community. Currently MAMA is a standalone program that can export quantification results in a basic text format that can be imported into other programs such as Excel and Access. There is also a basic report generating feature that produces HTML formatted pages of the same information. We will be working with collaborators to provide better integration of MAMA into their particular systems, databases and workflows.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗