Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “secure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 991 records · Page 55

Cyber Security Analysis for Nuclear Reactor Control Systems (Final Technical Report)

This project investigated the cyber-security impacts of moving from an all analog, point-to-point, instrumentation and control (I&C) system to a digital I&C system based on Modbus and a shared communication medium. A formalism called a hybrid attack graph was expanded to support the nuclear research reactor system. The hybrid attack graph allows one to check a system for vulnerabilities, in this case cyber-security vulnerabilities, and to document the attack vectors (scenarios) causing those vulnerabilities. In parallel, a simulation of the system was developed to model both the physical reactor parameters and operations, as well as the network interconnects and communications. This simulation platform was modeled on the nuclear research reactor located at Washington State University. The simulation platform provided a sandbox to evaluate and quantify the impact of identified and proposed vulnerabilities in the system and to determine the effectiveness of countermeasures at stopping these attacks. The simulation and hybrid attack graph tools were integrated to provide a streamlined process of generating attack scenarios, playing those scenarios out in the simulation, and then analyzing the results to correlate system state to states in the hybrid attack graph. This process was used to (1) quantify the impact of attack scenarios and (2) to determine if the system moved through the hybrid attack graph as anticipated. The hybrid attack graph tool was extended and customized to produce a tool to automatically identify critical assets (CAs) and critical digital assets (CDAs) as defined by NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71. This tool was verified using the nuclear research reactor at Washington State University. Finally, a series of educational modules covering the findings of the different aspects of this research have been created.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Energy Assurance: Essential Energy Technologies for Climate Protection and Energy Security

We present and apply a new method for analyzing the significance of advanced technology for achieving two important national energy goals: climate protection and energy security. Quantitative metrics for U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 and oil independence in 2030 are specified, and the impacts of 11 sets of energy technologies are analyzed using a model that employs the Kaya identity and incorporates the uncertainty of technological breakthroughs. The goals examined are a 50% to 80% reduction in CO2 emissions from energy use by 2050 and increased domestic hydrocarbon fuels supply and decreased demand that sum to 11 mmbd by 2030. The latter is intended to insure that the economic costs of oil dependence are not more than 1% of U.S. GDP with 95% probability by 2030. Perhaps the most important implication of the analysis is that meeting both energy goals requires a high probability of success (much greater than even odds) for all 11 technologies. Two technologies appear to be indispensable for accomplishment of both goals: carbon capture and storage, and advanced fossil liquid fuels. For reducing CO2 by more than 50% by 2050, biomass energy and electric drive (fuel cell or battery powered) vehicles also appear to be necessary. Every one of the 11 technologies has a powerful influence on the probability of achieving national energy goals. From the perspective of technology policy, conflict between the CO2 mitigation and energy security is negligible. These general results appear to be robust to a wide range of technology impact estimates; they are substantially unchanged by a Monte Carlo simulation that allows the impacts of technologies to vary by 20%.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Status Summary of 3He and Neutron Detection Alternatives for Homeland Security

This is a short summary whitepaper on results of our alternatives work: Neutron detection is an important aspect of interdiction of radiological threats for homeland security purposes since plutonium, a material used for nuclear weapons, is a significant source of fission neutrons [Kouzes 2005]. Because of the imminent shortage of 3He, which is used in the most commonly deployed neutron detectors, a replacement technology for neutron detection is required for most detection systems in the very near future [Kouzes 2009a]. For homeland security applications, neutron false alarms from a detector can result in significant impact. This puts a strong requirement on any neutron detection technology not to generate false neutron counts in the presence of a large gamma ray-only source [Kouzes et al. 2008].

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Remediation Progress Toward Closure of Contaminated Sites

The Environmental Restoration activities at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office assess the environmental impacts that resulted from atmospheric and underground nuclear tests conducted from 1951 to 1992 on the Nevada National Security Site and Nevada Test and Training Range (which includes the Tonopah Test Range). The goal is to protect public health and the environment through investigations and corrective actions. The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), established in 1996 between the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense, serves as the cleanup agreement for the Environmental Restoration activities and provides the framework for identifying, prioritizing, investigating, remediating, and monitoring contaminated sites. This agreement satisfies the corrective action requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. To ensure efficiency in managing these corrective actions, the sites are grouped according to location, physical and geological characteristics, and/or contaminants. These groups, called corrective action units, are prioritized based on potential risk to workers and the public, available technology, future land use, agency and stakeholder concerns, and other criteria. Environmental Restoration activities include: Industrial Sites, Soils, and Underground Test Area. Nearly 15 years have passed since the FFACO was established, and during this time, more than 3,000 sites have been identified as requiring investigation or corrective actions. To date, approximately 1,945 sites have been investigated and closed through no further action, clean closure, or closure in place. Another 985 sites are currently being investigated or are in the remediation phase, leaving approximately 80 contaminated sites yet to be addressed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Operations Application to Environmental Restoration at Corrective Action Unit 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, at the Nevada National Security Site

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office has responsibility for environmental restoration at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site). This includes remediation at locations where past testing activities have resulted in the release of plutonium to the environment. One of the current remediation efforts involves a site where an underground subcritical nuclear safety test was conducted in 1964. The underground test was vented through a steel pipe to the surface in a closed system where gas samples were obtained. The piping downstream of the gas-sampling apparatus was routed belowground to a location where it was allowed to vent into an existing radioactively contaminated borehole. The length of the pipe above the ground surface is approximately 200 meters. This pipe remained in place until remediation efforts began in 2007, at which time internal plutonium contamination was discovered. Following this discovery, an assessment was conducted to determine the quantity of plutonium present in the pipe. This site has been identified as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites. The quantity of plutonium identified at CAU 547 exceeded the Hazard Category 3 threshold but was below the Hazard Category 2 threshold specified in DOE Standard DOE-STD-1027-92. This CAU, therefore, was initially categorized as a Hazard Category 3 environmental restoration site. A contaminated facility or site that is initially categorized as Hazard Category 3, however, may be downgraded to below Hazard Category 3 if it can be demonstrated through further analysis that the form of the material and the energy available for release support reducing the hazard category. This is an important consideration when performing hazard categorization of environmental restoration sites because energy sources available for release of material are generally fewer at an environmental restoration site than at an operating facility and environmental restoration activities may result in the complete removal of source material.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

U.S. national security through global technical engagement presentation to composite group A : homeland and international operations.

This talk will discuss Sandia's Global Security Program focused on reducing proliferation and terrorism threats to U.S. national security through global technical engagement. Elements include nuclear and radiological risks, biological and chemical risks, and multi-threat risk reduction. Also, recent work addressing the need to better integrate nonproliferation, arms control, counterterrorism, and nuclear deterrent objectives will be discussed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Video performance for high security applications.

The complexity of physical protection systems has increased to address modern threats to national security and emerging commercial technologies. A key element of modern physical protection systems is the data presented to the human operator used for rapid determination of the cause of an alarm, whether false (e.g., caused by an animal, debris, etc.) or real (e.g., a human adversary). Alarm assessment, the human validation of a sensor alarm, primarily relies on imaging technologies and video systems. Developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) that drive the design or evaluation of a video system or technology becomes a challenge, given the subjectivity of the application (e.g., alarm assessment). Sandia National Laboratories has conducted empirical analysis using field test data and mathematical models such as binomial distribution and Johnson target transfer functions to develop MOEs for video system technologies. Depending on the technology, the task of the security operator and the distance to the target, the Probability of Assessment (PAs) can be determined as a function of a variety of conditions or assumptions. PAs used as an MOE allows the systems engineer to conduct trade studies, make informed design decisions, or evaluate new higher-risk technologies. This paper outlines general video system design trade-offs, discusses ways video can be used to increase system performance and lists MOEs for video systems used in subjective applications such as alarm assessment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ID201202961, DOE S-124,539, Information Security Analysis Using Game Theory and Simulation

Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic simulations of Agent Based Models (ABMs). Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. Our approach addresses imperfect information and scalability that allows us to also address previous limitations of current stochastic game models. Such models only consider perfect information assuming that the defender is always able to detect attacks; assuming that the state transition probabilities are fixed before the game assuming that the players actions are always synchronous; and that most models are not scalable with the size and complexity of systems under consideration. Our use of ABMs yields results of selected experiments that demonstrate our proposed approach and provides a quantitative measure for realistic information systems and their related security scenarios.

Availablity↗

PNNL Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School

PNNL's Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School gives graduate and advanced graduate students an understanding of how radiation detectors are used in national security missions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) - U.S. Copyright TXu 1-901-039

Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing compliance pressures require careful consideration and adaptation. The Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) provides a measure (i.e., a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance, and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES accounts for the variance that may exist among the stakes one attaches to meeting each requirement. The basis, objectives and capabilities for the CSES including inputs/outputs as well as the structural and mathematical underpinnings contained in this copyright.

Cyber Security Econometrics System↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Husman Irradiators Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) Husman Irradiators waste stream (BCLAHUSMANS00, Revision 0) is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The LLNL Husman Irradiators waste stream consists of 3 fully self-shielded self-contained cesium-137 (137Cs) irradiators that have exceeded their useful lifetime (LLNL 2015). The LLNL Husman Irradiators waste stream requires an SA because the 137Cs activity concentration exceeds the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Level (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office [NNSA/NFO] 2013). The results indicate that all performance objectives can be met with disposal of the LLNL Husman Irradiators in a SLB trench. Addition of the LLNL Husman Irradiators inventory had no significant effect on the maximum mean and 95th percentile performance assessment results over the 1,000-year compliance period. The short half-life of 137Cs limits its potential impacts to a few hundred years after disposal. The 3 Husman Irradiators are suitable for disposal by SLB at the Area 5 RWMS.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, LLNL, Hu↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory EnergyX Macroencapsulated Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) EnergyX Macroencapsulated waste stream (B LAMACRONCAP, Revision 1) is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulated waste stream is macroencapsulated mixed waste generated during research laboratory operations and maintenance (LLNL 2015). The LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulated waste stream required a special analysis due to tritium (3H), cobalt-60 (60Co), cesium-137 (137Cs), and radium-226 (226Ra) exceeding the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Levels (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office [NNSA/NFO] 2015).The results indicate that all performance objectives can be met with disposal of the waste stream in a SLB trench. Addition of the LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulated inventory slightly increases multiple performance assessment results, with the largest relative increase occurring for the all-pathways annual total effective dose (TED). The maximum mean and 95th percentile 222Rn flux density remain less than the performance objective throughout the compliance period. The LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulated waste stream is suitable for disposal by SLB at the Area 5 RWMS. The waste stream is recommended for approval without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Low Activity Beta/Gamma Sources Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Low Activity Beta/Gamma Sources waste stream (BCLALADOEOSRP, Revision 0) is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The LLNL Low Activity Beta/Gamma Sources waste stream consists of sealed sources that are no longer needed. The LLNL Low Activity Beta/Gamma Sources waste stream required a special analysis because cobalt-60 (60Co), strontium-90 (90Sr), cesium-137 (137Cs), and radium-226 (226Ra) exceeded the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Levels (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office [NNSA/NFO] 2015). The results indicate that all performance objectives can be met with disposal of the LLNL Low Activity Beta/Gamma Sources in a SLB trench. The LLNL Low Activity Beta/Gamma Sources waste stream is suitable for disposal by SLB at the Area 5 RWMS. However, the activity concentration of 226Ra listed on the waste profile sheet significantly exceeds the action level. Approval of the waste profile sheet could potentially allow the disposal of high activity 226Ra sources. To ensure that the generator does not include large 226Ra sources in this waste stream without additional evaluation, a control is need on the maximum 226Ra inventory. A limit based on the generator’s estimate of the total 226Ra inventory is recommended. The waste stream is recommended for approval with the control that the total 226Ra inventory disposed shall not exceed 5.5E10 Bq (1.5 Ci).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Xenith Scalable Security Economics

These slides present a high level overview of an ongoing project sponsored by NNSA. The project is focused on economic analysis of physical security design of micro reactors. The slides will be presented to NNSA's office of International Nuclear Security (INS) at a program update meeting on May 28th, 2025.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Methodology for Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance Indicators and Stakeholder Mission

Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing compliance pressures require careful consideration and adaptation. This paper proposes a Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) that provides a measure (i.e., a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES reflects the variance that may exist among the stakes she/he attaches to meeting each requirement. This paper introduces the basis, objectives and capabilities for the CSES including inputs/outputs as well as the structural and mathematical underpinnings.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Harden Security of High-Risk and Critical Supply Chains

This article focuses on the security risk in the container supply chain. It provides an overview of the technical and policy initiatives that are being implemented by international organizations, governments, and the private sector to enhance security in the container supply chain.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Combining Traditional Cyber Security Audit Data with Psychosocial Data: Towards Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation

The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the combination of traditional cyber security audit data with psychosocial data, so as to move from an insider threat detection stance to one that enables prediction of potential insider presence. Two distinctive aspects of the approach are the objective of predicting or anticipating potential risks and the use of organizational data in addition to cyber data to support the analysis. The chapter describes the challenges of this endeavor and progress in defining a usable set of predictive indicators, developing a framework for integrating the analysis of organizational and cyber security data to yield predictions about possible insider exploits, and developing the knowledge base and reasoning capability of the system. We also outline the types of errors that one expects in a predictive system versus a detection system and discuss how those errors can affect the usefulness of the results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗