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NASA NTRS2008

A Performance Assessment of an Airborne Separation Assistance System Using Realistic Complex Traffic Flows

This paper presents the results from a study that investigates the performance of a tactical Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) in en route airspace, under varying demand levels, with realistic traffic flows. The ASAS concept studied here allows flight crews of equipped aircraft to perform separation from other air traffic autonomously. This study addresses the tactical aspects of an ASAS using aircraft state data (i.e. position and velocity) to detect and resolve projected conflicts. In addition, use of a conflict prevention system helps ASAS-equipped aircraft avoid maneuvers that may cause new conflicts. ASAS-capable aircraft are equipped with satellite-based navigation and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) for transmission and receipt of aircraft state data. In addition to tactical conflict detection and resolution (CD&R), a complete, integrated ASAS is likely to incorporate a strategic CD&R component with a longer look-ahead time, using trajectory intent information. A system-wide traffic flow management (TFM) component, located at the FAA command center helps aircraft to avoid regions of excessive traffic density and complexity. A Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), as used today is the system of last resort. This integrated approach avoids sole reliance on the use of the tactical CD&R studied here, but the tactical component remains a critical element of the complete ASAS. The focus of this paper is to determine to what extent the proposed tactical component of ASAS alone can maintain aircraft separation at demand levels up to three times that of current traffic. The study also investigates the effect of mixing ASAS-equipped aircraft with unequipped aircraft (i.e. current day) that do not have the capability to self-separate. Position and velocity data for unequipped aircraft needs to be available to ASASequipped. Most likely, for this future concept, state data would be available from instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft, equipped with at least ADS-B transmission capability. The objective is to reduce the number of losses of separation to a minimum and investigate the limits of tactical-only CD&R. Thus, the objective is not, expressly, to achieve zero losses of separation with tactical ASAS because this is one component of an integrated ASAS.

Smith, Jeremy C.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Separation of Lift-Generated Vortex Wakes Into Two Diverging Parts

As part of an ongoing study of the spreading rate of lift-generated vortex wakes, the present investigation considers possible reasons as to why segments of lift-generated wakes sometimes depart from the main part of the wake to move rapidly in either an upward or downward direction. It is assumed that deficiencies or enhancements of the lift carry over across the fuselage-shrouded wing are the driving mechanism for departures of wake-segments. The computations presented first indicate that upwardly departing wake segments that were observed and photographed could have been produced by a deficiency in lift carryover across the fuselage-shrouded part of the wing. Computations made of idealized vortex wakes indicate that upward departure of a wake segment requires a centerline reduction in the span loading of 70% or more, whether the engines are at idle or robust thrust. Similarly, it was found that downward departure of wake segments is produced when the lift over the center part of the wing is enhanced. However, it was also found that downward departures do not occur without the presence of robust engine-exhaust streams (i.e., engines must NOT be at idle). In those cases, downward departures of a wake segment occurs when the centerline value of the loading is enhanced by any amount between about 10% to 100%. Observations of condensation trails indicate that downward departure of wake segments is rare. Upward departures of wake segments appears to be more common but still rare. A study to determine the part of the aircraft that causes wake departures has not been carried out. However, even though departures of wake segments rarely occur, some aircraft do regularly shed these wake structures. If aircraft safety is to be assured to a high degree of reliability, and a solution for eliminating them is not implemented, existing guidelines for the avoidance of vortex wakes [1,3] may need to be broadened to include possible increases in wake sizes caused by vertical departures of wake segments. Further study may indicate that it is not possible to modify existing aircraft enough to prevent wake departures. Wake-avoidance guidelines must then be adjusted to provide the desired degree of safety. It appears that steps to avoid upwardly moving wake segments have already been incorporated into the avoidance procedures used for aircraft on approach to runways at the Frankfurt Airport [6,7]. The uncertainty in the prospects for compromises in flight safety caused by rapidly upwardly or downwardly moving wake segments suggest that it be specified that aircraft do not fly above or below each other during operations in the airport vicinity where aircraft are likely to be closely spaced [20].

Rossow, Vernon J.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Examination of Icing Induced Loss of Control and Its Mitigations

Factors external to the aircraft are often a significant causal factor in loss of control (LOC) accidents. In today s aviation world, very few accidents stem from a single cause and typically have a number of causal factors that culminate in a LOC accident. Very often the "trigger" that initiates an accident sequence is an external environment factor. In a recent NASA statistical analysis of LOC accidents, aircraft icing was shown to be the most common external environmental LOC causal factor for scheduled operations. When investigating LOC accident or incidents aircraft icing causal factors can be categorized into groups of 1) in-flight encounter with super-cooled liquid water clouds, 2) take-off with ice contamination, or 3) in-flight encounter with high concentrations of ice crystals. As with other flight hazards, icing induced LOC accidents can be prevented through avoidance, detection, and recovery mitigations. For icing hazards, avoidance can take the form of avoiding flight into icing conditions or avoiding the hazard of icing by making the aircraft tolerant to icing conditions. Icing detection mitigations can take the form of detecting icing conditions or detecting early performance degradation caused by icing. Recovery from icing induced LOC requires flight crew or automated systems capable of accounting for reduced aircraft performance and degraded control authority during the recovery maneuvers. In this report we review the icing induced LOC accident mitigations defined in a recent LOC study and for each mitigation describe a research topic required to enable or strengthen the mitigation. Many of these research topics are already included in ongoing or planned NASA icing research activities or are being addressed by members of the icing research community. These research activities are described and the status of the ongoing or planned research to address the technology needs is discussed

Reehorst, Andrew L.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Automated Escape Guidance Algorithms for An Escape Vehicle

An escape vehicle was designed to provide an emergency evacuation for crew members living on a space station. For maximum escape capability, the escape vehicle needs to have the ability to safely evacuate a station in a contingency scenario such as an uncontrolled (e.g., tumbling) station. This emergency escape sequence will typically be divided into three events: The fust separation event (SEP1), the navigation reconstruction event, and the second separation event (SEP2). SEP1 is responsible for taking the spacecraft from its docking port to a distance greater than the maximum radius of the rotating station. The navigation reconstruction event takes place prior to the SEP2 event and establishes the orbital state to within the tolerance limits necessary for SEP2. The SEP2 event calculates and performs an avoidance burn to prevent station recontact during the next several orbits. This paper presents the tools and results for the whole separation sequence with an emphasis on the two separation events. The fust challenge includes collision avoidance during the escape sequence while the station is in an uncontrolled rotational state, with rotation rates of up to 2 degrees per second. The task of avoiding a collision may require the use of the Vehicle's de-orbit propulsion system for maximum thrust and minimum dwell time within the vicinity of the station vicinity. The thrust of the propulsion system is in a single direction, and can be controlled only by the attitude of the spacecraft. Escape algorithms based on a look-up table or analytical guidance can be implemented since the rotation rate and the angular momentum vector can be sensed onboard and a-priori knowledge of the position and relative orientation are available. In addition, crew intervention has been provided for in the event of unforeseen obstacles in the escape path. The purpose of the SEP2 burn is to avoid re-contact with the station over an extended period of time. Performing this maneuver properly requires knowledge of the orbital state, which is obtained during the navigation state reconstruction event. Since the direction of the delta-v of the SEPI maneuver is a random variable with respect to the Local Vertical Local Horizontal (LVLH) coordinate system, calculating the required SEP2 burn is a challenge. This problem was solved using a neural network as a model-free function approximation technique.

Flanary, Ronald↗

NASA NTRS2011

Climate, Health, Agricultural and Economic Impacts of Tighter Vehicle-Emission Standards

Non-CO2 air pollutants from motor vehicles have traditionally been controlled to protect air quality and health, but also affect climate. We use global composition climate modelling to examine the integrated impacts of adopting stringent European on-road vehicle-emission standards for these pollutants in 2015 in many developing countries. Relative to no extra controls, the tight standards lead to annual benefits in 2030 and beyond of 120,000-280,000 avoided premature air pollution-related deaths, 6.1-19.7 million metric tons of avoided ozone-related yield losses of major food crops, $US0.6-2.4 trillion avoided health damage and $US1.1-4.3 billion avoided agricultural damage, and mitigation of 0.20 (+0.14/-0.17) C of Northern Hemisphere extratropical warming during 2040-2070. Tighter vehicle-emission standards are thus extremely likely to mitigate short-term climate change in most cases, in addition to providing large improvements in human health and food security. These standards will not reduce CO2 emissions, however, which is required to mitigate long-term climate change.

Shindell, Drew↗

NASA NTRS2016

UAS-NAS Project Demo - Mini HITL Week 2 Stats

The UAS-NAS Project demo will showcase recent research efforts to ensure the interoperability between proposed UAS detect and avoid (DAA) human machine interface requirements (developed within RTCA SC-228) and existing collision avoidance displays. Attendees will be able to view the current state of the art of the DAA pilot traffic, alerting and guidance displays integrated with Traffic advisory and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) II in the UAS-NAS Project's research UAS ground control station (developed in partnership with the Air Force Research Laboratory). In addition, attendees will have the opportunity to interact with the research UAS ground control station and "fly" encounters, using the DAA and TCAS II displays to avoid simulated aircraft. The display of the advisories will be hosted on a laptop with an external 30" monitor, running the Vigilant Spirit system. DAA advisories will be generated by the JADEM software tool, connected to the system via the LVC Gateway. A repeater of the primary flight display will be shown on a 55" monitor mounted on a stand at the back of the booth to show the pilot interaction to the passersby.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2016

AIAA Aviation UAS DAA Demonstration-Mini HITL Week 2 Stats

The UAS-NAS Project demo will showcase recent research efforts to ensure the interoperability between proposed UAS detect and avoid (DAA) human machine interface requirements (developed within RTCA SC-228) and existing collision avoidance displays. Attendees will be able to view the current state of the art of the DAA pilot traffic, alerting and guidance displays integrated with Traffic advisory and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) II in the UAS-NAS Project's research UAS ground control station (developed in partnership with the Air Force Research Laboratory). In addition, attendees will have the opportunity to interact with the research UAS ground control station and "fly" encounters, using the DAA and TCAS II displays to avoid simulated aircraft. The display of the advisories will be hosted on a laptop with an external 30" monitor, running the Vigilant Spririt system. DAA advisories will be generated by the JADEM software tool, connected to the system via the LVC Gateway. A repeater of the primary flight display will be shown on a 55" tv/monitor mounted on a stand at the back of the booth to show the pilot interaction to the passersby.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2016

UAS in the NAS Flight Test Series 4 Overview

Flight Test Series 4 (FT4) provides the researchers with an opportunity to expand on the data collected during the first flight tests. Following Flight Test Series 3, additional scripted encounters with different aircraft performance and sensors will be conducted. FT4 is presently planned for Spring of 2016 to ensure collection of data to support the validation of the final RTCA Phase 1 DAA (Detect and Avoid) Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). There are three research objectives associated with this goal: Evaluate the performance of the DAA system against cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft encounters Evaluate UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) pilot performance in response to DAA maneuver guidance and alerting with live intruder encounters Evaluate TCAS/DAA (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System/Detect and Avoid) interoperability. This flight test series will focus on only the Scripted Encounters configuration, supporting the collection of data to validate the interoperability of DAA and collision avoidance algorithms.

flight test↗

NASA NTRS2017

Subject Matter Expert Evaluation of Multi-Flight Common Route Advisories

Traffic flow management seeks to balance the demand for National Airspace System (NAS) flight resources, such as airspace and airports, with the available supply. When forecasted weather blocks nominal air traffic routes, traffic managers must re-route affected flights for weather avoidance. Depending on the nature and scope of the weather, traffic managers may use pre-coordinated re-routes such as Playbook Routes or Coded Departure Routes, or may design ad hoc local re-routes. The routes of affected flights are modified accordingly. These weather avoidance routes will, of course, be less efficient than the nominal routes due to increased flight time and fuel burn. In current traffic management operations, the transition into a weather avoidance re-routing initiative is typically implemented more aggressively than the transition out of that initiative after the weather has dissipated or moved away. For example, strategic large-scale Playbook re-routes are sometimes left in place (as initially implemented) for many hours before being lifted entirely when the weather dissipates. There is an opportunity to periodically modify the re-routing plan as weather evolves, thereby attenuating its adverse impact on flight time and fuel consumption; this is called delay recovery. Multi-Flight Common Routes (MFCR) is a NASA-developed operational concept and associated decision support tool for delay recovery, designed to assist traffic managers to efficiently update weather avoidance traffic routes after the original re-routes have become stale due to subsequent evolution of the convective weather system. MFCR groups multiple flights to reduce the number of advisories that the traffic manager needs to evaluate, and also merges these flights on a common route segment to provide an orderly flow of re-routed traffic. The advisory is presented to the appropriate traffic manager who evaluates it and has the option to modify it using MFCRs graphical user interface. If the traffic manager finds the advisory to be operationally appropriate, he or she would coordinate with the Area Supervisor(s) of the sectors that currently control the flights in the advisory. When the traffic manager accepts the MFCR advisory via the user interface, the corresponding flight plan amendments would be sent to the displays of the appropriate sector controllers, using the Airborne Re-Routing (ABRR) capability which is scheduled for nationwide operation in 2017. The sector controllers would then offer this time-saving route modification to the pilots of the affected flights via datalink (or voice), and implement the corresponding flight plan amendment if the pilots accept it. MFCR is implemented as an application in the software environment of the Future Air traffic management Concepts Evaluation Tool (FACET). This paper focuses on an initial subject matter expert (SME) evaluation of MFCR. The evaluation covers MFCRs operational concept, algorithm, and user interface.

Human-in-the-loop Evaluation↗

NASA NTRS2017

Subject Matter Expert Evaluation of Multi-Flight Common Route Advisories

Traffic flow management↗

NASA NTRS2014

Investigating the Impacts of a Separation Standard for UAS Operations in Enroute and Transition Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems will be required to equip with a detect and avoid system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. To comply with regulations in today’s operations manned aircraft must “see and avoid” other aircraft and use subjective judgment to determine whether those aircraft are well clear. For a detect-and- avoid (DAA) system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. Definitions for the boundary of well clear have been proposed by the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Executive Committee Science and Research Panel (SaRP) and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 on Detect and Avoid Systems. This study investigates the interoperability implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the national airspace system. The first analysis in the study focuses on the effect of variations in well clear definition parameters on the rate of losses of well clear per flight hour. The second analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The third analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All three analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results from the three analyses presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for the DAA minimum operational performance standards.

UAS Seperation Standard↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2021

Development of Near-term Urban Air Mobility Routes and Airspace Integration

Growing interest in Urban Air Mobility (UAM) has been demonstrated by a great deal of investment in related research made by industry, government, and academia. Based on this research effort along with considerations of the maturing concept for UAM airspace integration, a cognitive walkthrough exercise and a human-in-the-loop simulation were conducted with controller subject matter experts (SMEs) to evaluate Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) current day helicopter routes for near-term use as UAM routes. One of the outcomes of this work is a set of heuristics that should be applied when designing UAM routes in the future. The following heuristics were identified as critical to UAM route design: the proximity of routes to surrounding airports (including approach and departure paths of traditional commercial traffic), the configuration of surrounding airports, avoiding congested or heavily populated areas, avoiding route segments that would go through several sectors, avoiding route segments that would go in and out of Class B airspace, creating routes outside of Class B airspace when able, using routes with two-way, altitude-separated traffic when able, minimizing the length of the route, avoiding commonly placed Temporary Flight Restrictions, and creating Non-Movement Areas or UNICOM Areas. This paper describes each of these identified heuristics and relevant examples based on a human-in-the-loop study conducted using the DFW area airspace.

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lunar Excavator Mission Operations using Dynamic Movement Primitives

To support sustainable infrastructure on the Moon, NASA must leverage robots to extract lunar resources for in-situ processing and construction. As part of this effort, NASA is launching the in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) Pilot Excavator later this decade to validate a robotic regolith excavator based on the Regolith Advanced Surface Systems Operations Robot (RASSOR). RASSOR is designed to extract and transport regolith to meet the needs of ISRU architectures. During its mission, Pilot Excavator will be tasked with driving in test patterns to demonstrate the operational concept. One of these tests is a circular trajectory around the lander while avoiding miscellaneous surface hazards such as lunar rocks. To this end, we utilize dynamic movement primitives to represent navigation sequences as primitive trajectories. Here, we introduce a novel obstacle avoidance parameter, which is configured to avoid rocks throughout testing exercises. We demonstrate the effectiveness our method in a newly developed simulation tool called the Simulated Excavation Environment for Lunar Operations (SEELO) using models based on the NASA RASSOR 2.0 excavator. After making key changes to the obstacle avoidance formulation, our results show that the robot is able to safety and robustly navigate the lunar surface with densely populated rock obstacles while retaining the desired circle pattern behavior.

Space Robotics and Automation↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advanced Air Mobility Operations & Automation Part II Technical Lecture

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current presentation discusses two human-in-the-loop simulations that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in eVTOL simulators with varying levels of automation. It also presents overviews of these studies as well as how they assisted live flight tests, which will occur throughout 2023.

air taxis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A HIRF-Map Certification Approach for UAM, AAM, and UAS Vehicles

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Urban Air Mobility (UAM), and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) vehicles will fly in airspace similar to Transport Category Rotorcraft, requiring them to meet stringent requirements for High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) certification. The environment is notably severe, particularly compared to fixed-wing aircraft, due to operations at lower altitudes. This potentially exposes the vehicles to high-power transmitters on the ground, leading to significant challenges. High-level HIRF exposure can result in avionic system upsets, interference, and undesirable effects. Shielding and circuit protection against HIRF pose significant barriers concerning size, weight, and cost, especially for emerging electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) and electric short take-off and landing (eSTOL) vehicles. This paper proposes a novel HIRF protection approach, aiming to reduce costs by certifying vehicles to a "vehicle tolerance level" lower than that required for Transport Category Rotorcraft. The remaining protection is achieved by maintaining a safe distance from known HIRF sources. This distance is calculated based on the vehicle's tolerance level and transmitter characteristics, such as transmit power, antenna beamwidth, and direction. Tailored flight maps are developed to identify transmitters and avoidance zones within an operating area or along a flight path, enabling restricted vehicle operations. Vehicles with higher tolerance levels could have smaller HIRF avoidance zones, allowing them to operate closer to transmitters. Transmitter data are sourced from government databases, such as those of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). A map tool is developed using Matlab to calculate and visualize HIRF avoidance zones based on available databases. The tool determines stand-off distances based on input vehicle tolerance levels, displaying results on various base maps depicting HIRF-restricted areas. Illustrations cover various FCC transmitters, including AM/FM/TV transmitters, satellite earth stations, and NOAA weather radars. The HIRF zones of smaller transmitters, such as land-mobile radios, pagers, microwave links, and cellular towers, are also illustrated. An example of flight planning around transmitters is provided. For now, airports and government-owned lands are excluded due to limited access to sensitive transmitter data. Despite this approach, a minimum HIRF tolerance level for vehicles may still be necessary to cover mobile devices, cellular base stations, transmitters on other AAM vehicles, and other small power devices not included in the FCC databases. The paper discusses findings and areas for improving existing databases and suggests an approach for better access to sanitized data in more restricted government databases. This method significantly deviates from the standard approach and introduces slightly higher flight-planning complexity. However, the potential cost savings are considerable. Future AAM/UAM/UAS aeronautical charts could potentially incorporate these new HIRF avoidance zones. Keywords—HIRF; Map; AAM; UAM; UAS; Advanced Air Mobility; Urban Air Mobility; Unmanned Aerial Systems; Certification.

HIRF↗

NASA NTRS2024

Computing Proximity to Threat Along Uncertain Trajectory to Support Urban Air Mobility

Many airspace threats affect the selection of a flight route, such as terrain, physical obstacles, adverse weather, and special-use airspace, among others. Threat avoidance during Urban Air Mobility (UAM) and Low Altitude Mobility (LAM) flights is especially challenging due to their lower cruising altitudes. These operations may be exposed to buildings, towers, trees, terrain undulations, etc., along much of their flight route. Moreover, these low-altitude flights in urban environments are expected to encounter very busy airspace, increasing the workload associated with threat avoidance. The Proximity to Threat (PtT) function aims to support onboard or remote pilots by computing the risk from geospatial threats in the airspace along an aircraft’s flight path. The threats are both static entities and dynamic airspace restrictions that have been modeled and stored in geo-referenced mapping databases. The flight path may be specified by waypoints, airways, or similar discrete route elements or by a time series of closely spaced position and altitude points. Flight path uncertainty can also be taken into account by assuming both the position and altitude to be sampled from two normal distributions, each being specified by a mean and variance. PtT uses this additional information to verify that the flight path remains clear of threats along a wider path or if a position is reached earlier or later than anticipated, assuring the pilot or operator that there will be an available safety margin even if the aircraft deviates due to one or more occurrences of unexpected wind gusts, mechanical failures, airspeed changes, collision avoidance maneuvers, etc. The client can specify an uncertainty confidence level to bound the set of trajectories evaluated for threats so that the confidence level corresponds to the client’s risk tolerance under the expected conditions. PtT can be used as a pre-flight planning tool to determine a safe route through known threats and in-flight to avoid emerging or changing threats. In this report, we present the PtT function, discuss how the trajectory uncertainty is incorporated into the PtT function, and describe the use of this PtT function in a representative scenario.

urban air mobility↗

DOE OSTI2013

miniGMG

miniGMG is a compact geometric multigrid (MG benchmark designed to proxy the performance characteristics of the solves found in adaptive mesh refinement multigrid (AMR MG) applications. It solves the equation a*alpha*u - b div beta grad u = f on a large cubical domain using cell-centered values and periodic boundaries. a and b are scalar constants, alpha and beta are space varying constants, f is the right hand side, and u is the solution. The cubical domain is divided into cubical subdomains which are distributed across the supercomputer. The righthand side f is generated from a continuous function for u. Thus, one can solve this linear system of equations and verify the error properties of the discrete solution u by comparing to a sampling of the continuous u. miniGMG implements both v- and f- cycles, as well as two constant coeffficient discretications of the equation above (one 27pt 2nd order, and one 13pt 4th order). In both cases, the (embedded) v-cycles are truncated when a subdomain reaces 4^3, 2^3, or 1^3 cells (a u-cycle). The multigrd solver then swtiches to one of seven coarse grid (bottom) solves. relaxation, BiCGStab, CABiCGStab, TelescopingCABiCGStab, CG, or CACG. The code exploits two forms of communication-avoiding. The first is exemplified by the referenced SC'12 paper in which DRAM data movment is avoided when smoothing. The second, described in the IPDPS'14 paper avoids collectives in a bottom solve (the CA bottom solves). There are a number of implementations of the operators for both CPUs and NVIDIA GPUs. The CPUs have been optimized to exploit a wavefront approach to communication-avoiding. The GPU versions include a number of optimized and tunable implementations. The code has been demonstrated to scale to 46K nodes on the BGQ Mira (750K cores), 9K nodes on Edison (111K cores), and 14K GPUs on Titan (37M cuda cores). It thus acts as a scalable testbed for a wide range of computer science and applied math research. Nominally, one invokes the benchmark as ./run b x y z alpha beta gamma Each subdomain is (2^b)^3 cells Each MPI process receives a x-by-y-by-z collection of subdomains. There are alpha*beta*gamma total MPI processes For correctness (a cubical domain), *alpha==y*beta==z*gamma.

Williams, Sameul↗